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ABSTRACT 
It has been common to assume that each of the 
Romantic critics meant the same thing by the word 
'imagination' as did his contemporaries. The first 
part of this thesis traces the evolving ideas of. 
imagination of Coleridge, Leigh Hunt, Hazlitt and Lamb, 
establishing both the content of what each man thought, 
and also the historical position of each man's thought 
with regard to his contemporaries. Concerning Coleridge, 
it is shown that in 1795, before he met Wordsworth, 
there occurred a significant change in his ideas on 
fancy and imagination. His rejection of Hartley in the 
early 1800s is seen to be accompanied by the adoption 
of a modified theory of association which supports his 
first definitions of fancy and informs his thought in 
Biographia. Chapter XII of Biographia (and the works 
to 1819) represents the conclusions on imagination which 
Coleridge arrives at in 1816. An attempt is made here 
to integrate that chapter with the rest of the work and, 
on the basis of the evidence, to suggest that in the past 
Coleridge may have been misunderstood. 
Hazlitt, Hunt and Lamb do not show the same 
extended evolution of thought on imagination as did 
Coleridge. Hazlitt formulated an important theory of 
imagination in 1$05. Hunt followed in 1807, and was the 
first of the Romantic critics to publish a two-part 
distinction of imagination. Lamb is relatively late in 
emerging with his ideas in 1811. 
Each man uses his understanding of 'imagination' 
to shape his critical remarks; this is the subject matter 
of the second part of the thesis. Whether considering 
the effects of Hunt's 'imagination - conception' 
distinction; or Lamb's idea that 'imagination' is 
meditative not spontaneous; or Hazlitt's notion of the 
democratic 'imagination'; or the integral relationship 
between Coleridge's metaphysics and his criticism, the 
2 
concept of 'imagination' is seen to be the most 
important critical tool used by the Romantic critics. 
Notwithstanding the differences in the specific theories, 
it is in their critical application that similarities 
in the attitudes toward 'imagination' are most apparent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of imagination is regarded as one 
of the central concepts of the Romantic movement in 
English literature. Understanding of the concept has 
been wide and various, and it is partially the adapt- 
ability of the concept to various interpretations which 
has made it an invaluable general tool for discussing 
the Romantics. The concept has been of particular use 
in discussing poetry. It has been used to understand 
Romantic approaches to the act of poetic creation; to 
poetic unity and organic form; and to nature and the 
perception of God through nature. The concept has been 
used to define the similarities among the Romantic poets 
and to suggest the differences between them and the 
poets who went before them, for instance on the subject 
of poetic diction and the proper uses of language in 
poetry. 
The question might be raised, however, whether 
we have not strayed too far from the precise meaning 
with which the Romantics used the term? Can we be sure 
that the advantages found in using the term 'imagination' 
as a general critical tool have not encouraged us to 
use the term too liberally at the expense of critical 
or historical accuracy? Can we be sure that our own 
vision is correct when the objects before us seem to 
blur into one? I would suggest that the modern under- 
standing of the term when applied to the Romantics is 
in danger of becoming too generalized, saying less about 
what the Romantics actually thought than what we, for 
the sake of convenience, 'would like them to have thought. 
This is not to argue that modern critical use of the 
term 'imagination' should be abandoned, nor is it to 
suggest that generalization can or should be avoided in 
all cases. Rather, it is to say that we should continu- 
ally weigh our current understanding against the original 
text to make sure that it is justified. It is from this 
position we can be confident that our use of generalizations 
serves the purpose they are intended'to serve: to clarify, 
not to distort. 
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In this thesis an attempt is made to explore the 
understanding of 'imagination' as held by the Romantic 
critics. Although extensive use of the concept of 
'imagination' has been made, in studying the Romantic 
poets and poetry, relatively little attention has been 
given to what the critics saw as imagination and how 
they applied that concept in their criticism. The 
writings of the four main Romantic critics of Shakespeare 
are considered: Coleridge, Leigh Hunt, Hazlitt and 
Lamb. Each of these critics uses the word 'imagination' 
in important passages of criticism. When 'imagination' 
has been mentioned in relation to Hunt, Hazlitt, and Lamb 
in"the past, it has commonly been assumed that these 
critics used the word either as Coleridge and Wordsworth 
used it, or as earlier writers used it. 
Common use of the word 'imagination' does not 
mean common understanding of that word. The Romantic 
critics were living in a time of political and intellect- 
ual upheaval. In the field of criticism, the influence 
of classical ideas of art had been meeting increased 
opposition, with the result that various words, commonly 
used in criticism, were particularly vulnerable to 
misinterpretation. A word like 'imagination' could be 
interpreted in a number of ways, some quite close to 
each other, but some completely opposed. 'Imagination' 
might suggest to some a wild, unruly and essentially 
destructive faculty while to others it might mean a 
highly creative one. When 'imagination' was contrasted 
with another faculty, usually 'fancy', either one might 
be seen as superior - the definitions in Wordsworth's 
1815 "Preface" were prompted by William Taylor's use of 
the words in a manner opposite to Wordsworth's understanding. 
The Romantic critic could not use a word like 
'imagination' and expect necessarily to be understood. 
It is not surprising then to find that each of the 
Romantic critics felt the need to define what he meant 
by 'imagination' very early in his writing career. With 
Coleridge, the first definition came in 1795 and the 
concept was developed throughout his career; 'imagination' 
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was distinguished from 'fancy' in 1802 and the philosoph- 
ical basis of this distinction was a central theme in 
Biographia Literaria. Hazlitt felt the concept was so 
important - probably in part through his contact with 
Coleridge - that he developed a metaphysical system 
around his concept of 'imagination' in 1805. Before Hunt 
had written many theatrical reviews he'felt compelled to 
define what he meant by "imagination' in 1807, and con- 
trasted imagination with 'conception'. And while Lamb 
wrote -, very little criticism, it was in his first major 
piece in 1811 that it became necessary to clarify what 
imagination meant for him. 
From the four theories of 'imagination' which 
emerge from the critics, it is clear that they thought 
of 'imagination' in quite different ways, and ways which 
were quite precise. The critics were not in agreement 
on the concept of 'imagination'; nor were they necessar- 
ily interested in or sympathetic to each other's ideas; 
nor did they indicate that they felt themselves engaged 
in a systematic debate on the subject of 'imagination'. 
Nonetheless, each critic saw 'imagination' as the superior 
faculty of the mind. 
The evolution of the ideas of 'imagination' 
in the context of each man's thought and in relation to 
the other critics - is the concern of the first part 
of this thesis. In the past there has been no attempt to 
trace systematically the evolving ideas of imagination in 
the Romantic critics. This is partly because accounts of 
Romantic imagination have tended to ignore Hazlitt, Hunt 
and Lamb in favour of concentrating on Coleridge and 
Wordsworth. But even with Coleridge there has been no 
concentrated attempt to trace his ideas from his school 
days through to Biographia Literaria and the works to 
1819. Coleridge's ideas on imagination in Biographia 
itself have not been given the attention they might have 
been because Chapter XII of his argument has tended to 
be ignored and there has been no attempt in the past to 
integrate that Chapter with the rest of the work. By 
tracing the evolving ideas of 'imagination' in the 
Romantic critics, I have attempted to develop an histor- 
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ical perspective which is necessary for a consideration 
of 'imagination' as a theme in Romantic criticism. 
The Shakespearean and dramatic criticism of the 
Romantics is considered in the last part of the thesis, 
in exploring the relation between imagination theory 
and critical practice. Leigh Hunt's criticism is given 
extensive consideration - much of it has never before 
received critical attention as the greater part of his 
criticism in The News and The Examiner has never been 
reprinted. It is shown that his 'imagination-conception' 
distinction provides for him the basis for a range of 
critical judgements that shape his entire approach. 
Lamb's Shakespearean and dramatic criticism is given the 
detailed attention it has for the most part lacked in 
the past, with some interesting conclusions. Foremost 
of these is that whereas the Romantic 'imagination' has 
so often been thought of as spontaneous, Lamb's idea of 
it is just the opposite, while his thoughts on the 
matter show him to be anything but sympathetic to the 
aims of the theatre. In surveying Hazlitt's extensive 
criticism, it has been found that far from fluctuating 
on his ideas of 'imagination' as critics have frequently 
suggested, he is entirely consistent with what I have 
labeled as his 'democratic imagination' which formed the 
heart of his l$05 theory. His ideas lead him into areas 
more diverse than Hunt or Lamb - for example, into topics 
in the area of language and what we would call metaphor - 
but the moral emphasis inherent in his: notion of 'demo- 
cratic' is never completely absent. Finally, with 
Coleridge an attempt has been made to show the integral 
relation of his criticism to his metaphysics, two branches 
of his work that previously have been felt to exist 
somewhat independently of one another. The complexity 
and harmony of his criticism is shown in a new light. 
In spite of the differences, it is in the 
critical application of the theories of imagination that 
important similarities begin to emerge. Each critic uses 
his concept to concentrate on tragedy, mimesis, and on 
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the internal workings of the minds of dramatic characters. 
It will be shown in the concluding chapter that Romantic 
ideas of 'imagination' have similarities not only among 
themselves but also in relation to a modern understanding 
of metaphor. Paul Ricoeur's terms for the composite 
parts of metaphor - the terms "sense" (i. e. the literal 
sense of a work) and "reference" (i. e. the. implication or 
deeper meaning of a work) - will be used, and it will be 
seen that. Romantic thoughts on imagination correspond 
quite closely to the. division implied by these terms. 
The similarities indicate that imagination for the 
Romantic critics did not imply a distrust of reason and 
a preference to rely on purely subjective or emotional 
standards. Rather, the concept of imagination, for all 
of the critics, seemed to imply a means of rationally 
extending critical standards beyond the confines of the 
purely material world. 
A word about the methodology of this thesis: 
heavy use is made of the original sources and generally, 
when there has been a choice between paraphrasing a 
critic or using the critic's own words, the latter has 
been favoured. It is felt by the author of this thesis 
that much of the distortion of Romantic thought which has 
appeared in critical studies is a result of insufficient 
attention to the actual arguments of the critics (Hazlitt, 
Lamb, and Coleridge being cases in point). On the most 
basic level, one reason for this is that the critic's 
actual words in the text have often been regarded as of 
secondary importance. 
PART ONE: EVOLUTION OF THE IDEAS 
CHAPTER I 
COLERIDGE: THE EARLY YEARS 
Coleridge did not systematise his thoughts on 
imagination until he wrote Biographia Literaria, The 
Statesman's Manual, The Treatise on Method, and volume 
three of The Friend, between 1815 and 1819. He was the 
last of the Romantic critics to settle his ideas on the 
subject of imagination, but he was also the first to 
investigate the concept seriously. He had been working 
at least with the terms 'imagination' and 'fancy' since 
the early 1790s, first in his poetry, and then later, 
with more detail, in his prose. By 1802, and again in 
1804, he had formulated privately the basic distinction 
between imagination and fancy he would later develop. 
Contrastingly, Hazlitt did not publish his thoughts 
until 1805 (although he had been working on them for 
some time before that); Hunt developed his definitions 
in 1807; and Lamb was later still, in 1811. 
In the years prior to 1805, Coleridge's theoretical 
comments on imagination are relatively few. Nevertheless, 
it would be hard to overestimate the importance of this 
period in the development of Coleridge's ideas, for 
during these years Coleridge's poetical career - in 
other words, his practical exploration of imagination - 
reached its peak and declined. From modest beginnings 
in 1787, Coleridge's poetical ability gradually 
increased and then reached its zenith in a sudden 
burst of activity in 1797-98, with "The Ancient Mariner", 
the first part of "Christabel", "Kubla Khan", "Frost at 
Midnight", and "Fears in Solitude", among others. In 
1801, however, Coleridge complained to Godwin that the 
poet in him was dead and that his imagination lay "like 
Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass Candle-stick, 
without even a stink of Tallow to remind you that it 
was once cloathed & mitred with Flame. "1 "Dejection: 
1 CL, II, To William Godwin, 25 March, 1801. 
2 
An Ode"', published in October, 1802, took up the cry 
again, and certainly by 1804 the poet in him was, in 
fact, dead. 
In writing his best poetry in the late 1790s, 
Coleridge acquired experience which was to be 
instrumental in shaping the theories of imagination 
he developed years later. Studies to the present have 
treated more than adequately the similarities between 
Coleridge's poetic practice of the late 1790s and his 
theories of imagination in the 1800x. 
1 Rather sur- 
prisingly, almost no work has been done to try to 
uncover what Coleridge's ideas of imagination were 
before he reached his creative peak. The present 
chapter will try to remedy this situation. It will 
argue that Coleridge's ideas on imagination were not 
always as they seemed to be in 1797;: that sometime 
between 1795 and 1797 there seemed to be a change in 
Coleridge's thought on imagination; - and, finally, 
that this intellectual change would have contributed 
to the sudden flowering of Coleridge's talents. Two 
approaches will be used to isolate the change in 
Coleridge's thought: one will involve consideration 
of Coleridge's early use of the words imagination and 
fancy. The other will concentrate on a shift in 
Coleridge's psychological attitude towards poetry. 
1 One of the first books to demonstrate the manner 
in which Coleridge's poetic practice and imagination 
theory might be used to mutually. inform one another 
was I. f... Richards's Coleridge On Imagination (London, 
1934).. Other critics have tried to draw more precise 
links between practice. -and--theory.. -. -For example, H. W.. Piper, in his The Active Universe (London1 1962), 
has pointed to specific instances in oleridge s poetry 
in which he believes the imagination-fancy distinction 
is operant - even thou h the distinction was yet to be formulated (pp. 123-146). Thomas McFarland has recently 
moved away from the more usual interpretation of "Kubla 
Khan" in terms of the secondary imagination by suggest- 
ing that the emphasis should be placed on the primary 
imagination; ("The Origin and Significance of Coleridge's 
Theory of Secondary Imagination", New Pers ectives on 
Coleridge and Wordsworth [New York and London, , 202-204). 
3' 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
there were three ways in which the terms fancy and 
imagination were being used. The ancient and mediaeval 
use, which still had some influence, made 'fancy' 
('phantasia') superior to 'imagination' ('imaginativ') . 
The second manner of usage was the direct inverse of 
this and was Coleridge's in 1802. John Bullitt and 
W. Jackson Bate have shown that Coleridge was antici- 
pated by a general shift in the positions of the two 
faculties in English criticism, starting as early as 
ITryden and crystallized by William Duff and later 
Dugald Stewart .l 
The third and most common usage, not discussed 
by Bullitt and Bate, treats the terms as synonyms. 
Of ten dictionaries I have consulted from 1719 to 
1794, seven, including. Johnson's Dictionary, give fancy' 
as a one-word definition of 'imagination: Of the other 
three dictionaries, one merely suggests the terms are 
synonyms, 
3 
and the other two are not sufficiently 
precise to allow a conclusion to be drawn. 
4 
1 "Distinctions Between Fancy And Imagination In 
Eighteenth-Century Criticism", ! LN (January, 1945), 8-15. - 
2 Nathaniel.. Bailey, Ku Universal Etymological 
English Dictionary, 24th edition London, 1; The 
Rev. Frederick Barlow, M. A., The Complete English 
Dictionary (London, 1772); A. is sonar of the English 
Language, kth. edition -(London, 1794); - , 
Samuel Johnson, 
A Dic ionar of-the English Language, 2 vols., 6th 
edition, correcte . by. the author . London,. 1778); Benjamin Martin, Lin a Britannica-Reformats (London, 
1749); John Walker, A.. ritic Pronouncing ictionary (London,. 17.91); and, An Universal ictionar of the 
English Language (Edinburgh, 13. 
3 J. Barrow, A New and Universal Dictionary-of 
Arts and Science (London, 1751). 
4 The English Expositor (London, 1719), defines 
imaginary- but not imagination. A_Poetical Dictionary 
or; the Beauties of the En lish Poets, 4 vols. ondon, 
1761), quotes various people without mentioning fancy. 
Coleridge's earliest uses of the term fancy 
date from his school days and suggest the common 
dictionary meaning. There is-no differentiation of 
fancy from imagination, and fancy is recognised as 
the power of forming images. He connects Fancy with 
false images in 1787 in perhaps his first recorded use 
of the term - the lines were written as part of a 
school exercise: 
Why does thy mind with hopes delusive burn?. 
Vain are thy Schemes by heated Fancy plann'd.... 
l 
The connection of Fancy with poetic images, as opposed 
to images of delusion, is, however, the sense in which 
Fancy is most commonly used by Coleridge throughout 
the early 1790s. Fancy is the force of poetic 
inspiration, as is made clear in "Monody on the Death 
of Chatterton" (1790). Chatterton's death suggests 
to Coleridge the death of his own poetic inspiration 
and ambitions: 
But, Chatterton! methinks I hear thy name, 
For cold my Fancy grows, and dead each Hope of Fame. 
2 
He goes on to describe how, in a Poet's meditation, 
"Fancy in the air/ Paints him many a vision fair, " 
and causes the bosom to glow and the eye to dance with 
rapture. 
3 Later in the poem, Fancy is portrayed as the 
powerful, picture-making faculty; Chatterton's suffer- 
ing face is seen almost against the poet's wishes: 
For powerful Fancy evernigh 
The hateful picture forces on my sight. 
Numerous poems following the 1790 version of 
"Chatterton" retain Fancy as the force of poetic 
creation.. The toil of earthly life is contrasted with 
1 PUJ. ', I, 2: "Dura Navis", 11.. 5-6.. 
2 PW, Is 13:. '"Monody", 11.3-4. This suggestion 
of the loss of the poetic muse has connections to the 
poetic tradition of invoking the muse; it also provides 
an interesting comparison with "Dejection: - An'Ode" (especially stanza VI), in which the loss of the poetic 
muse is felt as a reality. 
3 P1,!, I, 1I-: 11.29-31. 
4 PW I, 14: 11.45--46. 
5 
"Fancy's high career"', in the poem "To The Evening 
Star" (1790). 1 Iii 1791, there is reference to the 
streaming of "Fancy's vivid colourings. "2 In two poems, 
of 1792 and. 1793, the poet seeks Fancy, personified 
as a maiden, and discovers the haunts of Fancy and 
Poesy beside a stream. Specific references to "Fancy's 
eye" and "Fancy's ear" suggest that Fancy is the 
faculty to which beauty appeals - it is the aesthetic 
faculty. 3 There is a suggestion that it is a repro- 
faculty, for it can extend the natural beauties ductive 
of the stream's warbling song: "Still, Fancy! still 
that voice, those notes prolong. "4 In 1794, it is 
Fancy which becomes ill at the total absence of beauty 
in man's actions: "Sick Fancy groan'd o'er putrid 
hills of slain. "5 
Throughout this period it is common to find 
Fancy pictured as an elf-like form "hovering round on 
shadowy wing. "6 Neither the image nor its underlying 
meaning are original, but the relationship between 
personified Fancy and the persona of the poet is 
informative about the way in which Coleridge may have 
viewed the creative act of fancy. When the poet is 
feeling sorrow, Fancy is pictured sighing at his 
side7 (1794) or, in another place, is shown drooped 
and wreathing herself in willow8(1795). When the 
1 PTT, I, 11:: 11.11-12. 
Z PW, I, 30: "Happiness", 1.11. 
3 PW, I, 50 & 54: "Effusion at Evening", 
11.. 59 "Lines", 11.97 & 99. 
4 PW, I, 52: "Lines", 1.. 53. 
5 P'j, II, 500: "The 'Fall of Robbespierre", 1.. 174. 
6 PW, I, 128: "Monody on the Death of Chatterton", 
1-. 14 (1774 variation).. See also the following pages 
for similar images:: PW, I, 40,49, & 115. 
7 W-4,1,71:: "The Faded Plower", 11.10-11. 
8 PW, I, 95:: "Lines in the Manner of Spenser", 
11.10-13. 
6 
poet is feeling rapture, Fancy is pictured as 
"Hope-born", showering rejuvenating fragrances 
from her wings (1795); 
1 her songs are Sayer than 
they were before (1795). 
2 Whether the poet is 
distressed or not, however, Fancy is with him. 
There seems to be no real danger of being cut off 
from poetic inspiration. Fancy is always near at 
hand. He calls it "the Guardian power" ;3 and if 
it is ever away from him, it is only slumbering 
and will return as surely as does the morning:. 
But Fancy now more gaily sings; 
Or if awhile she droop her wings, 
As skylarks 'mid the corn, 
On summer fields she grounds her breast: - 
The oblivious poppy o'er her n, st 
Nods, till returning morn. 
Here, Fancy is not connected with the poppy and 
dreams of opium, as imagination would be later. 
In the same year, 1795, Coleridge did come close, 
however, to defining fancy in terms that later 
would be reserved for imagination, when he suggested 
that Fancy was a "shaping" power. 
5 
The word imagination does not play a major 
role in Coleridge's poetry to 1795. Probably his 
1 PW', I, 87: "To Robert Southey", 11.. 5-9. 
2 PW, I, 98: " "Lines", 1.61. 
3 PW, I, 87:: see the variant reading of 
"Sheridan (1794). 
4 PW, I, 98-99: "Lines", 11.61-66. 
5 PW, I, 87: see the variant reading of 
"Sheridanl, from MS. Y. 
7 
first recorded use of the word is in a preface to 
a poem he sends to his brother George from Christ's 
Hospital, on March 31,1791. The poem is written 
to make the truth of mathematics (in this instance 
a specific Euclidian exercise) more attractive, 
thereby supplying a deficiency inherent in mathematics: 
... viz. that though Reason is feasted, - Imagination is starved;, whilst Reason is 
luxuriating in its proper Paradise, Imagination 
is wearily travelling on a weary desert. To 
assist Reason by the stimulus of Imagination 
is the design of the following production. 
The poem, as a poem, has little merit; it seems 
that "Imagination" merely refers to the attempt to 
bring some sort of rhyme and poetic interest to 
geometry.. It is another word for fancy. 
The second reference to imagination is in 
August of 1792, and here it is obviously a synonym 
for fancy. "An Effusion At Evening" begins with 
the lines 
IMAGINATION, Mistress of my Love: 
Where shall mine Eye thy elfin haunt explore? 
2 
At the beginning of the third stanza, Fancy is 
substituted for Imagination: 
Propitious Fancy hears the votive sigh - The absent Maiden flashes on mine Eye! 
One year later, when Coleridge rewrote the poem, 
he dropped the reference to Imagination in the 
first lines, and used Fancy instead: 
0 THOU wild Fancy, check thy wing! No more 
Those thin white flakes, those purple clouds 
explore. 
1 Piro, Is 21- 
2 PW; 1,49. 
3 Pw, I, 51: 
"A. Mathematical Problem. " 
"Lines. 11 
8 
There are no poetic references to imagination 
in 179+, but at the beginning of that year there are 
three letters which allude to his attempt to escape 
financial and personal problems by joining the Light 
Dragoons. ' Imagination is mentioned in each letter 
as being responsible for the mad scheme: "It had been 
2 better for me, if my Imagination had been less vivid"; 
"... Wisdom may be gathered from the maddest flights 
of Imagination't; 
3 
and, "I have been, deeply do I 
feel that I have been, the dupe of my Imagination, 
the slave of Impulse, the child of Error and Imbecil- 
ity... "4 There is nothing to suggest that the word 
fancy could not have been used instead. 
In 1795, there comes a major change in Coleridge's 
use of the words imagination and fancy. The change 
is highlighted in the poem "Religious Musings. "5 
The uses of the terms imagination and fancy in this 
poem are significant because, for the first time in 
Coleridge's poetry, a new meaning for the terms becomes 
evident, although the old meaning is present as well. 
Fancy is still the force of poetic creation,. as is 
indicated in the lines from Akenside which Coleridge 
adapted and prefixed to the 1796 edition of the poem: 
What tho' first , In years unseason'd, - I attun'd the lay 
To idle Passion and unreal Woe? 
Yet serious Truth her empire o'er my song 
Hath now asserted.... 
... and my Fancy's c reless toil Drew to the better cause: 
b 
1 John Cornwall gives an-interesting account of 
the enlistment in his Coleridge: Poet and Revolutionary 
l772-1804: (London, 1973), 31-32. `- 
2 CL, I, To George Coleridge, 23 February, 1794. 
3 CL, I, To George Coleridge, 4 March, 1794. 
4 CL, I, To George Cornish, 12 March, 1791. 
5 This poem was begun on 24 December, 1794 and was 
not finished until March, 1796. By October, 1795, 
Coleridge claimed that 300 (as opposed to the final 
419) lines were written. As will be seen in this paper, 
many of the thoughts in the poem belong to 1795, and I 
will be treating the poem as though it belongs to 1795 
on the strength of these. Because the poem will be 
quoted many times in this paper, line references will 
be given internally. The poem may be found in. P4J, I, 108-125-- 
6 Ptd, I", 108. 
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The same meaning is evident in the poem itself, 
where the Biblical prophecy of the final 
Destruction of the earth is contemplated: 
Heights most strange 
Whence Fancy falls, fluttering her idle wing. 
For who of woman born may paint the hour, 
When seized in his mid course, the Sun shall wane 
Making noon ghastly! 
(ll. 382-386) 
Imagination is not explicitly offered as a 
synonym for fancy in this context, but with regard. 
. 
to the new way in which fancy is used, imagination 
does seem to be a synonym. Fancy is cast in a 
religious role. It is the agent of faith and 
revelation. It helps to 'diffuse' one's self 
into the Self of God: 
Through courts and cities the smooth savage roams 
Feeling himself, his own low self the whole; 
When he by sacred sympathy might make 
The whole one Self! Self, that no alien knows! 
Self, far diffused as Fancy's wing can travel! 
Self, spreading still! Oblivious of its own, 
Yet all of all possessin .5 This is Faith! (11.151-158) 
This suggestion of. Fancy's role in religious exper- 
ience is reinforced by what is said of Imagination, 
later in the poem. The "vacant" mind of the Shepherd - 
Coleridge's archetypal man in the poem - is awoken 
by the 'conjuring' of Imagination, and a chain 
reaction is the result. Self-consciousness and 
personal desires emerge, which in turn give rise to 
all forms of virtue (including "the inventive arts, 
that nursed the soul/ To forms of beauty", 11.208- 
209) as well as all forms of vice (Disease, Envy, 
Want, Avarice, Luxury and War). The chain reaction 
finally produces Science which will free man from 
his bondage. (See 11.198-225) 
The production of Science ends the abuse of 
Imagination's powers. The scientists seem to be the 
direct agents of Imagination (or Fancy). They are 
"Philosophers and Bards. " They conjure "bright 
visions" which hypnotise the masses and awaken them 
10 
to the reality of God. They correct man's chaotic 
course and inspire him to do good. The earlier 
aesthetic power of Imagination (and Fancy) in 
Coleridge's poetry is supplemented by this additional 
power to perceive God in the unity and harmony of His 
creation, and to point to him through one's own 
creation. (See: 11., 225-259. ) 
. The new meaning given to imagination and fancy 
in "Religious Musings" is present in the lectures on 
politics and on revealed religion in the first six 
months of 1795, although there the new meaning is 
attached only to imagination. 
' The poem and portions, 
of the lectures are-closely related, and may have been 
written simultaneously. The lectures do not interpret 
the on-going revolution in France along millen,,, arian /n 
lines (as does the poem, working on notions already 
developed by Joseph Priestley, and others), 
2 but many 
of the themes in the lectures are identical to those 
in, the poem and are given more detailed treatment. 
The Shepherd as archetypal man is again present; 
Coleridge speaks of the "uncorrupted Shepherd's Belief 
of God originat Ling' in the incessant perception of 
his benevolence. " He says that in the pastoral state, 
"motives to evil were few and the imaginations of men 
strong and vivid", enabling men to perceive God's 
design in nature. This design, and God's benevolence, 
were both obscured by the building of towns and cities 
(i. e. the growth of civilization). 
3 In the lectures, 
the responsibility for the subsequent rise of Vice and 
1 The lectures do not seem to use the terms 
imagination and fancy synonymously. "Fancies"', in one 
place are associated with absence of fact (Letts [i795j, 189); and in another place, "diseased anf cy" 
is connected with "feverish slumber, ", (328). 
2 See: M. H. Abrams, "English Romanticism:: The 
Spirit of the Age", in Romanticism Reconsidered, (New 
York and London, 1963), 26-72; esp. 30-37 K 49-50. 
See also John Cornwall, Coleridge, 77-79. 
3 Lects (1795), 350. 
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Appetites is not laid with imagination, as clearly 
as it was in "Religious Musings. " Coleridge does 
speak of "imaginary wants" arising to divert "the 
pains of Vacancy", and of the dangers of misapplic- 
ation of the powers of imagination, 
' but he places 
the responsibility with another faculty, the under- 
standing. 
The 1795 lectures are the first place in which 
Coleridge discusses understanding as a faculty, and 
distinguishes it from both imagination and reason. 
Vice, he says, "originates not in the man, but in 
the surrounding circumstances; not in the heart, 
but in the understanding., 
2 Later he says, "when 
the heart is vitiated, the understanding will not 
long remain pure"; 3 and in another place, "the 
Depravity of the Heart spread[sj a darkness over 
the understanding. "4 Depraved understanding is 
accompanied by depraved reasoning. 
5 
It is in this context of depraved understanding 
and reasoning that the role of imagination is dis- 
cussed in the lectures. In several places, Coler- 
idge stresses the need to cultivate benevolence and 
virtue, 
6 
and as in "Religious Musings", it is imag- 
ination which makes this possible. It contemplates 
"splendid Possibilities" that revivify God's purpose 
for our lives; it stimulates us "to the attainment 
of real excellence"; it "urges us up the ascent of 
Being. "7.. It. . is identified with the creative power 
1 Lects (1795), 236. 
2 ibid., 12 & 40. 
3 ibid., 74. See also: 196-7. 
4 -:: ibid. , 350. Apparently related to this are Coleridge's references to Robespierre's "dark 
imagination" (35) and "people of a stupid and earthy 
imagination" (139). 
5 ibid., 111. 
6 See: ibid., 12,39,40,46,48,105,114. 
7 ibid., 235 & 238. These passages directly 
anticipate Coleridge's famous description of the 
normal vale of human life in BL, I, 164-166 (Chapter 
XII); (Everyman, 137-138). 
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of God.; ' and is called a "restless faculty", 
2 
and "truth-painting. "3 But as Coleridge 
emphasises: 
The noblest gift of Imagination is the 
power of discerning the Cause in the 
Effect [, ]a power which when employed on 
the works of the Creator elevates and 
by the variety of its pleasures almost 
monopolizes the Soul. We see our God 
everywhere - the Universe in the most literal Sense is his written Language. 
Both here and in "Religious Musings", 
Coleridge is using the word imagination with a 
meaning that is new for him and is present at 
no time before 1795. He sees imagination 
primarily fulfilling a capacity in religious 
development and connects it with the soul. It 
is the power which seeks Unity and Cause in the 
works of nature, 
5 
perceiving truth through 
nature's symbols. 
1 Lects (1795), 235. 
2 ibid., 236. 
3 ibid., 248. 
4 ibid., 338-339- 
5 This notion and others (see: Lects [17951, 
33,93,94,109) may be seen as early e preparation 
for Coleridge's later ideas on imagination and 
Method. 
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dhat was the impact of the new understanding 
of imagination Coleridge developed in 1795? Broadly 
speaking, there were three results. First, there was 
a reappraisal of both the role of the poet and the 
power of the poet. Second, there was a basis for new 
insights into the psychological means of perception, 
and these, in turn, would assist Coleridge in further 
developing his ideas on imagination. Third, the 
seeds were planted for the eventual desynonymizing 
of imagination and fancy. 
Reappraisal of the role of the poet resulted in 
an upwards revaluation of his function:, No longer 
in Coleridge's poetry was the poet portrayed searching 
after a personified Fancy; as the lines prefixed to 
"Religious Musings" indicated, no longer was he tuning 
his lay "To idle Passion and unreal Woe. " The poet 
had a higher role which involved unveiling the reality 
of God by piercing the symbolic husk of the universe. 
In "The Eolian Harp", written in 1795, the poet feels 
"the one Life within us and abroad" and compares him- 
self to a lute being played by the wind: "the breeze 
warbles, and the mute still air/ Is Music slumbering 
on her instrument. "' In "Religious Musings", the 
'one Life' is expressed as Love, and the poet is 
seen as a'warbling stream: 
I discipline my young and novice thought 
In ministeries of heart-stirring song, 
And aye on Meditation's heaven-ward wing 
Soaring aloft I breathe the empyreal air 
Of Love, omnific, omnipresent Love, 
Whose day-spring rises glorious in my soul 
As the great Sun, when he his influence 
Sheds on the frost-bound waters - The glad stream Flows to the ray and warbles as it flows. (411-419) 
1 PW, I, 101; 11.26 & 32-33. 
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In later poems the idea of poet as a reader of 
nature's symbols would again emerge, as in the lines, 
For all that meets the bodily sense I deem 
Symbolical, one mighty alphabet 
For infant minds l 
or in the lines addressed to the poet's son, 
so shalt thou see and hear 
The lovely shapes and sounds2intelligible 
Of that eternal language.... 
Significantly, too, the poet's power is 
reappraised in 1795, in accordance with the new 
notions of imagination (or fancy). References to 
the soaring wings of fancy are exchanged for 
descriptions like that in "The Eolian Harp" which 
portray the power of the wind: 
o'er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all. 
3 
In "Religious Musings", the philosophers and 
bards rush, 
And tame the outrageous mass, with plastic might 
Moulding Confusion to such perfect forms, 
As erst were wont, - bright visions of the day! (246_248) 
At the end of the poem the philosophers and bards 
are related to a "mystic choir" of "Contemplant 
Spirits": 
ye that hover o'er 
With untired gaze the immeasurable fount 
Ebullient with creative Deity! 
And ye of plastic power, that. interfused 
Roll through the grosser and material mass 
In organizing surge! 
(402-407) 
In these last lines, Coleridge identifies the plastic 
powers of the poet with the plastic creative power 
of God, but the lines have another importance which 
1 PW I132; "The Destiny of Nations", 
11.18-0-4736). 
2 PWWW, I, 242; "Frost at Midnight", 11.58-61 (1798). 
3 PW, I, 102; 11.46-48. Ten years before this, 
Thomas Reid had spoken of "painting, or other plastic 
arts"; he said, "We consider this power of the mind [conception] as a plastic power, by which we form 
ourselves images of the objects of thought. " Essays 
on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh, 1785), , 
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might be mentioned here. Coleridge's ideas of'inter- 
fusion' and 'rolling' were borrowed by Wordsworth in 
lines which have been traditionally associated with 
Romantic views of imagination: 
and I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: 
A. motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. 1 
Coleridge's discoveries about imagination in 
1795 opened the way for new insights into psychological 
perception. The reason for this is clear: Coleridge 
began to see that man's deepest experiences with 
nature were the legitimate grounds of poetic explor- 
ation. Nature as it existed was not as important as 
nature as it was experienced and perceived by the mind 
as it struggled to-synthesise thought and feeling. As 
Coleridge was to write in 1802, "every phrase, every 
metaphor, every. personification, should have it's 
justifying cause in some passion, either of the Poet's 
mind, or of the Characters described by the Poet. "2 
Coleridge was only beginning to move towards 
this position when he wrote "Religious Musings. " The 
poem contains frequent examples of God being revealed 
to individuals through nature's symbols. God is 
revealed to the Oppressor (11,9-14); to the Sceptic 
(28-45); to the Elect (45-49); to Fear (68-80); 
1 Wordsworth: Poetical'Works (London, 1967), 164; 
"Tintern Abbey ,. ll. 93-102. The image of the setting suns and the ocean may have been suggested by the image 
of the rising sun and "frost-bound waters" which followed 
the Coleridge lines. Lines from "The Eblian Harp" may 
have been in Wordsworth's mind as well: "0: the one 
Life within us and abroad, / Which meets all motion and 
becomes its soul, ". (ll. 26-27). 
The above lines from "Religious Musings" come from 
the section of that poem 'thich Wordsworth liked the best; 
see M.. H.. Abrams, "English Romanticism: the Spirit of the 
Age", 50. 
2 CL, II, To William Sotheby, 13 July, 1802, p. 812. 
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to the Shepherd (94-116); to the warring crowd 
(239-259); to the good man (345_354); and to the 
poet, in three different places (2-5; 153-158; 395 ff. ). p 
Considering that no poem of Coleridge's before 1795 
contained any. suggestion of revelational experience 
(i. e. an experience in which the mind of a character 
or the poet is disclosed through changes in events 
or in nature around him), it is surprising to find 
such heavy emphasis on this kind of experience in 
"Religious Musings. "1 
"Religious Musings" presents a contrast to the 
poetry which went before it because of the focus on 
mind as well as nature. But although in 1795 Cöler- 
idge had recognised the role of imagination in help- 
ing the mind to pierce the symbols of nature, he had 
not yet recognised the process of its actions. He 
had yet to gain the psychological insight that, in 
addition to nature acting on the mind, the mind acted 
on nature through imagination altering the manner in 
which nature is perceived. Over and over in the poem, 
the personified passions which grip the minds of the 
characters, are shown to disappear suddenly - not' 
through any internal workings of the mind, but rather 
through the external action of nature and God. 
2 
Passions affecting the mind are the justifying cause 
of few of the phrases, metaphors, or personifications 
in the poem. 
Coleridge's practical understanding of the 
psychological power of the imagination in 1795 may 
be illustrated by considering the best example of 
1 The fact that this type of experience first 
appears in a religious poem may be of significance, but 
it is quite possible that this kind of experience would 
have been related in Coleridge's poetry without the 
explicitly religious subject. . 
2 Coleridge's own words are an accurate 
description of his method in this poem: 
Thus from the Elect, regenerate through faith 
Pass the dark Passions and what thirsty cares 
Drink up the spirit, and the dim regards 
Self-centre. Lo they vanish! or acquire 
New names, new features - by supernal grace Enrobed with Light, and naturalised in Heaven. 88-93) 
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revelation in "Religious Musings" and comparing it 
with an example from "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner", 
of which it is the prototype .1 In "Religious Musings" 
a shepherd is described walking through a thick morn- 
ing fog. No connection is made between the fog and 
the shepherd's mind; his mind, and his imagination, 
seem passive until revelation is thrust at him, in a 
sense: 
a shepherd on a vernal morn 
Through some thick fog creeps timorous with slow foot, 
, Darkling he fixes on the immediate road His downward eye: all else of fairest kind 
Hid or deformed. But lo: the bursting Sun! 
Touched by the enchantment of that sudden beam 
Straight the black vapour melteth.... 
And wide around the landscape streams with glory!..., 
From himself he flies, 
Stands in the sun, and with no partial gaze 
Views all creation; and he loves it all, 
And blesses it, and calls it very good; 
This is indeed to dwell with the Most High! 
Cherubs and rapture-trembling Seraphim 
Can press no nearer to the Almighty's throne. 
(11.94 ff. ) 
There is an. allusion here to God blessing his creation 
in Genesis, an allusion which is not obvious in "The 
Ancient Mariner. " 
The Ancient Mariner has a similar experience of 
'flying from himself' as he watches the water-snakes, 
and this experience is also one in which God is per- 
ceived through symbols: 
0 happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gushed from my heart, 
And I blessed-them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, " And I blessed them unaware. 
1I am not aware of the following comparison 
having been made before; John Livingston Lowes's 
The Road to lanadu (Boston, 1927) might have been 
expected to draw the relation, but did not. 
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The self-same moment I could pray; 
And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
Like lead into the sea. l 
By the time. Coleridge wrote this poem, he had grown 
in understanding about the psychological powers of 
the imagination. 
, 
The Mariner's imagination is shown 
working before and during the above scene; every- 
thing around him he sees as symbolic of his evil 
deed. His inner mind and nature reflect each other 
and there is an interpenetration of the two. A. 
change which is purely internal and psychological 
has physical effects in external nature - the 
Albatross falls from his neck. The presence in 
"Religious Musings" of some ten examples of revelat- 
ional experience in which the mind remains inactive 
is a factor which, in itself, argues for an early 
dating of the poem. 
Numerous other poems written after 1795 could 
be cited to give further proof of growth in CAler- 
idge's ideas on imagination. In "Frost at Midnight", 
the poet's Spirit merges so closely with the flame 
on which it meditates that it is impossible to tell 
which is a reflection of which: 
Only that film, which fluttered on the grate, 
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing. 
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
, Gives it dim sympathies with me who live, 
Making it a companionable form, 
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit 
By its own moods interprets, every where 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself, 
And makes a toy of Thought. 2 
In "The Nightingale", the poet is found actually 
checking himself in the act of projecting his own 
feelings onto that which he sees: 
And hark! the Nightingale begins its song, 
'Most musical, most melancholy' bird! 
A melancholy bird? Oh! idle thought! 
In Nature there is nothing melancholy. 
3 
1 PW, I, 198; 11.282-291. Another 1795 poem, 
"The EoI-Tan Harp", also anticipates these lines: 
"Methinks, It should have been impossible/ Not to love 
all things in a world so iill'd. " 11.30-31- 
2 PW, I, 240-241; 11.15-23. 
3 Pu, 1,264; 11.12=-15. 
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In some of the early poems, Coleridge portrayed 
the poet looking for Fancy beside a stream. In 
"Lewti", the poet is in a similar setting, walking 
along the banks of a river, but his aim is much 
different. He is consciously trying to forget the 
image of his lover. Despite his efforts, all of the 
objects he sees are subconsciously acted upon by the 
imagination and he finds himself, again and again, 
staring at the image of Lewti. He disturbs two swans 
at one point; his thoughts-turn to Lewti and then 
return to the swans, and both images are fused: 
I then might view her bosom white 
Heaving lovely to my sight, 
As these two swans together ieave 
On the gently-swelling wave. 
Compare the psychological means of perception in the 
above lines with the process in similar lines written 
by Coleridge in 1790:: 
Within your soul a voice there lives! 
It bids you hear the tale of Woe. 
When sinking low the sufferer wan 
Beholds no hand outstretch'd to save, 
Fair, as the bosom of the Swan 
That rises graceful o'er the wave, 
I've seen your breast with pity heave, 
And therefore love I you, sweet Genevieve. 
In the latter lines, nature and the swans are merely 
an ornament to thought, and mind and nature are far 
apart, neither one really penetrating the other. 
Coleridge's reappraisal of the role and powers 
of the poet in 1795, coupled with his subsequent 
development as.. a poet, eventually led to the de- 
synonymizing of fancy and imagination. The seeds 
for this were already planted by the summer of 1795, 
by which time he had written his lectures. In con- 
sequence of his new ideas on imagination, Coleridge 
1 Pw, 1, 256; 11.72-75. 
2 Pti, I, 20; - "Genevieve", 11.7-14. 
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was using both words a) with the old meaning,. 
concerning poetry, and b) with the new meaning, 
concerning primarily religion, but including poetry 
as well. 
The attractiveness of differentiating the terms 
was enhanced, or perhaps for the first time brought 
to consciousness, in September of 1795, or sometime 
shortly afterwards. It was in September that 
Coleridge met Wordsworth. The powerful., effect of the 
poetry Wordsworth recited, led Coleridge to repeated 
meditations and the suspicion, 
that fancy and imagination were two distinct 
and widely different faculties, instead of 
being, according to the general belief, either 
two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, 
the lower ai. d higher degree of one and the 
same power. 
Although by Coleridge's own admission, his initial 
suspicions along these lines matured into full con- 
viction only after "a more intimate analysis of the 
human faculties, their appropriate marks, functions, 
and effect";, 
2 it seems unlikely, from the scanty 
evidence available, that Coleridge continued to 
think of imagination and fancy as synonyme after 1795" 
The closest Coleridge got to defining fancy in 
terms of the later imagination, was in 1795 when he 
called it a "shaping" power. It is probably the last 
year in which there can be found references to fancy 
as the faculty of poetic creation. Coleridge does 
not stop-making references to fancy in his poetry at 
this time, but from 1796 to 1802, there is a consid- 
erable drop in the frequency of its usage which seems 
to correspond to a change in meaning. 3 Instead of 
referring to. poetic creation, fancy refers almost 
1 BL, I, 60-61; (Everyman, 49-50). 
2 BL, I, 60; (Everyman, 50). 
3 From 1790 to 1796, Coleridge made about forty 
poetic references to fancy. In the next six years, 
the years of his greatest poetic activity, there are 
only about twelve references to fancy. The essential 
index for this kind of information is Sister Eugenia 
Zogan's limited edition of A Concordance to the Poetry 
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge st* 
Indiana; 1940). Dates can be determined only in 
conjunction with PW.. 
V 
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exclusively to daydreams, wishes, and imaginary 
schemes .l 
The decline in the number of poetic references to 
fancy does not coincide with an increase in poetic 
references to imagination, for there are none from 
1796 to 1802. References to imagination in Coler- 
idge's prose, however, began to hint that imagination 
was being considered as the superior of the two powers. 
In contrast to numerous references to fancy and wish- 
ing, Coleridge speaks in 1797 of "those lofty 
imaginings, that are peculiar to, and definitive 
of, the poet. 't2 In a review of The Monk, in the 
same year, he deplores the "little expense of thought 
or imagination" in attempts to awaken exhausted 
appetites of readers by powerful stimulants. The 
character of Matilda he finds "exquisitely imagined", 
and the whole novel he finds, "distinguished by the 
variety and impressiveness of its incidents; and the 
author everywhere discovers an imagination rich, 
powerful, and fervid. "3 
Despite these and other references to imagin- 
ation in the late 1790s; and despite the fact that 
Coleridge's new poetry seemed of a different kind 
from his early poetry which had been classified 
mainly in terms of fancy; Coleridge did not de- 
synonymize imagination and fancy clearly until 1802. 
In a letter to William Sotheby he wrote: 
[In Greek religious poems All natural Objects 
were dead - mere hollow Statues. - but there was 
a Godkin or Goddessling included in each - In 
the Hebrew Poetry you find nothing of this poor 
Stuff - as poor in genuine Imagination, as it is mean in Intellect - /At best, it is but Fancy, 
or the aggregating Faculty of the mind. - not 
Imagination, or the modifying, and co-adunating Faculty. This the Hebrew Poets appear to me to 
have possessed beyond all others -& next to them 
the English. In the Hebrew poets each Thing has 
a life of it's own, & yet they are all one Life. 
1 For example, see: P'r1, I, 249; 317; 343; 353. 
PUS, II, 520; 533; 555; 568. - 
2 CL, I, To Joseph Cottle, Early April, 1797, p. 184. 
3 CI1C, 370-371. 
CL, 111 10 September, 1802, pp"I59-460. 
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The reference to 'one Life' owes allegiance to 
Coleridge's insight in 1795 that imagination is 
the power of perceiving "the one Life within us 
and abroad. " Coleridge's differentiation of 
imagination and fancy in 1804 seemed more directly 
the result of his poetic attempts to link mind and 
nature through passion:: 
I dare affirm that he [Wordsworth] will 
hereafter be admitted as the first & 
greatest philosophical Poet - the only 
man who has effected a compleat and 
constant synthesis of Thought & Feeling 
and combined them with Poetic Forms, with 
the music of pleasurable passion and with Imagination or the modifying Power in that 
highest sense of the word. in which I have 
ventured to oppose it to Fancy, or the 
aggregating power -. in that sense in which it is a dim Analogue of Creation, not all that we can believe bait all that we can 
conceive of creation. - 
V 




1805--1807 -. WILLIAM HAZLITT 
William Hazlitt was twenty-seven when his 
first book, Essay on the Principles of Human Action, 
was published in 1805. High hopes that the work 
would establish him as a metaphysician of some 
ability were disappointed by very poor sales. It was 
with some difficulty that he managed to persuade the 
publisher, J. Johnson, to accept his second work two 
years later, an' abridgement of Abraham Tucker's The 
Lieht of Nature Pursued; and in fact it was Charles 
Lamb, whom Hazlitt had met in 1804, who had to inter- 
cede on his behalf. 1 Hazlitt devoted half of what 
should have been an introduction to Tucker, to a 
recasting of his argument in the Essay, on the basis 
that he might "not soon have an opportunity of 
recurring to the some subject, "2 but his attempt to 
arouse interest in his earlier work did not succeed. 
In 1828, two years before his death, he was still 
feeling frustration and bitterness at never having 
received proper recognition for that work:, 
.. it fell still-born from the press, and none ... it those who abuse me for a shallow catch penny 
writer have so much as heard of it. Yet, let 
me say that the work contains an important meta- 
physical discovery, supported by a continuous 
and severe train of reasoning, nearly as subt e 
and original as anything in Hume or Berkeley. 
During Hazlitt's lifetime., Coleridge was one of 
the few critics even to suggest that Hazlitt's work 
1 See P. P. Howe, The Life of William Hazlitt (London, 1922), 88. 
2H Works, 1,130-134. 
3H Works, XVII, 312. 
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had been original. 
' In modern times, much attention 
has been given to the question of Hazlitt's originality 
in the Essay. Critics like Herschel Baker, 2 Leonard M. 
Trawick 111,3 W. P. Albrecht Y4 Roy E. Cain, 
5 Kathleen 
Coburn, 6 Ralph M. Wardle, 7 and Roy Park, 
$ have each 
mentioned the subject and stated that Hazlitt was 
not original in his ideas. Critics have recognised 
the similarity of his ideas in the Essay to eighteenth 
century ideas on sympathy. - However, full appreciation 
of Hazlitt's Essay may still be lacking since few 
critics have given close consideration to his argument 
or focused on the distinctive features of his part- 
icular account of sympathy. It will be argued in the 
following pages that to see Hazlitt's ideas on imagin- 
ation strictly in the context of a faculty of sympathy 
is to limit what he says about imagination in the Essay. 
When he speaks about the particular functions-of 
imagination, it becomes clear that he understood 
imagination to be more complex and comprehensive than 
just a faculty which allowed man to sympathize with others. 
Also, Hazlitt is less concerned with sympathy per se than 
he is with describing the psychological factors which lay 
behind man's feelings of sympathy, or lack of sympathy, 
for others. 
1 In 1817, in a footnote to his 'Second Lay 
Sermon', Coleridge made the following judgment: "The 
fallacious sophistry 
philosophy that all actions stem from 
self-love] has been detected by Des Cartes, and Bishop 
Butler: and of late years with great ability and origin- 
ality, by Mr Wm. Hazlitt. " Lay Sermons (London and 
Princeton, 1972), 187. 
2 William Hazlitt (London and Cambridge, Mass., 
1962)', esp. 140-147. 
3 "Sources of Hazlitt's 'Metaphysical Discovery', " 
P@, 42 (1963), 277-282; esp. 278-9. 
4 Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination (Lawrence, 
Kansas, 1965), esp. 27-2T. 7 
5 "David Hume and Adam Smith as sources of the 
Concept of Sympathy in Hazlitt", PELL, I (1965), 133- 
140; esp. 140. 
6 "Hazlitt on the Disinterested Ima in1ttion", in 
Some British Romantics (Columbus, Ohio, 19665, ; 
esp. 173. 
7 Hazlitt'(Lincoln, Nebraska, 1971), $5. 
8 Hazlitt and the Spirit of theme (Oxford, 1971)45" 
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Hazlitt's Essay is long (in the volumes edited 
by P. P. Howe it occupies fifty pages) and in places it 
is difficult.. The argument may be seen to be in two 
sections. In the first seventeen pages Hazlitt develops 
the core of his argumemt, and in the remainder of the 
work he shifts his focus to prove many of the same points 
from a different angle. The reason for this 'doubling 
back', as it were, seems to be Hazlitt's concern that 
the reader understand his argument. 
Because the Essay has not received full apprec- 
iation in the past, the argument (at least of the first 
section) will be followed quite closely. Hazlitt starts 
by maintaining that the mind can be understood as 
mechanical only concerning past and present impressions. 
l 
We have a direct interest in our past through the faculty 
of-memory and in our present through consciousness. 
Impressions which we have concerning the future must be 
understood in another manner as we can have no direct 
interest in the future and what interest we do have is 
provided by the imagination. (1) 
Hazlitt then criticises traditional approaches 
on the subject of disinterestedness. He points to the 
proponents of the doctrine of natural selfishness. They 
would argue that there is no positive reason for pain- 
fully exerting oneself to help someone else, since one 
can a-ly enjoy one's own pleasure and one cannot feel 
the pleasure or pain of someone else. (2) Hazlitt 
argues that the fact that we are mechanically affected 
by our senses neither precludes us from sharing in the 
feelings of others, nor implies that our feelings are 
all of the same kind. (3) Further, he sees these 
philosophers maintaining that one has a "real, sub- 
stantial interest" (2) in the future, and this he 
disputes. It is true, he says, that concerning one's 
own pleasures and pains in the present that one has a 
IH Works, S, 1. Future references to the 
Essay are from this edition and will be given internally, 
where possible. 
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sense of absolute interest, but there is not the same 
interest concerning pleasures and pains we have not yet 
felt. (2) We have no direct sympathy with our future 
sensations: Further, "We certainly do not know, and we 
very often care as little what is to happen to ourselves 
in future. It has no more effect upon us in any way, 
than if it were never to happen. " (3) 
Hazlitt predicted that some would object by 
saying that man "has a real interest in. his own welfare.. 
which he cannot have in that of another person". (3) 
Hazlitt reiterates that one cannot have a real interest 
in the future self. (4) Some philosophers would say 
"I shall have a real sensible interest in my own future 
feelings". Hazlitt responds that to say that I shall 
have an interest is the same thing as saying "I have 
a general interest in whatever concerns my future"'(4) - 
a position he could accept. Hazlitt believes we are too 
ready to attribute what he calls "a real identity of 
interests to the same person [i. e. past, present and 
future]". The reason is that we have "an indistinct 
idea of extended consciousness" and "a community of feel- 
ings [believed] as essential to the same thinking being. " 
Continued consciousness, he argues, only serves to connect 
past and present, and not the future. (4) To those 
philosophers who would say that just the idea of 
pleasure or pain concerning the self naturally excites 
interest, Hazlitt responds that a general sense of self- 
interest is learned through the particular emotions of 
pleasure and pain concerning the self, but that self- 
interest in itself is not identical with these feelings. (5) 
There is another "more liberal philosophy" which 
Hazlitt sees between the two main positions he has outlined. 
1 Hazlitt refers to this liberal hypothesis as 
holding "a sort of middle place between the two opposite 
ones already stated". (5) Just what are the two opposite 
ones is not self-evident from his paper. The organization 
of his work suggests the two positions to be (a) man is 
naturally selfish and (b) man has an inescapable real 
interest in his own welfare that he cannot have in others. 
But from what he goes on to sa on page five, the poles 
more appropriately would be (a) natural selfishness and (b) natural benevolence. The ambiguity, unfortunate though 
it. is, has little bearing on the argument as a whole. 
4' 
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This philosophy recognises benevolence in man and tries 
to reconcile it to man's selfishness; (5) it says that 
man's generous affections arise from making kind action 
habitual. Hazlitt responds that the theory claims we 
should be benevolent for selfish reasons. The advantages 
of Virtue, he says, are to be derived from the immediate 
satisfaction it produces, not from "a. gross calculation 
of self-interest". (6) 
Hazlitt's opposition to the various philosophical 
positions helps to lay the ground-work for his own 
alternative method of accounting for the virtue in man. 
He outlines five points which are central to his argu- 
ment. (p. 7): 
1) man is "originally and essentially dis- 
interested"; 
2) as a voluntary agent man must be disinterested; 
3) the faculties which provide man with an 
interest in his own welfare also provide him 
with an interest in the welfare of others; 
4) man is cut off from his future self and 
his actions are always "absolutely independent 
of ... the feelings of the being for whom he 
acts, whether this be himself, or another"; and 
5) moral, rational, and voluntary action can 
relate only to the future and are dependent 
upon, the imagination, whether in connection with 
ourselves or another. 
These points are elaborated by Hazlitt in the 
pages which follow. The same emphasis on the division 
between future self and past and present self as was 
found in the first pages is continued here. Voluntary 
action proceeds from a will and relates to the future, 
but the existence of anything in the future is problem- 
matical he says. (8) We can have an idea of something 
in the future through the assistance of the imagination, 
but "the thing itself is a non-entity". We can have no 
real direct impressions of the future on our present 
selves. Our future desires make no more immediate 
impression on us thaf the desires of others. (8) The 
crux of Hazlitt's argument will rest on the parallel that 
. he is maintaining exists between the future self and the 
self of others in the manner in which we relate to both. 
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What about the "real, positive interest" we have 
in our own feelings as*opposed to the feelings of others? 
Hazlitt says that pleasure and pain are mechanical feel- 
ings and have nothing to do with self-love. (9) Further- 
more, pleasure and pain may be the object of volition, 
but are never the cause of it: the cause of any volition 
.o 
If the act of willing an object and the enjoyment of that 
object is consequential. Imagination enables us to 
"foresee the probable or necessary consequences of things, 
and [gives us interest] in them" but there is no faculty 
which can give us directness of impression (like pain 
and pleasure in the present and past) concerning the 
future. (9) 
Hazlitt claims that in spite of the predominant 
belief that we have an absolute interest'in our own 
welfare and only an indirect and voluntary interest in 
the welfare of others, this belief has no foundation - 
it is "utterly false, and groundless". (9-10) Because 
all our ideas of the future depend on the imagination and 
not on direct sensation, we cannot claim that the 
identity of the self is absolute. One's future interests 
will not necessarily be one's present ones, just because 
the samg being is involved. Hazlitt suggests that real 
individuality, or a correct understanding of an identity 
of interests in the self, consists in "the whole' sentient 
system [--] nothing that passes in any part of it can be 
indifferent to me". (10) He refers to it as a "conscious 
principle [which] pervades every part of me". (10) 
Hazlitt goes on to comment further about the 
division between future and present selves: 
... so long as there is not this inter- 
community of thoughts and feelings, so 
long as there is an absolute separation, 
an insurmountable barrier fixed between 
the present, and the future, so that I 
neither am, nor can possibly be affected 
at present by what I am to feel hereafter, 
I am not to any moral or practical purpose 
the same being. (11) ' 
Do we not have a direct interest in the future when we 
say "I know I shall become that being"? Hazlitt says 
no, we merely have a present interest in that knowledge, 
_not 
in anything felt at present about the future. When 
we pursue our wishes aid desires, we pursue "the idea of 
good, not the reality". (11) When we refer to our real 
29 
interest in the future, it is not what is commonly under- 
stood as a real substantial interest, but one dependent 
upon reflection and imagination. Hazlitt raises the ques- 
tion of why we are not indifferent, then, to the future 
and why we pursue our own welfare. The reason he gives 
is twofold. First, "there is something in the very idea 
of good, or evil, which naturally excites desire or 
aversion ... which impels the mind to pursue the one 
and to avoid the other by a true moral necessity". (12) 
Second, we pursue our welfare because we have a vivid 
idea of it: 
I naturally desire and pursue my own good (in 
whatever this consists) simply from my having 
an idea of it sufficiently warm and vivid to 
excite in me an emotion of interest, or 
passion; and I love and pursue the good of 
others, of a relative, of a friend, of a 
family, a community, or of mankind for just 
the same reason. (12) 
On page twelve of the Essay, Hazlitt gives an 
assessment of what he believes is unusual in his approach. 
It is surprising that none of the critics who have paid 
attention to the subject of his originality has paid 
attention to his evaluation. He says that selfishness 
is the result of habit, and that other actions stem from 
disinterested love of good: 
The scheme of which I have here endeavoured 
to trace the general outline differs from 
the common method of accounting for the 
origin of our affections in this, that it 
supposes what is personal or selfish in 
our affections to be the growth of time and 
habit, and the principle of a disinterested 
love of good as such, or for it's own sake 
without any regard to personal distinctions 
to be the foundation of all the rest. In 
this sense self-love is in it's origin a 
perfectly disinterested, or if I may so say 
impersonal feeling. (12) 
Self-love is impersonal, in Hazlitt's sense, because the 
reasons we love our good are identical to the reasons we 
love the good of others. Because we have a stronger, more 
distinct idea of our own good, we may strive for that in 
preference to the good of others; but this is not because 
we are innately selfish, says Hazlitt. In the case of a 
child it is "for want of knowing better". (12) Hazlitt's 
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position is that we are not born benevolent, but neither 
are we born with an idea of self or a principle of self- 
love. All are acquired. Natural benevolence, in his 
usage of the term, does not equal an innate abstract 
idea of good but equals a natural link between happiness 
and the desire of it, independent of personal consider- 
ations. (12) 
Hazlitt says that the desire of good is not 
inherent in the mind, but claims that there is inherent_ 
a property of the mind which makes us open to this 
desire. (13) Love of good starts with ourselves and 
moves outwards. First we love one object because it is 
good and then we grow to love any known good, gradually 
acquiring a composite idea of goodness. 
Hazlitt objects to both the suppositions that 
man is either innately benevolent or innately selfish. (14) 
A feeling of general comprehensive benevolence can only 
arise from "an habitual cultivation of the natural 
disposition of the mind to sympathise with the feelings 
of others by constantly taking an interest in those 
which we know, and imagining others that we do not know". 
(14) If benevolence requires expansion of the mind, 
selfishness requires contraction, or an habitual "narrow- 
ing of the mind to our own particular feelings and 
interests, and a voluntary insensibility to every thing 
which does not immediately concern ourselves". (14-15) 
Selfishness is not a natural consequence of the general 
love of good, in Hazlitt's opinion. We move naturally 
from an understanding of our own specific good to our 
own general good, to the good of our families, neighbours 
and strangers. (15) Hazlitt reiterates his central 
theme, that "refined self-love and refined benevolence 
are the same" (16) and concludes the first section of 
the Essay with two points of summary. The first is that 
the traditional understanding of self-interest has 
wrongly supposed a principle of absolute identity of the 
self. (16) The second is that selfishness is the 
product of habit and is opposed both to reason and to 
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the natural disposition of the mind towards good. 1 (17) 
By the end of the first section of the Essay we 
have a fairly clear understanding of what lies behind 
benevolent action for Hazlitt. Although here we are not 
specifically concerned with joining the argument concern- 
ing Hazlitt's originality (although shortly we will be 
trying to trace influences on Hazlitt), it would seem 
from the above that any discussion of the topic should, 
at the very least, consider the two distinctive features 
of Hazlitt's approach. Firstly, as we have seen, Hazlitt 
does not argue for the innate or natural benevolence of 
man as it had commonly been understood; he argues that 
both selfishness and benevolent action are the result 
of habit, butXthe mind has a natural tendency to move 
towards the good. 
Secondly, and perhaps most fundamental to his 
entire approach, Hazlitt makes a radical division between 
past and present, taken as a unit, and the future. An 
important aspect of this division which should not be 
overlooked is its relation to morality. When Hazlitt 
1 In discussing the second section of the Essýa 
I will be concentrating on Hazlitt's specific understand= 
ing of imagination. However, in that section he makes 
an important qualification of the above argument which 
is worth mentioning here. He says that the position of 
general comprehensive benevolence is an unattainable 
ideal, just as it would be impossible to sink to a 
position of total selfishness: "If I had no idea of what 
passes in the minds of others, or if my ideas of their 
feelings and perceptions were perfect representations, 
i. e. mere conscious repetitions of them, all proper per- 
sonal distinction would be lost either in pure self-love, 
or in perfect universal sympathy. " (38) Moreover, we 
will always have a more vivid or distinct idea of our own 
good than we will have concerning others. The imagination, 
he says, has a great facility in leaping the barrier 
between present and future which thus "confer[s] on my 
future interests a reality, and a connection with my 
present feelings which [the feelings of others] can never 
have. " (41) "[The] facility in passing from the recoll- 
ection of my past impressions to the imagination of my 
future ones makes the transition almost imperceptible, 
and gives to the latter an apparent reality and resent 
ness to the imagination, so that the feelings of others 
can never be brought home to us to the same degree. " (42) 
confines question of 
on one level simply 
under the control of 
moral. Morality can 
action. 
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morality to the future, he is 
saying that only future actions are 
the will and can be considered as 
only be accorded to a voluntary 
The division of future from past and present goes 
much beyond the issue of morality, however. On another 
level Hazlitt is using the division to make an important 
distinction about the nature of the self. There is no 
ground, that Hazlitt sees, for arguing for an absolute 
identity of the self: the future self is cut off from 
the past and present self. Leonard Trawick III is one 
of the few critics to have noticed and explored Hazlitt's 
division of the self; he has shown that the division was 
probably made in reaction to Bishop Butler and has 
suggested a link between Hazlitt's scepticism about- 
personalidentity and similar notions in strict Lockean' 
thinkers. ' More in terms of Hazlitt's own argument, 
the division allows Hazlitt to maintain that there is a 
certain alien quality about the future self which is not 
unlike the alien nature of the self of others. We relate 
to both in a similar fashion. 
By the end of the first section of the Essay 
we also have the beginning of an understanding of what 
Hazlitt understood as the imagination. As opposed to 
the faculties of memory and consciousness which work only 
with the past and present, imagination gives us our 
impressions concerning the future. It presents us with 
ideas about the possible or probable consequences of 
actions (9) providing us with a variety of ideas. Hazlitt 
had said that the mind is naturally excited by "the very 
idea of good, or evil" (12) and that we pursue good by 
having an idea of it "sufficiently warm and vivid to 
excite in [us] a 
demotion 
of interest" (12). Since moral 
pursuit is dependent upon the imagination in Hazlitt's 
thought, it follows that it is-the imagination which is 
excited by good and evil and which provides warmth and 
vividness to ideas about the future, and it is the mind 
which naturally selects and moves towards that which is good. 
1 See "Sources of Hazlitt's 'Metaphysical 
Discovery", 280. 
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The first section of the Essay represents the 
more compact formulation of Hazlitt'. s response to the 
issue Hobbes raised. In the second section, where he 
. 
develops the argument from a slightly different position, 
the role of imagination is again of central importance. 
He calls it the "faculty of multiplying, varying, 
. extending, combining, and-comparing 
his [man's] original 
passive impressions. " (p. 20) There is a similar des- 
cription of it later in which he specifically attributes 
to it a creative power: 
By the same power of mind [i. e. the power of 
imagination] which enables him [man] to con- 
ceive of a past sensation as about to be re- 
excited in the same being, namely, himself, 
he must be capable of transferring the same 
idea of pain to a different person. He creates 
the object, he pushes his ideas beyond ----- 
the bounds of his memory and senses in the first 
instance, and he does no more in the second. 
If hismmind were merely passive in the oper- 
ation, he would not be busy in anticipating 
a new impression, but would still be dreaming, 
of the old one. It is of the very nature of 
the imagination to change the order in which 
things have been impresses on the senses, and 
to connect the same properties with different 
objects, and different properties with the same 
objects; to combine our original impressions 
in all possible forms, and to modify these 
impressions themselves to a very great degree. 
(pp. 26-27. Single underlining my own. ) 
The idea of the imagination being a creative force is 
further reinforced when he refers to it as "a power of 
willing a given end for itself, and of employing the means 
immediately necessary to the production of that end. " (p. 23) 
In these quotations, Hazlitt is obviously not 
speaking about the imagination creating specifically in an 
aesthetic sense, the way Coleridge might mean creation 
with regard to the secondary imagination. Hazlitt was 
talking about the creative act of the imagination in 
the act of perception (rather like what Coleridge de- 
fined as the primary imagination, "the living power and 
prime agent of all human perception"). But it will be 
noted that there is a striking parallel between the first 
two quotations of Hazlitt and Coleridge's descriptions 
of imagination (when he was not distinguishing primary 
and secondary) and of secondary imagination, both 
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written eleven years later. 
' Coleridge called 
imagination "the shaping and modifying power. " 
Secondary imagination, he said, "dissolves, 
diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or 
where this process is rendered impossible, yet 
still, at all events, it struggles to idealize 
and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as 
all objects (Rs objects) are essentially fixed 
and dead. " 
The full impact of the power-Hazlitt sees in 
the imagination becomes apparent when he approaches 
the subject from a negative point of view - what 
man would be like without imagination. Hazlitt 
says man would be devoid of hope, fear, foresight, 
self-motion, self-interest, wisdom, generosity, 
resistance and desire. He would be "the passive 
instrument of undreaded pain and unsought-for 
pleasure", "unable to avoid or remove the most 
painful impressions, or to wish for or even think 
of their removal. " In short, he would be "in a 
state of more than ideot imbecility. " (p. 21) 
1 It'might be noted here that Hazlitt in 
turn may have been influenced in the choice of his 
words by Hume, though as we will see later in this 
chapter, there is only a superficial similarity 
between their actual ideas on imagination. Hume 
described the imagination as having "a great 
authority over our ideas; and there are no ideas 
that are different from each other, which it 
cannot separate, and Join, and compose into all 
varieties of fiction. My underlining) From 
"An Abstract of a Book lately published, entitled, 
A Treatise of Human Nature, Etc. " in A Treatise of 
Human Knowledge: Book One, ed. D. G. C. Macnubb, 
PP. 352-353. 
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This adds up to a picture of the imagination 
as the supreme faculty of the mind. With all of 
its other functions, imagination is the power which 
makes man capable of reasoning. As Hazlitt says at 
one point, "Man without this [i. e. imagination] 
would not be a rational agent: he would be below 
the dullest and most stupid brute. " (p. 27) 
A question which might be asked, then, is what 
is the relationship between the imagination and the 
other faculties of the mind? For example, what are 
the precise characteristics and roles of conscious- 
ness and memory in Hazlitt's philosophy? Conscious- 
ness, or rather that faculty which gives us a real 
interest in the present, Hazlitt considers to be 
synonymous with sensation, or at least to be 
sufficiently close to it for the same explanation to 
apply to both. 1 Presumably when Hazlitt speaks of 
the mind being passive without imagination, he is 
referring to the passivity of a strictly sense- 
receiving consciousness. 
The memory for Hazlitt is a kind of storehouse 
of images. The imagination, as we have seen, goes 
"beyond the bounds" of memory (and of the senses, 
too) in its operation. Certainly in part, the ideas 
of the memory are not different in nature from those 
of the imagination. He says that they are of "one 
flesh and blood" and that "The same vital spirit 
animates them both. "! (p. 23) But the "tablets of 
memory", working in conjunction with consciousness, 
are what wrongly convince man of his absolute 
distinction from others. (p. 41) When Hazlitt speaks 
of the imagination being "a power... of controuling 
the blind impulses of associated mechanical feelings, 
and of making them subservient to the accomplishment 
of some particular purpose" and of being a "power 
1 See his footnote, p. 38. 
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over the will" (p. 23), I think he is speaking both of 
the operation of memory and consciousness together and 
of imagination's superior force over them both. Memory 
and consciousness exist to serve the imagination in. 
working towards the goal of general comprehensive benevolence. 
In the past, insufficient emphasis has been given 
to the implications behind Hazlitt's division of future 
from past and present. One of the results has been a 
failure to. appreciate the central importance of imagination 
in Hazlitt's thought in 1805; and the powers and distinct- 
ive characteristics of imagination, as Hazlitt saw them, 
have all but been missed. It has been common to recognise 
'imagination' in the Essay as simply the 'sympathetic 
imagination' of the 18th century, as discussed for instance 
by W. J. Bate in his important article*' Also, it has 
been assumed that it was only later in Hazlitt's life that 
'imagination' became of central importance to Hazlitt, as 
this comment indicates: "The older the nineteenth century 
got, and the more he [Hazlitt] talked with Lamb and 
Coleridge, the more Hazlitt must have recognized - and 
did recognize as his lectures on the Elizabethans show - 
the importance of imagination. "2 
There are important similarities between 18th 
century theories of the sympathetic imagination and 
Hazlitt's theory of imagination, and in fact, Hazlitt 
invited comparison by his use of the word 'disinterested'. 
The word appears in the subtitle to his Essay, "An 
Argument in Defence of the Natural Disinterestedness of 
the Human Mind"; the word appears inthe first sentence, 
"... to shew that the human mind is naturally disinterested, 
or that it is naturally interested ... "; and the word 
is again present at the top of page two: "I could not 
love myself, if I were not capable of loving others. 
1 ! 'The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth- 
Century English Criticism", ELH, XIII (1945), 144-1(4. 
2 Kathleen Coburn, "Hazlitt on the Dis- 
interested Imagination", 182. 
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Self-love used in this sense, is in it's fundamenta-t, 
principle the same with disinterested benevolence. " 
However, use of the same word by Hazlitt and earlier 
philosophers is to some extent deceptive. 
In the lath century, the notion of disinterest- 
edness was commonly associated with notions of man's 
innate moral sense; man had to cultivate disinterestedness, 
in other words distance himself from intellectual processes, 
in order to allow his, natural feelings of sympathy to 
dominate - hence the concept of a disinterested imagination 
which removed an individual from himself. The Essay 
suggests that this was not the sense in which Hazlitt was 
using the word disinterested, nor was his concept of 
imagination to be. read too closely in that light, although 
recently it seems to have been. In 1966 J. D. O'Hara spoke 
of the imagination, for Hazlitt, preserving "disinterest- 
ed attachment"' and of the manner in which sympathy 
"suppresses the selfish mercenfary impulses of our per- 
sonal identity and thereby permits our imagination to 
view the world disinterestedly., 
2 In 1968 O'Hara reit- 
erated this thought by defining "sympathy, in Hazlitt's 
customary usage, as the entering disinterestedly into 
another person's concern. "3 Herschel Baker seemed to 
share this view when he described Hazlitt's theory as 
being opposed to subjectivism and as an "escape from 
self. "4 
These notions are in accord with lath century 
philosophy, but are less in agreement with Hazlitt's 
exact thought. Against the traditional view which saw 
man as selfish and in need of cultivating detachment and 
hence disinterestedness, Hazlitt argued that selfishness 
arose from habit and that the love of good for others was 
natural and-simply needed to be encouraged to become a 
comprehensive desire for benevolence. Hazlitt did not 
suggest that disinterest in the self was a necessary, or 
1 "Hazlitt on the Functions of Imagination", 
P14LA, 81 (1966), 554. 
2 ibid., 556. 
3 W. P. Albrecht and J. D. O'Hara, "More on 
Hazlitt and the Functions of Imagination", PMLA, 83 
(1968), 152. 
4 William Hazlitt, 116. 
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even a desirable, stepXbecoming sympathetic to others, Ain 
for sympathy for others was closely related to sympathy 
for the self. Rather, he urged the cultivation of 
imagination, in order that one might overcome a natural 
tendency to feel more sympathy for the self than for others. 
Considering this it may be recognised that to call 
Hazlitt's concept of the'imagination' the 'disinterested 
imagination' (as Kathleen Coburn labels it in her article, 
"Hazlitt on the Disinterested Imagination") or the 
'sympathetic imagination' tends to confuse, if not dis- 
tort, Hazlitt's position. John Kinnaird points out the 
irony that would exist if the main ideas'behind Hazlitt 
were, as Baker suggests, "'benevolence', 'the sympathetic 
imagination', [and] 'man's essential goodness"' - Hazlitt's 
own uncompromising positions concerning his idealism in his 
personal life would then have to be seen in direct conflict 
with his written ideas, ' I suggest if a label is to be 
used-for Hazlitt's 'imagination' that it be 'democratic 
imagination', a label which avoids the contradiction 
mentioned by Kinnaird and suggests the distinctive aspect 
of his thought with a minimum amount of distortion. 
Hazlitt's political and critical writings always held the 
French Revolution, and perhaps to a lesser extent Napoleon's 
rise and career, as representative of the democratic 
ideal: mankind bettering itself by aiming at human- 
itarian reform. This ideal encouraged mankind to escape 
from selfish motivation. The purpose of what Hazlitt saw 
as 'imagination' was precisely this. Individuals had a 
social responsibility to cultivate imagination. If 
imagination were cultivated by all members of society, the 
natural movement of the mind towards good would set reform 
in motion. Hazlitt's bitterness towards his contemporaries 
whom he felt had abandoned the ideals of the Revolution 
was part of a general intolerance towards those who sought 
their own good before that of others. A cautionary note 
must be sounded concerning the term 'democratic imagination' 
however. Strictly speaking, 'imagination' itself is not 
humanitarian or democratic in Hazlitt's view, but rather 
1 John Kinnaird, "The Forgotten Self", PR 
xxx (1963), 303-306. p. 304. - 
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the whole movement which it commences and of which it 
has the largest part is democratic. As we have seen 
already and will see again later in Hazlitt's criticism, 
imagination magnifies not just the good or humanitarian 
possibilities, but also the bad. 
The faculty of imagination played the major role 
in Hazlitt's philosophy in 1805, and the powers he 
attributed to it were extensive. Several critics, includ- 
ing Baker, have pointed to various meanings Hazlitt 
attached to the word 'imagination'. Baker notes that it 
is sometimes a molding, creative power; sometimes one of 
association; sometimes a power of conveying feeling; but 
Baker sees it mostly as the "sympathetic" faculty. 
1 
Although various critics have found different meanings, 
none has found the origin of these different meanings 
(excluding sympathy) in the Essay, nor have they cited 
sources as early as 1805. In fact, the Essay establishes 
that the different meanings are largely present in 1805 
and are more closely related than hitherto has been 
suspected. 
The failure of Hazlitt's ideas to find adequate 
appreciation suggests that possible sources of Hazlitt's 
ideas in the Essay need further exploration. This is a 
task of no small undertaking and to a large extent it is 
one which will have to be put off until sometime in the 
future. A start on the problem can be made here, however. 
When Hazlitt wrote the Essay, he believed that 
the traditional view of imagination would not credit the 
faculty with a direct ability to influence human action 
and with an ability to extend from a feeling in the present 
to an influential idea about the future. He explained why 
this had been the case: 
This notion could not have gained ground as 
an article ofpphilosophical faith but from 
a perverse restriction of the word idea to 
abstract ideas, or external forms, as if the 
essential quality in the feelings of pleasure, 
or pain, must entirely evaporate in passing 
through the imagination; and, again, from 
associating the word imagination with merely 
fictitious situations and events, that is, 
such as never will have a real existence, 
and as it is supposed never will, and which 
consequently do not admit of action. (p. 23) 
1 William Hazlitt, 147-8. 
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In the 1800 "Preface to the Lyrical Ballads", Wordsworth 
made the comment that in "Goody Blake and Harry Gill" 
he had "wished to draw attention to the truth that the 
power of the human imagination is sufficient to produce 
such changes even in our physical nature as might appear 
miraculous. The truth is an important one .... "1 Hazlitt 
had read the "Preface" (he refers to it at one point in 
the Essay) and no doubt believed he was carrying on from 
Wordsworth by making new inroads to an understanding of 
imagination. 
Hazlitt's reading in speculative thought was 
largely restricted to the British empiricists and their 
French counterparts, 
2 
along with ideas of imagination he 
might have gleaned from his readings in English literature. 
Some of these possible sources can be eliminated by the 
process of negation. For instance, Hazlitt's ideas of 
the imagination, at this stage in his life, were per- 
ceptual and not specifically aesthetic; and the latter 
kind of imagination seems to be the dominant kind with 
men like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Addison and Akenside. 
Also, in Hazlitt's own words, he did not associate the 
word imagination "with merely fictitious situations and 
events"; and to some extent this was the view of Locke 
and his followers. Further, in as much as imagination had 
to span the gap between present and future, and was itself 
the rational faculty, Hazlitt did not restrict the imag- 
ination to conception of abstract ideas; nor did he totally 
separate imagination from that knowledge gained from the 
emotions or the senses. This would also counter Locke, 
but it is a more direct criticism of Hume. 
Hume, however, seems to be the man who most 
influenced Hazlitt's ideas in the Essay. Roy Cain 
has already given detailed attention to the manner 
in which Hume may have influenced Hazlitt's notions 
1 Literar Criticism of William Wordsworth, 
ed. Paul M. Zall Linco n, Nebraska, , 28. 
2H Works, XII, 223-1. 
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of sympathy, and Cain has also mentioned Hazlitt's 
early reading of Hume's Treatise. ' Hume's influence 
may have been wider than Cain has suggested, for 
some of the things Hazlitt has said in the Essay may 
be in response to similar issues raised by Hume. 
Hume, like Hazlitt, had noted the uncertainty of the 
future and he, too, developed notions of imagination 
to deal with it. But whereas Hazlitt had contended 
that there was a total barrier between present and 
future, Hume, in A Treatise of Human Knowledge, had 
maintained that the barrier was less complete. The 
future was not totally unknown:. one could at least 
use reason and experimentation with cause and effect 
to determine distinct probabilities about the future. 
An "imperfect belief" about the future was possible. 
2 
Because Hume saw a less complete barrier to the 
future than Hazlitt, the role Hume gave to imagin- 
ation was more limited. But there was a major flaw 
in Hume's treatment of imagination, as he himself 
admitted. He was forced to use the word imagination 
in two different ways which were not necessarily 
compatible. In order to understand how Hazlitt's 
ideas differ from Humes, and in order to point out 
how Hazlitt might have viewed his work as a response 
to Hume, it is necessary to consider Hume's ideas 
more closely. 
1 "David Hume and Adam Smith as 
Concept of Sympathy in Hazlitt", 133-1- 
reading of Hume. is discussed on 135. 
2 David Hume, The Philosophical 
A Treatise of Human Knowledge London, 
428-439. 
Source of the 
+0. Hazlitt's 
Works; I& II, 
1986), I, 
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Hume's two uses of the word 'imagination' 
are suggested in his own words: "When I oppose 
the imagination to the memory, " he said, "I mean 
the faculty by which we form our fainter ideas. 
When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, 
excluding only our demonstrative and probable 
reasonings. "1 
Hume's first use of 'imagination' 2 that is, 
in conjunction with memory, establishes that the 
two faculties are similar. Both faculties "borrow 
their simple ideas from the impressions"; 
2 
and 
both faculties operate by the associative principles 
upon which the mind generally functions. 
The difference between 'imagination', in 
Hume's first sense, and memory, is that imagination 
is much more free than memory - it is not so tightly 
bound by the principles of association, for assoc- 
iation, in this case, is to be seen only as "a gentle 
force, which commonly prevails. "3 The imagination 
has what Hume calls an "original tendency", 
4 in that 
it can unite impressions in what forms it pleases. 
The main difference between imagination, in 
Hume's first sense, and memory, is that the ideas 
of the former are fainter and have less "vivacity. " 
Hobbes had identified imagination with memory and 
'decaying sense', and to an extent this was true for 
Hume. But Hume distinguishes between the two 
faculties by the amount of decay which takes place. 
Mnemonic impression decays into something 'inter- 
mediate betwixt an impression and an idea", 
5 
and 
still retains something of the original vivacity. 
Impressions. of the imagination entirely lose their 
1 Treatise, I, 416. 
2 ibid.., Is 386. 
3 ibid., I, 319. 
4 bid., It 500. 
5 ibid., It 317. 
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vivacity and become "perfect ideaýj "l instead of 
a mixture of impression and idea. Thus Hume felt 
that when a painter wished to represent a passion 
or emotion brought to the fore by the imagination, 
he would have to "get a sight of a person actuated 
by a like emotion, in order to enliven his ideas, 
and give them a force and vivacity superior to what 
is found in those, which are mere fictions of the 
imagination. "2 
Hume's second use of imagination, imagination 
as opposed to reason, diminishes the power of the 
faculty. The imagination is simply fictijous with no 
powers of logical association. When trying to deter- 
mine cause and effect, the imagination was only a 
hindrance. Its ficti, (ous_ impressions had to be separ- 
ated from the real impressions of memory, and where 
this was rendered difficult, an act of "belief or 
assent" was brought to bear. 
3 
Hume was one of the few philosophers to give 
detailed attention to the imagination and to the 
manner in which the mind projected into the future. 
It was concerning projection into the future that 
the contradiction in his thought concerning imagin- 
ation became most apparent. Imagination, as opposed 
to reason, could "never go beyond... original impress- 
ions't, 4 and was false concerning fact. It had to be 
discarded when contemplating the future. On the other 
hand, imagination, when opposed to memory, had certain 
rational and creative powers. Although in the past 
the senses might never have conveyed to the mind a 
particular shade of colour, the mind has an ability 
to conceive an idea of that particular colour. That 
this is possible, Hume sees as proof that "the simple 
1 Treatise, I, 317. 
2 ibid., I, 387. 
3 ibid., I, 387. 




ideas [of imagination] are not always derived from 
the correspondent impression. tt1 
Hume recognised that he was using 'imagination" 
in at least two different ways and he was aware of 
the contradictions which might arise. Hume asserted, 
however, that this was common in philosophy, and he 
put off any attempt to resolve the difficulties. He 
said that "the word imagination, is commonly used in 
two different senses", and that, "nothing could be 
more contrary to true philosophy than this inaccuracy", 
but conceded that he had "often been obliged to fall 
into it. "2 
Hazlitt might have been responding to the 
challenge posed by Hume to resolve the philosophical 
ambiguity concerning imagination. In contrast to 
Hume, Hazlitt claimed: 
.... I wish the reader to be apprized, that I do 
not use the word imagination as contra- 
distinguished from or opposed to reason, or 
the faculty by which we reflect upon and 
compare our ideas, but as opposed to sensation, 
or memory. 
Hazlitt also may have been trying to suggest a more 
satisfactory explanation of how man relates to the 
future than Hume had been able to provide. In relation 
to Hume, Hazlitt strengthened the imagination by trans- 
ferring to the faculty powers that had been formerly 
associated with other faculties. In particular, 
imagination subsumed the powers of reason and the 
ability to relate cause and effect and project into 
the future. Also, imagination became the moral agent 
of man, both providing him with a moral alternative 
by contemplating the future, and enabling him to make 
a decision towards correct action by making certain 
ideas more vivid than others. 
I Treatise, I, 315. 
2 ibid., I, 416. 
3H Works, I, 19. 
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The ability of the imagination to will its own 
end and achieve that end by its controlling influences 
on the mind, was something Hume would not have agreed 
with. But Hume would not have been in sympathy, either, 
with the theory of the imagination as applied to 
aesthetics which was to be Hazlitt's subject in later 
years. That later development in Hazlitt's thought 
was not a new approach to the imagination. Instead 
it was a direct and logical extension of his theory 
in the Essay. Before Hazlitt focused on that subject, 
however, there was to come an important modification 
in his delineation of the faculties of the mind. He 
was to add to the faculties of memory, consciousness, 
and imagination, the faculty of understanding. Although 
critics have noticed that Hazlitt incorporated notions 
of a'faculty of understanding in his later thought, 
none have tried to suggest when these notions entered 
Hazlitt's thought. 
There has been no mention to this point of 
two other possible influences on Hazlitt's ideas of 
the imagination in his Essay - Coleridge and Kant. 
Coleridge's precise influence in this field is almost 
indeterminable, and the delay in considering him has 
been partly for that reason. Coleridge first visited 
the Hazlitt family in Wem as a guest of William's 
father in January, 1798. Prior to the visit, William 
had been engaged in two years of independent study, 
after leaving Hackney College and abandoning plans 
for becoming a Unitarian minister. His private study 
had been devoted largely to metaphysics and the plan 
for the Essay had already been formulated in his 
mind. He spoke to Coleridge of it as he accompanied 
him on `the first six miles of his departure from Wem. 
They spoke of it again. in the spring of that year 
when Hazlitt visited Coleridge (and met Wordsworth) 
in Alfoxden and Nether Stowey. Coleridge must have 
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been impressed with Hazlitt's argument, though he 
is said to have found it rather dark. When Hazlitt 
reflects on the period, thirty years later, he makes 
it clear that it was Coleridge who had first 
, encouraged him to develop his ideas into a book: 
"Till I began to paint, or till I became acquainted 
with the author of The Ancient Mariner, I could 
neither write nor speak. He encouraged me to write 
a book, which I did according to the original bent 
of my mind.... "l 
Hazlitt was again with Coleridge and Words- 
worth from September to December of 1803, one year 
before the Essay was completed, when he visited them 
in the Lake District. 2 Wordsworth's 1800 "Preface", 
which Coleridge referred to as "half a child of my 
own Brain'=, 3 and which had signalled publicly a 
radical re-appraisal of the powers of the imaginat- 
ion, had been written in the meantime. Conversations 
with Coleridge again turned to metaphysics. Two 
subjects that we know they discussed are the sacrä- 
ments4 and the origin of evil. The latter convers- 
ation, which took place presumably while Coleridge 
sat for his portrait by Hazlitt on the 27th of 
October, had at least some mention of imagination. 
Coleridge's notebook. gives a summary of his argument 
only, but in it the question arises as to why the 
"infinite Power": does not create beings which are 
infinite in their duration. In the course of the 
argument he uses imagination, with a capital "I", 
H Works, XVII, 312. 
2 This was the occasion when Hazlitt finally had 
to flee from the local people who were angry at his 
behaviour. See: - C. M. Maclean, Born Under Saturn (London, 
1943), 197ff. ; H.. Baker, William Hiazlitt, 140. See also 
CN 1618 & 1850n. 
Close friendship between Coleridge and Hazlitt 
fell off after this visit, though they later met 
frequently at Lamb's. 
3 CL, II, to Robert Southey, 29 July 1802. (p. 830) 
4 CN, 1516n. 
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" as a synonym for God:: "Let him have created this 
infinity of Infinities - Still there is space in 
the Imagination for the Creation of Finites.... "l. 
In the actual conversation, this unusual use of the 
word may have provoked discussion, we cannot know. 
It is highly probable, however, that conversations 
with Coleridge would have at least impressed Hazlitt 
with the fact that the two greatest poets living in 
England were seeing the imagination as an under- 
estimated faculty. 
In December of 1803 Coleridge was working on 
Kant's Foundation for the Metaphysic of Ethic (1785)2 
and it may have been Coleridge who first introduced 
Hazlitt to Kant. There are some similarities to 
Kant in the Essay, though they are only vague and 
are more related to the Critique of Judgement (1790). 
For instance, Kant gave imagination a key role in 
his system; and he divided it into three different 
kinds, the reproductive (which was associative), 
the productive (which was perceptual), and the 
aesthetic (which was creative). Hazlitt did not 
make these divisions, but his theory of imagination 
did incorporate, or at least allow for, these various 
functions. Further, Kant had two classifications 
for ideas, rational and aesthetic, only the first 
of which'concerns us here. As Kant saw it, the 
understanding formed concepts that were limited by 
sense data, but rational ideas were something beyond 
this that he called 'transcendent concepts'. 
3 In 
Hazlitt's theory both of these can be seen as distinct 
acts of-the imagination, and there is a slight hint 
of Kant, though it may only be the result of coincid- 
ence. Because Hazlitt made imagination, in a sense, 
all-powerful, it incorporated the experience-related 
1 ON 1 1619. 2 ON, 1705 & 1705n. 
3 See: R. L. -Brett, Fancy and Imagination (London, 1969), 46. 
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n 
reasoning process, of what Kant called the under- 
standing. The imagination, as Hazlitt saw it, also 
leapt into the future and generated a sense of 
reality about it. This latter formation of ideas 
could be seen as analogous to Kant's notion of 
'transcend&nt concepts. ' 
Hazlitt may not have known much Kant, except 
what he learned from various commentators. More 
work. will have to be done on possible filtrations 
of Kantian ideas to Hazlitt's Essay. For the present, 
I doubt whether Kant's ideas had much influence on 
Hazlitt in 1805. 
In Hazlitt's "Preface" to An Abridgement of 
the Light of Nature Pursued (1807), a work which 
has rarely been considered by critics, there may be 
greater evidence of Kant's influence. Kant may have 
played at least a secondary role in influencing the 
addition to Hazlitt's scheme of a faculty of under- 
standing. The "Preface" is certainly the first 
place in Hazlitt's writings where Kant is mentioned. 
He praised "the system of professor Kant, as far as 
I can understand it", for trying "to explode this 
mechanical ignorance [of Locke and his followers]... 
and to admit our own immediate perceptions to be. 
some evidence of what passes in the human mind. "' 
A. little later he noted that Abraham Tucker "believed 
with professor Kant in the unity of consciousness, 
or 'that the mind alone is formative, ' that funda- 
mental article of the transcendental soul; in the 
immateriality of the soul, etc. "2 
1H Works, I, 128-129. 
2H Works, I, 130. On the terms of this quotation 
it would seem that Hazlitt viewed himself as being a 
member of the 'transcendental' school. For a discussion 
of Hazlitt's later desertion of Kant on the basis of 
reading a poor interpretation in Willich's Elements 
of the Critical Philosophy, see Elizabeth Schneider, 
The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt (Philadelphia, 1933), 
p. 29ff. The departure took place between 1812 and 
1814. 
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In the pages of the "Preface" which Hazlitt 
devotes to his own ideas, he attempts a brief 
summary of his entire argument, and it is complete 
with arguments for and against his position. But 
because of the obvious need for compression and because 
of the difficulty of his thoughts, his argument is 
hard to follow - it is no wonder that this attempt to 
advertise the Essay was a failure. The change that 
Hazlitt makes in his theory is slipped in unannounced. 
In the E ssay it was only imagination which was the cause 
of action, and understanding was never mentioned. 
Contrastingly, in the "Preface" he says that "the 
imagination and understanding are real efficient causes 
of action. "' This is the only mention he makes of the 
imagination in his summary, but he mentions understand- 
ing twice more: 
The springs that give birth to our social 
affections are, by means of the understanding, 
as much regulated by the feelings of others, 
as if they had a real communication and 
sympathy with them, and are swayed by an 
impulse that is altogether foreign to self- 
love. 
In this last quotation it becomes clear that he is 
seeing the understanding as an associative faculty: 
Without an elastic power to the understanding; 
a power of collecting and concentrating its 
forces in any direction that seems necessary; 
and without supposing that our ideas have a 
power to act as relative representative things, 
connected together in a certain regular order, 
and not as mere simple pleasure and pain; the 
will would be entirely. useless: indeed, there 
could be no such thing as volition, either 
with respect to our own affairs or those of 
others. 
Obviously some of the powers Hazlitt is here 
1H Works, 1,13 1. 
2H Works, I, 1314.. 
3H Works, I, 133. 
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ascribing to the understanding (such as volition) 
are powers Hazlitt was formerly ascribing to the 
imagination in his Essay. The question is raised 
as to how this change in Hazlitt's thinking affects 
his theory of the imagination in the Essay. Hazlitt 
was using the "Preface" as an introduction to the 
Essay for those who had not read it, and the 
addition of a faculty of understanding undoubtedly 
was not meant to overthrow his former scheme. 
Hazlitt does not tell us this in the "Preface" but 
we can find convincing support for the suggestion 
by considering the direct source of his change in 
thinking. 
It was said that Kant probably played a 
secondary role in the process; Hazlitt's new 
position has definite echoes of Kant. However, 
Hazlitt's prime source would have been the man whose 
works he had just abridged, Abraham Tucker, who 
incidentally wrote before Kant did. 
Tucker viewed the understanding as primarily 
the faculty "by which we discern whatever presents 
itself to our apprehension": 
' "in every exercise of 
our understanding, the mind passes either from a 
state of insensibility to a state of discernment, 
or from one kind of discernment to another, as from 
sights to sounds, or tastes or reflections, accord- 
ing to the variety of objects that act upon it. "2 
He did not want it to be taken "in the vulgar sense 
for the judgement of reason, but for every discern- 
ment of the perceptive faculty. "3 And he classified 
it as passive (except in the sense that it might put 
us in a position to read)4 because it did not in 
itself cause us physically to act. 
1 Abraham Tucker, The Light of Nature Pursued, 
ed. Nildway, 7 vols. (London, 1805), I, 4. In the 
following quotations I will be using Tucker's original 
text and not Hazlitt's abridgement. 
2 ibid., I, 5. 
3 ibid., I, 148. 
4 ibid., I, 21. 
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The understanding was, then, a mode of 
perception, and imagination could be classified 
as such as well. The understanding Tucker saw as 
growing out of the imagination' for the imagination 
was the faculty which presented pictures to the 
understanding for discernment. 
2 It was a wild 
faculty, however, -and the suggestion is that it 
needed to be controlled: "imagination may be law- 
fully employed in the services of reason, but 
ought to be restrained from all sallies which 
those do .. not require. "3 
There is no similarity between Hazlitt's view 
of the imagination and Tucker's, and no doubt 
Hazlitt discarded this aspect of Tucker's philosophy; 
it was a view not different from most of British 
philosophy. But Hazlitt did not discard Tucker's 
faculty of the understanding precisely because it 
was an idea that he could incorporate into his own 
theory without much altering his former definition 
of the imagination. The weakness in his earlier 
view was that it did not provide for a sufficient 
account of the mind in the present. He had linked 
the imagination to the future and had gone so far 
as to say that man in the present could not be a 
thinking creature without imagination. Clearly, 
however, it was not necessary at all times for the 
mind to leap into the future to cope with the past 
and the present, and by incorporating a faculty of 
the understanding, Hazlitt was able to acknowledge 
this. 
The three brief quotations from Hazlitt's 
muddled argument in the "Preface" are not enough in 
themselves, perhaps, to convince us that Hazlitt 
actually took this position, either with regard to 
1 Tucker, II, 1. 
2 Tucker, I, 210. 
3 Tucker, II, 320. 
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the understanding or to the imagination. We do 
have more than this to go on though. In 1809 
Hazlitt was still considering the implications of 
a faculty of the understanding. In an eight-page 
pamphlet entitled "Prospectus of a History of 
English Philosophy" he gives his first (and what 
was to be his fullest) analysis of the faculty. 
He says that he is going to prove the following, 
amongst other things: 
That the understanding or intellectual power 
of the mind is entirel distinct from simple 
percevtion or sensation. By the understanding 
I mean that faculty which perceives the relat- 
ions of things, which combines, compares, and. 
distinguishes our different impressions, and 
by which we are enabled, besides being sensible 
to the successive impulses and fluxional parts 
of objects, to consider them in reference to 
one another, or understand their connections, 
forms, and masses. Without this power we 
should not only be incapable of judging or 
reasoning on any subject, that is, of per- 
ceiving the relations between a variety of 
objects, but we could never have so much as 
a single idea of any object whatever, since 
there is no object which does not consist of 
a number of parts arranged in a certain manner. 
But of this arrangement the parts themselves 
cannot be conscious. Ideas are the offspring l of the understanding, not of the senses. 
Hazlitt's faculty of understanding accounts for the 
mind only in the past and present; there is nothing 
in this that would contradict the central view of 
the imagination as presented in the Essay. Nor is 
there in the remarks that follow, from various years: 
1H Works, II, 116-117. The last idea in this 
quotation may`have been directly influenced by Tucker. 
Locke and others had maintained that the sensations 
were ideas. Tucker makes the comment at one point 
that "in every exercise of the understanding, that 
which discerns is numerically and substantially 
distinct from that which is discerned". (Vol. I, 19) 
At another point he says that sensations "are the 
immediate causes exhibiting ideas to our perception. " (Vol. I, p. 210) 
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the understanding is "a common principle of thought, 
a superintending faculty, which alone perceives the 
relations of things, and enables us to comprehend 
their connexions, forms, and masses" (1812); 
1 "The 
province of the imagination is principally visionary, 
the unknown and the undefined: the understanding 
restores things to their natural boundaries ... " 
(1818); 2 and, the understanding "is this super- 
intending or conscious faculty or principle which 
is aware both of the colour, form, and sound of an 
object; which connects its present appearance with 
its past history; which arranges and combines the 
multifarious impressions of nature into one whole... " 
(1822). 3 Even in Hazlitt's later thought, the 
connection of present appearance and past history 
with the future would be the task of imagination. 
Hazlitt's basic ideas on the human faculties 
did not undergo much change after the initial 
formulation of his imagination theory in 1805, 
followed by the modification of that theory in 
1807. In concluding, it might be noted that just 
as Hazlitt's early ideas have failed to receive 
proper recognition so, too, the impact of those 
ideas on his later thought largely has been missed. 
It has been common to point to several works in 
Hazlitt's later life which seem to restate the 
ideas in his Essem. In particular are mentioned 
four papers submitted to the NorninF, Chronicle in 
1814; a letter to William Gifford, editor of the 
slH Works, II, 151. See also pp. 153 and 155- 
2H Works, V, p. 9. The end of this quotation 
reads, "and strips them of their fanciful pretentions. " 
I have left it out for clarity, as Hazlitt is referring 
to a more specifically aesthetic imagination which 
we will encounter later. 
3H Works, XII, p. 150. 
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Quarterly Review, in 1819; and an 1828 article 
entitled "Self-Love and Benevolence. " However, 
the impact of his ideas is much wider than these 
works suggest, for they simply focus on the question 
of imagination as the faculty of sympathy. An essay 
entitled "On Reason and Imagination", written some- 
time between 1820 and 1825, has a broader focus. It 
makes several points which originate in 1805, and 
can be-found in much of Hazlitt's later criticism, 
including his attacks on Coleridge and Wordsworth: 
imagination must be cultivated to enrich thought; l 
imagination is the force which governs our actions 
and must be seen and used as a moral force; 
2 
and 
imagination must be used to perceive the truths 
common to all men and must take man beyond simple 
concern with the self. 3 In spite of the large powers 
given to understanding, imagination still performs 
many of the essential functions of rational thought: 
"The imagination is an associating principle; and 
has an instinctive perception when a thing belongs 
to a system, or is only an exception to it. "4 The 
latter remark will help to indicate why Hazlitt, 
in his later years, was to be unsympathetic to 
Coleridge's efforts in Biographia Literaria; there, 
Coleridge was equally emphatic that imagination had 
nothing to do with association. 
1H Works, XII, 45. 
2 H'Works, XII, 50-51. 
3H Works, XII, 55. 
4H Works, XII, 51. 
CHAPTER III 
IDEAS OF. IMAGINATION: 1807-1815 
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It is the aim of this chapter to follow the 
main developments on the subject of imagination 
from 1807 up to the time of Wordsworth's 1815 
"Preface" and Coleridge's Biographia Literaria. 
One of the chief interests in this chapter will be 
in witnessing the energence of Leigh Hunt's and 
Charles Lamb's definitions of imagination; further 
consideration will be given also to Coleridge and 
Hazlitt, and the possibility of mutual influence 
among the four men. But though the title of this 
chapter suggests a tracing of ideas on a general 
theme, it could equally have been called "The 
Contra-distinguishing of Imagination to 1815", or 
some such title, for the story of imagination in 
these years is the story of two-part distinctions. 
These arose primarily out of the necessity for 
critical precision that each of the authors en- 
countered, and have not been recognised, except 
in the case of Coleridge. One would expect Coler- 
idge tb be the leading figure in this chapter, and 
in a sense he is. The influence of his ideas of 
imagination and fancy, an influence enhanced by 
his close contact with Lamb and Hazlitt, cannot be 
underestimated. Ultimately, however, it is an 
ambiguous background influence, and the most 
dramatic position in the chapter is taken by Hunt - 
not because he was most influential, but because 
he has been most overlooked. . 
Hunt and Lamb present a contrast to Coleridge 
and Hazlitt, for the factors which caused them to 
define imagination were quite different. Hunt and 
0 
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Lamb had neither the background nor the inclin- 
ätion for metaphysical explorations. Neither were 
they concerned with defining their own poetic 
processes. Lamb arrived at his definition in the 
context of an essay in which he was trying to 
establish the superiority of art in Hogarth's prints. 
Hunt's definition similarly arose for pragmatic 
reasons. He was trying to make distinctions about 
the theatrical experience that was at once the cause 
and chief focus of his treatment of imagination. 
Lamb's definition of imagination has enjoyed 
some measure of publicity ever since its publication 
(largely because Wordsworth repeated it in his 1815 
"Preface") but Hunt's definition has not been so 
fortunate. The fault was partly his own - he tucked 
it away in a footnote well into the main body of his 
Critical Essays on the Performers of the London Stage. 
The Critical Essays were probably begun early 
in 1806 and, as Hunt tells us in his "Preface", they 
were written "by starts and snatches in the midst of 
better subjects of meditation. "1 Whether these other 
subjects of meditation were better or not, they 
certainly placed more immediate demands on Hunt's 
time. He was acting as a full-time clerk in the War 
Office (a position he held until the end of 1808); - 
and for his brother, John Hunt, who was a publisher, 
Leigh was writing the weekly theatrical column for 
The News, miscellaneous pieces in The Statesman, and 
some essays for the five volume Classic Tales, of 
which he was also the general editor. Hunt was 
encouraged to continue with his Critical Essays, 
however, "partly by the originality of an enlarged 
criticism on the theatre, and principally by the hope 
of exciting an honourable ambition in the actors. "2 
1 CE, ix. 
2 CE, ix. 
I 
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By June of 1807 he was able to announce to his 
readers that his long-promised work was "on the eve 
of publication. "1 By September it was being printed 
at the offices of The News2 and only the difficulties 
encountered by John Hunt prevented the book from 
appearing before January 1808, although 1807 is the 
date on the title page. In any case Hunt's ideas, 
and particularly his definition of imagination, were 
formulated before his twenty-fourth birthday on 
October 19,1807. It was a young age to have come up 
with a workable basic theory of imagination. 
To my knowledge, Hunt's 1807 definition of 
imagination is almost completely unknown. Although 
modern students of Hunt owe a considerable debt to 
Lawrence and Carolyn Houtchens, 3 neither they, nor 
any of Hunt's numerous previous editors, have re- 
printed any material from Critical Essays, nor have 
they mentioned the fact that he had a theory of 
imagination in 1807. The same is true of those who 
have done full-length studies on Hunt, most notably 
Edmund Blunden4 and Louis Landre; 5 and also of those 
who have written articles on Hunt. C. D. Thorpe 
1 The News, 28 June, 1807. 
2 The News, 20 September, 1807. 
3 They have collected and edited some of Hunt's 
writings in the following volumes: Leigh Hunt's 
Dramatic Criticism (London, 1950) Leigh us 
terar Criticism (New York and 
fon on, 1956); and 
Leigh Hunt's Political and Occasional Essays (London,. 
i/ vL/ . 
4 See his Leigh Hunt (London, 1930); and his 
Leigh Hunt's "Exam ner"'Sxämined (London, 1928). " 
5 Leigh Hunt 1 84 1859): Contribution ä 
1'histoire du Romantisme ari la s, 2 vols. arise 1935 & MUT. - 
.ý 
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devoted several pages of a long essay on Hunt to a 
discussion of Hunt's ideas of imagination, 
' but like 
most critics both before and after him, Thorpe gener- 
ally made reference to Hunt's ideas in 1844, in Hunt's 
volume entitled Imagination and Fancy. Stephen F. 
Fogle similarly has looked to Hunt's 1844 ideas; he 
has concluded that Hunt's position on the subject of 
imagination is merely a summary of Coleridge and 
Wordsworth and, more than this, that the summary is 
almost a misrepresentation of the other men's ideas: 
Hunt's was an imitative rather than a truly 
creative mind, and, in criticism at least, 
his imitation was occasionally nearly a mis- 
representation of the original. 
Had Fogle and others considered the Critical Essays, 
they'would have found that in spite of the influence 
of Coleridge and Wordsworth, the ideas of 1844 were 
not misrepresentations of their ideas, but were the 
logical and direct outgrowth of Hunt's own early 
thought. 
There is another reason for surprise concerning 
the general oversight. When Hunt formulated his 
early definition of imagination, he did so in part 
by distinguishing it from another faculty of the 
mind, a fact which in itself would have seemed to 
invite attention. Hunt's definition, as it appears 
in the footnote on page fifty of the Critical Essays, 
reads as follows: 
I would not be understood in the following 
argument as using the words conception and 
imagination indiscrimately. oýý. ptIon. is 
a dependant and passive capacity, that receives 
ideas suggested by others, and therefore belongs principally to the actor, who displays 
the ideas of the poet. Imagination is an 
original and active power, that forms it's 
own images and impresses them upon the minds 
of others: it belongs therefore more to the poet. 
1 "Leigh Hunt as Man of Letters", Leigh Hunt's 
Literars Criticism, 1-73; esp. 25 & 51-56. 
2 "Leigh Hunt and the End of Romantic Criticism", 
Some British Romantics, 119-139; esp. 139. 
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Before I consider Hunt's application of 
conception and imagination to actors and poets, 
respectively, and the modifications he went on to 
make of that position, it is necessary to comment 
on Hunt's selection of conception to contradistinguish 
imagination. From an historical point of view it 
was an unusual selection. When imagination was 
differentiated from a similar faculty, or at least 
a faculty which might easily be confused with it, 
that faculty was usually fancy. In earlier chapters 
it was seen that Wordsworth attempted to distinguish 
fancy from imagination in his note to "The Thorn" 
and that Coleridge also made an attempt, though 
more successfully, in two of his letters. But 
modern scholarship has proven, contrary to Coleridge's 
belief, that there were numerous attempts in England 
to do the same thing from-the late 1600s onwards, 
some of them directly anticipating Coleridge. 
' 
Imagination and fancy often changed positions, 
with imagination being used sometimes to denote the 
superior faculty and sometimes to denote the inferior. 
Hunt's definition of the imagination has affinities 
with former definitions of the superior faculty, 
whether it was called imagination or not. Hunt's 
definition of conception, however, as it is stated, 
bears little resemblance to the inferior faculty 
and it seems that he is pointing to something differ- 
ent from the usual differentiation between imagination 
and fancy as faculties. 
Hunt's use of conception is somewhat closer to 
the usual 18th century definitions of conception or 
to conceive, than to the usual definitions of the 
'inferior faculty', but at best the resemblance is 
1 See: Bullitt and Bate, "Distinctions Between 
Fancy and Imagination in Eighteen-Century English 
Criticism", MLN (January, 1945), 8-15; Earl Wasserman, 
"Another Eighteenth Century Distinction Between Fancy 
and Imagination", MLN (January, 1949), 23-25; and 
R. L. Brett, "Imagination and the Association of Ideas", 
in his Fancy and Imagination, 7-30. 
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imperfect. Both words stem from the Latin 
concipere, meaning to take to one's self, to 
receive, and Hunt's description of conception as 
a 'dependent' capacity that 'receives' may have been 
influenced by that. I have consulted all the major 
English dictionaries of the century and found that 
none differs significantly from Dr. Johnson's 
treatment of the words in question; and Hunt does 
refer to Johnson's Dictionary in the Critical 
Essays. In Johnson's Dictionary conception is used, 
like fancy, as a synonym for imagination, for 
Johnson's first and second entries under imagination 
read: 
1. Fancy; the power of forming ideal 
pictures; the power of representing 
things absent to one's self or others. 
Dennis 
2. Conception; image in the mind; idea. 
Sidneyl 
Eighteenth-century usage linked conception with 
images or ideas and Hunt did as well. 
The usual synony'mizing of conception and 
imagination, as opposed to the opposition of the 
terms with Hunt, suggests even further that Hunt was 
using conception in an unusual manner. Synonymous 
usage of conception and imagination appears in the 
philosophical writings of Dugald Stewart in 1792 
and of Robert E. Scott in 1805, as Bullitt and Bates 
have shown? I have discovered that Thomas Reid did 
the same thing before' Stewart and Scott and that 
Reid might have influenced them when they did dis- 
tinguish between the two. Reid thought that if a 
separation of terms was to be made, it was imagination 
that had the lesser power:: 
1A Dictionar of the English Language (LQhdnn, 
1785). See also his entries under conception and 
imaginary. 
2 "Distinctions Between Fancy and Imagination", 
13n. & 14n. 
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Imagination, when it is distinguished from 
conception, seems to me to signify one 
species of conception; to wit, the con- 
ception of visible objects. Thus, in a 
mathematical proposition, I imagine the 
figure, and I conceive the demonstration;. 
it would not I think be improper to say, 
I conceive both; but it would not be so 
proper to say, I imagine the demonstration. 
What Stewart and Scott did, however, was to invert 
Reid's interpretation, making conception just one 
of the powers of imagination and thus, in making 
conception inferior and in seeing it as simple 
apprehension, they were moving closer to Hunt's 
stance. But that said, it was a position they 
held only infrequently. 
It is doubtful that Hunt would have read any 
of these philosophers and it is just as unlikely 
that Hunt was primarily, not coincidentally, 
engaging himself in a delineation of the mental 
faculties. Hunt was responding to two different 
kinds of art in the theatre and it is in this con- 
text that we come to a more plausible precedent for 
Hunt's use of conception. I have found it in a 
little-known two-volume work by John Trusler, 
published in London in 1766. Titled The Difference 
Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in the English 
Language, it in fact makes no mention of a distinc- 
tion between imagination and fancy, presumably 
because Trusler felt they were genuine synonyms. 
Trusler uses the word imagination in two instances. 
In the first he clarifies the difference between 
imagination and the words idea, thought, and notion. 
The latter words refer, to the representation, con- 
sideration, and opinion of an object, and are said 
to be appropriately described by the words just, 
fine and respectable. Imagination is the 'forming' 
power which enables opinions and is described as 
brilliant. 2 
1 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 371. 
2 Trusler, Vol. I, 118. 
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Further on in the book Trusler compares 
understand, comprehend and conceive: 
... conceive, relates, more especially, to the or ed design, of what, we 
propose .... 
LItJ 
appears with greater 
elegance, when, it relates to forms, 
arrangement, projects, and plans; in 
short, all that depends on the imagination. 
We understand languages. We com- 
rehend sciences. We conceive, whatever 
has ation to the ar s. 
It is difficult to understand that, 
which is enigmatical; to comprehend that, 
which is abstruse; an , to conceive that, 
which is confused .... 
LReadiness 
of con- 
ception, denotes, a clear head. 
A lover, understands the language of 
the passions. A learned man, comprehends 
the metaphysical questions of the schools. 
An architect, conceives the plan and 
economy of buildings.! 
There are a couple of points to be made here, 
and the first is that Trusler explicitly links 
conceiving or conception to the arts in a manner 
unusual in the 18th century, and very similar to 
what is suggested by Hunt. Further, Trusler casts 
conception in a role that is dependent upon 
imagination, and in that Hunt is identical to him. 
It is possible that Hunt used Trusler's definition 
of conception as a basis for his own and that Hunt 
saw actors conceiving the plan and economy of their 
roles in a similar way to Trusler's seeing the 
architect conceive the plan and economy of his 
buildings. 
Hunt and Trusler differed on the subject of 
imagination. Trusler's imagination had an ambiguous 
'forming' role in relation to ideas, thoughts and 
notions in his first definition and in relation to 
conception in his second. Hunt is emphatic about 
a clear division between conception and imagination. 
He lays more stress than Trusler (or even Hazlitt in 
the previous chapter) on imagination being a creative 
act. -. " 
[It ] is an original and active power that forms 
it's own images.... " For Hunt, conception was not 
1 Truslez; I, 152-153. 
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creative. Hunt's conception and imagination are 
both rooted in the arts, but they are completely 
different powers. When he speaks of the one being 
passive and the other being active, he is stressing 
that conception can only receive already-formed 
ideas 4p 
It was the clear distinction between con- 
ception and imagination that allowed Hunt to ascribe 
the former to actors and the latter to poets. Like 
all generalizations, it was too broad a categor- 
ization to hold up to intensive analysis, but as is 
the case in some generalizations, it expressed the 
desired point very succinctly: the conception of a 
role must be the primary and constant focus of the 
actor - it is not the actor's business to create a 
new character on stage. Hunt modified his definition 
. in this direction immediately after he made it, still 
in the footnote. He suggested that there were times 
in a play where the poet's directives were inadequate 
for the dramatic sense and it was in instances like 
this that the actor's imagination, in addition to 
his conception, was needed. Hunt's own words 
illustrate the kind of thing he was meaning - he 
was watching Mrs. Siddons in the "insipid" tragedy 
of The Grecian Daughter: 
This heroine has obtained for her aged and 
imprisoned father some unexpected assistance 
from the guard Philotas: transported with 
gratitude, but having nothing from the poet 
to give expression to her feelings, she starts 
with extended arms and casts herself in mute 
prostration at his feet. I shall never forget 
the glow, which rushed to my cheeks at this 
sublime action. -' 
From Hunt's description we might wonder that the glow 
on his cheeks was not embarrassment. But I think it 
safe to assume that in this instance it was his 
description that was not up to the occasion, not his 
judgement, for he assures us that this demonstration 
1 CE, 20-21. 
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of Mrs. Siddon's imagination was both natural and 
spirited. 
The argument to which Hunt's footnote is 
appended is centered around the definitions of 
imagination and conception he proposes and in the 
course of the argument it is clear that he is making 
several other modifications of the manner in which 
the terms are to be applied. The original definitions 
implied that Hunt's system for classifying art was 
straight-forward; but that simplicity vanishes when 
he applies his theories beyond the histrionic realm 
in which they originated. The recognition that 
imagination was superior to conception and character- 
ized 'poetical genius' as opposed to the lower genius 
of 'humour and wit', 
1 led Hunt to make a series of 
distinctions about various artists. Homer and 
Sophocles were superior to Terence and Plautus; as 
Benjamin West was to Smirk; Michael Angelo to Hogarth; 
Shakespeare to Congreve; and as were Milton or 
Shakespeare to Swift. 2 
Hunt felt that a great painter displayed more 
imagination than a great musician (and on the same 
basis, a great poet was superior to them both). 
3 
Still, within the field of music, Handel displayed 
a more poetical genius than did Reeve, whose pieces 
for the theatre failed to rise to the sublime. Mid 
even the lowest musician, because he required "some 
degree of imagination", had a more poetical genius 
than a maker of musical instruments, who was "a mere 
manufacturer. "4 
1 William Duff in his Essay on Original Genius (1767) makes a similar connection between imagination 
and genius on one hand, and fancy and wit and humour on 
the other, though he does not use the concept of a 
poetical genius as opposed to other kinds. See: 
Bullitt and Bates, p. 11. 
2 These points, and the ones that follow in the 
next paragraph, I have drawn from Critical Essays, pp. 52-55 
3 The merit of the actor in conjunction with the 
musician, painter and poet was indicated in the Examiner, 
31 January, 1808: "the histrionic profession... as a 
mer. i. t inferior to the other polite arts except music. " 
4 CE, 54. 
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Imagination was also the determining factor 
in distinguishing good'taste from poor in the arts. 
The imagination of poetical genius is occupied 
with "the intellectual properties of human nature", 
"the contemplation of heroism, of wisdom, and of 
virtue; it is occupied with the soul only": it 
is not occupied with "the vulgarities of common 
life. "1 And here Milton was superior to Butler, 
Corneille, and Rabelais; Dante was to Tassoni; and 
Raphael and Guido demonstrated more noble taste than 
"the grotesque postures, and monstrosities of Callot, 
or the historical attempts of Hogarth. "2 
Knote of qualification must be voiced: Hunt 
was explicit in identifying good taste with imagin- 
ation, but he was careful to avoid suggesting that 
conception was necessarily the-mark of poor taste. 
Where imagination was lacking, conception, too, was 
often lacking, and limited to portraying the vulgar- 
ities Hunt spoke of, but he did not suggest that this 
was always so. 
The terms conception and imagination were used 
frequently throughout the Critical Essays, both before 
and after he defined them in his footnote. He began 
using the terms more than two years before the 
Critical Essays, however. The earliest use of con- 
ception I have found is in his "Theatricals" column 
in The News, 29 September, 1805. He speaks of Kemble 
lacking "an immediate vivacity of conception and 
unstudied expression", and of Mrs. Siddons, as Juliet, 
being dignified "in her conception and delivery. " 
Both uses suggest he is using conception in the same 
manner as he later defined it. Hunt's first critical 
use of the word imagination was in the same column a 
month later when he spoke of Macbeth being possessed 
by "the phantoms of a diseased imagination". 3 
1 CE, 54. The discussion of taste and 
imagination occurs on pp. 54-57. 
2 CE, 55. 
3 The News, 20 October, 1805. 
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By January, 1808, when the Critical Essays 
went-on sale, the first issue of The Examiner had 
appeared. Hunt was the editor, writing the political 
leaders for the weekly publication, as well as being 
the theatre reviewer and a contributor of poems and 
various articles. The paper was a success: by 1809 
he was making sufficient money from it to enable him 
to plan marriage and to give up his job in the War 
Office (a position which was causing him increasing 
embarrassment because of his criticisms of the 
government). The Critical Essays also appears to 
have been a success, at least in London, if we can 
judge by the reviews it received. Of the six reviews 
I have looked at from 1808-1809, only one was unfavour- 
able. 
1 The longest and most laudatory was by Richard 
Cumberland and was given the first twenty-one pages 
of an issue of his The London Review? Cumberland, 
incidentally, was the only modern comic dramatist, 
apart from Sheridan, who had received high praise 
from Hunt. None of the reviews mentioned imagination 
and conception, and Hunt himself did not come back 
to his specific theory, although he applied it in 
the pages of The Examiner. 
Of the men in this study, only Coleridge was 
active on the subject of imagination between the 
years 1808 and 1811. Hazlitt had followed his work 
on Tucker with the Reply to Malthus and a book on 
the British Senate. 
3 
During 1808 he was at his wife's 
place in Winterslow, preparing a grammar of the 
English language and a prospectus for lectures 
1 The Satirist, 1 March, 1808 (Vol. II), pp. 75-84" 
2 The London Review, Vol. II, No. III, 1 August, 
1809. See also: The Monthly Mirror, n. s. Vol. III, 
1808, pp. 105-109; Lady's °tont useum, n. s. Vol. V, 
1808, pp. 42-43; Critica Review, --Third Series, Vol. XIV, August, 1808, pp. 37k-379; an he AntiJacobin Review 
and Magazine, June, 1809, p. 191. 
3 There is no extant copy of the latter, although 
several sources refer to his authorship of it. 
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on English philosophy, both of which were published 
in the following year. At the end of, 1809 he joined' 
Henry Crabb Robinson in London in working for Cumber- 
land on The London Review, but the paper collapsed 
shortly afterwards and Hazlitt spent most of 1810 
and 1811 on his painting career. 
Lamb, too, was occupied in areas distant from 
theorising on the imagination. He followed his work 
on Tales From Shakespeare (1807) with another 
children's book in 1808, a version of Chapman's 
Ulysses. In the same year he established his name 
as a critic with Specimens of English Dramatic Poets 
Contemporary with Shakespeare. Most of his energies 
during the years in question were devoted to his 
tasks at India House, however, and to the demands 
placed on him by Mary Lamb. 
From January to June, 1808, Coleridge was in 
London delivering a series of lectures (which probably 
numbered eighteen) at the Royal Institution. We are 
unfortunate in having only poor records of the mater- 
ial which might have been in these lectures, and even 
some of the material which has been thought to be 
from 1808 has recently been cast into doubt. ' In 
the summer prior to the lectures Coleridge wrote to 
Sir HumphrOy Davy outlining the plan for his lectures, 
and it is clear that imagination and fancy were to 
be the major themes. His topic was going to be his 
general and philosophical principles of poetry, and 
he announced to Davy that he had recently decided to 
confine himself to discussing literature. Nonetheless, 
he maintained:. 
1 Much of the material on imagination suggested 
by T. M. Raysor to belong to 1808 (see CSC, I& II) has 
been determined impossible to date any moe precisely 
than 1808-1811 in Volume 3 of the Coleridge Notebooks. 
In the latter see particularly 3246,3246n-, 3247 and 
3247n for significant entries on imagination and the 
problems of dating. 
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In the course of these I shall have said, 
all I know, the whole result of many years' 
continued reflection on the subjects of 
Taste, Imagination, Fancy, Passion, the 
source of our pleasures in the fine Arts, 
in the antithetical balance-loving nature 
of man, & the connection of such pleasures 
with moral excellence. 
Naturally this is an enthusiastic statement 
of intent, not achievement, but from the material 
we have, it seems that his intent was at least 
partially realised. The themes he mentions were 
discussed, but it is not possible to determine how 
Coleridge related taste, passion, pleasure, anti- 
thesis and morality to his other themes of imagin- 
ation and fancy in 1808. However they were linked, 
there is no evidence that the relationship was 
closely drawn. This is a significant point, for 
when we arrive at Biographia Literaria the relation- 
ship in most cases is not only explicit, but the 
various themes are also defining elements of 
imagination. The story of imagination and Coler- 
idge, particularly in the eight years prior to 
Biographia Literaria, is the story of imagination 
spreading her wings to become a comprehensive 
philosophy, and as it involves far more than 
imagination and fancy, the telling of much of it 
is best left until the next chapter. 
The difficulties with dating can be overcome 
if we look at 1808-1811 as a unit, instead of con- 
centrating on the lectures separately, a convenient 
step for us because of the silence of the other 
men during this period. This takes in the period of 
The Friend (1809-10), Coleridge's periodical which 
ran to twenty-seven numbers. It is surprising that 
despite the volume of material in that, there is 
nothing by way of theoretical treatment of the 
imagination. 
1 CL, III, To Humphry Davy, 9 September, 1807, 
30. Cite$-also in CSC, II1 5-6, where Raysor gives 
the date as 11 September. 
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Coleridge's treatment of imagination between 
1808 and 1811 is an expansion from former years 
and demonstrates an evolution, not'a revolution, 
in thought. Imagination is still largely the 
modifying power of Coleridge's early letters, but 
it is for the first time called the unifying and 
fusing power in the two quotations below. In the 
second we fand echoes of the earlier thought that, 
poetic endeavour is "a dim Analogue of Creation": 
' 
[Above Fancy is], Imagination, or the power 
by wh1ich one, image or feeling is made to 
modify many others, & by a sort of fusion 
to force many into one - that which after 
sewed itself in such might & energy in 
Lear, where the deep anguish of a Father 
spreads the feeling of Ingratitude & Cruelty 
over the Elements of Heaven -. Various 
are the workings of this greatest faculty 
of the human mind - both passionate & 
tranquil.... 2 (1808) 
Imagination/power of modifying one image or 
feeling by the precedent or following ones 
- So often afterwards to be illustrated that 
at present I shall speak only of - one of 
its effects - namely, that of combining many 
circumstances 1y into one moment of thought 
to produce that ultimate end of human Thought, 
and human Feeling, Unity and thereby the 
- reduction of the Spirit to its Principle & Fountain, who alone is truly one. 
Imagination was linked to the manner in which 
our perception is altered by our emotions in Words- 
worth's 1800 "Prefacd'. The thought may have been 
partly Coleridge's then, but in this period we have 
Coleridge clearly stating it: "[there is a] differ- 
ent manner, in which inanimate objects, or objects 
unimpassioned in themselves, are seen by the mind in 
moments of strong excitement and according to the 
kind of excitement.... "' He includes "poetic feeling", 
along with jealousy, rage, and love, as illustrations 
of the kind of excitement he means. 
1 CL, II, To Sharp, 15 January, 1804, p. 1034. 
2 CN, 3290. 
3 CN, 3247- 
4 CN, 3246. The same theme may have been suggested 
in a notebook entry for December, 1804; he refers to fancy 
and imagination in conjunction with psychology and "the 
modification of the same feeling by difference of form". 
See cri, 2357. 
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-Coleridge's ideas of fancy in 1808-11 are 
in line with his former ideas. He calls it the 
"faculty of bringing together". 
1 It is "the 
aggregative power" which brings together "Images 
dissimilar in the main by some one point e or 
more Likeness - distinguished - ". 
2 Coleridge is 
also probably referring to fancy when he speaks of 
"the poetic Power of; making every thing present to 
the Imagination/both the forms, & the passions 
that. modify these forms". 3 
In this period Coleridge, unlike Hunt, seems 
increasingly aware that a distinction between. 
mental faculties can serve as a. means of simplify- 
ing, if-not answering, a whole range of questions 
about poetry and psychological perception. The 
basic distinction is one he returns to frequently. 
Shortly after Coleridge moved back to London after 
finishing The Friend, Robinson records a conversat- 
ion at Charles Lamb's. Coleridge was speaking of 
an elaborate and somewhat obscure distinction 
between fancy and imagination. The excess of 
fancy is delirium; of imagination, mania. 
Fancy is the arbitrary bringing together of 
things that lie remote, and forming them into. 
a unity. The materials lie ready formed for 
the mind, and the fancy acts only by a sort 
of juxtaposition. In imagination, on the 
contrary, the mind from the excitement of 
some slight impression generates and produces 
a form of its own. As an instance of fanciful 
delirium may be 'cited the gell-known "seas 
of milk and ships of amber". 
As a point of interest, Robinson used the word 
obscure to describe Wordsworth's 1815 distinction 
between imagination and fancy, as well as this one 
of Coleridge's in late 1810.5 The Robinson account 
1 ON, 3290 (March, 1808). 
2 ON, 3247. Fancy is also described as 
aggregative in 3827 (May, 1810). 
3 CN, 3246. 
4 CMC, 387-8,15 November, 1810. 
5 CMC, 396. 
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is important, however, in suggesting the type of 
conversation when Coleridge attended Lamb's regular 
meetings and in confirming that Charles Lamb was 
fully conversant with Coleridge's ideas. 
Lamb had as yet written nothing about the 
imagination. At the beginning of 1811, in what 
was probably their first meeting, 
' Hunt approached 
Lamb to see if he would be interested in contribut- 
ing to his Reflector. The first number had already 
appeared but in the remaining three numbers (27 July 
and 25 October, 1811, and 23 March, 1812) Lamb 
managed to have fourteen pieces published. Two 
of these were long critical essays, one on Hogarth, 
the other on Shakespeare, appearing in the third 
and fourth numbers respectively. It was in these 
that Lamb voiced most of his thoughts on the subject 
of imagination. 
The Hogarth essay was completed in the spring 
of 1811 and was applauded at that time by Coleridge 
and Lamb's other friends. 2 Lamb's definition of 
imagination appears in the essay: 
... imagination... - that power which draws 
all things to one, - which makes things 
animate and inanimate, beings with their 
attributes, subjects and their accessories, 
take one colour, and serve to one effect. 
Every ýhing... to use a vulgar expression, 
tells. 
The definition itself may have been influenced 
by Coleridge. There is the suggestion of Coleridge's 
l Kenneth Kendall is the first to deal 
adequately with the question in his Leigh Hunt's 
Reflector (The Hague & Paris, 1971), 61-65. 
2 Robinson records Coleridge warmly praising 
the essay on 28 July, 1811. Cited in Kendall, Leigh 
Hunt's Reflector, 68. 
3L Works, I, 73. The text given by Lucas is 
that of 1818, buut in checking this against the 1811 
text I have found it the same, with the exception of 
a paragraph division. Because of availability, I 
quote. the Lucas text. 
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earlier thought about poetic feeling altering the 
perception of inanimate objects. There is also 
the suggestion of Coleridge's thought in praise 
of "Venus and Adonis": "How many Images & feelings 
are here brought together without effort & without 
discord". 1 There may be a variation on Coleridge's 
theme of imagination and unity. The similarities 
between Lamb and Coleridge are present, but to do 
anything more than acknowledge them is perhaps of 
limited value. They exist on a surface level. 
Lamb's extended definition of imagination, derived 
from an analysis of the essay itself, affirms that 
Lamb's concept is his', own, and is used for his own 
purposes. 
It is possible that Leigh Hunt was an influence 
on the essay at large. It is a matter of interesting 
coincidence that Lamb addresses points Hunt made 
about Hogarth in the Critical Essays. For instance, 
Hunt says at one point:. 
Hogarth ridiculed with infinite happiness 
the want of taste in painters; but he 
could not correct them by example. His 
serious pictures, so far from being models 
of grace, are scarcely any thing better 
than unintended caricatures; his Moses 
brought before Pharaoh looks like a school- 
boy approaching his master in all the fear 
of a whipping. 
Lamb takes up the same subject: 
Hogarth's excursions into Holy Land were not 
very numerous, but what he has left us in 
this kind have at least this merit, that they 
have expression of some sort or other in them, - 
the Child Moses before Pharaoh's au hter, 
for instance: which is more an can be said 
of Sir Joshua Reynolds's Repose in Egypt...? 
1 CN, 3290 (March, 1808). 
2 C, 55. 
3L Works, I. 76. 
. _. h. ý 
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Hunt attacks Hogarth''s taste, finds in him an 
artist of merely the humorous, and suggests that 
the genius in Hogarth is an inferior genius -a 
geniis of conception rather than imagination. 1 
Lamb argues for the sophistication of Hogarth's 
taste, argues that Hogarth has been misinterpreted 
if he is seen as merely humorous, and posits his 
own definition of imagination to define the 
character of Hogarth's genius. In Lamb's essay - 
fully titled "On the Genius of Hogarth; With Some 
Remarks of a Passage' in the Writings of the late 
Mr. Barry" - Hunt is not mentioned. It is the 
opinions of Barry (Works and Life, 1809) and Sir 
Joshua Reynolds which are explicitly under attack. 
Lamb's definition of imagination has been 
noted by critics2 but his particular thoughts on 
imagination, beyond the definition itself, have 
never been explored. The most distinctive feature 
of what Lamb says about the imagination is the 
emphasis he places on reflection or depth of 
thought. Coleridge, Hazlitt and Hunt all suggest 
that imagination is primarily a spontaneous or 
intuitive faculty which has a means of directly 
arriving at the truth. Not so for Lamb. Lamb 
sees imagination in Hogarth and in Shakespeare 
as something continually informed by or involved 
in a meditative action of the human mind. 
1 See CE, 52 & 55. 
2 See, for instance, W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., 
and Cleanth-Brooks, Literar Criticism: A Short 
Hiätor9 (New York, 1957), 387- R. I. oa es do-es 
not treat Lamb in his Romantic Criticism 1800- 
0 
1800- 
(London, 1968). Renee e e, In As or 1850 1 (London, 
Criticism 1 0-1 0; Vol.. II, 7rhe The-Romantic 
Acre (New Haven, 1955), mentions Lamb's definition 
(14? ) but makes no attempt to find any system in Lamb's thought (see 191-195)" 
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It is probable that this view of imagination 
stems from Lamb's orientation as a reader in his 
approach to the subject. The suggestion is Lamb's 
own: - "[Hogarth's] graphic representations are 
indeed books: they have the teeming, fruitful, 
suggestive meaning of words. Other'ptctures wo look 
at, - his prints we read. "'. Lamb's main point is 
that readers have failed to use imagination in their 
approach to Hogarth. The use of imagination implies 
abstracting one's thoughts, going beyond one's 
initial, superficial reaction, and discovering the 
reflective quality of the poet's mind, as it is 
evidenced by the unity of his creation. 
In Lamb's approach to Hogarth and the subject 
of imagination, he does not try to dismiss charges 
of poor taste and low morality. Rather, he admits 
them. Then, as if to underline the power of the 
poet's (and the reader's) imagination, he points 
to the manner in which Hogarth's art can be vindi- 
cated from those charges if sufficient sensitivity 
and imagination are employed. Thus the initial 
laughter provoked by a superficial inspection of 
the characters in the Harlot's Funeral can become 
sacrificed to sympathy for the pathetic state of 
the people in a longer examination. 2 Thus in Gin 
Lane, where Lamb admits there is "plenty of poverty 
and low stuff to disgust upon a superficial view", 
3 
1L Works, Is 71. Coleridge expresses an 
identical oug t sometime between May and August, 
1811: "... every thing in Hogarth is to be translated 
into Lan uage - words -& to act as words, not as Images, that in nature would actually expressing 
the fact, or co-exist as in the picture... " (CN, 
4096) It is not possible to establish who made the 
remark first, though I suspect it was Lamb as Coler- 
idge prefaces this remark with an example he sees as "one proof of a hundred" of the truth of the remark. 
He does not claim the thought is his and maintains 
Lamb's originality as late as 1816. 
ZSee, Coleridge's 
Miscellaneous Criticism, 'p. 397). 
2L Works, I, 73- 




an imaginative study reveals an almost prophetic . 
"diabolical spirit of phrenzy"1 infusing the entire 
composition. So, too, in prints like Boys Under 
Demoniacal Possession, the comical expressions might 
initially be felt unsuitable for the tragedy of the 
situation. Yet if one stops to reflect, one will 
see evidence of the poet's imagination which 1 
initially perceived that naturally comic expressions. 
are in fact the expressions of real madness. 
2 
When Lamb is talking about the manner in which 
initial impressions may be inverted, he is essent- 
ially talking about the manner in which a studied 
approach to art may discöver an inherent unity 
which, in turn, identifies the presence of imagin- 
ation. It is the meditative imagination of the poet 
which distils unity in creation, and it is the 
meditative imagination of the reader which will 
perceive it. 
The Hogarth essay ostensibly does not contain 
a division between imagination and fancy, but it 
can be argued that the groundwork is there - and 
it is Lamb's own groundwork, not that borrowed from 
others. In the 1812 essay on Shakespeare, the 
detailed discussion of which belongs to other 
chapters, the terms fancy and imagination are used 
almost without explanation. It is clear, however, 
that fancy is linked to sensory perception or rather, 
the superficial, intuitive reactions. Imagination, 
as in the Hogarth essay, is connected with intellect- 
ual abstraction. While Lamb undoubtedly knew 
Coleridge's distinctions between imagination and 
fancy, and he may have adopted the terms from him 
for critical purposes. Nonetheless, his definition 
of both terms is his own. 
1L Works, I, 71+. 
2 See L. Works, I, 76-7. There is 
autobiograph ca n Lamb's comment that 
madness in Hogarth are "so unforced and 
those who never were ºitness to madness 
think they see nothing; but what is fami; 
(76) ' 
. '' 
a hint of the 
the faces of 
natural l that in real life 
Liar to them. ,' 
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It must be remembered that for all Coleridge 
had written on imagination and fancy, he had as yet 
published nothing on the subject. His first 
published remarks appeared in Robert Southey's 
miscellany, Omn ianä, in November, 1812, the year 
before Southey received the laureateship. The 
relevant entry by Coleridge contains short defin- 
itions of other faculties besides imagination and 
fancy (the imitative power, understanding, speculat- 
ive reason, will, choice and volition) and is quoted 
in its entirety by Coleridge at the end of Chapter 
XII of Biographia Literaria. 
1 Imagination is the by 
now familiar "shaping 'and modifying power" and fancy 
is described as "the aggregative and associative 
power". It is the description of fancy that was 
to become famous for in 1815 Wordsworth took issue 
with Coleridge's denying the powers of fancy to 
imagination. The definition has become so well- 
known that it now seems generally assumed that this 
was always Coleridge's definition of fancy. I do 
not believe that commentators on Coleridge have ever 
pointed out that this-'is the first time that Cole--- 
ridge calls fancy associative. 
This matter. may have some significance with 
regard to Coleridge's critical application of his 
theories, but it has more bearing on Coleridge 
scholarship. If it could be proved that Coleridge's 
ideas on fancy (in his prose) underwent considerable 
change before they were finalized, it would cast 
doubt on the theories that Coleridge merely lifted 
his distinctions from earlier writers. Moreover, 
it would reinforce the notion, in this case at least, 
that when Coleridge used a term that had been frequent- 
ly used before, he (like Lamb) did not import it to 
his vocabulary complete with the meaning it had 
previously been given, but rather evolved around it 
his own meaning. 2 
1 BL, I, 193-4 (Everyman, 160). 
2 This may have an indirect bearing on Coler- 
idge's ideas of primary and secondary imagination and 
whether or not Coleridge is using them in an identical 
fashion to Tetens. See: McFarland "The Origin and . 
Significance of Coleridge's Theory of Secondary Imagination. " 
I I.! 
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I would like to suggest an argument for 
seeing the 1812 definition as a major change in 
thought. Coleridge's earliest description of fancy 
posed it as the aggregating faculty, not the assoc- 
iative; this was more than a year after he claimed 
to have refuted the doctrine of association: 
If I do not greatly delude myself, I have 
not only completely extricated the notions 
of Time and Space; but have overthrown the 
doctrine of Association, as taught by 
Hartley, and with it all the irreligious 
metaphysics of modern Infidels - especially, 
the doctrine of Necessity. - This I have 
done .... -1 
A'. letter to Southey in 1803 elaborates this position:: 
"I almost think that Ideas never recall Ideas, as 
far as they are Ideas - any more than Leaves in a 
forest create each other's motion.... If I had said, 
no one Idea ever recalls another, I am confident 
that I could support the assertion. "2 Instead, he 
proposed another theory: 
.... I hold, that association depends in a 
much larger degree on the recurrence of 
resembling states of Feeling, than on Trains 
of Ides/ that the recollection of early 
childhood in latest old age depends on, & 
is explicable by this -& if this be true, 
Hartley's System totters. 3 
I suggest that it is this new theory Coleridge is 
alluding to when, a week later, he again writes to 
Southey: 
1 CL, II, To Thomas Poole, 16 March, 1801. 
2 CL, II, To Robert Southey, 7 August, 1803. 
Coleridge was possibly hinting towards a similar 
thought nine years earlier: "I go further than 
Hartley and believe the corporeality of thought, 
namely, that it is motion. " CL, I, To Robert 
Southey, 11 December, 1794. 








... there is a state of mind, wholly unnoticed, 
as far as I know, by any Physical or Meta- 
physical Writer hitherto, & which yet is 
necessary to the . explanation of some of 
the 
most important phaenomena of Sleep & Disease/ 
it is a transmutation of the succession of 
Time into the Juxtaposition o Space, -Ty which 
t Fe smallest Impulses, if quickly & regularly 
recurrent, aggregate themselves -& attain a 
kind of visual magnitude with a correspondent 
Intensity of general Feeling. - The simplest 
Illustration would be the circle of Fire made 
by whirling rounj a live Coil= only here the 
mind is passive. 
If I am correct in linking the two letters to Southey, 
it would appear that Coleridge supplanted Hartley's 
theory of association with his own theory of 
aggregation: in the one the mind was passive and 
depended on trains of ideas and in the other the 
mind was active and depended on trains of feeling. 
2 
This would have been an attractive alternative for 
Coleridge as he had earlier rejected the passivity 
of mind which the materialist philosophy implied. 
3 
In any case, Coleridge's first definition of fancy as 
opposed to imagination had described fancy as 
aggregating, not associating (1802); - and this con- 
tinued to be the case in 180+ and in 1808. 
There is one more'point which may be of rele- 
vance here. In one of the Notebook entries which 
we have already mentioned, dating between 1808 and 
1811, Coleridge defines imagination and fancy but 
places between them another faculty, or rather, 
another requirement for the poet. He describes it as« 
1 CL, II, To Robert Southey, 14 August, 1803. 
Cbleridge-'Zrid not attribute the above to fancy in 
the letter. The significance of the passage is the 
manner in which the mind aggregates material. 
2 Strong support for this argument, and A, of tkA t 
further support/that Coleridge had been thinking along 
these lines, may be found in CL, I, To Thomas Poole, 
19 May, 1799:. "I could half suspect that what are 
deemed fine descriptions, produce their effects almost 
purely by a charm of words, with which & with those 
combinations, we associate feelings indeed, but no 
distinct Images. " i, 
3 See CL, II, To Thomas Poole, 23 March, 1801. 
I 
79 
- That power of & energy of what a late 
living peemoet has grandly & appropriately. 
To flash upon that inward Eye Which is the 
Bliss of Solitude -& to make every thing 
present by the a Series of Images - This 
an absolute Essential of Poetry, & of itself 
would form a poet, tho' not of the highest 
Class - It is however a most hopeful Symptom 
& the V. &A. is one continued Specimen/ 
The mention of the series of images is the first 
explicit suggestion in Coleridge's writing that 
association, in a Hartleyean sense of the word, is 
required for poetry. Placed after the aggregative 
fancy in the note, yet before imagination (which 
represents the highest class of poetry), it is 
possible that this power was amalgamated with the 
earlier fancy to form the 1812 definition. The 
note may in fact herald that change in thought. 
Coleridge's Omniana definition appeared at the 
end of an eventful year. Coleridge had finished his 
lectures on Shakespeare and Milton, and Hazlitt had 
given his lectures on English Philosophy. The 
Reflector reached its last number and its demise 
marked the end of a period of literary activity for 
Charles Lamb - in the next years he published little 
until his 1818 Works. In the spring of 1812 Lamb 
gnd Robinson helped to patch the ailing Coleridge- 
Wordsworth relationship and at Lamb's place, Hunt 
and Hazlitt met for the first time. At the end of 
the year, when Hunt and Hazlitt were meeting regularly 
at Haydon's studio, the government was successful in 
its third attempt to convict Hunt and his brother for 
libel in The Examiner, and both Hunts were facing two- 
year prison sentences which were to begin in February 
of the next year. Coleridge had reissued The Friend, 
was lecturing on Shakespeare at the Surrey Institution, 
and was preparing for the January re-opening of Drury 
Lane and the production of his Remorse. 
1 CN, 3247. See also 3246, probably from 





During the next two years (1813 and 1814) 
it was Hazlitt, of the four men in our study, who 
displayed the most literary activity. This in 
largely because he was; just beginning his career 
as a journalist and critic and the others were 
temporarily retiring from their journalistic 
connections. But Hunt was busy as well, despite 
poor health and imprisonment; he continued to 
write the leader articles for The Examiner and 
had time to devote to writing poetry. Both of 
these men made additional contributions to the 
contradistinguishing of imagination. 
The clearest evidence of this for Hunt comes 
out in his 1814 and 1815 editions of The Feast of 
the Poets, a poem first published in the last number 
of The Reflector. The later separate editions of 
the work carried lengthy notes which mention 
imagination and particularly fancy several times 
and include a short critical essay on Wordsworth. 
' 
The timing was unfortunate: Hunt was dealing with 
the 1802 "Preface" and poems (which, incidentally, 
along with Wordsworth's other work, Hunt had not 
read until 1812 or possibly later), not the 1815 
"Preface"'which was already in preparation. Thus 
while we have Hunt's specific responses to many of 
Wordsworth's ideas about poetry, we do not have his 
reaction to Wordsworth's differentiation between 
imagination and fancy. 2 It is a matter of interest, 
however, that Hunt was using the earlier "Preface"; 
Hunt's use of fancy in his notes could not have 
come-from what Wordsworth had written to that date. 
1' Feast of the Poets (London, 1814), see 92-107. 
2 The 1815 edition came out after Wordsworth's 
1815 Poems, as Hunt acknowledges in mentioning that 
his a me iration for Wordsworth has risen after reading 
the volumes (See Feast in Poetical Works of Leigh Hunt 
[London, 1819), Vol II, l. Hunts poem is slightly 
altered concerning Wordsworth, but the body of his 
notes remained unchanged. 
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In the early "Preface", Wordsworth explicitly 
linked the poetry of feeling and passion with 
imagination. In Hunt's comments on the "Preface", 
Hunt seems to do the same. But unlike Wordsworth, 
Hunt points to a "secondary species of poetry" 
which is classified by fancy. Its characteristics, 
for instance in the case of the Gray poem Wordsworth 
cites, are classical and metaphorical allusions 
which refer to natural emotions rather than create 
them. 1 Hunt suggests that fancy involves very 
particular, detailed associations that are orier4ed-,, 
towards the factual world of knowledge. 
It is interesting that Hunt's response to 
Wordsworth's early "Preface" was a division of poetry 
into two classifications which correspond with those 
Wordsworth himself employed in the year after Hunt's 
comments. I have not been able to prove whether or 
not these thoughts about fancy were a new line of 
thinking for Hunt. Hunt had used the word fancy 
as part of his critical vocabulary from early in 
his career, and often in a manner that suggests it 
is a synonym for imagination (using both terms 
loosely). For example, he spoke of the "verge of 
fancy beyond which it is a pain even for poetry to 
venture ", 2 of the "wild fancy of Hamlet", 3 and of 
the manner in which Tate turned Shakespeare's feel- 
ing "into scanty sprinklings over his own barren 
fancy. "4 If Hunt were using the words synonymously, 
the first evidence I have found which suggests they 
are not synonymized is in a review of Julius Caesar 
at the end of March, 1812; there he comments that 
Feast of the Poets (1814), 102-103- 
2 CE' 110. 
3 The News, 28 June, 1807- 





the play is one of Shakespeare's least poetical, 
lacking both colour and ornament, but contends 
that "fancy and imagination did not stir the 
business of the scene". 1 This is paltry evidence 
to go on, but it is the best we have. The date 
might be significant, for it was one week after 
the last number of the Reflector in which Lamb 
spoke of fancy and imagination. Significantly 
too, it comes only shortly after Coleridge's 
lectures, of which Hunt attended at least one and 
at which he might have heard Coleridge's distinction. 
There is, however, another possibility - it 
is that Hunt used fancy as a term closely related 
to conception. This certainly seems to be the 
case in 1814, when fancy, like conception, defines 
the lower species of art, deals mainly with sorting 
out and clarifying factual material, and has little 
to do with passions. But in 1807 it might have 
been the case as well, for in the Critical Essays 
on at least one occasion Hunt spoke of an actor's 
conception of character lacking "boldness of 
fancy", 2 a usAage which suggests that fancy is 
not a synonym for imagination (since conception 
and imagination were opposed) and may hint at a 
slight difference between fancy and conception. 
The point was made in the former chapter 
that Hazlitt's extensive 1805 theory of the imagin- 
ation was not aesthetic so much as it was meta- 
physical and perceptual. In the course of working 
as a critic, however, he adapted the theory to his 
critical purposes, and it was a change that he made 
" easily. One of the results was the emergence of 
1 Examiner, 29 March, 1812. 
2 CE, 46. 
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fancy in his theory, although Elizabeth Schneider 
has maintained otherwise. 
1 Hazlitt would have 
been very familiar with the thoughts of Coleridge 
and Lamb, and possibly even Hunt, on the matter, 
but it was not until February of 1815, one month 
before Wordsworth"s "Preface" appeared, that 
Hazlitt gave his own definitions. The influence 
of the others may be seen, but once again the 
emphasis is particularly the author's own. The 
thought surfaces while Hazlitt is making typically 
Romantic generalities about women: women lack 
powers of concentration and are best suited for 
gossip where the subject is continually changing. 
Imagination is what they lack; fancy is what they 
possess. Hazlitt calls imagination that which 
depends on intensity of passion, on the 
accumulation of ideas and feelings round 
one object, on bringing all nature and 
all art to bear on a particular purpose, 
on continuity and comprehension of the mind. 
Fancy has "greater flexibility of mind, and can 
more readily vary and separate... ideas at pleasure. "2 
It was a distinction Hazlitt was to retain. For 
instance, in 1822 he was suggesting that fancy 
was the volatile or lively quality of the mind. 
3 
In 1823, fancy is used, to refer to light poetry, 
cosmetic effects, and: 'the picturesque, as opposed 
to imagination and poetry of passion. 
4 Again in 
1825 fancy was the mind's strength of versatility. 
5 
In the latter instance it is clear that fancy is 
not connected to facts and knowledge as it was for 
1 Elizabeth Schneider claimed that Hazlitt 
used fancy and imagination interchangeably; see 
The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt, 103. I have 
oun no evidence of this a ter 1815, however. 
2H Works, XX, 42. 
3H Works, XI;, 144-59 
4H Works, XVI, 411-414. 
5H Works, XI, 134. 
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Hunt - facts and knowledge belong more to 
Hazlitt's faculty of understanding. Fancy for 
Hazlitt is the flexing activity of the-mind that 
can be seen, like the focusing activity of the 
imagination, quite separate from its product, 
though it may be intrinsically involved with it. 
We arrive, then, at the end of a long and 
possibly mind-boggling series of distinctions 
concerning imagination and what we may call her 
adjacent faculty. Though not yet pointed out, 
it can be seen that it is difficult to draw close 
comparisons among the views of the four men of 
our study. Clearly they are all working in the 
same general area of thought, but each has his 
own particular angle, his own mode of expression. 
If one compares them too closely, the usefulness 
of the enterprise can be lost in excessive 
subtlety of thought; yet at the same time failure 
to see them alongside each other can result in 
distortion of another kind. It can result in 
giving undue importance to the remarks of one 
man or to the remarks of that man at one particular' 
time as opposed to another. Moreover, it can 
result in failing to recognise the influences 
which do exist. 
In the general comparison of the four men 
and their evolving theories, Leigh Hunt fares 
remarkably well, even, though it is impossible to 
determine his influence on the other men. Hunt 
was the youngest of them and was the first to 
publish his two-part distinction in what was a 
book well-read by actors and the more intellectual 
theatregoers of the time. His theories of 
imagination and conception were workable theories, 
and could have been seen by others as such if 
their criticisms led them along similar lines 
of thought. What is ierhaps even more remarkable 
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is that Hunt, alone, was working in isolation 
from the others at the time of his initial 
theorising, yet the theory of conception which he 
came up with was not incompatible with the theories 
of fancy which the others (and later he) produced. 
Hunt's ideas were a means of classifying art and 
artists that recognised a difference in kind, not 
degree, between the faculties. In 1807,1814 and 
again in". 1844, Hunt's conception (or fancy) can be 
seen as fact-oriented, and imagination can be 
recognised as passion-oriented and image-forming. 
Lamb's theory of imagination is by far the 
simplest of the ones in this study, but its 
simplicity may be said to be a virtue. Imagination 
is explicitly connected with the unified effect of 
the entire work of art. His contradistinction of 
imagination with fancy I believe has not been noticed 
before, nor has Hazlitt's, and both of them give us 
very clear pictures of the possibilities of contra- 
distinguishing imagination. For Lamb, fancy is the 
initial sensory response to art and imagination is 
the studied response which recognises unity. For 
Hazlitt, fancy is the versatility of the mind to 
move from subject to subject, while imagination is 
the focusing power connected closely to depth of 
feeling. 
Coleridge, of course, remains of great import- 
ance in the period we have been studying. He has 
retained, though sharpened, his imagination-fancy 
distinction. This is just one of the areas in which 
he has influenced both Lamb and Hazlitt. We have seen 
" him calling imagination the highest faculty and calling 
it, for the first time, the unifying and fusing power. We 
have also seen that he was relatively late in coming out 
with published remarks on imagination and fancy, the 
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former being "shaping and modifying", the latter 
being "associative and aggregative. " But despite 
the amount that Coleridge had written to this 
point, it is a matter of speculation as to whether 
he would still be regarded as foremost of the 
theoreticians of imagination if he had not gone 





1815-1818: BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA AND BEYOND 
It is now one hundred and fifty years since 
Biographia Literaria was written and it remains one 
of the most problematic and misunderstood texts in 
English Literature. It is a tribute to the depth 
of Coleridge's thought that the book has become a 
classic for Romantic criticism and literary criticism 
as a whole. The numerous problems Coleridge en- 
countered in writing the work - problems of drug 
addiction, finance, distance from a decent library 
(he was living with the Morgans in Calne), along 
with problems with the printers who misled him 
about the length of the work - kept Biographia 
from presenting as clear a statement of his ideas 
as he might have liked. 
In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge tries to 
trace his "literary" life. Although he starts with 
his childhood and ends up with a broad statement 
of his ideas at the time of writing, he includes 
much material, irrespective of chronological order. 
His school days are discussed in Chapter I, but 
his other relatively' early experiences, for instance 
his connections with Wordsworth and with journalism, 
are mentioned in a number of chapters well into the 
work. 
' He traces consistent themes in his intellect- 
ual thought, but interrupts with criticisms of 
various philosophers, ý and miscellaneous thoughts 
on subjects ranging from talent and genius (Chapters 
II & XI) to modern literary criticism and his 
intellectual debts (III. & X). 
1 The Wordsworth connections are discussed 
in Chapters IV, XIV and others. Journalism is 
discussed in X. 
01 
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Coleridge recognised that his book was an 
"immethodical ... miscellany"l but he did feel he was 
building towards an intelligible statement of his 
poetic creed. The central aim of Biographia he 
defines as follows: 
... it was Mr. Wordsworth's purpose to consider the influences of fancy and imagination as 
they are manifested in poetry, and from the 
different effects to conclude their diversity 
in kind; while it is my object to investigate 
the seminal principle, and then from the kind 
to deduce the degree. My friend has drawn a 
masterly sketch of the branches with their 
poetic fruitage. I wish to add the trunk, 
a even the roots as far as they lift them- 
selves above the ground, and are visible to 
the naked eye of our common consciousness. 2 
This clear statement of intention in Chapter IV 
has not seemed to correspond with what was actually 
achieved in the chapters which followed. Imagination 
and fancy are mentioned several times, though never 
in a very clear context until Chapter XIII, when 
Coleridge comes out with his definitions of primary 
imagination, secondary imagination, and fancy. 
These seem to be entirely unsupported, lacking both 
the trunk and the roots Coleridge promised. Some 
critics have seized on Coleridge's performance as 
evidence of a vacillating, indecisive, opium- 
tortured personality,. which was trying to avoid 
commitment. Others have left his personality out 
of it, but have seen him making false starts towards 
defining imagination, and on each occasion, ultimately 
deciding that the time was not ripe. All critics 
agree that Coleridge wrote too little in Biorra phia 
on imagination and its divisions, that the dis- 
jointed approach to imagination mirrors the dis- 
jointed nature of the entire work,. and that, despite 
these facts, Coleridge has been one of the most 
stimulating commentators on the subject. 
ai 
1 BL, I, 64; (Everyman, 52-53). 
2 BL, I, 64; (Everyman, 52). 
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Critics have used various methods to treat 
Coleridge's thoughts on imagination in Bioa hia. 
Most frequently, comparative studies have been 
made with writers Coleridge knew. 
' Stephen Prickett 
has pointed to the irony that philosophical critics 
are unanimous in believing that Coleridge's thought 
was plagiarized, but are unable to agree "on what 
was plagiarized, or from whom. "2 Perhaps there 
is a further irony concerning comparative studies. 
They have been undertaken repeatedly while the 
integrity of Biographia has never been explored 
or debated. In other words, Coleridge's own 
argument has been given insufficient attention 
in the search to discover his meaning with regard 
to imagination. 
In 1953, George Whalley felt the need to 
defend the integrity of the work, but two decades 
later his introductory comment (with himself 
excepted) still rings. true: "A few have shown 
respect in handling extracts from the text, but 
1 Some 'examples', might be sighted here of the 
different kinds of comparisons which have been made. 
Coleridge's ideas of imagination have been approached 
through the psychology of emotions (I. A.. Richards, 
Coleridge on Imagination D ondon, 19341);. through 
Kant see especially D. G.. James, Scepticism and 
Poetr :- An Essay on the Poetic Ima inat. on ondon, 193 ; through the ng (lien? ee, mmanuel 
Kant in EnglandA[Princeton, 1931), 114ff. ; through AL7 3_I 3 English philosophers like Shaf esbury (R. L. ' Brett, The Third Earl of Shaftesburondon, 19511); 
through the notions o -polarity in Plotinus, Boehme, 
and Schellinig (J.. V« Baker, The Sacred River [Baton 
Rouge, La. ], 130ff. ); through or swor Stephen 
Prickett, Coleridge and Wordsworth:. The Pet of 
Growth [Cambr dge, 701t 37-41 71-94)-; and 
throu_gl Tetens: Thomas McFarland, "The Origin and 
Significance of Coleridge's Theory of Secondary 
Imagination", New Perspectives on Colerid e and 
Wordsworth [New ork an London, ,- 
)" 
. McFarland almost certainly has discovered the 





nobody seems ever to have. sought the integrity 
of the book itself. The general impression is 
that the book is incorrigibly diffuse, fragmentary, 
and obscure. "' Whalley himself did not argue the 
unity of the text or argue any logical progression 
through the text. Instead, he focused on defending 
Coleridge's early remarks which heralded Biographia, 
on Coleridge's personal difficulties, and Coleridge's 
usual manner of writing. Since then the issue has 
lain dormant. J. A. Appleyard, in 1965, suggested 
that the only way to make sense of Coleridge's 
definitions was to place them "in the context of 
his total argument"2, but he was more interested 
in Coleridge's thought outside of Biographia 
Literaria. His approach considers why Coleridge's 
line of thought in Biographia failed, and pre- 
supposes that the thought was disjointed. 
Most of the present chapter will concentrate 
on Coleridge's argument in Biographia Literaria in. - 
an attempt to establish the integrity of the work. 
Particular emphasis will be given to Chapter XII, 
to show its integration into the rest of Biographia. 
Also, an effort will be made to demonstrate, 
contrary to current opinion, that imagination is 
the main focus of Coleridge's philosophical 
argument (in accordance with his claim at the end 
of Chapter IV) and that the "seminal principle" of 
the imagination-fancy distinction is present in 
his thought. The conclusions cannot help but go 
against much of the criticism which has been written 
on Coleridge to date and in particular, I will be 
challenging the interpretations which have been 
given to the concept of reconciliation of opposites 
in Coleridge's thought,. 
1 "The Integrity'' of Bio a hie Literarie", 
in Essays and Studies, n. s. ,, 87. 
2 Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature 244-5. 
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The structure of Biographi_ Liter aria must 
be the initial concern. The first thirteen chapters 
give a broken account of the history of philosophy 
and end with Coleridge's definitions of primary 
imagination, secondary imagination, and fancy. 
The remainder of the work (Chapters XIV-XXIV) 
traces the history of English poetry, but is more 
accurately a long, occasionally rambling essay on 
all facets of poetry, concentrating on Coleridge's 
differences with Wordsworth on poetic theory. 
If the book is considered in the light of its 
title, it is only the first thirteen chapters which 
can be said to trace Coleridge's development - as 
he traces the history of philosophy he is in effect- 
tracing the course he plied through piilosophy. 
Even at this, only Chapters I to XI, inclusive, 
deal with Coleridge's thoughts prior to the time 
of writing, and Coleridge continually alternates 
between his former thoughts and his present ones, 
without at times indicating which is which. The 
long and difficult Chapter XII, along with Chapter 
XIII and most of the remainder are statements of 
Coleridge's ideas at the time of writing. Coleridge 
seems to have written Biographia on the assumption 
that his 1815-16 conclusions tell more about the 
evolution of his ideas than anything else. 
The first thirteen chapters create most 
problems. The most important thing to recognise 
initally about the first chapters, which has been 
missed in the past, is that Coleridge defines in 
separate places three specific problems with 




The first of Coleridge's problems centers 
around Hartley's theory of association. It 
occupies the entirety of Chapters V to VII and is 
unusual because it represents a well-organized 
unit and is presented with f irm, control: Chapter V 
treats the basic tenets of Hartley, Chapter VI 
discusses the basic errors of Hartley, and VII 
deals with the logical implications of Hartley's 
theory. Coleridge's problem with association, as 
he presents it in Biographia, corresponds with 
what the present thesis-has already studied with 
regard to the years 1801-1803. Hartley's theory, 
Coleridge felt, restricted the mind to a purely 
mechanical role and did not allow it the active 
functions Coleridge believed it to have. 
However much Coleridge deviates from strict 
chronological order in Volume One, Chapters I to 
VII do take the reader from Coleridge's childhood 
to 1803. Coleridge's second and third problems 
are the abiding philosophical concerns of the years 
which followed. Coleridge's early concern with 
revelation in "Religious Musing" is still an issue 
for him and it lies at the heart of his two 
remaining problems. 
One of the problems may be called the 
materialist-dualist dilemma. The materialist 
and dualist positions °are outlined in the first 
part of Chapter VIII, and Coleridge Is problems 
with both are discussed in the last'part of VIII 
and in Chapter II. Materialism, of course, involved 
notions of association, but it concerned much more 
than that. It tried to"caccount for everything in 
terms of matter, starting with the object and moving 
inwards (Locke and his followers). The duälists 
split the world into spirit and matter: Descartes 
" started with the subject, saw the soul as intelligence, 
and moved out from there; Leibniz developed a theory 
that soul and body existed in a state of pre- 
i 
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established harmony. Materialism failed on one 
count, that of association, but both materialism 
and dualism failed on another count, that of 
rationally dismissing or accounting for revelation: 
The most consistent proceeding of the 
dogmatic materialist is to fall back into 
the common rank of soul-and-bodyists; to 
affect the mysterious, and declare the 
whole process a revelation given, and not 
to be understood, which it wo be 
profane to examine too closely. 
In addition to the associationist problem, 
and the materialist-dualist dilemma, Coleridge 
discusses a third problem. This problem is 
specifically religious and is touched upon in 
Chapter IX, 2 but is given concentrated emphasis 
in the middle of Chapter X. 3 The problem is best 
identified as a pantheist dilemma. McFarland's 
work, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, devotes 
a long chapter to discussing "Coleridge and the 
Dilemmas of Pantheism. " Coleridge is seen on a 
kind of tight-rope strung between the poles of 
subject and object and he is continually trying 
to reconcile the two without falling into the abyss 
of Spinoza's pantheism. 
4 Although McFarland sees 
the poles in terms of subject and object, there is 
evidence that the poles could be seen as reason, on 
one hand, and on the other,, Coleridge's inability 
to reconcile reason with his belief in a Christian 
self-revealing God. Only in Spinoza could he find 
a rational proof for the existence of God, but even 
there he was denied the ability to attribute person- 
hood to God. Still, as Coleridge says regarding 
1 BL, It 91; (Everyman, 76). 
2 See: BL, It 93-99; (Everyman, 79-84). 
3 See: BL, It 132-7; (Everyman, 111-115). 
The clear definition of the problem as late as Chapter X 
may indicate a chronological importance Coleridge felt 
about the issue with regard to the problem which 
preceded it. As we will see, the solution to the other 
two problems certainly had to be found before the 
solution to the religious problem could be discovered. 
4 Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition 107-190. 
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Spinoza's pantheist system, "at no time could I 
believe, that in itself and essentially it is 
incompatible with religion, natural or revealed. "1 
Coleridge's pantheist dilemma is best summed up in 
his own words: "For a very long time, indeed, I 
could not reconcile personality with infinity; and 
my head was with Spinoza, though my whole heart 
remained with Paul and John. "2 
In the past perhaps insufficient emphasis 
has been given to the fact that Coleridge is out- 
lining three related but quite separate problems 
in the first thirteen chapters of Biographia. 
Associationism, materialism versus dualism, and 
pantheism are the main issues of those chapters 
(and perhaps also of Coleridge's philosophical 
growth to 1816). It is important to recognise 
further, that those chapters also contain the 
solutions to each of the problems. 
The solution to, the associationist problem 
is given first. It is given at the end of Chapter 
VII, concluding the lengthy discussion of the 
problem and all its ramifications begun in 
Chapter V. Coleridge, concludes that the law 
of contemporaneity, "being the common condition 
of all the laws of association", 
3 is inadequate 
to explain all methods of thought. As Coleridge 
says, "if we appeal to our consciousness, we 
shall find that even time itself, as the cause 
of a particular act of association, is distinct 
from contemporaneity, as the condition of all 
association. 4 Because of this major exception 
to the theory of association as Coleridge under- 
stood it, Coleridge concluded that Hartley's 
1 BL, It 99; (Everyman, 83-84). 
2 BL, It 134; (Everyman, 112). 
3 BL, I, 86;. (Everyman, 72). 
4 BL, I, 86; (Everyman, 72). 
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suggestion that the mind was merely passive 
was wrong. Coleridge decided that the mind 
was both active and passive, and the only way 
in which this was possible was in conceiving 
that there was "an intermediate faculty, 
which is at once both. active and passive".. 
This faculty, which provided the solution to 
the associationist problem, was what Coleridge 
denominated "the IMAGINATION". l 
Coleridge's formulation of a faculty 
of imagination provided the solution for one 
of his problems. This paper will argue that 
theoretical developments of the faculty of 
imagination provided Coleridge with the 
solutions to the other problems as well, and 
that Coleridge intended Chapters XII and XIII 
to be read as a statement of his conclusions. 
With regard to the materialist-dualist 
problem and the pantheist dilemma, it is not 
self-evident that solutions are given in 
Biographia, much less that the solution is 
found in the chapters, mentioned. Coleridge's 
hints must be followed, however. In Chapter 
IX, directly after the materialist-dualist 
problem is clarified, Coleridge gives a 
catalogue of the philosophers to whom he 
feels ind. ebted. 2 The list does not include 
either materialists or dualists but instead 
points to those philosophers who aided Coler- 
idge towards a solution.. He lists the mystics, 
George Fox, Jacob Behmen, and William Law, and 
also the German philosophers, Spinoza, Kant, 
Fichte and Schelling. Coleridge does not 
describe what the solution is, except by 
identifying it as a Philosophy of Nature 
1 BL, Is 86; (Everyman, 72). 
2 See BL, It 98-105:;; (Everyman, 83-89). 
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incorporating a Dynamic System; and he gives most of 
the credit to the German transcendentalists, 
especially Schelling: 
God forbid! that I., should be suspected of a wish 
to enter into a rivalry with Schelling for the 
honours so unequivocally his right, not only as 
a great and original genius, but as the founder 
of the PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, and as the most 
successful improver of the Dynamic System which, 
begun by Bruno, was re-introduced (in a more 
philosophical form, and freed from all its 
impurities and visionary accompanimants) by 
KANT; in whom it was the native and necessary 
growth of his own system. Kant's followers, 
however... had adopted his dynamic ideas, only 
as 'a more refined species of mechanics. With 
the exception of one or two fundamental ideas, 
which cannot be with-held from FICHTE, to 
SCHELLING we owe the completion, and the most 
important victories, of this revolution in 
philosophy. 
Coleridge claims that the solution to the materialist- 
dualist problem was found in the philosophical 
revolution brought about by Schelling and others, 
although in Chapter IX he does not go on to say 
what the solution is. 
The pantheist or religious problem is clarified 
in Chapter X, and there again Coleridge gives a hint 
about the solution without actually discussing it. 
He simply states: "A more thorough revolution in my 
philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into my 
own heart, were yet wanting. "2 The reference to a 
philosophical revolution once more points to German 
transcendental philosophy and particularly Schelling. 
Chapter XII is the only chapter which has material 
which has been identified with Schelling. The 
phil&sophical system Coleridge develops in that chapter 
is the only system which goes unchallenged in Biographia 
Literaria. What Coleridge describes is the Philosophy 
of Nature, the revolutionary Dynamic System, for which 
he has been preparing. 
From these facts it would be reasonable to 
suspect that Chapter XII contains the substantial 
part of Coleridge's solutions to the materialist- 
1 BL, It 103-4; (Everyman, 87-88). 
2 BL, It 137; (Everyman, 115). 
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dualist problem, and to the pantheist dilemma. 
This is, in fact, the case, and Chapter XII is 
probably the most important chapter in the book. 
The chapter provides the solution to Coleridge's 
two remaining problems and establishes the basis 
for claiming that the solution to both lies in 
Coleridge's theory of imagination. 
The thematic and structural integration of 
Chapter XII with the rest of the work has been 
missed by even the most astute of critics. This 
is partially because much of the material in the 
chapter (something less than half) has been 
identified with Schelling. W. J. Bate recently was 
able to conclude: "Chapter XII is far from necessary 
to the Biographia. It is in fact something of an 
excrescence, and it is rather dull reading, far from 
Schelling at his best. "' Other critics have considered 
Coleridge's use of Schelling in the light of his 
claimed rejection of Schelling in 1818.2 Fruman has 
suggested that Coleridge's use of Schelling in 
Biographia was makeshift, and that his use prevented 
him from disclaiming Schelling sooner than he did. 
3 
Schelling's influence on Coleridge is 
complicated and various, and it continues at least 
until the mid 1820s. Two brief points may be made 
here concerning Chapter XII. The first is that, 
if Chapter XII is seen in the context of Coleridge's 
larger argument, in particular in the context 
of the problems he has outlined, the reading is 
not so dull. It must be questioned whether, in 
attempting to render the Dynamic System 
"intelligible to his countrymen", 
4 Coleridge 
did not present them with a system more his own 
1 Coleridge, 136. 
2 See CL: To Green, 30 September, 1818; 
To Tulk, 24 November, 1818. 
3 Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel, 88. 
4 BL, It 105; (Everyman, 88). 
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than Schelling's. The second point is that 
Coleridge had cautioned in Biographia that 
"an identity of thought, or even similarity 
of phrase, will not be at all times a certain 
proof that the passage has been borrowed from 
Schelling"; 1 and Coleridge had added that 
possible coincidence of Schelling's thought with 
his own did not mean that the work was not "the 
offspring of a man's own spirit and the product 
of original'thinking. "2 It would seem a mistake 
to conclude either that Chapter XII is Schelling's 
thought or that Coleridge'a later rejection of 
Schelling included a rejection of the argument in 
Chapter XII. It would be more reasonable to con- 
clude that at the time Coleridge wrote Biographia, 
he believed there were deep-seated similarities 
between his thought and Schelling's, but further 
study led him to believe that this was not so. 
The solution Coleridge found for his 
materialist-dualist problem and his pantheist 
dilemma is involved and complex. It has to do 
with the rejection of traditional avenues of 
philosophical exploration and the adoption of 
what Coleridge saw as the entirely new method of 
transcendental philosophy. Prior to Chapter XII, 
Coleridge had made it clear that he had been looking 
for a philosophy which would provide an adequate 
theory of knowledge. In taking each philosophical 
system to its logical conclusion he found that it 
either a) contradicted itself (as in the case of 
some materialists admitting but not being able to 
account for revelation), b) contradicted observable 
or provable reality (Leibniz 's dualism), or c) 
contradicted what Coleridge knew to be true from 
his own experience (such asAconcerning the activity of 
1ý ýc cam, 
1 BL, I, 102;; (Everyman, 87)- 
2 BL, I, 104-5; (Everyman, 88). 
ý, 
,ý ý ii ý. ý 
4! ý 
99 
the mind and the personhood of God). Vast fields 
of intellectual analysis which were originally 
intended to explain the contradictions of man's 
existence, themselves broke down into irresoluble 
contradictions and ultimately failed Coleridge as 
adequate epistemological systems. 
Coleridge renewed his attack on traditional 
philosophy in his prefatory remarks in Chapter XII. 
Traditional philosophers had failed to go back far 
enough in their enquiries: 
[Their] criterion is this: [that] a man 
receives as fundamental facts, and therefore 
of course indemonstrable and incapable of 
further analysis, the general notions of 
matter, spirit, soul, body, action, 
passiveness, time, space, cause, and effect, 
consciousness, perception, memory and habit..... 1 
Their method, Coleridge went on to explain, was 
to take all of these terms "in mass, and unexamined,. 
[and required] only a decent apprenticeship in 
logic,. to draw forth their contents in all forms 
and colours". 
2 This type of analysis can succeed 
"in rendering our knowledge more distinct, [but] 
does not really add to it. It does not increase, 
though it gives a greater mastery over, the wealth 
which we before possessed. "3 
In the initial pages of Chapter XII, Coleridge 
actually. dismisses non-transcendental philosophy: , 
For forensic purposes, for all the established 
professions of society, this [rendering our 
knowledge more distinct] is sufficient. But 
for philosophy in its highest sense as the 
science of ultimate truths, and therefore 
scientia scientiarum, this mere analysis of 
terms is preparative only though as 
preparative discipline indispensable. 
1 BL, I, 162-3;, (Everyman, 136). 
2 BL, Is 163; (Everyman, 136). 
3 BL, I, 163; (Everyman, 136). 
4 BL, It 163; (Everyman, 136). 
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Coleridge goes on specifically to attack the 
dualists: 
... that compendious philosophy, which talking of mind but thinking of brick 
and mortar, or other images equally 
abstracted from body, contrives a theory 
of spirit by nicknaming matter, and in a 
few hours can qualify its dullest 
disciples to explain the omne scibile by 
reducing all things to impressions, ideas, 
and sensations. 
Coleridge's long lyrical passage in Chapter XII 
about the range of hills encircling the vale of 
common habitation beyond which few travellers 
have ventured is partly an attack on traditional 
philosophers. It is not stating the difference 
between philosophers and other men, as it is 
sometimes read, but rather between transcendental 
philosophers and all other men. 
The approach which Coleridge was going to 
take to find a solution to the inadequacy of 
traditional philosophy (with special regard to 
the materialist-dualist and pantheist issues) 
was the approach of "true philosophy". It would 
aim at ultimate reality and would go beyond the 
mere analysis of terms. Coleridge would question 
the philosophical basis of such notions as time, 
space, cause, effect, matter, spirit, active, 
passive, and the like, 'and would not use them 
as terms which had self-evident references. 
The approach would "at once explain and collect 
the fragments of truth scattered through systems 
apparently the most incongruous. "2 It was a new 
kind of "philosophic cpnsciousness"3 that Coleridge 
was pointing towards:: materialist and dualist 
philosophers did not have it, for it was "the 
exclusive domain of pure philosophy which is there- 
fore properly entitled transcendental. "4 
1 BL, I, 163; (Everyman, 136). 
2 BL, I, 169; (Everyman, 141). 
3 BL, I, 164; (Everyman, 136)- 
4 BL, Is 164; (Everyman, 137). Coleridge calls 
the consciousness demonstrated in other philosophies 
"spontaneous", lacking "an effort of freedom. " 
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The intention of Coleridge's prefatory 
comments was to warn away all readers who were 
content with the mere analysis of terms and 
were not prepared to seek ultimate reality. 
It is time, Coleridge said, "to tell the truth.... "1 
Despite an apparent air of arrogance, self- 
aggrandisement was not Coleridge's purpose, and 
his remarks were bound to be read in the wrong 
light. As will be shown, he was pointing to 
something radically new, and his remarks should 
be read with that in mind. He is saying, in 
effect, that the ideas which he is about to 
express as the solution to' his former problems 
are so important that he would rather have his 
argument in Chapter XII discarded than have it 
misunderstood and obscured. Some critics, of 
course, did discard the chapter, but even with 
those who took it more seriously, Coleridge 
possibly has suffered the misinterpretation he 
feared most. 
Coleridge's fear that his philosophical 
solution would be misunderstood arose from his 
study of Kant and the mechanical way in which his 
ideas had been handled by his followers. What 
Coleridge says about Kant, several chapters earlier, 
should be read alongside what Coleridge says in 
Chapter XII, for Coleridge warns readers who lack 
understanding to stay away from Kant as well. The 
terms Coleridge was going to use in his argument 
could not be taken as flat "technical terms or 
scientific symbols2 to be trotted out, analysed, 
and made to take any form, and neither could Kants: 
1 BL I 163; (Everyman 136). 





An IDEA, in the highest sense of that word, 
cannot be conveyed but by a symbol; and, 
except in geometry, all symbols of necessity 
involve an apparent contradiction. , ýwv7cr¬ 
aV'VCToi. ow : and for those who could not 
pierce through this symbolic husk, his 
writings were not intended. 1 
Coleridge's transcendental philosophy, 
which was going to provide his solution to the 
materialist-dualist problem and the pantheist 
dilemma, was going to use symbols as Kant had 
used them. Unlike the symbols of geometry, they 
would involve apparent contradiction. In 
Chapter XII Coleridge, spends some time talking 
about geometry, and one of the points he makes 
is that mathematical symbols are completely 
self-referential. An initial postulate is con- 
ceived and defined, and a symbol is ascribed to 
that postulate which presumes the definition. 
2 
Technical terms in traditional philosophy also 
tend to operate on this level, and their use is 
justified "whenever they tend to preclude con- 
fusion of thought, and when they assist the 
memory by the exclusive singleness of their 
meaning. "3 But what traditional philosophers 
failed to recognise is that their symbols differ 
from those of mathematics because they do not 
refer to distinct, unanalyzable entities. This 
approach ultimately can be detrimental to the 
argument of a non-transcendental philosopher, but if 
the same approach is applied to a transcendental 
philosopher's argument, the effect can be 
devastating. 
1 BL, It 100; (Everyman, 85). 
2 BL, It 170-1; (Everyman, 142-3). 
3 BL, It 188; (Everyman, 156). 
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Coleridge maintained that transcendental 
philosophers, himself included, used an approach 
to language which was different from that used by 
traditional philosophers. Coleridge also main- 
tained that the reader of transcendental philosophy 
had to be alert to the different way in which 
language was intended if the arguments were to 
be understood. Transcendental philosophers are 
appealing to a source of knowledge far higher 
and more inward than their symbols can hope 
immediately to convey. - The primary means by 
which this "ulterior consciousness" can be conveyed 
is "through words which are but the shadows of 
notions; even as the notional understanding 
itself is but the shadowy abstraction of living 
and actual truth. "2 The symbols of the transcend- 
ental philosopher must be recognised, then, to 
participate only inadequately in the reality for 
which they stand, and herein lies the contra- 
diction Coleridge was talking about. Transcend- 
ental symbols, like mathematical symbols, imply 
a certain unity between symbol and thought, but 
with transcendental symbols, this unity does not 
exist. Symbol and thought have their'own distinct 
identities and cannot be confused, one with the 
other. 3 
Coleridge's thoughts on symbol become most 
significant when they re-emerge in his writings 
between 1816 and 1818, but in Chapter XII of 
Bfr hia, they are important in establishing 
the starting point of Coleridge's new approach 
1 BL, I, 166; (Everyman, 138)- 
2 BL, I, 168; (Everyman, 140). 
3 Shawcross touches on this point= "Finally, 
the symbol, while remaining distinct from the thing 
symbolized, is yet in some mysterious way inter- 
penetrated by its being, and partakes of its 






to philosophy.. The principle which is operating 
in his discussion of symbol is an abstract 
principle of radical or absolute individuation, 
and logically it is not entirely separate from 
notions of contrariety. In other words symbols 
and thoughts exist, of necessity, apart from each 
other with separate identities. On an absolute 
or ultimate level, each identity, whether it is 
symbol or thought, is in a sense contrary to 
every other identity; - no two things can be the 
same and all are alike in being different. 
It is this highly abstract recognition of 
individuation and contrariety which Coleridge 
seems to suggest is the main prerequisite for 
understanding transcendental philosophy: 
The first lessonýof philosophic discipline 
is to wean the student's attention from 
the DEGREES of things, which alone form 
the vocabulary of common life, and to 
direct it to the KIND abstracted from 
degree.. 
This point was made in Chapter X. and in Chapter 
XIII a similar point is made. This time, again, 
the language is symbolic in the transcendental 
sense: 
Now the transcendental philosophy demands; 
first, that two,, forces should be conceived 
which counteract each other by their 
essential nature; not only not in con- 
sequence of the"`: accidental direction of 
each, but as prior to all direction, nay, 
as the primary forces from which the con- 
ditions of all possible directions are 
derivative and deducible: secondly, that 
these forces should be assumed to be both 2 
alike infinite, both alike indestructible. 
1 BL, Is 108; (Everyman, 92). For a significant 
forerunner of this comment and one which elucidates 
many of the ideas involved, see: CSC, I, 182-3; 
(Everyman, 163). There are other comments on kind 
and degree throughout: Coleridge's writing, including BL, I, 64+; (Everyman, 52) and "On the Principles of Nenial Criticism", in. M, Ir, 229-230., 




Perhaps there is no passage in Biographia 
as basic to Coleridge's argument as this one. 
Few passages are more difficult than this one to 
understand and it has never been given an 
adequate explanation. 
The language of the above passage must be 
read symbolically. Coleridge is using, as the 
starting point of his philosophy, an intellectuall, 
construct upon which all the rest of his ideas 
will be built. He is starting from "an intuition, 
a practical idea"l to which nothing corresponds 
in empirical reality. The"two forces" Coleridge 
is describing are abstract, multi-directional 
forces which have neither source nor end. 
Coleridge has mentioned these forces elsewhere. 
On the previous page he describes them as "two 
contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand 
infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend 
or find itself in this infinity. "' Earlier he 
calls them "centripetal" and "centrifugal", 
2 
and before that, "active and passive". 
3 Each 
time these "forces" appear in Coleridge's argument, 
they are ambiguous in meaning. But while on an 
empirical level these forces find nothing with 
which to correspond, on a logical level - on a 
level of abstract thought - they correspond to 
one notion and one notion only. Coleridge's words 
are precise in describing a realm of which the 
essence is absolute individuation and infinite 
opposition. Cole ridge's words must be read as 
symbolic of contradiction itself. 
1 BL, Is 171; (Everyman, 143)- 
2 BL, I, 188; (Everyman, 156). 
3 BL, I, 86; (Everyman, 72). Coleridge is 
using these terms symbolically here, as a transcen- 
dental philosopher would use them. This is not the 
same sense in which active and passive were used 





The first principle of transcendental 
philosophy may be put more strongly, and less 
symbolically, than Coleridge originally put it. 
The starting point is the recognition of opposition 
and contradiction. Coleridge broached the subject 
through the abstract concept of individuation, but 
on another level what he is saying is that 
transcendental philosophy starts with a consideration 
of the nature of contradiction, and it is this which 
makes transcendental philosophy revolutionary. 
Coleridge is establishing the foundations of a 
system which will spring from "a truth self- 
grounded", 
l 
and its basic principle will at once 
"preclude the possibility of requiring an ante- 
cedent"2 and avoid the necessity of starting with 
either subject or object. Philosophies which had 
started from those positions had ended in contra- 
dictions. The only way to circumvent their 
difficulties and for Coleridge to solve his own 
problems concerning the issues of materialism- 
dualism, and pantheism, was to begin by recognising 
that contradiction lay at the root of all thought 
and that it could not be excluded from or ignored 
in an account of knowledge. In Chapter XII, 
Coleridge moves from this recognition to establish 
what will be an adequate theory of knowledge. 
Coleridge's use of the concept of contra- 
diction at the heart. of his philosophy could be 
compared with a similar use of contradiction in 
the existential philosophy of Kierkegaard or others, 
which in some ways Coleridge anticipates. Like 
Coleridge ''s idea of transcendentalism, existentialism 
recognises contradiction underlying all thought. But 
for existentialism, this seems to be more of a 
1 BL, I, 181; (Everyman, 180).. 
2 BL, I, 181;; (Everyman, 180). 
107 
conclusion than a starting point, and it is 
accompanied by a statement that ultimately there 
can be no truth, or if truth exists it is illusory 
and perhaps irrelevant. Coleridge's course is 
different. Having arrived at the frontiers of 
logic and discovered contradiction, Coleridge does 
not cross the border into the realm of the absurd, 
but instead turns around and asks himself this 
question: How is it then that I am conscious, 
have thoughts which are communicable, and discover 
meaning in life? It was in answering this question 
Coleridge developed his complex theory of imagination. 
For Coleridge, meaning existed in spite of 
contradiction and he recognised that his two 
abstract forces of infinite opposition were 
insufficient in themselves to explain meaning. 
If the two forces existed by themselves, the 
result would be neutralization, not meaning. 
Although it seemed most obvious to think of two 
forces, there had to be something else which kept 
the two forces apart and mediated between them 
distilling meaning. Furthermore, this something 
had -to be finite, for were it infinite in its 
reconciling action, neutralization would again be 
the result. Coleridge records his thought-pattern 
on these issues: 
The counteraction... of the two assumed forces 
does not depend on their meeting from opposite 
directions; the power which acts in them is 
indestructible; it is therefore inexhaustibly 
re-ebullient; and as something must be the 
result of these two forces, both alike 
infinite, and both alike indestructible; 
. and as rest or neutralization cannot 
be this 
result; no other conception is possible, but 
that the product must be a tertium aliquid, 
or finite generation. Consequently this 
conception is necessary. Now this tertium 
aliquid can be no, other than an inter- 
penetration of the counteracting powers, 
partaking of both. l 
1 BL, Is 198; (Everyman, 164). This quotation 
is from OE pter XIII. 
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The act of interpenetration is generative 
because it produces meaning and the nature of 
that act will be considered in a moment. 
Two ideas logically follow from what 
Coleridge has said. One is that this finite 
act cannot happen just once, otherwise the spark 
of, finite moaning would immediately be overcome 
as though nothing had happened. Reconciliation 
must occur continually between the forces, and 
the only means by which this is possible is in 
what. Coleridge describes as "a perpetual self- 
duplication. " This elevates the act to infinite 
proportion, while it remains finite in itself. 
The other point is that the power of 
reconciliation or interpenetration is not some- 
thing added after the other two forces already 
exist, otherwise a state of rest would already 
reign. Just as one force presupposes and defines 
its opposite, so, too, the existence of both 
forces presupposes-the existence of the third 
force which prevents neutralization. When it is 
said that the tertium aliguid participates in each 
force, it must be recognised that in actual fact, 
it cannot be separated from them. 
In Chapter I%, Coleridge referred to the 
transcendental system of thought as Dynamic. It 
is dynamic because it has (as Coleridge felt 
Fichte had first shown a system of thought could 
have) an act instead of' a thing as its starting 
point 
1 BL, Is 183; (Everyman, 152). 
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... by commencing' with an act, instead of 
a thing or substance, Fichte assuredly 
gave the first mortal blow to Spinozism, 
as taught by Spinoza himself; and supplied 
the idea of a system truly metaphysical, 
and of a meta h si ue truly systematic: 
(i. e. having its spring and principle within 
itself). l 
The act which Coleridge is talking about is the act 
of reconciliation of opposites. The theorizing of 
the existence of an act of reconciliation of 
opposites is the true commencing point and basic 
principle of transcendental philosophy. Coleridge 
gives another name to reconciliation of opposites - 
it is the name, Imagination, as Coleridge suggested 
early in Biographia: 
There are evidently two powers at work, 
which relatively to each other are active 
and passive; and this is not possible without 
an intermediate faculty, which is once both 
active and passive. (In philosophical 
language, we must denominate this inter- 
mediate faculty in all its degrees and 
determinations, the IMAGINATION .... )2 
The concept of imagination for Coleridge is identical 
to the concept of reconciliation of opposites 
(embodying the complex'notions of individuation 
and opposition) and centers around the essence of 
meaning. It lies at the core of all Coleridge's 
philosophical thought in Biographia Literaria. 
Some general comments can be made already 
about the nature of imagination and the manner in 
which reconciliation of opposites may be understood. 
While before it was said that meaning exists in 
spite of contradiction, the theorising of a third 
something now makes it more accurate to say that 
meaning exists because of contradiction.. Imagination 
sets up and retains a dynamic relationship between 
the two symbolic opposing forces and, as in the case 
1 BLS I, 101; (Everyman, 85).. 
2 BL, I, 86; (Everyman, 72). 
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of the transcendental symbol (which is in fact 
an example of an act of imagination), the original 
identities are retained while )sing interpenetrated. 
The phrase "reconciliation of opposites" is para- 
doxical - opposites by, definition are irreconcilable - 
and because of this paradox, the phrase is particular- 
ly appropriate for describing imagination. Imagination 
is an act which at once both reconciles and does 
not reconcile. Further, from what was said above, 
imagination may be said to involve an additional 
paradox, for it is a finite act with infinite 
proportions. 
A more precise understanding of reconciliation 
of opposites can be gained by examining Coleridge's 
specific remarks on imagination in Biographia 
Literaria. These are to be found primarily at the 
end of Chapter VII, l previously noted as part of 
the solution to Coleridge's problem with association, 
and in Chapters XII to XIV, where they represent 
the solutions to the materialist-dualist conflict 
and the pantheist dilemma. 
The issue is complicated, however, by. the fact 
that in Chapter XIII, where Coleridge's most precise 
definitions occur, Coleridge defines two kinds of 
imagination, not one,, in addition to his definition 
of fancy. The appearance of primary and secondary 
imagination is problematical, for in Chapter IV9 
when Coleridge announced his intention to seek 
out the seminal principle of Wordsworth's imagination- 
fancy distinction, no pnention was made of a further 
division. 
Numerous critics have chewed'the meat of the 
Chapter XIII definitions and felt cheated by the 
lack of bone matter they'have discovered. In 1950, 
ti. 1 
1 The last quotation above, about the active 
and the passive, is from this location. 
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W. J. Bate felt that the primary-secondary 
distinction was artificial and unsupported. 
l 
In 1972, Thomas McFarland took Bate's point one 
step further, though in doing so he did no more 
than rephrase the assumption common among 
Coleridge scholars: - 
Not only is there no preparation for the 
threefold distinction of Chapter Thirteen 
in Coleridge's previous writing, there is 
none even in the Biographia.... Nowhere is 
there any mention of, or preparation for, 
any additional differentiation Jother than 
that of imagination and fancy ]. 
Critics have felt the main problem of the 
unsubstantiated definitions lies in Chapter XIII 
itself. A few pages into the chapter, Coleridge 
breaks his argument with his famous letter from 
a "friend" and announces that most of the intended 
argument about imagination is too obscure to be 
included. He gives only the conclusion to that 
argument, in other words, the definitions them- 
selves, and refers the readers to an unpublished 
prospectus -a double disappointment for the modern 
reader since the prospectus never appeared. 
To a certain extent, feelings of the suddenness' 
of Coleridge's primary-secondary division are 
justified - the division is not clearly announced 
beforehand, and this is both the case and the 
problem with a number of issues in the text. 
However, it has not been suggested, as it might 
have been, that in what Coleridge says at the end 
of Chapter VII, are the seeds of his later division. 
Part of the passage has been quoted already: 
1 "Coleridge on the Function of Art", in 
Perspectives of Criticism, ed. H. Levin (Cambridge, 
Mass. ). 144-6. Also cited by McFarland, below. 
2 "The Origin and Significance of Coleridge's 
Theory of Secondary Imagination", 196-7. 
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In philosophical language, we must denominate 
this intermediate faculty in all its degrees 
and determinations, the IMAGINATION. But 
in common language, and especially on the 
subject of poetry, we appropriate the name 
[imagination] to a superior degree of the 
faculty, joined t4 a superior voluntary 
controul over it. . 
When Coleridge speaks of imagination in philosoph- 
ical terms, and then contrasts that with imagination 
as applied to poetry, he is making precisely the 
same division as he later made in Chapter XIII, 
between primary and secondary imagination. As will 
be shown, what he says here about the poetic faculty 
helps to provide a very satisfactory explanation of 
what he intended the later distinction to be. 
The end of Chapter VII is important, but its 
importance is overshadowed by a fact of larger 
significance which explains why the primary- 
secondary division is made explicit in Chapter XIII 
and not before. The primary imagination of Chapter 
XIII is the philosophic imagination of Coleridge's 
earlier chapters. It is symbolically expressed as 
the third something, the "tertium aliquid" both 
finite and infinite which keeps separate yet inter- 
penetrates the two forces of infinite opposition; 
it is that which makes all meaning possible and is 
in fact the essence of meaning. Somewhat less 
symbolically expressed, primary imagination is the 
absolute self-consciousness which is God, the self- 
consciousness in man received from God, and the 
principle upon which all knowledge and meaning is 
founded. The argument which follows will show that 
when Coleridge defines primary imagination at the 
end of Chapter XIII, he has already completed his 
discussion of it. 
1 BL, I, 86; (Everyman, 72). 
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The chapters which follow Chapter XIII 
deal mainly with poetry. The secondary 
imagination is introduced at the end of Chapter 
XIII because it is mainly the poetic imagination. 
It is a new subject the understanding of which 
is dependent upon an understanding of the primary 
or philosophic imagination which preceded it, and 
just as important, the secondary imagination is 
the grounding principle for the chapters on 
poetry which follow it. 
The definition of primary imagination in 
Chapter XIII. is this-. 
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the 
living Power and prime Agent of all human 
Perception, and as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I AM. 
Taken by itself, the definition is cryptic and 
open to almost any interpretation, but if it is 
related to the argument, of Chapter XII, particularly 
Theses VI to i, 1 it can be seen that Coleridge is 
talking about the same thing in both places and 
his meaning becomes clear. The primary imagination 
represents the most basic kind of reconciliation 
of opposites and must precede all others. An 
hypothesis of the existence of primary imagination 
is necessary for Coleridge as soon as he finds 
contradiction at the frontiers of logic and yet 
affirms there is meaning. Meaning, at its most 
basic level, is given by the presence of self- 
consciousness. Self-consciousness is the first 
example, the primary example, of reconciliation 
of opposites of which the mind can be aware, and 
it is this act of self-consciousness which con- 
stitutes primary imagination. 
1 BL, I, 202; (Everyman, 167). 
2 The following pages may be consulted for 
reference:. BL, I,, 183-188;, (Everyman, 151-156). 
These theses will be discussed in more detail in 
the pages of this argument which follow. Theses I 
to V have generally been covered in the preceding 
argument. 
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In Chapter XII, Coleridge does not use the 
term primary imagination, nor the phrase 
'reconciliation of opposites. ' Use of the 
former term would have presupposed the existence 
of a secondary imagination and would have com- 
pelled Coleridge to discuss it before he was 
ready. The terms Coleridge does use are varied. 
He speaks of the "philosophic imagination", as he 
did in Chapter VII, and calls it "the sacred power 
of self-intuition. "l. In Thesis VI he introduces 
several other terms: 
This principle, 'and so characterised 
[as the foundation stone of transcendental 
philosophy], manifests itself in the SUM 
or I AM; which I shall hereafter indiscrim- 
inately express by the ords spirit, self, 
and self-consciousness. 
Each of these terms says something about the primary 
imagination and all are synonyms for it. 
Many attempts have been made to explain 
primary imagination by looking at Kant's ideas 
, of the productive imagination and connecting them 
with associationist explanations of how sensations 
are formed into thoughts: thus primary imagination 
is something which receives sensations and develops 
them into ideas which, in turn, will be presented 
to the understanding or faculty of discursive 
reasoning. 3 This is possibly a misinterpretation 
of Kant, but it does seem a misinterpretation of 
what Coleridge says in Biopraphia. The primary 
1 BL, Is 167; (Everyman, 139). The "philosophic 
imaginatIon" should not, be confused with "philosophic 
consciousness"'; the latter, taken as a seeking for 
ultimate truth, is only a prerequisite for a recognition 
of the former. 
2 BL, Is 183; (Everyman, 151). 
3 Several references could be given here. Notable 
examples of this interpretation are in R. L. Brett, , 
Fýancy 
and Imagination, (London, 1973), 45-46; Wiensatt and rrooks, 
lterar riti cism: A 'Short History. Vol. 3,392-3; 
. , James, ce t cism and Poetry: An Ess on the Poetic Ima ination, 18-24- 1c arland, he Origin an gn cance 
of o er dge's Theory of the Secondary Imagination" 214;; 
and Prickett, Coleridge and Wordsworth, 67-8 & 71-72. 
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imagination has nothing to do with associationist 
thought; nor has it anything to do with anything 
except the act of self-consciousness itself. It 
is a spiritual concept, concerned with clarifying 
the essential nature of individual self-conciousness 
and identifying the individual spirit with the 
essence of meaning, the absolute self-consciousness, 
or rather, God himself. 
Coleridge's discussion of the primary 
imagination in Theses VI to X is extremely difficult 
to follow, largely because he avoids using the 
terminology of reconciliation of opposites (for 
the reason already suggested). His thought can 
be understood, however, if the reader has this 
concept in mind, for Coleridge's discussion hinges 
on the reader drawing analogies; first, between 
the individual spirit and a specific act of recon- 
ciliation of opposites, and second, between God 
and the eternal act of reconciliation of opposites 
taking place throughout infinity. God, then, is 
seen as the essence of reconciliation of opposites, 
as meaning itself. Thus Coleridge is able to say 
that God is "the principle of being, and of know- 
ledge, of idea, and of reality, the ground of 
existence, and the ground of the knowledge of 
existence". (Thesis VI) The analogies also help 
to explain the nature of the individual spirit. 
The spirit is seen as something akin to a specific 
act of meaning, thus it has some finite qualities, 
yet at the same time it participates in the infinite 
meaning of God which, is its essence, hence it has 
some infinite qualities as well. Coleridge says 
that the individual spirit should be conceived 
"neither as infinite nor finite exclusively, but 
as the most original, union of both. "'(Thesis VIII) 
a 
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A further translation should be made. The 
word "self-consciousness"'should be substituted 
for the words (mine, not Coleridge's) "meaning"' 
and "essence of meaning", which is a valid sub- 
stitution since self-consciousness is both the 
prerequisite for all knowledge and the limit of 
man's knowledge about knowledge. Coleridge's 
meaning might have been expressed in the sentence, 
'The essence of meaning which resides in the 
individual spirit participates in the infinite 
meaning of God. ' But it is much closer to 
Coleridge's meaning to say instead, 'The self- 
consciousness which resides in the individual 
spirit participates in the infinite self-conscious- 
ness of God. ' 
One last point must be made before Coleridge's 
specific comments on primary imagination can be 
understood. The analogy between God and the 'third 
force' of eternal reconciliation is only an analogy. 
Coleridge does not see God as a being who exists 
between two forces of opposition.. Instead, he 
sees God as a being whose nature embodies contra- 
diction or opposition, as well as the reconciliation 
of opposition. The'same thing could be said for 
the individual spirit also. 
With these factors in mind, the main points 
about primary imagination may be sketched briefly. 
The primary imagination provides an account of the 
origin of self-consciousness, God's and man's 
- whether it is ultimately relevant for God, 
whose self-consciousness has neither beginning nor 
end, may be inconsequential). Originally the spirit 
is unconscious; it merely exists. It fails to 
recognise opposites;, it fails to see itself either 
as its own subject or object. (Theses VI & VII) 
In order for the spirit to become self-conscious it 
must recognise itself as both, for subject and 
object logically presuppose each other. Thus in 
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the move from unconsciousness to self-consciousness, 
there is a movement from identity of subject and 
object to a recognition of antithesis. (Thesis VII) 
Self-consciousness for Coleridge is by its nature 
antithetical. 
There is no logical accounting for this 
movement to self-consciousness except by an 
assumption of an act of free will. By this act 
of free will, the spirit "dissolve[s]' the identity 
of subject and object which formerly reigned, 
becomes conscious of both subject and object within 
itself, and finally (or simultaneously), reconciles 
them in self-consciousness. (Theses VII& VIII) 
The primary imagination, then, is the act of 
free will which dissolves identity, recognises 
opposites, and reconciles them as a necessary pre- 
condition for all perception and knowledge. The 
primary imagination is the nature of God and the 
essential nature of man. It is a self-duplicating 
power (Thesis VI), and man is the product of God's 
self-duplication. The finite and infinite aspect 
of man seem contradictory, but as Coleridge says, 
"In the existence, in, 'the reconciling, and the 
recurrence of this contradiction consists the 
process and mystery of production and life. '" (Thesis VIII) 
The "I AM", used in Coleridge''s Chapter XIII 
definition of primary imagination and also in Theses 
VI and 3X I is a perfect statement of primary 
imagination because it is, of course, the most 
basic statement of self-consciousness. But there 
is another reason for Coleridge's use of it which 
critics recently have overlooked somehow. While 
Coleridge arrives at this statement of the nature 
of God through reason,! his argument receives an 
almomt poetic reinforcement in the coincidence of 
his words with God's self-revelation in Ex= 
3: 14:. 
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And God said unto Moses, I AN THAT I AN: 
and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the 
children if Israel, I AM hath sent me 
unto you. 
The I AM in Exodus and in Coleridge points 
to God's self-revealing nature, or rather, a nature 
which reveals self. Isere we are at the heart of 
Coleridge's solution to the pantheist dilemma. 
For if it follows from individual self-consciousness 
that individual knowledge and character is built 
up, so, too, it follows that God himself has 
personhood. The distinction Coleridge makes, in 
effect between himself and Spinoza, is that Spinoza 
would agree in calling God "the Nature in 
Intelligences" but would not subscribe to calling 
him "Himself Intelligence and intelligent. "2 
" Coleridge has found substantiation in reason for 
his belief in a Christian God; he has reconciled 
head and heart with Paul and John. 
It might be asked why Coleridge does not 
conclude that the higher consciousness of which 
he is a part, has not a higher consciousness above 
it, and a higher one 'above that, and so on. In 
Thesis S, Coleridge does not rule out the possibilitey, 
but he does rule out the possibility of Man's ever 
knowing, since man's knowledge of self-consciousnesq 
is the limit of his knowledge. To use hic own 
words, "we yet can never pass beyond the principle 
of self-consciousness. Should we attempt it, we 
must be whirl'd down the gulf of an infinite series, 
But this would make our reason baffle the end and 
purpose of all reason, namely unity and system. "3 
l Authorized Version. Coleridge no doubt 
expected the reader to make this connection, for he 
does not explicitly make it himself. However, he 
obliquely refers to Exodus in a footnote to Thos: s 'TIS 
when he objects to tFie translation (of the authoriziod 
version), preferring "in that" or "because" to the 
equivocal "that". BL{, I, 183-4; (Everyman, 152). 
2' BL, Is 170; (: Everyman, 141). 
3 BL, I, 187; (Everyman, 155). 
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The primary imagination of God duplicates 
itself in the self-consciousness of the individual. 
How, then, does the individual self--consciousness 
duplicate itself, as it must if it partially shares 
the creative power of God? To account for this, 
Coleridge develops his theory of the secondary 
imagination 
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the 
living Power and prime Agent of all human 
Perception, and as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I All. The secondary 
Imagination I consider as an echo of the 
former, co-existing with the conscious will, 
yet still as identical with the primary in 
the kind of its agency, and differing only 
in are eýý-ýe-, and in the mode of its operation. 
It id ssolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order 
to re-create; or where this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still at all events 
it struggles to idealize and to unify. It 
is essentially vital, even as all objects 
(as oýjects) are essentially fixed and 
dead. 
Once the primary imagination is understood, 
the secondary is almost straightforward, but 
several points need to be emphasised. The primary 
imagination is the first act of reconciliation of 
opposites in the individual. All other recon- 
ciliations which follow as part of the self- 
duplicating process are of a secondary nature, 
hence they are the property of the secondary 
imagination. These acts are different in "degree" 
from those of the primary imagination: they do 
not produce self-consciousness but they do produce 
individual acts of meaning similar in "kind" to 
the essence of meaning residing in the I AN. The 
secondary imagination brings together apparently 
discordant elements and fuses them into meaningful 
thoughts, symbols, and images. It lies at the core 
of the entire language process. Like the primary 
imagination, the secondary is an act of will and 
also, like the primary, it "dissolves" identity 
in order to recognise and reconcile opposition. 
1 BL, 2,202; (everyman, 167). 
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The secondary imagination, for all its 
similarity with the primary, differs "in the mode 
of its operation. " It differs on three points. 
First, it operates by "conscious will" rather than 
by the mysterious free will of the primary. As. 
Coleridge says at the end of Chapter VII, the poetic 
imagination is distinct from the philosophic 
imagination in that it involves "superior voluntary 
controul. "' Second, it not only dissolves the apparent 
identity of opposites, it also "diffuses" and 
"dissipates" the elements with which it is involved; 
in other words, it employs extensive rearrangement 
of elements, something which the primary imagination 
did not do, especially since it was only concerned. 
with the elements of subject and object within the 
self.. Third, and possibly because of the number 
of elements involved, the secondary imagination 
struggles to idealize and unify, to bring order to 
contradiction. In Chapter VII, Coleridge calls the 
poetic imagination superior, and it is because of 
the above differences between it and the primary 
imagination that he is able to say this. 
' 
The usual interpretation of the secondary 
imagination, from Shawcross onwards, has been that 
it is the exclusive power of the poet who alone can 
perceive form in the disparate elements of man's 
experience and can bring these elements into one 
united and harmonious whole. 
2 The result of this 
interpretation has been twofold: it has elevated 
the poet to the role of high priest in society 
(much in line with the main theme in Kermode's 
Romantic Image3); and it has confined the secondary 
imagination to a select few. The evidence in 
1" BL, I, 86; (Everyman, 72). 
2 See: BL, I,, lxv; lxvii; lxviii. 
3 Frank Kermode, Romantic Image (London, 1972). 
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Biographia suggests that the interpretation neede 
modification. Granted that poets will always be 
a select few in society, but the secondary 
imagination is by no means the exclusive possession 
of the poet - it belongs to all those who employ 
symbolic language in a manner such that the symbol 
is not taken for the meaning itself. 
1 
Nonetheless, as Coleridge makes clear in 
Chapter XIV of Biographic, it is in the poet that 
one finds the highest use of the secondary 
imagination: 
The poet, described in ideal perfection, 
brings the whole soul of man into activity, 
with the subordination of its faculties 
to each other, accordinG to their relative 
worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and 
spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it 
were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic 
and magCical power, to which we have 
exclusively appropriated the name of 
imagination. This power, first put in 
action by the will and understanding, and 
retained under their irremi, ive though Is 
gentle and unnoticed, controul 
(laxis 
effertur habenis) reveals itselfhe 
balance or reconciliation of opposite or 
discordant qualities: of sameness, with 
difference; - of the general, with the con- 
crete; the idea, with the image; the 
individual, with the representative; the 
sense of novelty and freshness, with old 
and familiar objects; a more than usual 
state of emotion, ', with more than usual 
order; judgement ever-awake and steady 
self-possession, -, with enthusiasm and 
feeling profound`;! or vehement; and while 
it blends and harmonizes the natural and 
the artificial, still subordinates art to 
nature; the manner to the matter; and our 
admiration-of th poet to our sympathy 
with the poetry. 
1 Even in the. early "Religious tMusings", 
the poet was not so glorified: it was the philosophers 
and the poets who came to the rescue of a decadent 
society. Still, the secondary imagination cannot 
be confined to just these two categories of men. 
2 BL, II9 12; (Everyman, 174). In the sentence 
which follöws this quotation, Coleridge clarifies that he is speaking of5,,; the "poetic" imagination. 
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Before the topic is closed, there are some 
further parallels between primary and secondary 
imagination which the above passage makes clear. 
The list which Coleridge gives is symbolic of 
contradiction in the same way as were his various 
descriptions of the two forces which opposed each 
other. Also, the secondary imagination fuses 
elements into one another in the same way that 
the tertium aliquid (primary imagination) inter- 
penetrated the two forces of opposition; the 
identity of each force is retained yet they are 
brought together. 
The reference in the above passage to the 
poet bringing the whole soul of man into activity 
is striking, particularly since it is Coleridge's 
continual theme in Volume Two that the immediate 
object of poetry should be pleasure and not truth, 
' 
and he attacks Wordsworth on this basis. Just how 
pleasure relates to the whole soul of man is not 
made clear, but it will be argued in a future chapter 
that the relation is quite specific. It will be 
suggested that Coleridge links pleasure with self- 
harmony of a kind similar to that mentioned above, 
"the subordination of..; '; faculties to each other, 
according to their rela; ive worth and dignity. " 
If this is true, it would draw one last parallel 
between primary and secondary imagination, just as 
primary imagination brings about the most basic 
form of self-consciousness, secondary strives towards 
the broadest form of self-awareness. 
When Coleridge began Biographia Literaria he 
was simply intending to give philosophical support 
to the definitions of imagination and fancy Words- 
worth had given in his 1815 "Preface". But by the time 
Coleridge is drawing to a close the philosophical 
1 See: BL, II9 10; (Everyman, 172). 
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volume of Biographia and is preparing his own 
definitions for Chapter XIII, he realises that 
his "conclusions are not so consentient with 
[Wordsworth's]as, I confess, I had taken for 
granted. "' 
The main problem; arose with imagination. 
Wordsworth, responding to Coleridge's 1812 
Omniana definition of fancy as "the aggregative 
and associative power", complained that imagination, 
too, had the ability to associate, in addition to 
her power of shaping and modifying. 2 Not so, says 
Coleridge. Imagination has no connection with 
aggregation and association except through the 
fancy, and to see things as otherwise is simply 
the result of fancy being co-present with 
imagination. 
For Coleridge, th'e imagination - primary 
and secondary - operates solely by reconciliation 
of opposites. It works with elements that counter 
one another and is at all times vital and dynamic. 
Fancy, on the other hand, 
has no other counters to play with, but 
fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed 
no other than a mode of Memory emancipated 
from the order of time and apace; while it 
is blended with,, and modified by that 
empirical phenomenon of the will, which we 
express by the word CHOICE. But equally 
with the ordinary;, memory the Fancy must 
receive all its materia s ready made from 
the law of association. 
The distinction Coleridge makes between ordinary 
memory and "memory emancipated from the order of 
time and space" (i. e. fancy), is essentially the 
distinction between the Hartleyian theory of 
association, which Coleridge rejected in 1801, 
BL, It 193; (Eve'ryman, 159). 
2 See: Liters 'Criticism of William 
Wordsworth, 152. Zee also 
_L, 
I, ;- veryman, 159)- it 3 BL, 1,, 202; (Everymen, 167). 
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and the revised theoryi'of association Coleridgo 
developed. The preceding chapter in this thesis 
suggested that at that early time Coleridge sub- 
stituted a theory of aggregation for association. 
It was a theory which argued that similarity of 
feelings about things, determined which things 
were brought to the forefront of consciousness, 
not associations according to time and place. 
That theory was later modified to include 
associations of the latter type, and it is 
largely this revised version which is supporting 
fancy in Biographia. 
The end of Chapter, VII has been shown already 
to be of importance in anticipating the primary- 
secondary distinction in XIII. It should be noted 
also that the end of VII also anticipates what 
Coleridge says of fancy in XIII. After criticising 
associationist theories for their portrayal of the 
mind as passive, and after formulating ideas of 
the philosophic imagination, Coleridge goes on to 
give what he believesý, is the true law of association: 
... the true practical general law of 
association is this; that whatever makes. 
certain parts of a , total impression more 
vivid or distinct than the rest, will 
determine the mind to recall these in 
preference to others equally linked 
together by the, common condition of 
contemporaneity, or (what I deem a more 
appropriate and philosophical term) of 
continuity . 
3. 
As in Coleridge's earlier thought, before Biorraphia, 
Coleridge is pointing to two levels of association. 
One is the common kind , of association traditionally' 
understood as the association of ideas on the basis 
of contemporaneity or' 'continuity, The other kind 
is one which. is open to 
whatever 
process will make 
some ideas more vivid than others, and is suggestive 
of Coleridge's earlier notions of aggregation and 
association by similarity of feeling. 







There is one major difference between what 
Coleridge says in Biographia Literaria about fancy 
and what he says elsewhere, however; that is, in 
the appropriation of choice or will to fancy, which 
both refines and clarifies the theory. Will is the 
common element in all three of Coleridge's definitions. 
If the presence of will, in fancy is not recognised, 
Coleridge goes on to say in Chapter VII, fancy can 
be debased by being made vulnerable to comparisons 
with an "artificial memory. " By the presence of 
will, fancy "may arbitrarily give vividness or 
distinctness to any object whatsoever" by "confining 
and intensifying the attention. "1 
Coleridge did not, finally, reject in its 
entirety the theory of, association. He rocogniseä 
that it could account for some mental phenomena, 
but it needed considerable alteration to account 
for the non-passive actions of the mind. Coleridge's 
final, 1815-16 solution to the association problem 
involved the retention of traditional association 
processes on a basic level of the mind's operation, 
and also the retention, of ordinary memory as a 
'storehouse of images'. It also involved an addition 
of the emancipated memory of fancy, and the addition 
of the primary and secondary imagination. 
In terms of the evolution of Coleridge's ideas 
of imagination, a central question remains to be 
1 It might be pointed out that while Coleridge 
and Wordsworth had considerable differences on the 
subject of imagination. and fancy, they roughly agreed 
on the materials used. by each, as the following quotation 
illustrates: "Fancy does not require that the materials 
which she makes use of should be susceptible of change 
in their constitution, from her touch; and, where they 
admit of modification, fit is enough for her purpose 
if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly 
the reverse of these, a: ke the desires and demands of 
the Imagination. She rocoils from every thing but 
the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite. " 
Literary Criticism of William Wordsworth, 152. 
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answered: when did Coleridge first develop the 
idea of reconciliation of opposites and when did 
he recognise it as the seminal principle of 
imagination? As with most of Coleridge's ideas, 
the roots of his thought are to be found in his 
earlier writing, where the same basic concept is 
expressed, though not necessarily with the same 
words. There are numerous suggestions of similar 
ideas in Coleridge's poetry, but some of the first 
references: '. in his prose are in the notebook written 
in Malta, in 1805. In January, while briefly 
meditating on the embers of his dying fire, 
Coleridge was arrested by his restless desire to 
renew the perishing flames by adding fresh wood, 
even though he was going to bed and the act would 
be useless. He recognised in his contrary impulses 
a possible grounding principle for many-actions; 
Hence I seem (for I write, not having yet 
gone to bed) to suspect, that this desire 
of totalizing, of perfecting, may be the 
bottom-impulse of many, many actions, in 
which it never is brouCht forward as an 
avowed, or even agnized <anerkennt> as a 
conscious motive/ - thence I proceed to 
think of restlessness in general, its 
fragmentary nature, and its connection 
if not identification, with the < ýains 
correlative to the> pleasures derived 
from 'who eness - i. e. plurality in unity & the yearning left behind by thoje 
pleasures epee often experienced. 
This passage was not 'ritten about poetry - it 
was late-night philosophical speculation - but 
the vocabulary and the nature of the thought 
particularly suited it to poetic theory. Thus 
in April of the same year one finds a similar 
passage suggesting reconciliation of opposites, 
this time in the context of poetry: 
1 CN1 2414. 
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... two eeureee kinds of pleasure are 
procured, in the two master-movements 
& impulses of man, the gratification 
of the Love of Variety with the grat. 
of the Love of Uniformity - and that 
by a recurrence, delightful as a pain- 
less and yet exciting act of memory, 
tiny breezelets of surprize, the each 
one destroying the ripplets which the 
former had made, yet all together 
keeping the surface of the mind. in a 
bright dimple-smile - Hatred of' Vacancy 
reconciled to with th4 love of Rest - 
These and other causes often make Poetry 
an overpowering Delight to a Lad of 
Feeling... 
Coleridge's next references are somewhat 
later. In 1807 he is planning to speak on a 
number of themes including fancy, imagination, 
and the "antithetical balance-loving nature of 
man" in connection with art. 
2 He writes of 
composition being either by aggregation (i. e. 
fancy) or by "balance of opposition" in 1808.3 
Over the next years there are several references 
to imagination as the power of forcing "many into 
one",, 
4 but it is not until 1811 that imagination 
is explicitly connected to reconciliation of 
opposites:: 
... the Poet's own mind, by with the 
continued and spontaneous Activity of 
his own intellectual powers, more especially 
of the Imagination, the Fancy, and whatever 
else with these;, impeie aad reveals itself 
in the balancing'& reconciling of opposite 
or discordant qualities, sameness with 
difference... 5 
The passage continues, and it is apparent that it 
is the direct antecedent of the Chapter XIV 
1 CN, 2517.. The mind's abhc rence of vacancy Ar 
was a theme in iiazlitt's 1805 Essay. 
2 CL, To Davy, 9 September, 1807. 
3 CN2 3312, f. 15. See also ON, 3286 & 3288, 
4 See, for example, ON, 3290. 
5 CN, 4112* 
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quotation about the poet and reconciliation 
of opposites, with one important difference: 
fancy, and apparently other powers as well, 
have the ability to reconcile opposites. Even 
in 1814, reconciliation of opposites does not 
necessarily refer to imagination. Beauty is 
explicitly defined as "THE REDUCTION OF MANY 
TO OTTE.... - the simultaneous intuition of the 
relation of parts, each to each, and of all 
to a whole.... "1 
At present, very little work has been done 
by critics on the evolution of Coleridge's ideas; 
indeed, it is almost a new concept with regard 
to Coleridge's studies, largely because for the 
first time his complete letters, works and note- 
books have appeared,. or are appearing, before the 
public. A. vast amount of work still must be done, 
but until it is, it must be concluded that 
Coleridge clarified reconciliation of opposites 
as the seminal principle of imagination only 
when he set about the, I'task of answering Words- 
worth's"Preface': 
0 
The present chapter has a claim to newness 
in the argument that reconciliation of opposites 
underlies both primary 'and secondary imagination, 
and in suggesting reconciliation of opposites as 
the 'seminal principle' of Coleridge's imagination- 
fancy distinction. The topic of reconciliation of 
opposites, however, is net new; Coleridge used the 




term to discuss the secondary imagination in 
Chapter XIV, and critics in this century have 
given considerable attention to the subject, 
though generally confining it to Coleridge's 
context of poetry. The first book to bring 
the subject to the fore was Alice D. Snyder's 
The Critical Principle of Reconciliation of 
Opposites as Employed by Coleridge (Ann Abor, 
1918). She found many examples of reconciliation 
of opposites in Coleridge's thought, but it was 
her feeling that Coleridge's recurrence to the 
notion represented "a constitutional malady. "' 
But because even recent criticism has not 
explored the integrity, of Coleridge's argument 
in Biographia Literaria, there have been 
fundamental errors made in interpreting the 
concept. 
The paradox in the phrase reconciliation 
of opposites has often been too easily dis- 
missed and it has been assumed that Coleridge 
means actual and total reconciliation. 
Coleridge's coined word "Esemplastic", meaning 
"[shaping] into one"2 and used both at the 
beginning of Chapter kand in the title of 10 
Chapter XIII, has been seen to support this idea. 
But the beginning of Chapter X is one instance 
where Coleridge may have been insensitively 
1 Snyder, 20ff.. This citation was also 
made by Wimsatt and Brooks in Literary Criticism, 
III, 396; and they seem to give assentto Snyder. 
2 BL, It 107; (Everyman, 91). 
,ý :ý 
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handled and his remarks taken out of context. If 
the reader continues through the first paragraph 
and into the second, it is discovered that what 
Coleridge is actually saying is this: until the 
student of transcendental philosophy begins to 
perceive the divisions between things (i. e. until 
he dissolves identity and recognises opposites) 
he cannot expect to understand the manner in which 
the imagination may be said to shape into one. 
Coleridge's entire philosophy in Biographia 
emphasises that. imagination can only reconcile 
to the degree to which it participates in each 
opposite, or said another way, to the degree to 
which symbol and thought have something in common. 
The imagination is vital, and it is only if a 
tension exists between symbol and thought that 
this vitality can be retained. 
One example of misunderstanding of 
Coleridge's thought on this point is R. H. Fogle's 
The Idea of Coleridge' s Criticism. The book 
focuses on organicism in Coleridge's criticism, 
for which the concept of reconciliation of 
opposites is central. Early in the book it is 
stated that one of the basic requirements for 
reconciliation of opposites "is that the opposing 
forces themselves be such as can be reconciled", 
1 
and the emphasis there and elsewhere on straigh t 
unity has repercussions throughout the book. 
But numerous other critics also have turned 
Coleridge's feeling for:, the 'organic' into some- 
thing more static than it was; the fault seems 
particularly endemic to approaches to imagination 
through Coleridge's poetry, from I. A. Richards 
onwards, 
2 in which formalist emphasis on unity 
has tended at times to, öbscure tensions. 
1 R. H. Fogle, The Idea of Colerid e's 
Criticism (Berkeley and ps Angeles, 1962), -5. 
2 See Richards's! discussion of imagination 
as an "Act of Uniformity',! in Coleridge on 
Imagination, 94ff. ýý"ý 
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A second possible error concerning 
Coleridge's thought has resulted out of the 
failure to recognise reconciliation of opposites 
as the 'seminal principle' of the imagination- 
fancy distinction. The usual distinction made 
is the one used by James Volant Baker; 
imagination is distinguished from fancy by being 
active as opposed to passive - fancy is seen as 
passive in the 'mechanical' sense of association- 
ist philosophy. 1 While it is true that fancy 
must receive "its materials ready made from the 
law of association", it seems a mistake to see 
fancy as passive. Fancy does not operate strictly 
by traditional notions of association of ideas. 
Fancy is, after all, "memory emancipated from 
the order of time and place", in other words 
from what Coleridge calls contemporaneity, "the 
common condition of all laws of association" 
(Chapter VII). Also, fancy is modified by will, 
and will is the common factor in both imagination 
and fancy, giving them both freedom and giving 
them both activity. The real distinction between 
imagination and fancy` 'is not that one is active 
and the other passive, but rather that one operates 
by reconciliation of opposites and the other does " 
not. 
A third possible, error has arisen concern- 
ing reconciliation of opposites, specifically 
with regard to the primary imagination. The 
ramifications of this problem extend beyond 
mistaking primary imagination as associative. 
Coleridge's statement of I AM was a statement 
of self-consciousness based on a recognition of 
subject and object within the self and brought 
about a reconciliation ofthe two; it was an 
internal act of spiritual significance. Ever 
since Shawcross's essay at. the beginning of this 






century, the primary imagination has been dis- 
cussed along lines which are in accordance with 
materialist and dualist . philosophy, 
but which do 
not seem in accordance with Coleridge Is 
transcendental-philosophy. The primary imagination 
is seen as something taking place between the 
internal and the external, between the subject 
(self) and the object. 
1 This is the approach 
around which McFarland has built the main theme 
of his Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition. He 
interprets Coleridge's I AM as a statement of 
subject, and opposes it to "it is", as a statement 
of object; 
2 
and he defines the "consuming goal 
of Coleridge's philosophical activity" in 
Biographia as being "an attempt to reconcile the 
subjective and the objective. 
3 This may not have 
been Coleridge's conscious aim although it might 
be argued that indirectly it was his achievement. 
Coleridge regarded himself as a theologian 
first and a philosopher and poet afterwards. 
The theological aspect of Coleridge's thought 
has been given least attention, not only by 
literary critics, but'by theologians as well. 
4 
For instance, Emil Bruner, the German theologian, 
traces the origin of modern theology, to Kierkegaard, 
although the particular 'assessment of Kierkegaard 
corresponds almost exactly with Coleridge's 
achievement in Biographia Literaria: 
1 See: Shawcross, BL, I, lix-lxi. 
2 See: Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, 
138-160. 
3 "The Origin and Significance of Coleridge's 
Theory of the Seconda'r, y Imagination", 198-9. Also: 
Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, 191. 
4 One recent bo"ok does consider Coleridge's 
religious thought, though without giving emphasis 
to' imagination. See: J: D. Boulger Coleridge as 
Religious Thinker (New Haven, 19615. ' 
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The antithesis or the correlation of 
object and subject has dominated all 
Western philosophy since its very 
beginning.... The ultimate validity of 
this way of stating the problem has not 
been questioned until very recently. 
One did not ask if the truth could be 
found by means of these methods of 
reasoning, but merely which of the two 
great categories, the Objective or the 
Subjective, should be considered primary 
and what sort of, relation obtained between 
the two. On this issue the great systematic 
trends of thought separated, Realism with 
its primary emphasis upon the object, 
Idealism with its primary emphasis upon 
the subject, Pantheism or the Doctrine of 
Identity with its tendency to make 
antithesis a matter of indifference. 
It was left for the newest form of 
philosophy, the . existential, to question the validity of the antithesis itself. 
It is no accident that the source of this 
new thinking is to be found in the greatest 
Christian thinker of modern times, Sören 
Kierkegaard. 
Coleridge's ideas of the primary imagination, 
and hence his ideas of-: secondary imagination and 
fancy, spring from the, ' same questioning of the 
validity of commencing an ontological system from 
the position of either subject or object. 
Coleridge's theological interests, particularly 
with regard to imagination, were given further 
development in three works written before 1819, 
and these works mark, the completion of his thought 
in many areas. The Statesman's Manual develops 
the hierarchical arrangement of the human faculties 
in the context of an argument about the Scriptures. 
The Treatise on Method and the revised treatment 
of Method in Volume Three of The Friend cover 
much of the same ground, but they also establish 
the system (or method) by which knowledge is 
acquired. 
1 Emil Bruner, The Divine and Human Encounter, 
(London, 1944), 56-57. See also 73. 
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The hierarchical system which Coleridge 
develops is indicated in 'one of Coleridge's notes 
written between July 1818 and March 1819, and may 
be cited here as a useful skeletal summary of his 
ideas. The quotation is already well-known among 
Coleridge scholars for the treatment is was given 
by J. R. de J. Jackson in his Method and Imagination 
in Coleridge's Criticism. 
The simplest yet practically sufficient order 








Fancy and Imagination 
this connecting R and 





U; 1 that connecting 
rig. 
As it stands, it is a fairly accurate reconstruction 
of Coleridge's position in Statesman's Manual, and 
Jackson's discussion has removed the necessity of 
giving a detailed analysis to the entire system. 
2 
However, Jackson has seen the progression from 
lowest to highest (Sense, Fancy, Understanding; 
Understanding, Imagination, Reason) as a progression 
from conscious to unconscious. I would like to 
suggest an alternative reading, arguing that the 
line Coleridge draws 
, 
nid-way is not to separate 
conscious from unconscious, - (or that which is 
known from that which is beyond the possibility of 
knowledge) but rather is to separate that which is 
materially orientated; ýfrom that which is spiritually 
orientated. Also, Jack'son's valuable study of 
Coleridge's Methods ofilTheory and Law3 may be 
1 Quoted by Jackson from an unpublished manuscript 
in Method and Imagination in Coleridge's Criticism 
(Lon on, 19b9). 113 and note. 
2 See Method and Imagination, 113-121. 
3 See Method and Imagination, esp. 48-74. 
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carried one step further by indicating the manner 
in which Coleridge's arguments concerning Method 
overlap his arguments in Biographia and Statesman's 
Manual, and by demonstrating that the line 
Coleridge draws separates the Methodq of Theory 
and Law, as well as the realms of material and 
spiritual. M 
In Biographia, the primary imagination was 
defined as the self-consciousness of God and the, 
initial act of self-consciousness in the individual. 
Other words were connected to the concept of 
primary imagination; words like meaning, origin 
of knowledge, mind of God, absolute, universal, 
self, and I AM. In the works written between 1816 
and 1818, the concept of primary imagination is 
retained under the name of Reason, at the top of' 
the hierarchy. In these works, Reason. may be 
identified with the initial act of self-consciousness, 
the mind, of God and with absolute knowledge. 
In Statesman's Manual the origin of all 
knowledge is the Copula, and what Coleridge says 
about the Copula supports the interpretation given 
to primary imagination in this paper. The origin 
of all knowledge, Coleridge says, 
... contains the possibility - of every 
position, to which there exists any 
correspondence in reality. It is itself, 
therefore, the realizing principle, the 
spiritual substlatum of the whole complex 
body of truths. 
He 'connects the Copula,, not with experience, but 
with its "ground and source", which is "scarcely 
less than identical with its own beipg; -" it is 
"enunciated-in the word GOD. "2 As in Biographia, 
Coleridge is talking about self-consciousness as 
the origin of all knowledge and is connecting 
1 The Statesman's Manual, ed.?? R. J. White, in 
The Collec e or s of Samuel a for Coleridge, VI: 
Lay Sermons (Princeton and London, , 18. All 
quotations are from this edition. 
2 bid 18. 
136 
that not only with truth, but with the mind of 
God. He says that without the Copula, everything 
would be "the fleeting chaos of facts", 1 and 
later in Statesman's Manual he picks up the same 
idea and specifically links it to the I AM of 
the primary imagination: 
Without this latent presence of the "I am-P" 
all modes of existence in the external 
world would flit before us as colored 
shadows, with no greater depth, root, 
or fixture, than the image of a rock 
hath in a gliding stream or th e rain-bow 
on a fast-sailing rain-storm. Zý 
Similarly, in The Friend Coleridge 
maintains that knowledge must be grounded on 
the act of self-consciousness which can admit 
no predicate because, it is founded in the self- 
consciousness of God. The reality of every 
faculty, he says, is owed "to an existence 
incomprehensible and groundless, because the 
ground of all comprehension; "3 it is "that 
existence which admits, of no question out of 
itself, acknowledgesi, no predicate but the I AM 
IN THAT I AM. "3 
Reason is to be identified with the act 
of self-consciousness, the Copula, and the 
primary imagination because Reason is, in 
Coleridge's words, "the integral spirit of the 
regenerated man", 
4 
-He calls it "the science 
of the universal", concerned with "the laws of 
the WHOLE considered as ONE": 5 it is the 
1 The Statesman's Manual, 18. 
2 ibid., 78. 
3 The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke, in 
The Collected Works of Samuel Ta for Colerid e, IV 
(Princeton and London, 1969), , 519. All 
quotations are from this edition. 
4i bid. , It 519. 
5 The Statesman's Manual, 69. 
6 ibid,, 59. 
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highest property of man and is one its kind 
with the mind of God. Since Coleridge is 
maintaining that all knowledge and meaning 
originates in God, it is not surprising that 
he says that Reason is the realm of IDEAS, 
using the latter term in a specific (and 
'ideal') sense. In the 1812 edition of The 
Friend, Coleridge used the word Idea, "in its 
highest and primitive sense, and as nearly 
synonimous with the modern word ideal. "1 
In Biographia, he equated the word with essence, 
"the inmost principle of the possibility of 
any thing, as that particular thing. "2 In 
Statesman's Manual he clarifies that it is 
neither sensation nor perception, neither 
intuition nor conception, but it is that "to 
which there neither is or can be an adequate 
correspondent in the , world of 
the senses - 
this and only this is = AN IDEA. "3 
In addition to being identified with 
self-consciousness, Reason is to be Identified 
with a method of thought based on principles 
that can have no antecedents. This method of 
thought is what Coleridge calls Law. It is 
continually seeking absolute rules, ultimate 
causes, or the discovery of IDEAS in Coleridge's 
sense. In Treatise on' Method, Law is said to be the 
1 The Friend, 11,105. Retained in 
Frriiendd, I M7178. 
2 BL, II, 47 (Everyman, 204). 
3 The Statesman's Manual, 113-114. 
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"laying down [of] a rule": 
' "so the rule laid 
down we call... an Idea. "2 Elsewhere it is 
suggested that Law is "the final object and 
distinctive character of philosophy": 
for all that eX: ists conditionally 
i. e. the existence of which is 
inconceivable except under the 
condition of it, 3 dependency on some 
other as its antecedent) to find a 
ground that is unconditiona and 
absolute, and thereby to reduce the 
aggregate of human knowledge to a 
system. 
Law is defined as "the absolute kind which 
comprehending in itself the substance of every 
possible degree precludes from its conception 
all degree, 'not by generalization but by its 
own plenitude. "4 Furthermore, because Law is 
"the sufficient causeý'of the reality correspondent 
thereto", Coleridge claims that Law is an 
attribute of God and "inseparable from the idea 
of God. "5 
Part of the difficulty with Coleridge's 
system is establishing the relationship-between 
the mind of God and the individual mind of man 
since Reason (or self-consciousness,, or Law) 
clearly is related to both. The relationship 
is the same as that 
concerning 
the individual 
I am and the Divine I'4M. Individual self- 
consciousness and individual Reason are identical 
in the grounds of their being with the self- 
consciousness and Reason of God. God is Absolute 
1 Treatise onMethod as Published in the 
Encyclopaedia Metroo tana, e Alice Snyder 
(London, 1934), 4. All quotations are from this 
edition. 
2 Treatise on Method, 6. 
3 The Friend, 461. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid., I, 459. 
j 
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knowledge and the principles of that Absolute 
knowledge (i. e. Laws) are residing in the 
individual consciousness. As Coleridge had 
said in the 1809 and 1812 editions of The Friend, 
"God created man in his own image", and by that 
is meant intellectual and spiritual image, not 
physical image: 
to be the Image 'of his own Eternity and 
Infinity created he Man. He gave us 
Reason and with Reason Ideas of its own 
formation and underived from material 
Nature, self-consciousness, Principles, 1 
and above all, the Law of Conscience.... 
Individual Reason perceives that it operates on 
principles outside of the material world but 
which nonetheless are the governing principles 
of its operation. Reason is identified by 
Coleridge as the 'impartial' and 'far-sighted' 
"LEGISLATIVE of our nature", 
2 
J. R. de J. Jackson's suggestion that 
Reason or Primary Imagination is the "literary 
term for the unconscious", 
3 
when considered 
from the viewpoint of individual man, is under- 
standable. Man's consciousness is governed 
by the Laws of Reason which are highly abstract, 
and can be communicated only by symbols. There 
is an implication that these principles lie 
beyond the possibility of knowledge, hence the 
suggestion of the unconscious. However, it may 
be an error to favour,, this suggestion at the 
expense of clearer statements of Coleridge's 
thought. Coleridge's transcendental philosophy 
was not interested in what lay beyond the 
possibility of certain knowledge. As he said 
in Biographia: 
9 
1 The Friend, II, 78- 
1 2 The Statesman's Manual, 63. 
3 Method and Imagination in Coleridge's 
Criticism, 11 ackson ,s approach is quite 
different 
from the one which has been used in this paper. He 
was led to the conclusion that Reason in Coleridge's 
diagram was to be equated with Primary Imagination on 
the basis of Coleridge's different uses of the word Reason. 
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The transcendental philosopher does not 
inquire, what ultimate ground of our 
knowledge there may lie out of our knowing, 
but what is the `last in our knowing itself, 
beyond which we cannot pass.. The principle 
of our knowing is sought within the sphere 
of our knowing. It must be something there- 
fore,, which can itself be known. It is 
asserted only, that the act of self- 
consciousness is-for us the source and 
principle of all our possible knowledge. 
In other words, Coleridge does not go beyond the 
principle of self-consciousness itself with his 
philosophy, and the unconscious is not his concern. 
A further point to be considered is that 
Reason is not 'the unknowable' for Coleridge. 
Reason's Ideas and Laws may be known through 
symbols, as is the case, for example, with the 
Scriptures, 2 and as the object of transcendental 
philosophy testifies concerning the pursuit of 
absolute knowledge. Coleridge's Reason should be 
understood as the most abstracted kind of knowledge - 
knowledge abstracted from the limits of both time 
and space and into the purely spiritual. The 
principles of Coleridge, ''s Reason cannot find 
adequate correspondents in the material world, 
and cannot be readily articulated. Nonetheless 
they are knowable on the. deepest level of spiritual 
awareness and consciousness. 
Having established the nature of Reason 
for Coleridge, it is now possible to return to 
a discussion of Coleridge's diagram and his 
discussion of Method. Both the diagram and 
. 
Coleridge's thoughts on Method are designed to 
establish the means whereby transcendental 
philosophy relates all-; knowledge back to the 
source from which it, sp, rings; in other words, 
they are designed to trace the manner in which one 
moves, after the initial act of self-consciousness, 
1 BL, I, 186 (Everyman, 154). 
2 See: The Statesman's Manual, 28-29,30 & 79. 
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from mere sensory perception to realization of 
the Unity which is God. This is reflected in 
Coleridge' s use of the word Method. The word 
refers to methodical thinking, to contemplating 
"not things only, or for their own sake, but... 
[for] the relations of things. "' Method seeks 
"A PRINCIPLE OF UNITY WITH PROGRESSION. "2 The 
concept is orientated towards absolute knowledge. 
Method moves from one kind of relation of things 
to another kind, continually seeking the most 
basic cause that can be determined. 
There are two kinds of relations of things: 
Law and Theory. Theory is orientated to the 
material world. The faculties which contribute 
to Theory (from lowest to highest) are Sense, 
Fancy, and Understanding. Fancy and Understand- 
ing, Coleridge says, "abstract the outward 
relations of matter and'... arrange these phenomena 
in time and space, under the form of causes and 
effects. "3 The operation*of Theory is identical: 
[in Theory] the existing forms and qualities 
of objects, discovered by observation or 
experiment, suggest a given arrangement of 
many under one point of view: and this not 
merely or principally in order to facilitate 
the remembrance, recollection, or communication 
of the same; but for the purposes of under- 
standing, and in most instances of controlling, 
them. In other words, all THEORY supposes 
the idea of cause and effect. 
Fancy and Understanding, by the Method of 
Theory, discover certain laws of physical nature. 
By carrying the notion of cause and effect one step 
1 The Friend, I, 451; Treatise on Method, 2-3- 
2 The Friend, I, 476; Treatise on Method, 2. 
3 The Friend, I, 517-518- 
4 The Friend, I, 464; Treatise on Method, 
4-5 & 11. 
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further, the Understanding can recognise the 
necessity for an antecedent principle beyond the 
material world. Understanding, by itself, cannot 
move beyond the material world to discover the 
antecedent principle. The Understanding, by 
itself, is limited to the Method of Theory. 
The antecedent principle beyond physical 
nature can be discovered only when the Under- 
standing is aided by the higher faculties and 
the Method of Law, which looks for absolutes. 
The faculties which assist Understanding in 
determining the antecedent principle are 
Imagination and Reason. Imagination, as Coleridge 
defines it in Statesman's Manual, is the 
completing power'ýwhich unites clearness 
with depth, the 'plenitude of the sense 
with the comprehensibility of the 
understanding... impregnated with which 
the understanding itself becomgs 
intuitive, and a living power. 
Understanding "impregnated" with Imagination 
struggles for Unity and illuminates, through 
symbols, "the WHOLE considered as ONE" which 
is Reason. 
In Coleridge's chart, the Imagination 
which is mentioned is the Secondary Imagination 
of Biographia. It is ', the symbol-forming agent. 
Imagination, he says, "gives birth to a system 
of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and 
consubstantial with the truths, of which they 
are the conductors. " As in Biographin, the 
imagination in this sense is not limited to the 
poet. 
In the past, the division line on Coleridge's 
chart between Sense, Fancy, and Understanding and 
Understanding, Imagination, and Reason, has not 
1 The Statesman's Manual, 69. 
2 ibid., 29. 
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been seen as the division between the materially 
orientated and the spiritually orientated. Also, 
the line has not been seen to separate the Method 
of Theory from Law. ' ý To conclude this chapter, 
then, it might be useful to make some additions 
to Coleridge's chart in order that it may serve 
as a fairly accurate summary, not just of 
Statesman's Manual (which it represents quite 
well), but also the two works on Method. Only 
one column will be given, from lowest to highest: 








Imagination (Secondary Imagination) 
Reason (Primary Imagination) 
The hierarchical arrangement of the faculties, 
the interrelation of the faculties by Methods of 
Theory and Law, and the clarification of Primary 
Imagination as Reason related to Law and Ideas, 
were useful additions to Coleridge's thought in 
Biographia Literaria and helped to reinforce and 
systematise the transcendental philosophy 
Coleridge had developed. 
1 Jackson connects Theory with Fancy, Law 
with Understanding, and,, Imagination with a 
reconciliation of Theory and Law. See: Method 





PART TWO: IMAGINATION AND CRITICAL PRACTICE 
CHAPTER V 
LEIGH HUNT AND THE THEME OF 
IMAGINATION 
Coleridge, Leigh Hunt, Hazlitt and Lamb all 
had vital interest in theories of imagination. 
By 1816, most of the major formulations had been 
made. There were three periods in which cross- 
pollination of ideas seems apparent: a) around 
the turn of the century when Coleridge, Words- 
worth, and to some extent Hazlitt, were conversing 
on the subject; b) from 1811 to 1813, when Lamb's 
house-meetings seemed to have a catalytic effect 
on imagination theory; and c) from 1815-1816, 
when Lamb and Coleridge were quoted in Wordsworth's 
"Preface", followed by Coleridge's complex response 
in Biographia Literaria. 
However, it is unlikely that the Romantic 
critics felt themselves engaged in a systematic 
debate on the subject of imagination. Theoretical 
treatment of imagination occupied only a small 
portion of the total writings of any of the critics. 
The only works in which imagination was the central 
topic were Hazlitt's 1805 Essay and Coleridge's 
Biographiä. Most of the other ideas emerged in 
the context of arguments on other subjects and 
were contained in a large number of works scattered 
over nearly two decades. Many important comments, 
like the letters and notebooks of Coleridge, would 
have been unknown to the-other Romantics. 
Also, it should be recognised that in a great 
number of cases, the Romantic critics showed them- 
selves unreceptive to new theoretical treatment 
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of imagination and unsympathetic towards what 
might be interpreted as practical attempts to 
explore the faculty through poetry. Perhaps 
most obvious in this regard is the lack of res- 
ponse Hazlitt's 1805 Essay received (even though 
he sent a copy to Coleridge who had encouraged 
Hazlitt towrite the work) or the failure of 
Hunt's contemporaries even to acknowledge his 
theories in the 1807 Critical Essays. 
There are other examples which merit 
consideration as well; in particular the res- 
ponses to Wordsworth and Coleridge on the parts 
of both Hunt and Hazlitt, with Hunt often setting 
the stage for Hazlitt's later remarks. In 
apparent response to Wordsworth's early claim 
that "Goody Blake and Harry Gill" demonstrated 
the truth that the human imagination could change 
even physical nature, 
' Hunt singled out the poem 
as being dissatisfying and mortifying. 
2 Hunt 
complained that Wordsworth (and Coleridge) 
accosted the reader "with tales that make one's 
faculties topple over. "3 Hunt spoke of Words- 
worth's "dangerous art": "the giving importance 
to actions and situations by our feelings, 
instead of adapting our feelings to the importance 
they possess. , 14 And while Hunt acknowledged that 
Wordsworth was the best contemporary poet, he 
found Wordsworth's poetry often lacking in morality, 
turning "our thoughts away from society and men 
altogether. "5 When the 1815 "Preface" and 
Collected Poems appeared, one year after Hunt 
initially made these remarks, he did not change 
his opinions or comment on Idordsworth's new ideas 
on imagination and fancy. 
6 
1 Literary Criticism of William Wordsworth, 28,58-59. 
2 Feast of the Poets (1814), 106-7. 
3 ibid., 94. 
4 ibid., 98. 
5_ ibid., 97. 
6 Feast of the Poets (1815), in Poetical Works 
of Leigh hunt 1819, II, 109. 
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Hazlitt let Wordsworth's 1815 "Preface" 
go by without comment as well. He was as 
unsympathetic as Hunt concerning what Words- 
worth was trying to do with imagination, as 
Hazlitt had made clear in the review he gave 
to "The Excursion" in 1814. The review appeared 
in two numbers of "The Round Table" in Hunt's 
Examiner, and the theme of Wordsworth's egotism 
and some of the specific comments as well, seem 
to be taken directly from Hunt: 
f Wordsworth's] imagination holds immediately 
from nature, and 'owes no allegiance' but 
'to the elements'.... He hardly ever avails 
himself of remarkable objects or situations, 
but, in general, rejects them as interfering 
with the workings of his own mind, as 
disturbing the smooth, deep, majestic 
current of his own feelings.... every 
object is seen through the medium of 
innumerable recollections, is clothed 
with the haze of imagination like a 
glittering vapour, is obscured with the 
excess of glory, has the shadowy brightness 
of a waking dream. The image is lost in 
the sentiment, as sound in the multiplication 
of echoes.... The power of his mind preys 
upon itself. It is as if there were nothing 
but himself and the universe. He lives in 
the busy solitude of his own heart; in the 
deep silence of thought. His imagination 
lends life and feeling only to 'the bare 
trees and mountains bare'; peoples the 
viewless tracts of air, and converses 
with the silent clouds. ' 
Later, Hazlitt was to comment that the source of 
Wordsworth's imagination was "a stagnant, gilded 
puddle. Mr. Wordsworth has measured it from side 
to side. 'Tis three feet long and two feet wide. "'2 
Hazlitt was similarly scornful of Coleridge 
and what Coleridge had to say about imagination. 
He saw Biographia as a two-hundred page preface 
to an essay which never materialised on the 
1H Works, IV9 112-113. 
2H Works, XVIII, 309" (1820) 
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difference between imagination and fancy. 1 He felt 
that Coleridge's metaphysics "have been a dead 
weight on the wings of his imagination - while his 
imagination has run away with his reason and 
common sense. "2 The closest Hazlitt came to 
making any specific comments on Coleridge's ideas 
of imagination is in the following: ' 
We shall dismiss the whole of this 
metaphysical exploration, therefore, 
into the law of association and the 
nature of fancy, by shortly observing, 
that we can by no means agree with Mr. C. 
in refusing to Hobbes the merit of 
originality in promulgating that law, 
with its consequences - that we agree with 
him, generally, in his refutation of 
Hartley - and that we totally dissent f5om his encomium on Kant and his followers. 
Elsewhere Hazlitt had called Coleridge "the Dog 
in the Manger of literature, an intellectual 
Mar-Plot who will neither let any body come to 
a conclusion, nor come to one himself. 14 While 
Hunt generally nay have encouraged the tone of 
many of Hazlitt's remarks, in this case he was 
the direct source of the comment. Hunt had said 
that iordsworth nourishes 'ivagueness of sensation, - 
that making a business of reverie, - that despair 
of getting to any conclusion"; 
5 
and in the same 
work, Hunt had portrayed Coleridge at Apollo's 
"Feast of the Poets" as a "lazy dog", who stood 
"yawning askew" and needed his ear twitched. 
6 
Charles Lamb was probably less guilty than 
either Hunt or Hazlitt concerning openness to new 
ideas of imagination, although in 1801 
1H Works, XVI, 115. Hazlitt's review of 
Biographia 1s one of four scathing reviews he gave to 
Coleridge in 1816. For other contemporary reviews of 
Bio ra hia, including Hazlitt's, see: J. R. de J. Jackson, 
Coleridge: The Critical Heritage (London, 1970), 295-387. 
2H Works, XVI, 137. 
3H jam, XVI, 122-3. 
4H Works, VII, 115. 
5 Feast of the Poets (1814), 97. Retained in 1815. 
6 Feast of the Poets (1815), 18ff. 
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Wordsworth and Coleridge had censured him for 
insensitivity to "a certain Union of Tenderness 
and Imagination" in his response to Lyrical 
Ballads. ' Lamb left no written response to 
Biographia, but he was favourably impressed 
with Wordsworth's ideas of' imagination' in the 
1815 "Preface": 
You ask me about your preface. I like 
both that and the Supplement without an 
exception. The account of what you mean 
by Imagination is very valuable to me. 
It will help me to like some things in 
poetry better, which is a litýle 
humiliating in me to confess. 
For Wordsworth's part, it might be noted that 
he did not give the sympathetic reaction 
Coleridge was expecting to his treatment of 
imagination and fancy in Biographia. 3 
The Romantic critics, then, did not see 
themselves engaged in a systematic exploration 
of the faculty of 'imagination. ' Each critic 
had his own theory of what imagination was and 
how it worked; and each man's theory was 
adequate to describe a certain aspect of his 
own experience, whether literary, theatrical, 
or metaphysical. Moreover, each critic probably 
recognised, as Lamb did when he wrote to Words- 
worth, that other men had their own meanings 
for the word 'imagination. ' They did not see 
-themselves necessarily talking about the same 
thing when the word 'imagination' was used. The 
word Imagination' was a metaphor for the Romantics 
and it had a wide variety of meanings. 
1L Works, VI, 212-214; esp. 213. 
2 The Letters of Charles and Mar Lamb, 
ed. E. V. Lucas, 3 vols. (London, 1935 , 11,159. Written to Wordsworth, 15 April, 1815. 
3 See E. K. Chamber, Coleridge (Oxford, 
1938), 300. 
149 
Up to now the present thesis has been 
considering the evolution of the various 
theories of imagination, and in doing so, it 
has been concentrating on the processes or 
functions of imagination, as each man saw them. 
That concentration on the processes of 
imagination will be exchanged for a con- 
centration on the use of imagination as a 
theme, in this second part of the thesis. 
The dramatic and Shakespearean criticism 
of each writer will be considered in order 
to determine the relation between specific 
theories and their critical application. It 
will be shown how each man used his theory 
as a theme in his criticism. It will be 
shown how this thematic integration of 
imagination theory allowed each man to use 
his theory as a critical tool, and enabled 
him to say things which otherwise would have 
been difficult. The remainder of the present 
chapter will make a step in this direction 
by discussing the critical application of 
Leigh Hunt's theory of imagination. 
Leigh Hunt's theory of imagination lies 
at the heart of much of his Shakespearean and 
dramatic criticism. The theory occupies this 
position of importance, first, because it was 
developed to distinguish art which was original, 
from art which was less so. Imagination, it 
will be remembered, he defined as "an original 
and active power, that forms it's own images 
and impresses them upon the minds of others", 
and it belonged more to the poet than to the 
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actor. Less original art, like that of actors, 
was characterized generally by conception, "a 
dependant and passive capacity, that receives 
ideas suggested by others. " 
A second, and possibly more significant, 
indication of the importance of Hunt's theory of 
imagination to his criticism, lies in the fact 
that it is on this theory that he builds his 
understanding of tragedy, comedy, and dramatic 
mimesis. Partly in this manner, imagination 
becomes a theme in his criticism and forms the 
basis of many of his judgements. Hunt's comments 
on tragedy, comedy, and mimesis mainly arise, 
like his theory of imagination, in the course of 
his discussion of acting in the Critical Essays. 
Also, like Hunt's theory of imagination, his ideas 
on tragedy, comedy, and mimesis have suffered 
complete neglect by Hunt's editors and critics. 
Hunt uses the distinction between con- 
ception and imagination to distinguish between 
comedy and tragedy. Conception, he suggests, 
dominates the art of comedy. His theory of con- 
ception is used to support and illuminate his 
approach to comedy - an approach which incor- 
porates classical and Renaissance ideas about 
comedy, particularly with regard to manners. 
Just as conception is dependent on ideas suggested 
by others, so, too, says Hunt, comedy is dependent 
on ideas suggested by the actions of people in 
everyday life. It imitates "real and simple 
manners"; 
1 it focuses on habits and those 
"emotions and inclinations" which are not 
associated with the strongest kinds of passion. 
2 
1 CE, 1. 




As Hunt says at one point, "in comic characters 
we generally recognize the manners or peculiarities 
of some person with whom we are acquainted, or 
who is at least known in the world. "' The world 
must be able to find an accurate reflection of 
itself in comedy. 
2 
When Hunt speaks of the comic artist, there 
is the same emphasis on dependency on real life. 
The comic artist is. almost totally dependent on 
his ability to imitate what he has seen around him. 
His genius consists in having "no common observation 
of life. "3 He must be able to look at life and 
have "an instantaneous perception of every thing 
that varies from the general seriousness of human 
nature, or from that behaviour which is contemplated 
with a serious indifference. "4 He must also be 
able to look at his own performance and ascertain 
that the source of the variations is in real life, 
and thus prevent comedy from degenerating into 
caricature and farce. 
5 Caricature and farce are 
fine in their place, says Hunt, but they only 
produce merriment and fall short of the business 
of comedy, which is to instruct: 
Caricature... is very justly confined by 
good authors to farce, which professes 
nothing but to raise merriment, and though 
some writers of huge farces may call their 
productions comedy, yet the world invariably 
recognizes them for what they are, and 
would as soon look for it's own image in 
their kind of satire, as a beauty would 
search for her lik8ness at the back of 
her looking-glass. 
Hunt made it clear that there were only rare 
occasions on which the comic artist could go beyond 
1 CE, 51. 
2 See: CE, 143. 
3 CE, 58. 
4 CE, 58. 
5 CE, 58. 
6 CE, 143. 
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conception and the strict imitation of the 
manners and lighter passions of common life. 
He noted that, 
There are tricks and shadows of character, 
which are so rarely exhibited in the 
world, that they are to be deduced from 
the probable effects of general character 
rather than from known peculiarities, 
and must therefore be left to the 
imagination. 
However, just as conception was the main art of 
comedy, imagination was the main art of tragedy, 
and was generally confined to that genre, as 
Hunt saw it. 
Hunt's comments on comedy reflect the 
dependent nature of conception. His comments on 
tragedy reflect the independent and original 
nature of imagination. The tragic stage, he says, 
"is always a step above nature.. "2 Rather than 
being occupied with the manners and habits of 
daily life, "tragedy is wholly occupied with 
passions"; 
3 
and "the loftier passions are rarely 
exhibited in the common intercourse of mankind. 1"4 
Thus, the tragic artist had to rely on his 
imagination for much of his material: 
of the deeper tragic passions we have 
only read, or heard; we never see in 
society an impassioned character like 
Macbeth, or King Lear, or Hamlet; such 
characters exhibit themselves on great 
occasions only, their very nature prevents 
their appearance in common lifeg but 
habits appear no where else.... 
Accordingly, the tragic artist was to be estimated, 
1 CE, 58. 
2 CE, 142. 
3 CE, 49. 
4 CE, 3. 
5 CE, 51. 
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not for his representation of the common 
occurrences of the world, not for his 
discernment of the familiarities of life, 
but for his idea of images never sub- 
mitted to the observation of the senses. 
The task of the tragic artist, then, was 
more difficult than that of his counterpart in 
comedy, for as Hunt said, "that which is done by 
imagination is more difficult than that which is 
performed by discernment or experience. "2 The 
tragic artist is not copying nature so much as he 
is trying to imitate an idea about nature, an 
ideal quality in nature, or what Hunt suggests is 
a "general opinion of life and manners. "3 He must 
contemplate "heroism", "wisdom", and "virtue", and 
must turn away from "the familiar vanities and 
vulgarities of common life"; in other words, he 
must become "occupied with the soul only. "4 
As was the case with conception and comedy, 
Hunt's ideas of imagination are used to give support 
to some of the ideas concerning tragedy which Hunt 
would have gained from his classical education at 
Christ's Hospital. In particular, much of what he 
says about the elevation needed for imagination 
on stage sounds much like traditional ideas of 
decorum. 
This is apparent when Hunt discusses the 
actor's difficulty in trying to address "the soul 
only", and in trying to convey an ideal quality 
in nature which is not seen normally. In order 
to give the proper elevation to tragedy, the 
language and manners of the main characters must 
be such as "they never use in real life. "5 Hunt 
gives the following example: 
1 CE, 51. 
2 CE, 51. 
3 CE, 3. 
4 CE, 54. 
5 CE, 2. 
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A tragic hero, who called for his follower 
or his horse, would in real life call for 
him as easily and carelessly as any other 
" man, but in tragedy such a carelessness 
would become ludicrous: the loftine. s of 
his character must be universal.... 
Once this appropriate elevation is achieved by the 
actor, he must keep it separate from either the 
natural behaviour of daily life or the swollen 
emotions of burlesque; he must neither "debase 
his dignity by too natural a simplicity of manner, 
nor... give it a ridiculous elevation by pompous- 
ness and bombast. "'2 Moreover, while he must use 
his imagination to give him the correct elevation, 
he must still "imitate nature asýclosely as 
possible in passages of emotion and passion"; 
3 
"he should not indulge himself in novelties of 
invention, because the hearts of his audience will 
be able to judge where their experience has no 
power. "4 All of the time while on stage, the 
tragic actor must be trying to match the common 
idea of a great man. He must be trying to create 
an image of that which exists only as an idea or 
feeling in the audience. 
Hunt uses his notions of imagination and 
conception to analyze the audience's reaction to 
dramatic illusion or mimesis. From the beginning 
of Critical Essays he had maintained the fallacy 
of "the general idea, that tragedy and comedy 
are equally direct imitations of human life. "5 
They were not. As has been shown, tragedy "is 
an imitation of life in passions", 
6 
and is elevated 
from real life; comedy "imitates both passions 
1 CE, 2-3. 
2 CE, 3. 
3 CE, 142-3. 
4 CE, 3. 
5 CE, 2. 




and is dependent on real life. 
Hunt had concluded that different kinds of 
imitation were involved possibly because of 
the different feeling he was left with finally 
after watching tragedy as opposed to comedy. 
Just as the art of comedy was conception, so, 
too, it appealed to conception in the spectators 
and left them still bound to real life. Comedy's 
effect was humour, or conception at its best: 
Humour surprises and wins, bftt it never 
elevates: it meets with too great 
familiarity-our common ideas, and 
while it amuses us with it's powers 
leaves u2 sufficient contentment with 
our own. 
The effect of tragedy was the effect ' of 'imagination; ' 
it lifted the audience into meditation on the soul: 
... imagination surprises, wins, "and 
elevates too; it carries us off from 
our level with earthly objects and 
ordinary cares, it bears the mind to 
it's highest pitch of ascent, transports 
us through every region of thought and of 
feeling, and teaches us that we have 
something within us more than mortal. 
3 
Tragedy appealed to the imagination of the 
audience, more than to the conception. 
There seems to have been no meeting of 
'conception' and 'imagination' in Hunt's thinking, 
for throughout Hunt's discussion in Critical 
Essays, the two seem thematically opposed. 
Hunt's thinking along these lines is most evident 
when he is explaining the effect on the audience 
if either tragedy or comedy strayed from its 
proper object of imitation. Two things would 
happen, Hunt says, if a tragic actor started to 
imitate real life and reduced the proper elevation 
of the play. First, the cathartic effect would be 
1 CE, 3. 
2 CE, 53. 
3 CE, 53. 
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lost: "the spectators would lose sight of the 
emotion, considered in it's imitative powers, 
from which some critics have deduced all the 
pleasure arising from tragedy. "' Second, the 
tragic play would become too painful to bear: 
"in proportion as [the spectatorsl lost sight of 
this imitation [i. e. of ideal passion], they 
would be awake to a sorrow too apparently real 
to be softened into a pleasing effect. " Con- 
trastingly, if the comic actor tried to elevate 
comedy beyond the imitation of real life, the 
effect would be ludicrous, not painful, and the 
play would be doomed to failure because comedy' 
excites too, littlq passion to'enable it 
successfully-to move into the ideal. Comedy is 
unable "to carry our enthusiasm beyond a sense 
of it's imitation [of real life]. "3 
Hunt's ideas of imagination and conception 
support a clear division in his thought between 
tragedy and comedy. The one point imagination 
and conception (or tragedy and comedy) may be said 
to'have in common in Hunt's thought, concerns the 
necessity for both to instruct. Hunt adopted this 
idea from Horace, whom he quotes on the title page 
of Critical Essays; and certainly with regard to 
comedy, Hunt's ideas were along the classical 
lines. Comedy instructed through satirizing the 
follies and vices of man. As will be shown later, 
Hunt's ideas concerning the instruction of tragedy 
have less similarity with Horace (or even Aristotle). 
Tragedy instructed, Hunt said, by "teach[ing] others 
to feel". 
4 
At least concerning the more popular 
tragedies of Shakespeare, Hunt seems to have meant 
1 CE, 142. 
2 CE, 142. 
3 CE, 143. 
4 CE, 4. 
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that the passions which the audience experienced 
were the purpose of tragedy, as distinct from 
" the moral lessons arising out of the actions. 
Most of Hunt's critical comments were geared to 
maximizing the instructive ability of the theatre, 
whether concerning the didactic purposes of comedy 
or the emotional purposes of tragedy. 
Sufficient attention has been paid to the 
Critical Essays to demonstrate the thematic 
integration of Hunt's ideas of imagination concern- 
ing his general approach to the theatre in that 
work. The theme of imagination operates in a 
similar manner in much of Hunt's more detailed 
criticism of Shakespeare and drama. Many of 
Hunt's specific comments may be traced to his 
understanding of conception and imagination and 
their particular effects in comedy, tragedy and 
the mimetic process. 
Hunt's Shakespearean and dramatic criticism 
is to be found mainly in three places, The News, 
the Critical Essays, and The Examiner. The News 
was a weekly paper, and Hunt was its theatre critic 
from its first issue, on 19 May, 1805, until he 
and his brother left the paper after the issue of 
13 December, 1807. There are two problems with 
the criticisms in The News, however. The first is 
that, until the last issue, Hunt did not sign the 
articles he had written. In the last issue there 
is an article titled, "The Critic's Farewell to 
His Readers", signed with the index hand Hunt used 
from then on to identify his weekly work in The 
Examiner. In the "Farewell" Hunt claims that, 
"Stith six or eight exceptions I have written every 
theatrical article in this paper from its 
commencement. " 
The second problem is that numbers 34 to 85 
of The News, in other words, the bound edition of 
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1806, no longer appears to exist; 
' hence it is 
impossible to examine all of the articles to 
determine which ones were not Hunt's. It may have 
been that the review of 8 March, 1807 (signed 
"B. F. " [probably Barron Fieldj), was not the only 
review to have a signature, and that the reviews 
which were not Hunt's were identified, and mainly 
occurred in 1806. 
There is only one precedent for quoting any 
of Hunt's material in The News, and that is an 
article by Jeffrey Fleece in which three News 
criticisms are cited. 
2 Fleece ignored the problem 
of authorship. There are seventy-five theatrical 
reviews in the 1805 and 1807 issues of The News, 
and eleven of these are centered on Shakespearean 
productions and plays. In the remainder of this 
thesis I will be quoting only those reviews which 
show strong internal evidence for the material 
being Hunt's, based often on the similarity of 
specific comments with his later ones. 
l The British Museum does not have a copy, nor 
does it have record of any other library holding one. 
Louis Landre' was unable to obtain a copy when he 
prepared his work in 1936: see Leigh Hunt (1784-1859), 
II, 485. 
2 See "Leigh Hunt's Shakespearean Criticism", 
Essays in Honor of Walter Clyde-Curry (Nashville, 
. 1954)9 181-195. 3 Positive proof is available concerning some 
reviews: in the 28 June and 20 September, 1807, reviews 
(the former concerns Hamlet), Hunt refers to his 
forthcoming Critical Essays. "An Essay on the 
Appearance, Causes, and Consequences of the Decline 
of British Comedy", an important essay in three 
sections in the issues of 23 August, 30 August, and 
6 September, 1807, is definitely by Hunt. The 
Critical Essays contains an appendix of some former 
reviews by Hunt, which not only contains the above 
essay, and two other articles from 1805 (25 August 
and 27 October), but it also contains some articles 




Fortunately authorship is not a problem 
with Hunt's Examiner material. He helped to set 
up the paper at the beginning of 1808 and made 
regular reviews of the theatre until a few months 
before his imprisonment in 1813. Although he was 
released in February, 1815, after serving his 
full sentence, he made only scattered criticisms 
over the next two years. Then, in June, 1817, 
Hunt began regular reviewing which continued 
almost until his last "Theatrical Examiner" in 
March of 1821, immediately prior to his departure 
for Italy to join -Byron and Shelley. 
1 
By that time, Hunt had written a total of 
two-hundred and forty-five "Theatrical Examiners" 
(the Houtchenses have reprinted forty-six2). 
Of these thirty-two explicitly dealt with 
Shakespeare (the Houtchenses have given twelve) 
and a large number of others contained' 
significant comment on Shakespeare. 
1 Four-hundred-and-twenty-six "Theatrical 
Examiners" had been written to this date. Hunt 
also wrote reviews for the Tatler in 1830-31 
(see Leigh Hunt's Dramatic Criticism, 232-288). 
These reviews will not be considered in this 
thesis partially because they were written well 
after the other men in this study had finished 
writing on Shakespeare, and partially because 
they more properly belong to a new era of Hunt's 
career, and a new era of Shakespeare and the 
stage. 
2 Leigh Hunt's Dramatic Criticism. Cross- 
references to this text will be given where 
possible. 
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Hunt's theme of imagination in Critical 
Essays is present in his extensive Shakespearean 
and dramatic criticisms in The News and The 
Examiner. On the basis of the foregoing dis- 
cussion of imagination in Critical Essays, it 
is possible to indicate' some of the features 
that will be found in Hunt's general approach 
to Shakespeare in the theatre. First, from 
Hunt's clear division of conception and imagination, 
and from his belief in the superiority of the 
art of imagination, it is reasonable to assume 
that Hunt's criticism will show a preference 
for Shakespearean tragedy. 
Secondly, Hunt's treatment of Shakespearean 
comedy can be expected to rely on his under- 
standing of conception. While some forms of 
comedy might benefit from a critical approach 
which demands the imitation of real life and 
manners, Shakespearean comedy is not ideally 
suited to such an approach. Hunt's critical 
use of conception, therefore, may be seen to have 
contributed-to Hunt's lack of appreciation of 
some of Shakespeare's comedies. 
A third point may be made concerning 
a) Hunt's insistence on the didactic purpose 
of comedy and b) the close parallel between 
some aspects of his thoughts on tragic elevation 
and traditional ideas of decorum. Since the 
notions of didacticism and decorum had classical 
origins and were critically employed throughout 
the eighteenth century, it is to be expected 
that many of Hunt's comments on these issues 
are in line with the criticism of the previous 
century. 
Lastly, it is to be expected that if Hunt 
excels in any area of criticism, it must be 
concerning imagination and tragedy. His 
preference for tragedy, his vision of tragedy 
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as "ian imitation of life in passions", his 
feeling that tragedy addresses the soul, and 
his interest in the mind of the tragic 
character (often as opposed to the morality of 
his actions), all suggest positive contributions 
of Hunt's theme of 'imagination: 
Hunt was involved more extensively with 
the theatre than any of the other Romantic 
critics. Hunt's interest in Shakespeare in the 
theatre was that Shakespeare "cannot only elevate 
our imagination, but can familiarize us with the 
business of life. "' The remark seemed in particular 
to imply praise of Shakespeare's tragedy, but con- 
cerning comedy he added that Shakespeare "can 
make us laugh heartily and has an inexhaustible 
fund of gay wit and humour. "2 The contrast 
between the comments may serve generally to 
characterise the difference between Hunt's. approaches 
to Shakespeare's comedy and tragedy. Hunt never 
1 .. r 
suggests that Shakespeare's comedies elevate, or 
that they teach through opening the audience to 
new feelings, in the manner of imagination. 
Instead, he concentrates on the manner in which 
Shakespeare's comedies 'surprise and win' through 
relative degrees of humour. In 1809 he says that 
The Merry Wives of Windsor, as an example of pure 
comedy, is surpassed by Much Ado About Nothing in 
wit, and Henry IV Part One in wit and humour. 
3 
Along a similar line, in 1811, Hunt noted that 
Twelfth Night possessed passages of poetic deli- 
cacy and two scenes of irresistible humour, but 
it was "inferior to the Falstaff pieces in invention, 
to Much Ado About Nothin; in wit and interest, and 
to the Tamin.. of the Shrew in effect and complete- 
ness of design. " 
1 CE, 203. 
2 CE, 203. 
3 Examiner, 
4 Examiner, 
10 December, 1809. 
3 I; arch, 1811; (DC, 41) . 
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In Critical Essays Hunt expressed a belief 
that runs throughout his criticism in The News 
and The Examiner, and that is that "All art 
acquires it's greatest effect from contrast. "1 
The contrasts he points to in Shakespearean 
comedy are quite different from those which he 
finds in Shakespearean tragedy. The contrasts 
of comedy are the kinds derived from conception 
and found in daily life; they are contrasts which 
serve to keep the imitation on the-plane of real 
life by furthering wit and humour., not passion 
and imagination. The contrasts that he points 
to in comedy are not found in the internal thoughts 
and feelings of any one, character, but are found 
rather in the structures of the plays, often 
centering on the characters and their opposing 
functions. 
For example, concerning Twelfth Night, 
Hunt points to the advantage of contrasting Sir 
Toby Belch and Sir Andrew Aguecheek: Sir Toby, 
Hunt says, "is a mere knavish sot; and is only 
preserved from our contempt by contrast with his 
tool Ague-cheek, whose excessive stupidity gives 
the other an air of sense and even of a taste 
for irony. " Hunt points to the midnight scene 
(Il, iii) in which the contrast between Malvolio 
and the others "is sure to convulse the spectators 
with laughter. " Also, Hunt points to the "very 
lively and refreshing" contrast between the "scenes 
and characters of low vice" and "the delicate 
mind and elegant language of Viola. "2 
Hunt's main focus in his comments about 
Much Ado About NothinG is again the humour arising 
from the contrast of characters: 
1 CES 197. 
2 All of these quotations are from Examiner, 
3 March, 1811; (DC, 42). 
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The two principal men and women are 
excellently contrasted: Claudio, instant 
in his feelings and incapable of con- 
cealing them, but altogether rational 
and resolute, is opposed to the careless, 
the mirthful, the apparently thought- 
less Benedick; while the satirical and 
talkative though good-hearted Beatrice 
presents a fine relief to the retiring 
sensibility of Hero. The merry warfare 
of raillery between Benedick and Beatrice 
is a masterpiece of familiar wit; it is 
poetry applied to cojimon feelings and 
common occasions.... 
The final reference to poetry and "common feelings 
and common occasions" seems to offer direct proof 
that Hunt's remarks are being shaped by his 
understanding of conception, and the imitation 
of real life and manners. 
Because of conception's dependency on real 
life, and because of the need for comedy to con- 
fine itself to an accurate reflection of everyday 
occurrences, Shakespeare's comedies often fare 
less well with Hunt than his tragedies. In 
particular, Hunt criticised The Jinter's Tale, 
Cymbeline, As You Like It, and Comedy of Errors 
for their inability to convince the audience 
that real life was being addressed and hence for 
their failure to instruct. Hunt criticised Kemble 
for his revival of The Winter's Tale in 1807: 
The play] exhibits so much feebleness of 
writing as well as violation of probability 
and possibility, that nothing but an imposing 
scene, in which Hermione stands as a statue, 
could render it tolerable to any audience.... 
Can anything be more ridiculous than a ship- 
wreck in Bohemia, than a King of Bohemia at 
the Sicilian court during the times of 
ancient heathenism, than a daughter of an 
Emperor of Russia married to an ancient 
King of Sicily, or lastly, than a statue 
made by Julio Romano in the age of the 
Delphic Oracle? 2 
1 Examiner, 3 January, 1808; (DC, 4). 
2 The Nevis, 15 November, 1807. 
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Hunt also found it difficult to believe that 
the character of Antigonus had any counterpart 
in real life: "... Antigonus is a most unnatural 
mixture of courage and weakness, of frankness 
and court-servility; he trembles and kneels 
before the enraged King, and then jokes at his 
indignation to his face-"' In another edition 
of The News Hunt already had complained that 
inconsistencies in plot had spoiled the 
occasional beauties of Cymbeline, and he had 
lamented Kemble's revival of that play as well. 
2 
Interestingly, Hunt's later theatre experience 
did seem to. modify his views. In 1820 he called 
Cymbeline a "beautiful play", 
3 
much in'line with 
the viewpoint expressed by Hazlitt in his 1817 
Characters of Shakespeare's Plays. 
When Hunt reviewed As You Like It in 1810, 
he came close to condemning the play, even 
though he admired much of the characterization 
and found Shakespeare's "wit and wisdom" 
demonstrated "to great advantage in occasional 
passages. " But as Hunt went on to say: 
the plot is unnatural, and probability 
and nature are offended at once, when the 
two young ladies, one in man's cloathes 
and the other with a crook., go a 
shepherdizing, and in a Flemish forest 
too. Arcadian tales tigere -much in 
fashion in Shakespeare's time, and 
when laid in a southern climate, had 
some little claim to toleration; but 
they never were natural, - at least 
not in that elegance with which the 
poets invest them, - and should have 
been avoided, as pictures of false life '4 by the great master of men and manners. 
1 The News, 
2 The News, 
3 Examiner, 
4 Examiner, 
15 November, 1807. 
27 September, 1807. 





Hunt modified his comments about the play 
ten years later when he praised the casting 
at Covent Garden and referred to the play 
as "this delightful pastoral. " However, 
Hunt does not seem to be totally without 
some of his former misgivings concerning the 
play's ability to convince the audience: 
EShakespearee even seems, after 
having finished his work, to have 
waked up as from a dream, and to 
have doubted how far the audience 
would go with him; though his age 
was a much more sylvan one than ours, 
He calls his play As You Like It, as 
if he felt that its success would 
depend upon the greater or less 
tendency of the spectators to be 
pleased with nature in general, - 
upon their identification of a 
natural pleasure with a good-natured 
critical taste. 
Hunt expressed considerable reservation 
about , Comedy of Errors, along the same 
lines 
ol e ning ý Tinter's Tale, Cymbeline and as cr 
He continued to criticise As You Like It. 2 
the play strongly in 1819: 
It is impossible for the spectators' 
imagination, however willing, to 
get over the utter improbability 
of two masters quite alike, who 
cross and confound each other at 
every step, Without coming to an 
explanation. 
Hunt goes as far as to question whether 
Shakespeare had any satisfaction in writing 
the play and says, "the classical stories 
that it was his [Shakespeare's] fortune to 
chuse, or to have chosen for him, are the 
things in which he gives us the least pleasure, 
whether in comedy or tragedy. Vie allude in 
1 Examiner, 
2 See, for 
1811; (DC, 43). 
3 Examiner, 
16 January, 1820. 
nstance, Examiner, 3 I, iarch, 
26 Dece; iber, 1819. 
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the latter to Coriolanus. "l 
Hunt's theory of 'conception' would have 
supported the harsh criticisms he made of some 
of Shakespeare's , 
comedies, particularly in his 
earlier criticism. But Hunt would have drawn 
support also from Johnson. Hunt's criticism 
contains numerous references to Dryden, Thomas 
Rymer, Addison, Steele, Warburton, William 
Richardson, Thomas Warton, and George Steevens, 
but Hunt most frequently quotes Johnson. Although 
Johnson favoured Shakespeare's comedy, and 
although he was not insistent upon the need for 
the dramatic unities, he lacked sympathy for 
the pastoral convention. In some of his criticism 
he was even more harsh than Hunt. Consider, for 
example, his closing comment on Cymbeline: 
To remark on the folly of the fiction, 
the absurdity of the conduct, the 
confusion of the names and manners of 
different times, and the impossibility 
of the events in any system of life, 
were to waste criticism upon unresisting 
imbecility, upon faults too evident for 
detection, and too gross for aggravation. 
2 
Hunt in many cases was following leads given by 
Johnson. If his theory of 'conception' led him to 
adopt former attitudes towards Shakespeare's 
comedy, he may be credited at least with 
recognising, in his later criticism, that his 
approach had been too limited. 
Coriolanus is the only Shakespearean tragedy 
about which Hunt is highly critical. Throughout 
Hunt's Shakespearean criticism, the comments on 
tragedy reflect Hunt's early notions of 'imagination. ' 
1 Examiner, 26 December, 1819. 
2 Samuel Johnson, The Yale Edition of the 
Works of Samuel Johnson, VII & il, Johnson on 
Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo (New Haven and London, 
1968), VIII, 908. All future quotations from 
Johnson on Shakespeare will be from this edition. 
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In contrast to comedy, the emphasis is on the 
manner in which tragedy elevates by addressing 
the imagination; Hunt focuses on the emotions 
of the characters and the feelings of the audience. 
The imitation Hunt speaks of is not that of real 
life, nor generally are there specific moral 
lessons which he draws (as is the case with 
comedy) concerning the representation of vice 
and virtue. 
Hunt's specific criticism of Coriolanus 
centered on. the issue of the elevation necessary 
for tragedy. The character of Menenius lacked 
sufficient elevation, Hunt complained in Critical 
Essays; I'4enenius, as a Patrician and close friend 
of Coriolanus, showed too much familiarity in his 
address to the public, and Shakespeare had "given 
the comedian an opportunity of displaying his 
merriment rather too broadly. " Humour had 
"entirely overcome the man of rank. " Coriolanus, 
said Hunt, was the "proudest man in Rome and [was] 
not very likely to associate with buffoons. "' 
The comments were intended as a criticism 
of Shakespeare, and not just of a particular 
performance. Similar complaints were voiced in 
1819 and 1820, when Hunt saw Macready and Kean, 
respectively, playing Coriolanus. On these 
occasions Hunt was disturbed by the kind of 
elevation given to the hero. Macready was good 
in the part, but he "did not touch all the keys 
of Coriolanus's passions truly; " "we suspect he 
was intended to be more short, impatient, and ti 
soldier-like in his haughtiness, with less of 
the graceful ungraciousness of the mere patrician. "2 
1 All quotations from CE, 84-85. In this 
instance, Hunt is borrowing directly from John Dennis's 
discussion of decorum and Coriolanus (Essay On The 
Genius And Writings of Shakespeare £7.711 . Dennis had 
said that Shakespeare was guilty of indecorum in 
representing Menenius as little more than a buffoon. 
See: J. W. H. Atkins, £: n lish Literary Criticism: 
17th & 18th Centuries London, 19 , 244. 
2 Examiner, 5 December, 1819; (DC, 223 & 224). 
I 
168 
In 1820, Hunt was answering what he said were the 
charges of other critics that Kean's Coriolanus 
was not grand or heroic enough: 
We confess that we think him occasionally 
a little over-familiar, or rather over- 
sarcastic, - two Csic] malignantly subdued 
in his tones; but with respect to his being 
not grand enough, or theatrical enough (for 
that, after all, is what is generally meant 
by the objection) we own he appears to us 
in many instances a great deal too much so. 
l 
Evidently the elevation Kean was supplying was 
still missing something of the essential character 
of Coriolanus. 
Hunt's strong criticism of Coriolanus, 
particularly his early criticism, is unusual, but 
he did criticise other tragedies of Shakespeare. 
When Hunt criticised Shakespeare's less popular 
tragedies, he made it clear that they were not 
strictly operating in the realm of the'imagination' 
and the world of ideal passion, and he mellowed 
his criticism of the plays accordingly. For instance, 
there is his comment on Julius Caesar: 
. Julius Caesar, with the exception of Coriolanus, has perhaps less of the 
poetical in it than any other tragedy of 
Shakespeare; but fancy and imagination 
did not suit the business of the scene; 
ana what is wanting in colour and ornament, 
is recompensed by the finest contrasts of 
character. It i2 of itself a whole school 
of human nature. 
Hunt made a similar comment about King John, when 
he reviewed Kemble's revival of the play in 1810, 
two years before the above comment, Hunt is 
answering -a remark of Johnson's: 
The tragedy of King John is certainly "not 
written with the utmost power of Shakespeare, " 
because the utmost power of the poet's wis- 
dom and imagination was not called into play 
by the nature of the story; but it contains 
all that is adequate to a just and delicate 
discrimination of character.... 
1 Examiner, 30 January, 1820. 
2 Examiner, 29 March, 1812; (DC, 66). 
3 Examiner, 3 June, 1810; (DC, 39)" 
169 
In both of these plays, Hunt was thinking that 
history was more "the business of the scene" 
than was 'imagination. ' Indeed, concerning the 
historical tragedies, Hunt almost seemed to 
prefer'imagination' to be sacrificed for the 
sake of historical accuracy. 
' It is interesting 
to note that in removing these the plays from 
the realm of 'imagination, Hunt focuses on 
issues (like contrasts of characters) which are 
more typically associated with the art of 
conception in Hunt's thought. 
2 
Whether or not he was reviewing one of 
Shakespeare's less pöpular tragedies, the 
standards Hunt generally brought to bear on 
the actors in those plays were the standards 
dictated by the imagination. Actors were judged 
by their imitation of passions and images they 
probably never observed in daily life. They 
were judged by the contrasts which characterise 
tragedy and 'imagination'- contrasts of emotion 
within a character as he struggles with external 
events. The contrasts Hunt focuses on in tragedy 
are internal, psychological contrasts, rather 
than the external and more social contrasts of 
comedy. 
I Hunt was against the alteration of history 
in historical drama. Hunt protested that Shakespeare 
had violated historical accuracy by making Richard III 
the epitome of all the rumours about him. (Examiner, 
23 June, 1811). Concerning Caesar Hunt noted, 
"Shakespeare has distorted and tumified Caesar's 
character enough, as it is", and went on to complain 
about Egerton's treatment of the role. (Examiner, 
5 April, 1812; CDC, 68]). 
2 Also relating to conception are Hunt's 
interests in the "manners and greatness" of the Romans 
in Julius Caesar which Hunt says will give the young 
student "the clearness of local conception which is 
afforded us by a panorama. " (Examiner, 29 Fiarch, 1812; 
(DC, 651. ) - 
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Although Hunt had said that Julius Caesar 
was not stirred by fancy and imagination, he 
seemed to mean this as a general comment, because 
he pointed to a particular part of the play which 
he said excellently portrayed the ideal world of 
tragedy. Mr. Young was playing Cassius and Hunt 
was referring to the speech beginning, "I know 
that virtue to be in you" (I, ii): 
This speech is a string of varieties, 
from the commonest colloquial familiarity 
to the loftiest burst of passion; and Mr. 
Young passes from one to another with 
the happiest instantaneousness of 
impression - from an air of indifference 
to one of resentment, from anecdote to 
indignant comment, from the subdued tone 
of sarcastic mimicry to the loud and 
impatient climax of a jealousy wrought 
up into rage. The transition in 
particular from the repetition of 
Caesar's sick words to the contemptuous 
simile they occasion, and from that 
again to the concluding burst of 
astonishment, accompanied with a start 
forward and a vehement clasp of the 
hands, is exceedingly striking. As 
there is no single passage in Shakespeare 
more various in expressing the shades of 
passion and discourse, so I do not 
remember a speech delivered on the 
stage by which the actor more nearly 
approaches to the ideal picture of the 
person he represents. 
Hunt's earliest criticism had focused on 
the kinds of contrast his later criticisms were 
consistent in claiming belonged to the imagination. 
In 1805, Hunt had criticised Elliston's performance 
of Macbeth: 
1 Examiner, 5 April, 1818; (DC, 67). 
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14hat Mr. Elliston principally failed 
in was that nice distinction of emphasis 
and variety of feature which are so 
requisite in soliloquies: here he was 
painfully monotonous, and so little 
changeable of countenance, that he was 
evidently deficient in the study of 
his author, for though his face is 
not the most happily adapted to tragic 
expression, we should be loth to 
imagine that he does not feel and 
therefore cannot eypress the variations 
of tragic emotion. 
Hunt expressed a similar idea in Critical Essays 
when he referred to Mr. Raymond's performance 
in the role of Macduff, except that Mr. Raymond 
had succeeded in the various gradations and 
changes of passion: 
Everybody can clench his fist, can sob, 
and can strike his bosom every other 
minute; but to change the voice and the 
countenance into all the transitions 
from desperate to languid sorrow, or 
from resentment of wrongs to piteous 
complaint, and gradually to become 
vehement or gentle, powerful or power- 
less, as the passion fluctuates, belongs 
to a master only. 2 
In 1808 Hunt praised Miss Smith in Rowe's tragedy, 
Jane Shore, because "the whole tone of Miss Smith's 
fine variable countenance answers to every cord 
struck in her feelings: " at the same time, Hunt 
held little hope for Miss Norton in tragedy 
because "her face does not exhibit that 
instantaneous acknowledgement of her feelin, 4, s. "3 
In addition to criticising tragic actors 
for lack of sufficient elevation Hunt's most common 
criticism of tragic actors was for lack of 
imagination in portraying fluctuating passion. 
In particular he criticised them concerning what 
he called the 'gentler passions. ' The easiest 
tragic passions (and hence the ones which were 
1 The News, 
2 CE, 30. 
3 Examiner, 
20 October, 1805. 
13 March, 1808. 
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presented on stage most frequently) were the 
strongest passions. As Hunt said of the role 
of Hotspur in The News, "violent passions are 
always easy and advantageous for tworeasons, 
because they demand action rather than 
expression, and because they bewilder scrutiny. "1 
Hunt had said this concerning Mr. Young, but the 
same comment was made concerning Mr. Pope in 
Critical Essays, who played a suitable Hotspur, 
but had no great tragic talent: 
... violence has no sensation of restraint, it has no feelings to hide or to repress, 
and no niceties of action to study; the 
gentler passions give us leisure to'examine 
them, we can follow every variation of 
feeling and every change of expression; 
but here [in Pope's Hotspur[ we have 
leisure for nothing; every thing is 
rapid and confused; we are in the con- 
dition of a man who should attempt to 
count the spokes of a wheel in a chariot- 2 race., 
Even the best actors in Hunt's time were 
prone to failure in roles which demanded the 
gentler passions. Kemble was the least likely 
to be an exception, for as his performance of 
lago indicated in 1808, his imagination lacked 
flexibility: 
I grant, that it would be almost impossible 
for Mr. Kemble, even were he to attempt it, 
to shake off that lofty stiffness which 
wraps and impedes him like a buckram 
shirt; but Mr. Itemble ought to be sensible 
of his obstructions, he ought to be 
sensible of that rheumatism of mind which 
sometimes renders his fancy so ludicrously 
stiff, and not attempt characters that 
require a peculiar pliability of expression. 
3 
1 The News, 
2 CE j 26. 
3 Examiner, 
19 July, 1807. 
31 January, 1808. 
.. 
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Early in October, 1817, Hunt suggested that a 
Mr. Maywood was probably trying to imitate Kean, 
but said that Maywood "wants a scene of great 
incitement in order to rouse his imagination and 
action"; 
' three weeks later Hunt made exactly 
the same criticism of Kean in Macbeth: 
... Macbeth is not one of 
his best characters; 
and the reason is, that it is a mixed 
character, with moderate as well as 
passionate qualities in it; and Mr. Kean 
requires a perpetual stimulant, - not 
because his temperament is sluggish, but 
because it is restless. Neither does he 
succeed even in the passionate scenes 
where the stimulus is ideal. He must 
grapple with something actual as well 
as vehement, - with a tragedy bordering 
on common life. Witches-and air-drawn 
daggers are out of his sphere; but put 
a rea [sic] sword in his hand, and he has 
at you. Some of the most familiar touches 
in Macbeth were excellently done, as the 
Hush: after the murder; but his mouthing 
and mastication in the quieter scenes 
are as little contemplative, as his 
general appearance is heroic; and his 
dagger scene is poor and impotent, as 
the fight with Macduff is rich and 
forceable. Yet even here, it is not so 
much Macbeth as it is a desperate 
gladiator. 2 
Macready also came in for the same criticism as 
had Kemble and Kean. With regard to Macready's 
Richard III, Hunt reminded Macready that "depth of 
feeling in reflecting minds requires a proportionate 
depth and quietness of expression. "3 By the next 
year, 1820, Macready evidently had improved his 




5 October, 1817. 
26 October, 1817. 
31 October, 1819; (DC, 221). 
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We are not in the number of those who 
think his mad scenes are his best. 
They are good, but the quieter ones 
are better, not forgetting however 
the more agitated scenes of his return 
before mentioned. Tenderness and 
dignity are the qualities in which 
Mr. Macready excels most.... The great 
merit of his Richard is that he made 
the buoyancy and animal spirit of his 
character outshine his villainy. -l 
It can be seen that Hunt's theme of imagination 
and the "imitation of life in passions" placed 
radical demands on the actor and that Hunt's 
comments on actors were guided by the relative 
success with which the demands were met. 
Hunt's theme of imagination had particular 
relevance for the audience, for the object of all 
imitation, whether tragic or comic, ideal or real, 
was to involve the audience with the play at the 
appropriate level. Seeing a performance of 
Othello in which Nr. Pope played the title role 
in a mask. helped Hunt to articulate the need 
for good acting and the effect on the audience's 
imagination if the imitation was poor: 
The best character he [Mr. Pope] performs 
is Othello, because he performs it in a 
mask: for when an actor's face is not 
exactly seen, an audience is content to 
supply by its own imagination the want 
of expression, just as when reading a 
book we figure to ourselves the counten- 
ance of the persons interested. But when 
we are presented with the real counten- 
ance, we are disappointed if our imagination 
is not assisted in its turn; the picture 
presented to our eyes should animate the 
picture presented to our mind; if either 
of them differ, or if the former is less 
lively than the latter, a sensation of 
discord is produced, and destroys the 
effect of nature which is always harmonious. 
2 
1 Examiner, 4 June , 1820. 
2 CE, 25. 
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It would appear that there were a great 
many times when Hunt went to the theatre to-find 
that his 'imagination was not assisted in its 
turn. ' Hunt's interest in mimesis may have been 
fostered by the type of conflict he describes 
between pictures presented to the eye and 
presented to the mind; and Hunt's theme of 
imagination may be seen operating behind many of 
his specific criticisms of stage management and "M 
acting styles. 
From the beginning of Hunt's theatre-going - 
and perhaps more at the beginning than later, on, 
thanks. largely to the innovations of Kean and 
others - the common style of acting presented 
problems for Hunt. In June, 1805, Hunt described 
"what is called, 'clap-trapping, ' or the art of 
gaining applause without deserving it. " 'Clap- 
trapping' was generally easy, Hunt said, if an 
actor gestured tragically after a speech. Hunt 
pointed to Charles Kemble who "has a knack of 
darting his lips asunder, breathing hard, and 
fixing down the corners of his mouth. " Mr. H. 
Johnston, Hunt noted, "is very fond of rolling 
his eyes and then clapping his hand over them, 
being always no doubt in an agony of grief. " 
And there was another trick that was used, and 
that was, "after bellowing through eight or ten 
lines, to lower the voice into a kind of passion- 
ate tremulousness, give one good flourish with 
the right arm, and strut fiercely to the left 
side of the stage. "' 
Evidently this latter trick was still being 
used quite commonly three years later. Hunt 
described Mrs. Siddons's son, Mr. H. Siddons, in 
the role of Falkland in Sheridan's The Rivals: 
If he made an exclamation of impatience 
he shook his head dismally, lifted up his 
hands and shook them too, and then suddenly 
turned to the right or left and trampled 
1 All quotations are from The Newp, 9 June, 1805. 
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up and down the stage, like a hero during 
the applause of the galleries; if he 
concluded a scene with any thing serious 
or impassioned, he prepared for an 
important and hurried departure, lowered 
his voice as he hastened towards the end 
of the speech, and then drove of the 
stage with a thrust of the arm. 
In the same review Hunt recorded that another 
actor, Ir. Liston, had been using the same kind 
of 'clap-trapping' gestures in another play. 
There were other barriers to effective 
imitation in the affectations of the actors. 
As Hunt complained, "the appearance of reality 
is totally destroyed by the affectation of 
settling the limbs into an attitude, of contemplat- 
ing the dress, or casting self-sufficient glances 
into the side-boxes. "2 In Critical Essays Hunt 
praised Bannister as a model of the actor's 
proper approach to the audience, as Hunt saw it: 
No actor enters so well into the spirit 
of his audience... for he engages your 
attention immediately by seeming to care 
nothing about you; the stage appears to 
be his own room, of which the audience 
compose the fourth wall: if they clap him, 
he does not stand still to enjoy their 
applause; he continues the action, if 
he cannot continue the dialogue; and 
this is the surest way to continue their 
applause. The stage is always supposed 
to be an actual room, or other scene, 
totally abstracted from an observant 
multitude.... 3 
There were not many scenes which Hunt 
pointed to as illustrations of the kind of 
acting which actually assists, rather than impedes, 
the audience's imagination. There were a few 
instances, however. One of those was Kean in 
Richard III in 1815, standing in front of his 
tent in the scene before the battle. Kean's 
acting, Hunt suggested, helped the audience to 
see into the mind of Richard: 
1 Examiner, 9 October, 1808. 
2 The News, 27 October, 1805. 
, --'. '. 4-. 3-- `CE, 60-61. ' 
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[it wasj impossible to express in a 
deeper manner the intentness of 
Richard's mind upon the battle that 
was about to take place, or to quit 
the scene with an abruptness more 
self-recollecting, pithy, and 
familiar, than by the reverie in 
which he stands drawing lines upon 
the ground with the point of his 
sword, and his sudden recove'y of 
himself with a "Good night. " 
Mrs. Siddons similarly had drawn the concentration 
of the audience away from the chambers of the 
castle at Inverness and into the chambers of 
Lady Macbeth's mind, as Hunt recalled in 1812: 
The sleep-walking scene... has been 
much and deservedly admired; the 
deathlike stare of her countenance, 
while the body was in motion, was 
sublime; and the anxious whispering 
with which she made her exit, as if 
beckoning her husband to bed, took 
the audience along with her into 
the silent and reaming horror of 
her retirement. 
In another performance of Lady Macbeth, several 
years later, in 1817, Hunt had praised one scene 
in which Miss Campbell was brilliant. While she 
had been reading the letter, Miss Campbell had 
passed her finger lightly around her head in 
anticipation of wearing the crown. The 
illustrative action had been very effective, 
but she had used it too much and it had become, 
"the reverse of imagination, and of a power of 
exciting it in others. "3 
The poor acting Hunt seemed to find 
generally at the theatre was not the only barrier 
to imagination Hunt found in contemporary theatre. 
Hunt claimed in 1806 that "The majority of an 
audience were certainly never deluded into a 
belief, that events represented on the stage 
were realities., 
4 Any dream of reality, he said, 
1 Examiner, 26 February, 1815; (DC, 114). 
2 Examiner, 5 July, 1812; (DC, 72). 
3 Examiner, 26 October, 1817. 
4 CE, "Appendix", 22 (The News [18061). 
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would soon be removed by the frequent 
cessations on the entertainment, and 
particularly the alteration of scene, 
so badly managed- at the theatre, 
where you see two men running violently 
towards each other, with hall a castle l 
or a garden in their grasp. 
Beyond the problems of interruption and scenery 
change, there were problems with the costumes 
and the scenes themselves. Hunt maintained 
that Mrs. Siddons was the only performer who 
knew how to dress without incongruity, but 
noted that Elliston, Kemble, and Charles Kemble 
were more attentive than most. 
2 The best actor, 
Hunt stated, "gains but half his effect, if his 
eloquent imitation is not assisted by the mute 
imitations of dress and of scenery. 
0 
- 'Mute imitations of dress and of scenery' 
seemed lacking most frequently in the Shakespearean 
productions Hunt saw. Numerous instances of the 
impediments to the audience which Hunt found may 
be cited here. In 1805 Hunt complained about a 
production of The Merry Wives of Windsor: 
Master Ford and his Merry 14ife had no 
doubt a very good house in Windsor, 
but who would think of seeing an 
apartment in the time of Queen 
Elizabeth adorned with elegant modern 
sash-windows and mahogany furniture? 
In 1807 Hunt noted that a production of Henry IV 
had provided the Boar's Head tavern with drinking 
glasses and mahogany; Hunt congratulated the 
actors for "so well concealing the amazement, 
with which their characters must doubtless have 
been struck at the sight of those luxuries of 
futurity. "5 In the same year, concerning Kenible's 
revival of The %Tinter's Tale, runt made the 
following observation: 
1 CE, "Appendix", 22 (The News 11806]) . 
2 ibid., 23. 
3- ibid., 23. 
4 The News, 6 October, 1805. 
5 The Nevis, 19 July, 1807. 
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The performers indeed seemed to 
conspire with the author to make 
the inconsistencies of the play as 
gross as possible. Mr. Kemble, 
not content with the anachronisms 
in the text, gave us, in a Sicilian 
court of justice during the age of 
the Delphic oracle, two standards 
adorned with coat-armour which was 
an invention of the age of Chivalry, 
and two judges dressed in the 
university cap and gown. 1 
Mrs. C. Kemble, in the role of Paulina, "wanted 
nothing but an oil-skin gypsey bonnet and a 
basket under her arm to be as energetic a fish- 
woman, as ever was clamourous in praise of eels. "2 
Comments similar to these ones in The News 
may be found in The Examiner. Hunt's first 
review in the paper was of Kemble's new revival 
of Much Ado About Nothing. Hunt calculated that 
the last Sicilian king of the House of Arragon 
was at the beginning of the fifteenth century, 
and Hunt was surprised at Kemble: 
... the manager of Covent-Garden therefore has dressed his Spanish prince of the 
14th or 15th century like a modern 
English gentleman in a blue coat, white 
breeches and stockings, and an opera 
hat; one of his Spanish officers 
appears in the exact regimentals of 
our present infantry, and the Italian 
officers exhibit the same identical 
coats and breeches which their 
descendants wear at this day. 
3 
Hunt had noted that Kemble usually claimed his 
productions demonstrated thoughtful propriety. 
In fact, it was this claim which Kemble 
made when the Covent-Garden company opened at 
the King's Theatre in September of 1808, after 
Covent-Garden Theatre had burned down. Kerable 
apologised to the audience that the King's Theatre 
did not have the equipment to assist productions, 
1 The News, 15 November, 1807. 
2 The News, 15 November, 1807. 
3 Examiner, 3 January, 1808; (DC, 7). 
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and Hunt used this address to attack Kemble: 
When Mr. Kemble talks of assisting 
the works of our own poets. .. I hope 
he does not intend to say that 
Shakespeare was assisted at Covent- 
Garden Theatre with that vile pitch- 
kettle and those washerwoman-dresses 
in the witches' scene of Macbeth, or 
indeed with any of the scenery of 
his plays. 1 
In 1810, again at Covent-Garden, Cordelia 
appeared in a modern hat tied under the chin 
and in a dress that was also modern. Hunt 
allowed that some anachronisms are permitted 
in King Lear "both for the author's and for 
effect's sake" but felt that in instances like 
this the manager "intended to make his 
debutantes ridiculous. 112 
One of the most glaring and consistent 
failures of the managers, and one which con- 
sistently assaulted the imagination of the 
audience, was the casting of people meant to 
look alike. In Twelfth Night in 1811, Mr. 
Brunton was presented "as the facsimile of a 
delicate little lady, shorter at least by the 
head and shoulders. " The lines, "An apple, 
cleft in two, is not more twin/ Than these two 
creatures! " (V, i, 230-231) were retained, 
adding to the absurdity of what Hunt described 
as the two people "affecting an unaffected 
astonishment at the double likeness. "3 
1 Examiner, 2 October, 1808. 
2 Examiner, 21 October, 1810. It seems 
unusual that Hunt was expecting such a high degree 
of stage propriety since Kec ble's age was the first 
consistently to strive for period costume. How- 
ever, Hunt was a product of that age, and certainly 
was not the first theatre reviewer to point out 
inaccuracies (but was probably the first to be 
so stringent). See H. C. Gray, Theatrical Criticism 
in London to 1795 (New York, 1931 2C7-28b. 
3 Examiner, 3 March, 1811; (DC, 43). 
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In the review of Twelfth Night Hunt 
had suggested the advisability of using masks, 
particularly for Comedy of Errors. 
' Although 
Hunt had mentioned that Pope used a mask for 
Othello, masks were not used for Comedy of 
Errors. As Hunt commented in 1819: 
... in an English Comedy of 
Errors, 
two men altogether as different as 
their shins, Jones and Duruset for 
instance, disenact the two masters; 
and we are to believe in the identity 
of their two servants, Liston and 
Farren, persons no more resembling 
each other than moisture and drought, 
or a bowlt of cream and a tobacco 
pipe.... 
Hunt commented that the assumption of the 
identities was "impossible for the spectators' 
imagination, however willing, " and that "the 
thing is made worse by the parties being 
represented by different performers. "3 
Hunt demonstrates an attitude towards 
women which is of relevance concerning the 
theme of `imagination.. It was said in a former 
chapter4that in 1815, Hazlitt defined 'fancy 
and imagination according to the differences 
he saw between the minds of women and men: 
women's minds demonstrated fancy because they 
were versatile and moved from subject to subject, 
and there was the suggestion that only men's 
minds had powers of concentration or' imagination' 
to focus thoughts around one central idea. 
The same kind of distinction seems operant 
in Hunt's criticism before Hazlitt, and it seems 
to indicate what might have been a common social 
attitude determined by the conventions of the 
time. For instance, Hunt says in 1808 that, 
1 Examiner, 3 March, 1811; (I)C, 43) " 
2 Examiner, 26 December, 1819. 
3 loc. cit. 
4_ See pp. 83-84 of this thesis. 
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"A female performer cannot excel in all the 
variety of an actor, for a certain singleness 
of thinking and of habits seems to be one of 
the distinctions between female and male 
character. "' Whether or not Hunt's attitude was 
a common one, it influenced his thought con- 
cerning the roles women should play and the 
style of acting they should use. In general, 
he did not like women in roles of imagination: 
tragic actresses are no favorite 
of our's [sic] :- we cannot help 
thinking they must get rid of a good 
deal of what is pleasant in women, 
before they can be so; and we prefer 
pleasant women even to great tragic 
actresses. 2 
Imagination demanded an ability to imitate a 
range of passions easily and naturally, and 
an actress, more than an actor, risked the 
audience's respect and the elevation of the 
tragedy if she failed. 
Hunt suggested that an actress had two 
choices; no similar suggestion was made about 
men: 
When Mrs. Jordan was young, she should 
have fixed at once either upon the 
lady or upon the romping girl as her 
future character; for these two 
characters will never unite in the 
same actress. Broadness destroys 
reserve, and reserve will not allow 
broadness. 3 
Hunt was thinking perhaps about his own reaction 
to a woman who combined reserve and broadness, 
for the combination was represented as a barrier 
for his own imagination in Critical Essays: 
1 Examiner, 24 January, 1808. 
2 Examiner, 26 October, 1817. 
3 Examiner, 24 January, 1808. 
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When the generality of actresses are 
representing the objects of a man's 
attachment, their broadness of 
demeanour produces in the beholders 
a kind of silent disagreement with 
the hero's choice that deranges their 
satisfaction: his compliments become 
false, his ardour unwarrantable, his 
sorrows ridiculous; a delicate 
spectator cannot say "Such is the 
woman I would marry myself. " 
1 
This notion had far-reaching implications for 
roles like Rosalind or Viola. 
2 For a woman to 
adopt the disguise of a man on stage, Hunt felt, 
she would have to demonstrate either broadness 
of mind, which would lessen her femininity, or 
a reserved delicacy of mind, which would lessen 
the masculinity of the adopted role. In either 
case the 'imagination' would be affronted. Hunt 
felt this was a problem new to the modern age : 
In Shakespeare's time, when there 
were no female performers, the personal 
absurdity was avoided; and this circum- 
stance probably gave rise, in other 
nations as well as ours, to the fond- 
ness for r5presenting women as boys 
and pages. 
In general, Hunt tried to discourage actresses 
from adopting male disguises. 
Lawrence and Carolyn Houtchens seem to 
echo an earlier comment by Richard Brimley 
Johnson when they claim that Hunt "constantly 
protested against the alteration of Shakespeare . 
This is certainly true concerning the plays which 
suffered most from change on the contemporary 
stage. Hunt criticised Kemble for retaining 
the Dryden-Davenant addition of Sycorax to 
1 CE, 209.. 
2 Concerning Rosalind, see CE, 209; and 
Examiner, 17 January, 1808. Concerning Viola, see 
Examiner, 5 June, 1808; and Examiner, 3 March, 
1811; DC, 42-3). 
3 Examiner, 3 March, 1811; (DC, 42). 
4 DC, 295. See also R. B. Johnson Essays 
and Sketches by Leigh Hunt (London, 19065, v. 
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The Tempest. 1 He argued that Tate' s Lear 
lessened the dramatic effect of the play and 
claimed that the insertion of the love scene 
between Cordelia and Edgar while Cordelia was 
searching for her father divided the, interest 
of the play, and reduced the play from the 
level of abstraction and imagination. 
2 Hunt 
complained that the Garrick version of Romeo 
and Juliet overloaded the tragic effect by 
allowing Romeo to survive the poison until 
after Juliet had awoken - the senses had begun 
to rule over the imagination. 
3 While Hunt was 
enthusiastic about the revival of Timon of 
Athens in 1816, he regretted that some of the 
most poetical and profound passages had been 
omitted. 
4 
Whatever Hunt felt about John Kecble as 
an actor, or in some cases as a manager, Hunt 
did acknowledge that his age owed much to 
Kemble for retaining Shakespeare's tragedies 
on stage: "were it not for Mr. Kemble's 
exertions the tragedies of our glorious bard 
would. almost be in danger of dismissal from 
the stage. "5 As has already been suggested, 
however, Hunt was not a Shakespeare idolator, 
and if he generally was against the alteration 
of Shakespeare's tragedies, he was not against 
all. alteration of Shakespeare. Even consider- 
ing Lear, he would have excused the omission 
of some of what he felt were anachronisms, 
1 CE, "Appe 
2 Examiner, 
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22 May, 1808; (DC, 15-19). The 
the date as 28 play. 
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the omission of the Pool "which is now out 
of date", and the sending of Gloucester behind 
the scenes while he is blinded. 
' It is more 
usual to find Hunt consenting to minor 
alterations of ; Shakespeare's comedies (or 
perhaps his historical tragedies), in which 
conception and the imitation of real life 
play a significant part for Hunt. He objected 
to some coarseness in the language of Rosalind, 
and in one review seemed pleased that a 
production of The Merry Wives of Windsor had 
omitted some of the farce. 
2 Hunt agreed 
with several eighteenth century critics when 
he complained about Shakespeare's love of 
punning, especially in scenes of despair and 
death, and added that "many of Shakespeare's 
errors are endured merely on account of his 
long reputation. "3 If Hunt had a general 
attitude towards alteration of Shakespeare, 
it might have been that contained in his advice 
to the writer who would alter Dryden's Don 
Sebastian: ` 
... he would study to, preserve all the striking and novel effect of 
the original story, and would omit 
only such passages as were written 
in a decidedly wrong taste, and as 
he might suppose the author himself 
would have avoided had he been 
living now. 
4 
With the important exception of Hunt's 
psychological approach to Shakespearean 
character, most of the significant aspects of 
1 See Examiner, 22 I": ay, 1808; (DC, 15-19). 
2 Examiner, 10 December, 1809. 
3 The News, 22 February, 1807. 
4 Examiner, 20 December, 1812. 
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the theme of 'imagination' in Hunt's Shakespearean 
and dramatic criticism have now been considered. 
Critics had shown varying interest in character 
study throughout the eighteenth century, although 
the emphasis in criticism, more often than not, 
was given to other issues. H. C. Gray's study, 
called Theatrical Criticism in London to 1795, 
has shown that theatre critics, at least, 
demonstrated a fairly consistent interest in 
character in the last part of the century, well 
before Hunt and the other Romantics. 
Gray's study, and more recent ones as 
well, 
' 
suggest that the performance of Shakespeare 
on the stage helped to contribute to an interest 
in character studies in the late eighteenth 
century, partially because of the need to 
evaluate different performances. Hunt's own 
position as a theatre critic undoubtedly is 
responsible for a good part of his interest 
in character. In fact, many of Hunt's early 
ideas on characters seem less the result of 
his oivn meditation on Shakespeare than descriptions 
of a particular performance. For example he saw 
Iago as a "mere assassin" and villain whose 
character "ought not to exhibit a single trait 
of nobler feeling", 
2 largely because he had 
seen G. F. Cooke play lago in that manner. Lamb 
had complained already about Cooke turning 
Shakespeare's "Man Richard" into a "monster 
Richard. "3 
Hunt's theatre experience accounts for 
some of his interest in Shakespeare's characters, 
but it does not in itself provide a satisfactory 
explanation of why his interest is confined 
almost exclusively to tragic character. Hunt's 
1 See: Joseph \^l.. Donohue, Dramatic Character 
in The English Romantic Ade (Princeton, i9"70). 
2 Examiner, 31 January, 1808. 
3L Works, It 36ff. 
187 
interest in the characters from Shakespeare's 
comedies generally does not go beyond a super- 
ficial assessment of how they are contrasted. 
Hunt does not point to character con- 
trasts in Shakespeare's tragedies, but as has 
been seen already with regard to tragic actors, 
He looks for the contrasts of feeling which 
arise within the individual. Wordsworth had 
written in the 1800 "Preface" (which Hunt 
apparently did not read until his imprison- 
ment) that his poems were meant "to illustrate 
the manner in which our feelings and ideas are 
associated in a state of excitement. "1 Hunt's 
interest in tragic character demonstrates a 
similar fascination with the effect of passions 
on the mind, even though his specific under- 
standing of characters at times may be at fault. 
One of Hunt's criticisms of Johnson was that Johnson 
lacked sensitivity to Shakespeare's tragedies 
and experienced "no strength of emotion in 
witnessing the workings of great minds in awful 
situations. "2 Hunt's treatment of tragic 
character and his understanding of tragedy as 
an "imitation of a life in passion" suggests 
that he felt the purpose of tragedy was to 
explore those inner realities of the mind which 
Johnson, he felt, had missed. 
The theme of 'imagination' relates to Hunt's 
treatment of tragic character not just for the 
general reason that Hunt saw tragedy as the 
realm of imagination. Imagination in Hunt's 
thought is the process whereby the poet creates 
1 Literary Criticism of tidilliam Wordsworth, 19. 
2 Examiner, 29 T-larch, 1812; (DC, 66). Hunt's 
comment echoes one made earlier in the same month by 
Lärnb in Hunt's Reflector; Lamb spoke of putting 
the spectator "into possession of that knowledge 
of the inner structure and workings of mind in a 
character". (L Works, I, 99) 
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tragedy, whereby the actor represents the 
poet's tragic characters, and whereby the 
audience responds to the imitation of passion 
on stage. Similarly, the imagination is the 
process displayed in the minds of the tragic 
characters themselves - imagination is found 
in "the workings of great minds in awful 
situations".. 
Hunt describes the imagination of the 
poet as being akin to madness, as Shakespeare 
and Dryden had done,. the latter of whom Hunt 
quotes: 
I can easily conceive that a poet 
rises from fancies like these, as 
Dryden is said to have risen from 
his celebrated ode, with a pulse 
disordered by inspiration. The 
imagination looks out into other 
worlds with an eagerness stretched 
beyond its natural tension, and it 
returns back in languor and irrit- 
ability. In fact, one could almost 
be persuaded, sometimes, that a true 
poet in his enthusiasm enjoys nothing 
but an admirable insanity, and that 
more truth is contained than we 
generally imagine in the celebrated 
distich, 
Great wits to madness nearly are allied, 
And thin partitions do their bounds divide. 
Hunt's description of the imagination eagerly 
stretching into "other worlds... beyond its 
natural tension" is not unlike the descriptions 
he gives of some of Shakespeare's tragic 
characters. This is particularly true when Hunt 
is tracing movements of the mind which seem 
related to madness. 
Hunt's Shakespearean criticism suggests 
that he saw madness, like poetic genius, 
1 Examiner, 22 May, 1808; (DC, 18). 
L. H. and C. W. Houtchens have pointed out the 
omission of "are sure" after "Great wits" in the 
quotation from Absolom and Achitophel. 
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arising from a tension in the mind created 
by imagination and influenced by passion. 
Hunt sees Caliban's account of the torments 
which have been driving him to madness in 
terms of "the 'fine frenzy' of the poet" 
which "hovers on that verge of fancy beyond 
which it is a pain even for poetry to 
venture. "' When the tension in the mind 
becomes too great, madness is the result, 
as was the case, Hunt felt, with Lear and 
Ophelia. 
Hunt's ideas correspond to some 
eighteenth century notions which saw madness as 
resulting from a wild and over-active 'imagination' 
which disrupted the normal patterns of 
associative thought. However, Hunt views 
imagination in a positive way, without the 
distrust with which it was regarded in much 
eighteenth-century criticism. His respect 
for the creative power of imagination is 
demonstrated by his respect for Lear's mind; 
Hunt sees in Lear' s madness "a world of mighty 
and awful turbulence, touching in its extremes 
on the very height of intellectual grandeur 
and the depth of pathos. "2 He sees in Lear 
a person who is "all imagination as well as 
passion. "3 In 1808 Hunt criticised Kemble's 
failure in the mad scenes, 
4 
and in 1820 
criticised Kean for the same failure to 
represent the workings of Lear's imagination: 
1 CE, 110. 
2 Examiner, 15 August, 1819. 
3 Examiner, 30 April, 1820. 
4 See Examiner, 22 May, 1808; (DC, 20). 
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All the imaginative parts, - the whole 
scene of the storm for instance, - fell 
as flat as the actor's voice. His 
favorite piece of abruptness, - the 
one sudden drop of his voice, would 
not do here. It was not enough by a 
hundred. Lear should have been all 
abruptness and distraction, -a mind 
torn a hundred ways; not one, nor fifty. 
l 
Hunt's interest in Ophelia similarly was 
centered on her mind in madness. -He criticised 
Mrs. Corri's performance in 1808 for having no 
feminine delicacy and "no power of expression 
for the supernatural and ever-shifting genius 
of insanity. "2 Shakespeare's Ophelia, Hunt felt, 
had degenerated "into a mere singing-girl, a 
mere opera debutante, full of stage attitudes 
and a ridiculous self-possession, rational when 
she should be insane, and insane in nothing but 
her rationality. "3 The tension in the mind of 
Shakespeare's Ophelia had not been broken. Hunt 
suggests that her imagination has not lost its 
eagerness to stretch into "other worlds", but 
it seems to have lost direction. In Ophelia, 
Hunt says, Shakespeare 
... gave us that beautiful picture of 
a delicate mind disturbed not distorted 
into madness, that insanity full of 
genius and of patient anguish, in which 
. 
the chords are tangled not snapped, in 
which the last weakness of nature has 
not destroyed her strength of mind, nor 
the last suffering thoughts of her 
father.... 
Her mind, Hunt suggests, is vibrant with energy 
but deprived of a rational focus, not because of 
her actions, but because of the actions of others. 
As is often the case with Hunt's discussions of 
the mind, his comments have more interest in 
1 Examiner, 30 April, 1820. 
2 Examiner, 25 September, 1808. 
3 Examiner, 25 September, 1808. 




themselves than for what they say about 
the play at large. 
Hunt sees Ophelia and Lear quite 
explicitly as being mad. H',. e studies the 
minds of other tragic characters as well, 
apparently using his understanding of 
imagination to account for what he inter- 
prets as their tendency towards madness. 
For instance, he sees Cordelia as a character 
"whose whole imagination is filled with one 
great, pathetic, and disinterested idea. " 
In the same review an identical thought is 
expressed concerning Johnson, only this time 
the fixation of the imagination on one idea 
is associated with the cause of madness: 
Johnson tells us that he was once 
so shocked by the death of Cordelia 
that he believes he never could 
read the last scene again till he 
undertook to edit the tragedy. This 
confession easily accounts for his 
approbation of Tate; he was affected 
with a morbid melancholy, and when 
any great emotion found its way to 
his feelings, it clung to his 
irritable fancy and produced that 
impatient fixture of the mind to 
one object which is the origin of 
madness. ' 
The thought again resurfaces in his inter- 
pretation of Lear and Edgar meeting on the 
heath: 
... it is wonderful to see the 
consummate art with which Shakespeare 
has preserved in these two pictures 
of madness that single occupation 
of thought which at once fixes and 
distracts the mind. Lear can think 
of nothing but his daughters, Mad 2 Tom of nothing but the foul fiend. 
1 Examiner, 22 Lay, 1808; (DC, 16). 
2 Examiner, 22 Icay, 1808; (DC, 17). 
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In other reviews Hunt may be suggesting 
again that the tension in the minds is the 
result of the imagination being dominated by 
one idea or feeling. Romeo, he says, is 
completely dominated by love and "every passion 
should be kept subordinate to the predominate 
one"; and he adds that Romeo's mind displays 
"an occasional sameness... a despair too much 
fatigued with its own thoughts to be always 
violent". 
' Hunt finds in Hamlet "that mingled 
air of anxiety and repose, which breathes over 
the manner of a person whose hours are spent 
in meditating one great purpose. "2 
In many of Hunt's analyses of tragic 
character it is not always possible to deter- 
mine the precise influence of his understanding 
of imagination. His use of the word imagination 
(or fancy) in relation to the characters of 
Hamlet and Macbeth, for instance, seems quite 
general. Hunt speaks of Hamlet's movements 
from familiarity to "the proudest flights of 
fancy". 3 He sees Macbeth's remorse in terms 
of "the silence of the night, [and] the phantoms 
of a diseased imagination., 
4 
Elsewhere he sees 
Macbeth struggling between good and evil thoughts, 
and between human knowledge and a "most inventive 
fancy". 5 However, even in these cases, there 
seems to be a confirmation that Hunt's understand- 
ing of imagination has at least some influence in 
shaping his comments. 
1 The News, 
Examiner, 5 April, 
2 CE, 183. 
3 The News, 
4 The News, 
5 The Exami 
9 June, 1805. See CE, 206 and 
1817 for similar comments on Juliet. 
28 June, 1807. 
30 October, 1805. 
ner, 30 July, 1809" 
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The thematic development of Hunt's 
ideas of 'imagination' into a broad critical 
approach first occurred in Critical Essays, 
where Hunt formulated his ideas of imagination 
and conception. However, the same lines of 
critical thought were anticipated in The News 
and were followed in The Examiner. It has 
been shown that the theme of imagination was 
present in Hunt's comments on tragedy and 
comedy, on acting, and on dramatic mimesis. 
It has also been shown that Hunt saw'imagination'- 
not only in terms of the poet and actor, but 
also in terms of the audience and the mind of 
the character in the play. The task remains 
of trying to evaluate Hunt's contribution to 
Shakespearean and dramatic criticism. 
In relation to comedy, there seem to 
be few claims that can be made for Hunt ; he 
seems to have made little advance on 
eighteenth-century thought. It may be 
remembered, however, that many of the limitations 
in his approach to comedy were limitations 
belonging to the tradition of Shakespearean 
criticism which he had inherited. Emphasis 
on the relation between comedy and manners 
had dominated many of the considerations of 
comedy in the eighteenth century and were 
preserved in Hunt's criticism by his under- 
standing of conception and the imitation of 
real life. Also, Hunt's focus on the contrasts 
of character in comedy and the contrasts which 
contributed to wit and humour were standard 
approaches to Shakespearean comedy and would 
have been found in most of the critics Hunt 
consulted, including Johnson. One of the few 
critics to have broken through what may be seen 
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as the traditional approach to comedy was Maurice 
Morgann (E ssa_y on the Dramatic Character of Sir 
John Falstaff [1777) whom Hunt, along with Cole- 
ridge and Hazlitt, apparently did not know. 
' 
Hunt's strength does not seem to lie, 
either, in his specific interpretations of 
Shakespeare's tragedies. Hunt was a theatre 
critic first, and a critic of Shakespeare after- 
wards. His concern in his reviews was more with 
describing performances for his readers and with 
correcting obvious misinterpretations of Shake- 
speare than with giving complete reassessments. 
of plays. 
Although Hunt's strength does not lie in 
his analyses of the tragedies, his critical con- 
tributions are directly related to tragedy, 
particularly in conjunction withlimagination: 
Hunt was the first of the Romantic critics to 
publish a work in which the 'imagination' was linked 
clearly with tragedy and in which tragedy was seen 
as superior to comedy. Hunt was also one of the 
first theatrical critics to insist upon realistic 
expression, in acting . Hunt's comments on these 
points and his clear preference for Shakespearean 
tragedy in his criticism anticipated the published 
remarks of the other men in this study. Hunt's 
influence as a critic (and his influence on rais- 
ing the standards of actors and newspaper critics 
of his time) may have had some effect in popular- 
izing the acceptance of these notions at a time when 
eighteenth century debates on the relative superior- 
ity of comedyand tragedy were not entirely settled. 
2 
1 See D. N. Smith, Eighteenth Century Essays 
on Shakespeare, 2nd edn. Oxford, 1963)9 xxxv[-xxxvii. 
See also Stuart M. Tave, "Notes on the Influence of 
Morgann's Essay on Falstaff, " RES, 1952,371-375. 
2 See W. P. Albrecht, "Hazlitt's Preference 
for Tragedy, " PMLA, 71 (December, 1956), 1042. 
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Hunt also made a contribution to theory 
on the question of mimesis in tragedy. His'. 
account in Critical Essays owed much to 
Aristotle, but it differed from him (and in 
general with eighteenth century critical 
thought, including Kame s)1 on the understand- 
ing of tragedy. Aristotle said comedy imitated 
people below the level of the common world, and 
tragedy imitated people above it, 
2 
although 
tragedy was at all times in keeping with what 
was probable in the real world. 
3 Hunt saw both 
comedy and tragedy on higher levels. Comedy 
imitated the real world while tragedy imitated 
a world above the real. There were no models 
for tragedy in the real world, and the stage 
had to be above nature in order to remind the 
audience that passion was being imitated, not 
events. Further, Aristotle defined tragedy as 
"an imitation of an action". 
4 In a sense this 
is closer to what Hunt said about comedy imitat- 
ing "manners". For Hunt, tragedy did not imitate 
actions but imitated "passions only". Hunt seems 
to have been trying to adapt classical theories 
to something which he felt would be more suitable 
to Shakespearean drama, and possibly would lead 
to a new appreciation of Shakespeare's tragedies. 
In Hunt's criticism, the emphasis on 
passion with regard to tragedy was evident. 
His interest in Shakespeare's tragedies was 
not in the. structure of the plays, nor was it, 
1 See Helen Randall, "Critical Theory of Lord 
Kames", Smith College Studies in Modern Language, 
XXII, 52-53. For an indication 01' the general 
acceptance of Aristotle and the popularity of his 
ideas (or what were understood to be his ideas) see 
H. C. Gray, 279 & 309. See also Ati: ins, 17 & 18. 
2 Aristotle on the Art of Fiction: 'The 
Poetics', trans. L. J. Potts (Cambridge, 196x), 19, 
23, & 37; (Chapts. 2,5, & 15). 
3 : 'Poetics', 29,37; (Chapts. 9& 15). 
4 'Poetics', 26; (Chap t. 6). 
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for the most part, in the morality of the actions. 
This was a significant departure from much of 
the eighteenth century criticism which had been 
fostered in moralist philosophy. It was also a 
further indication of Hunt's difference from 
Aristotelian thought. Aristotle had said of Greek 
tragedy that the most important element was the 
Fable ("the whole structure of the incidents"), 
and that after the Fable came Character. 
' Hunt's 
criticism placed little emphasis on either Fable 
(in Aristotle's sense) or morality. 
The element in tragedy which seems most 
important to Hunt is Character. His' - wide 
critical influence gave increased impetus to an 
interest in character studies which had been 
developing in the late eighteenth century. He 
may have made a more precise contribution in this 
regard by concentrating specifically on the minds 
of tragic characters, not the contrasts the 
characters made, one with another, or on the 
correctness of their actions, or the lessons 
taught. From one viewpoint Hunt may have limited 
his focus too much, for he failed to give compre- 
hensive analyses of individual characters. But 
from another viewpoint, his focus on "great minds 
in awful situations" - seen for instance in his 
comments on Kean's Richard and Mrs. Siddons's 
Lady Macbeth, and in his tracing the movements 
of passion within the minds of actors and tragic 
characters - helped to emphasise hi s theme of 
imagination. Despite the differences between Hunt 
aid the other Romantic critics on specific ideas 
of 'imagination, ' his. general approach to the 
theme of 'imagination' in his criticism was not 
without close similarities to the other men. 
1 'Poetics', 24-27; (Chapt. 6). 
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Chapter Six: 
THE THEME OF IMAGINATION IN LAMB 
Charles Lamb's relations with the theatre have 
been dealt with in detail by other critics, 
' 
and need 
not be the focus of much attention here. It is important 
to emphasise, however, that by the time Lamb had written 
his most important criticism of Shakespeare in 1812, 
he was a seasoned veteran of the London stage. He had 
attended the theatre regularly, seen many important 
productions and performers, ' and knew some of the actors 
personally. He had written many small pieces for the 
stage, including an epilogue and a prologue for Godwin's 
Antonio (1$00) and Faulkener (1807), respectively, and 
another epilogue for Henry Siddon's farce, Time's a 
Tell Tale (1807); and in 1812 he-was working on the 
prologue to Coleridge's Remorse. 
2 He had also written 
two plays, the second of which failed at Drury Lane 
in December of 1806. Mary Lamb explained the failure 
of Mr H. in a letter of the same month, and she hinted 
at the knowledge Charles had gained: 
The blame rested chiefly with Charles, 
and yet should not be called blame, for- 
it was mere ignorance of stage effect - 
and I am-mistaken if he has not gained 
much useful knowledge .... He intends 
to write one more with all his dear bought 
experience in his head, and should that 
share the same fate, he will thgn turn 
his mind to some other pursuit. ' 
1 See, for example, W. D. Howe's chapter on 
"Charles Lamb and the Theatre", Charles Lamb and His 
Friends (New York, 19410,194-24 ; an uo irc s 
introduction to Lamb's Plays and Dramatic Essays 
(London, 1893). 
2 See L Works, V, 121-126. 
3 The Letters of Charles and Mary Lamb, 
II, 32-33. 
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Lamb never did put his experience to use by 
writing another play, but he did put it to use 
when he wrote his articles for Hunt's Reflector; 
particularly the article on Shakespeare, the 
full title of which may be seen to reflect 
Lamb's early discoveries about representation 
on stage: "On Garrick, and Acting; and the 
Plays of Shakespeare, considered with reference 
to their fitness for Stage Representation. "' 
Lamb's Shakespearean and dramatic criticism 
is not extensive. Unlike the other Romantic 
critics, he did not write either regular reviews 
of the theatre or lectures on drama. The most 
important essays of Lamb on the subject of drama 
are his essay on Cooke's Richard III (1802), 
his essay on Shakespeare in the Reflector, two 
Elia essays written about 1822, called "On Some 
of the Old Actors" and "On The Artificial Comedy 
of the Last Century", and a later Elia essay 
on "Stage Illusion" (1825). Other important 
" comments are found in Lamb's 1808 Specimens of 
English Dramatic Poets, contemporary with 
Shakespeare, with Notes, and in a number of 
minor essays (including four reviews for Hunt 
in the 1819 Examiner) in various papers to 1825. 
Lamb's definition of 'imagination's as it 
appeared in the essay on Hogarth, reads as 
follows: "that power which draws all things to 
one, - which makes things animate and inanimate p 
beings with their attributes, subjects and 
their accessories, take one colour, and serve 
to*one effect. " It was argued in Chapter Three 
of this thesis that Lamb's theory of'imagination' 
was not related to spontaneous, intuitive acts 
of creation as much as it was related to the 
meditative actions of poet and reader which 
produce or perceive unity. 
1 In 1818 the first part of the title was 
changed to "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare.. **" 
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This idea is central to the thematic 
development of 'imagination' in Lamb's thought. 
In effect, Lamb opposes'imagination'to 
spontaneity. For instance, a spontaneous or 
intuitive reaction to Hogarth's prints, he 
felt, was a superficial reaction based on 
sensory perception. As appropriate response 
to the unity of effect in Hogarth's prints was 
a studied response involving intellectual 
abstraction. The reader had to employ imagination 
in order to perceive imagination. 
Accordingly, Lamb made a distinction 
between two kinds of art, based on the involve- 
ment of the spectator. The. higher kind of art 
placed demands on the spectator and was character- 
ised by'imagination: The lower kind of art 
allowed no participation to the spectator other 
than on a sensory level. Lamb quoted from 
Shakespeare's The Rape of Lucrece, the lines 
describing the painting of Achilles in which, 
"'A hand, a foot, a face, a leg, a head, / Stood 
for the whole to be imagined. '" (11.1427-8) 
The context of the lines would have been 
suggestive of the thought Lamb developed: 
This he [Shakespeare] well calls 
imaginary work, where the spectator 
must meet the artist in his con- 
ceptions half way; and it is peculiar 
to the confidence of high genius 
alone to trust so much to spectators 
or readers. Lesser artists shew 
every thing distinct and full, as 
they require an object to be made 
out to themselves before they can 
. comprehend it. 
l 
The basis for the division between art of 
'imagination' and other kinds of art, found first 
in the "Hogarth" essay, lies behind almost all 
of Lamb's later major comments on drama and 
Shakespeare. 
1L Works, I, 74. 
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Critics in the past have not noticed 
the division between art of 'imagination' and 
other kinds of art in Lamb's thought, nor have 
they pointed to the theme of 'imagination' in 
Lamb's "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare". 
The meditative quality of imagination and its 
difference from the immediate and sensory, 
are both important for the essay and determine 
many of the conclusions Lamb reaches about 
Shakespeare and the theatre. Because this 
very important aspect of Lamb's thought has 
been overlooked, and because his essay often 
has been dismissed without the significance of 
his remarks receiving proper appreciation in 
the light of Romantic ideas of imagination, 
1 
a close study of Lamb's essay seems justified 
here. 
Like Hunt, Lamb connected the 'imagination' 
with tragedy; Hunt's idea of tragedy as "an 
imitation of life in passions, " is not unlike 
Lamb's thought that "the grounds of passion, 
its correspondence to a great or heroic 
nature... is the only worthy object of tragedy. "2 
Lamb certainly felt that the grounds of passion 
and the effects of passion on the mind were 
the objects of Shakespeare's tragedy: 
... in Shakespeare above all, how 
obvious it is, that the form of 
speaking, whether it be in soliloquy 
or dialogue, is only a medium, and 
often a highly artificial one, for 
putting the reader or spectator into 
possession of that knowledge of the 
inner structure and workings of 
mind in a character .... 
3 
1 See, for instance, Rene Nellek, 
A History of Modern Criticism, II, 192-193. 
2 Lam, I, 102. 
3L Works, 1,99. 
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" This specific comment and the general 
interest in the minds of characters, shown 
by Lamb and the other Romantics as well, was 
clearly anticipated by some of the comments 
in Mrs. Elizabeth Montagu's An Essay on the 
Writings and Genius of Shakespeare (1769). 
One critic has noted her comment that in the 
meeting of Macbeth and the witches, Shakespeare 
"exhibits the movement of the human mind, and 
renders audible the silent march of thought. "2 
This critic has claimed that "This statement 
is the first in Macbeth criticism to put in 
precise language the premise of psychological 
criticism: words are external signs of mental 
events. "3 What is significant about Lamb's 
criticism is not only the continuation and 
development of this psychological approach, 
but also the importance he gave it, as Hunt 
had already done, in his approach to tragedy. 
Lamb saw Shakespeare's tragedies in 
terms of the deep emotional struggles of 
characters. It was on this deep emotional 
level that the real action of Shakespearean 
tragedy took place for Lamb. As seemed to 
be the case with Hunt, Lamb did not see the 
Fable as foremost in tragedy: 
1 A. J. Ralli has pointed to some of the 
comments which may be seen to anticipate Lamb. 
See: A History of Shakespearean Criticism, 
London U932), I, -6T. - 
2 Montagu, 183. Cited by Donohue, below. 
3 J. W. Donohue, Dramatic Character in the 
English Romantic Age, Princeton 19 0,198. 
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... [with] characters in Shakespeare 
so little do the actions comparatively 
affect us, that while the impulses, 
the inner mind in all its perverted 
greatness, solely seems real and is 
-exclusively attended to, the crime is comparatively nothing. ] 
Concerning Macbeth, Richard, and Iago, Lamb also 
says that while reading, 
we think not so much of the crimes 
which they commit, as of the ambition, 
the aspiring spirit, the intellectual 
activity, which prompts jhem to over- 
leap those moral fences. 
The same kind of thing had been said about the 
Hogarth prints of The Rake's Progress, in which 
Lamb looked beyond the surface actions to the 
drama of the inner mind they contained. Con- 
cerning both Hogarth and Shakespeare, it was 
impossible to gain an understanding of the inner 
mind without imagination; and, imagination was 
the result of meditation. The "very idea of 
what an author is, " Lamb said, "cannot be made 
0 
comprehensible without some pain and perplexity 
of mind': 
3 
Meditation and abstraction were as much 
ingredients for the proper appreciation of 
Shakespeare as they were for the appreciation 
of Hogarth. Lamb describes the effect of 
reading tragedy, possibly making a distinction 
between fancy and imagination akin to the 
distinction between the spontaneous action of. 
the senses and the meditative action of the 
mind: 
1L Works, Is 106. 
2L Works, I, 106. 
3L Worka, I, 98. 
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[The reading of tragedy] presents 
to the fancy just so much of external 
appearances as to make us feel that 
we are among flesh and blood, while... 
the better part of our imagination 
is employed upon the thoughts and 
internal machinery of the character. 
Even with imagination focusing the main energy 
of the reader's mind beyond the external 
appearances of the play, Lamb noted that an 
understanding of Shakespeare still might be 
missed. As Lamb said, Shakespeare's plays 
"are grounded deep in nature, so deep that the 
depth of them lies out of the reach of most of 
us. "2 Lamb's main argument in the "Shakespeare" 
essay its developed in conjunction with the 
theme of imagination, particularly as it 
relates to tragedy and the proper appreciation 
of Shakespeare. 
The main point in Lamb's essay is that it 
is preferable to read Shakespeare rather than 
to see his tragedies acted on stage. In general, 
Lamb's reason is that the art of the theatre 
is geared to the senses and the external and 
is in opposition to'imagination. l In particular, 
Lamb points to the limitations of the stage 
and the limitations of actors in conveying 
the depth of Shakespeare. It will be seen 
that while Lamb's particular understanding of 
imagination showed him to be very sensitive 
to Shakespeare, it showed him to be remarkably 
insensitive to the purposes of dramatic 
representation. 
The fact that the spectator has no control 
over the time in a theatre production, whereas 
he does in reading Shakespeare, has much to do 
with Lamb's opposition of stage art to 'imagination. ' 
1 L Works, I, 111. 
2 L Works, I, 102. 
K 
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Lamb speaks of "the instantaneous nature of 
the impressions which we take in at the eye 
and ear at a playhouse, compared with the 
slow apprehension oftentimes of the under- 
standing in reading. "1 But there is a more 
direct reason why imagination suffers at the 
theatre in Lamb's opinion. Stage art 
deliberately attempts to address the senses 
of the audience: 
... the things aimed at in theatrical 
representation, are to arrest the 
spectator's eye upon the form and 
gesture, and so to gain a more 
favourable hearing to what is spoken: 
it is not what the character is, but 
how he looks; not what he says, but 
how he speaks it. ' 
The same point is made later in the essay when 
Lamb suggests that in reading there is "the 
perfect triumph... of imagination over the 
senses.... But upon the stage, when the 
imagination is no longer the ruling faculty... 
we are left to our'poor unassisted senses". 
3 
Lamb gives specific examples of the 
dependence on the senses which the contemporary 
theatres created. He complained of the 
diminution of supernatural agents, like the 
witches in Macbeth and the ghost in Hamlet, 
when they were represented on stage. The 
serious, the grotesque and the appalling 
aspect of the spell which Macbeth experiences 
is lost on the audience. Hunt's comment about 
the witches looking like washerwomen with a 
pitch-kettle might support Lamb when he says, 
1 L Works, I, 98. 
2 L. Works, I, 101. 
3 L Works, I, 108. 
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... attempt to bring these beings 
on to a stage, and you turn them 
instantly into so many old women, 
that men and children are to laugh 
at. Contrary to the old saying, 
that "seeing is believing, " the 
sight actually destroys the faith.... 
l 
Similarly, making the ghost an object of the 
senses removed it from the realm of 'imagination' 
and credibility:. 
It is the solitary taper and the book 
that generates a faith in these 
terrors: a ghost by chandelier light, 
and in good company, deceives no 
spectators, -a ghost that can be 
measured by the eye, and his hqan 
dimensions made out at leisure. 
The appeal to the senses rather than 
'imagination' in the theatre also gave undue 
importance to things that were trivial in 
Shakespeare. Unlike Hunt, Lamb does not point 
to the incongruity of stage costume. However, 
he comments on the last time he saw Macbeth on 
stage and the extraordinary emphasis given to 
Macbeth's clothes - the coronation robe Lamb 
describes as "fairly a counterpart to that which 
our King wears when he goes to the Parliament- 
house, - just so full and cumbersome, and set 
out with ermine and pearls. "3 The changes of 
clothing, and the various "shiftings and re- 
shiftings, like a Romish priest at mass, "4 
focused the attention on something that was 
irrelevant in Shakespeare: 
1L Works, I, 109. 
2L Works, I, 109. 
3L Works, I, 110. 




... in reading 
[Shakespeare], what 
robe are we conscious of? Some dim 
images of royalty -a crown and 
sceptre, may float before our eyes, 
but who shall describe the fashion 
of it? Do we see in our mind's eye 
what Webb or any other robe-maker 
could pattern? This is the inevit- 
able consequence of imitating every 
thing, to make all things natural. 
The 'imitation of every thing' extended 
to Hamlet; Lamb complained that when Hamlet 
compares the pictures of his father and father- 
in-law, the audience did not need to see the 
miniature pictures "lugged out. "2 Undue 
importance also had been given to Lady Macbeth's 
dismissal of the guests, partially because it 
was Mrs. Siddons's most famous scene: "But 
does such a trifle as this enter into the 
imaginations of the readers of that wild and 
wonderful scene? Does not the mind dismiss 
the feasters as rapidly as it can? "3 
The most serious result of the emphasis 
on the senses in stage art was the reduction 
of Shakespeare'-s tragic characters. This was 
partly because of the nature of the theatre 
as a-public place. Lamb's consciousness of 
other people in the theatre, and his inability 
to escape an awareness of their presence, 
made the expression of deep personal feelings 
on stage seem inappropriate. He spoke of the 
love-dialogues involving Romeo, Othello, or 
Posthumus as being "delightful in reading, " 
but on stage they were "sullied and turned 
from their very nature by being exposed to 
1L Works, I, 111. 
2L Works, I, 111. Walter Whiter commented 
on the miniatures in 1794, hence Lamb was commenting 
on a fairly' typical feature of the production of 
Hamlet. Whiter believed the introduction of the 
miniatures to be a modern innovation. See A Specimen 
of A Commentary On Shakes eare, ed. Alan Over && Mary 
-Bell (London, 19b7), 34. 
3 'L Works, I. 111. Lamb seems obtuse here: 
at the end-or III, iv, Shakespeare's lines precisely 
. 
require rapid dismissal of the guests. 
207 
a large assembly-"' Lamb felt that Hamlet's 
soliloquies became ludicrous: 
These profound sorrows, these light- 
and-noise-abhorring ruminations, 
which the tongue scarce dares utter 
to deaf walls and chambers, how can 
they be represented by a gesticulating 
actor, who comes and mouths them out 
before an audience, making four 
hundred people his confidants at once? 
2 
It is with regard to statements like this that 
the implications of Lamb's association of 
'imagination' with quiet meditation became most 
apparent. Quite clearly, Lamb granted the 
imagination none of spontaneous power given 
it by the other Romantics, a power which 
overcame the obvious drawbacks of the theatre 
as a public place. 
Shakespeare's tragic characters were 
reduced also because of the limitations of the 
actor's art. The actor only had the ability 
to convey the external suggestions of a 
character and missed the internal workings of 
the mind. The actor could imitate the signs 
of passion in the countenance, but as Lamb 
pointed out, this was often no more than "that 
symbol of the emotion which gasses current 
t the theatre for it. "3 The external effects 
of passion could be given, 
but of the motives and grounds of 
the passion, wherein it differs 
from the same passion in low and 
vulgar natures, of these the actor 
can give no more idea by his face 
or gesture than the eye (without a 
metaphor) can speak, or th4 muscles 
utter intelligible sounds. 
1L Works, I, 100. 
2L Works, s, 1.100. 
3L Works, I, 102. 
4L Works, I, 98. 
. 
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Because it is impossible for the art of mere 
imitation to convey the grounds of passion 
within a tragic character, Lamb concludes, 
"that there is something in the nature of 
acting which levels all distinctions. "' He 
suggests that Othello's mind will seem little 
different from that of George Barnwell in 
Lillo's play. 
2 He suggests that it would make 
little difference to the effect on the audience 
if Hamlet had been written by Banks or Lillo, 
omitting all the poetry and-"divine features 
of Shakespeare, " and retaining only the story 
and "enough of passionate dialogue. "3 He 
suggests that it does not matter whether an 
actress or an actor takes the role of a Shake- 
spearean character or not: 
Are they not spoken of and remembered 
in the same way? Is not the female 
performer as great (as they call it) in 
one as in the other? Did not Garrick 
shine, and was he not ambitious of 
shining in every drawling tragedy 4 
that his wretched day produced...? 
The 'levelling of all distinctions' meant that 
the essence of no Shakespearean hero could be 
conveyed accurately on stage: Shakespeare's 
characters, says Lamb, have "something in them 
which appeals too exclusively to the imagination, 
to admit of their being made objects to the 
senses without suffering a change and a 
diminution. "5 
1 L Works, I, 104. 
2 L Works, It 102. 
3 L Works, Is 101. 
4 L Works, I, 104. 
5 L Works, I, 108. 
M 
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In Lamb's opinion, then, neither the 
general art of the stage nor the art of 
imitation of the actor, were addressed to the 
'imagination. When seeing a Shakespearean 
tragedy on stage, the author's idea was lost 
in exchange for the superficial notions con- 
veyed by the senses. As Lamb phrases it, 
ire find to our cost that instead of 
realizing an idea, we have only 
materialized and brought down a 
fine vision to the standard of flesh 
and blood. We have let go a dream, 
in quest of an unattainable substance. 
l 
In 'letting go the dream' the movements of 
passion in the mind, -which should take precedence, 
are lost in a greater consciousness of the actions 
of the characters. Their crimes become so obvious 
to the audience that all pleasure in tragedy is 
destroyed. When watching Hamlet, the ambiguous 
features of Hamlet's relationship with Ophelia 
are not retained, and his actions with regard 
to her become harsh, unpleasant and painful. 
2 
Richard III, particularly as Cooke played it, 
had all the worst features exaggerated: 
Nothing but his crimes, his actions, 
is visible; they are prominent and 
staring; the murderer stands out, but 
where is the lofty genius, the man of 
vast capacity, - the profound, the 
witty, accomplished Richard? 
The mind of Macbeth was similarly obscured by the 
acting. Whereas in the reading of the play we are 
conscious of only the images, the poetry, and the 
"state of sublime emotion into which we are 
elevated", the focus is quite different when 
imagination is no longer of assistance: 
1L Works, I, 98. 
2L Works, Is 103. 
3L Works, I, 106. 
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... when we no longer read it in a book, when we have given up that 
vantage-ground of abstraction which 
reading possesses over seeing, and 
come to see a man in his bodily 
shape before our eyes actually 
preparing to commit a murder, if the 
acting be true and impressive, as I 
have witnessed it in Mr. K'sLKemble's] 
performance of that part, the painful 
anxiety about the act, the natural 
longing to prevent it while it yet 
seems unperpetrated, the too close 
pressing semblance of reality, give 
a pain and an uneasiness which 
totally destroy all the delight 
which the words in the book convey.... 
Likewise it was the reality of Lear's pain which 
was brought most forcibly to the center of 
attention in the stage production, making any 
enjoyment impossible for Lamb: 
... to see Lear acted, - to see an old 
man tottering about the stage with a 
walking-stick, turned out of doors by 
his daughters in a rainy night, has 
nothing in it but what is painful and, 
disgusting. We want to take him into 
shelter and relieve him. That is all 
the feeling which th2 acting of Lear 
ever produced in me. 
To reduce any of Shakespeare 's tragedies to the 
level of the senses from the level of 'imagination' 
implied for Lamb an increased and disproportion- 
ate emphasis on action and an increased sense 
of moral revulsion on the part of the audience. 
Although Lamb traditionally has been 
associated with the origin of Romantic notions 
of the nonactability of Shakespeare, it might 
be noted that the origin actually lies with Hunt, 
although Johnson might have been an influence as 
well. Johnson had said that spectators never 
believe that actions on stage are real, but 
1L Works, I, 106. 
2L Works, I, 107.. 
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he went on to say that if this were not the 
case with tragedy, all pleasure would be lost: 
"The delight of tragedy proceeds from our 
consciousness of fiction; if we thought murders 
and treasons real, they would please no more. "' 
Obviously Lamb contradicted Johnson's under- 
standing of spectators, for Lamb found tragic 
action on the stage all too real. 
Hunt was much closer than Johnson to the 
idea of non-actability. In June of 1807 he 
had suggested the idea: 
It is evident therefore that none 
but a Garrick can grasp all the 
varieties of such a character ras 
Hamlet] at once, and... we really 
imagine that there is no actor of 2 the present day equal to the task. 
In Critical Essays, however, the idea was much 
clearer: "It must be the praise of a man, who 
shall possess a genius capable of more than the 
art of acting, to personate Hamlet.... "3 Lamb 
makes the comment about actors that, "To know 
the internal workings and movements of a great 
mind, of an Othello or a Hamlet for instance... 
seems to demand a reach of intellect of a 
vastly different extent from... bare imitation". 
4 
Hunt also seemed to anticipate Lamb when he 
spoke of the audience's desire for expressions 
on stage to correspond to those supplied by 
imagination "in reading a book. "5 But Hunt is 
closest to Lamb with an idea central to his 
notion of tragedy. Tragedy is an imitation of 
passions, not events,; - "in proportion as [the 
spectators] lose sight of this imitation, they 
1 Johnson on Shakespeare, VI, 78. 
2 The News, 28 June, 1807. 
3 CE, ' 41. 
4L Works, 1,98. 
5 CE, 25. 
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would be awake to a sorrow too apparently 
real to be softened into a pleasing effect. "1 
This is exactly Lamb's idea in the above 
passage concerning Macbeth, and lying behind 
many of Lamb's other comments: "... the too 
close pressing semblance of reality, give a 
pain and an uneasiness which totally destroy 
all the delight which the words in the book 
convey.... "2 
Lamb's comments on Shakespeare's tragedies 
might be taken to mean that he was against the 
production of Shakespeare's plays at the theatre. 
He comes close but does not actually say this, 
and his comments might be given a slightly 
different emphasis somewhat closer to his 
intention. Shakespeare's plays become some- 
thing other than Shakespeare's plays when they 
are performed on the stage. They lose the 
depth of the poet's imagination; they gain an 
emphasis on the senses which was never intended; 
and they relinquish all capacity to appeal to 
imagination in the audience. In other words, 
the entire realm of the `imagination' is removed 
from the tragedies, leaving something which has 
only superficial resemblance to Shakespeare. 
The theme of imagination is of central 
importance to Lamb's comments on Shakespeare's 
tragedy; and Lamb's particular notions of 
'imagination' as meditative and abstracting, and 
1 CE, 142. 
2 Even considering Hunt's influence, Lamb 
had formulated the idea about the difference between 
Shakespeare's Richard III9 and the stage Richard of 
Cooke, as early as 1802. In "G. F. Cooke in 'Richard 
the Third"', written for the Morning Post of 8 January 
(L Works, I. 36ff. ), Lamb develops contrasts in the 
"monster Richard" which Cooke drew, and "the man 






limagination as being opposed to the external 
and sensory, may be seen to be largely responsible 
for the ideas he presents. 
`Imagination' is an essential factor in 
tragedy for Lamb, and as was the case with 
Hunt, he believed that`imagination'was not 
involved in comedy. The reason for this could 
be explained simply by considering Lamb's 
theory of imagination: comedy involved nothing 
which required meditation or abstraction. The 
poet's idea was immediately displayed before 
the spectator and required no "pain and per- 
plexity of mind". There was no risk of 'letting 
go a dream' or of "[bringing] down a fine vision 
to the standard of flesh and blood. " Indeed, 
in comedy everything was-at the standard of 
flesh and blood and familiar life. 
Since comedy had nothing to do with the 
imagination or the internal workings of the 
mind, and it had everything to do with the 
external and sensual, it might have been expected 
that Lamb would advocate the performance of 
Shakespeare's comedies on stage. However, this 
was not the case. Lamb closed his remarks on 
Shakespeare's tragedies with the observation that 
It would be no very difficult task to 
extend the enquiry to his comedies; and 
to shew why Falstaff, Shallow, Sir Hugh 
Evans, and the rest, are equally in- 1 
compatible with stage representation. 
Lamb did not explain himself, and never 
returned to the specific subject of Shakespeare's 
comedies, possibly because the Reflector ceased 
publication. From what we can see of Lamb's 
thought, his argument. probably would not have 
1L Works, I, 111. 
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involved the 'imagination. ' It might be 
supposed that he would have argued that 
characters like Falstaff are taken more 
seriously on stage than in reading; as these 
characters gain in reality, their humour is 
lost in the moral revulsion one feels for 
their actions. 
It is this thought which seems to have 
been developed by Lamb in his Elia essays. 
In "On Some of the Old Actors", Lamb advances 
a theory of imitation for comedy which is 
directly opposite to Hunt's. Hunt had argued 
that comedy must imitate real life, and be as 
close to it as possible in order that the world 
might recognise its likeness. Lamb argues 
that the "absolute sense of reality" can diminish 
the-pleasure of some comedy and that the comedies 
of Congreve and Sheridan demand artificial acting. 
What Lamb says about the character of Joseph 
Surface might apply to the character of Falstaff: 
The fact is, you do not believe in 
such characters as Surface - the 
villain of artificial comedy - even 
while you read or see them. If you 
did, they would shock and not divert l you. 
Lamb says that for such characters an actor is 
needed who will be "the creature dear to half- 
belief" and not create discord in the play by 
suggesting that "a real man has got in among 
the dramatis personae . 112 
In two other essays, also written in the 
1820s, Lamb gives further treatment to illusion 
in comedy, and again he is stressing that comedy 
should be escapist. He praises Congreve and 
1L Works, II, 140. 
2L Works, II, 141. 
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Wycherley: "I could never connect those 
sports of a witty fancy in any shape with any 
result to be drawn from them to imitation in 
real life. "' Lamb claims that artificial 
comedy makes no moral demands; the characters, 
he says, 
have got out of Christendom into the 
land - what shall I call it? - of 
cuckoldry - the Utopia of gallantry, 
where pleasure is duty, and the 
manners perfect freedom. It is 
altogether a speculative scene of 
things, which has no reference2 
whatever to the world that is. 
Lamb complains that in the contemporary comedy 
everything had a reference to the real world 
of moral judgements: 
we recognise ourselves, our brothers, 
aunts, kinsfolk, allies patrons, 
enemies, - the same as in life, - 
with an interest in what is going 
on so hearty and substantial, that 
we cannot afford our moral judgement.. 
to compromise or slumber for a moment. 
5 
In order to avoid such a close suggestion of 
real life in comic representation, Lamb suggests 
that it is the "proof of the highest skill in 
the comedian when, without absolutely appealing 
to an audience, he keeps up a tacit under- 
standing with them. "4 He points to Bannister 
in the role of a coward, who would "let out by 
a thousand droll looks and gestures- meant at 
us, and not at all supposed to be visible to 
his fellows in the scene, that his confidences 
in his own resources had never once deserted him. "5 
L Works, II, 
2L Works, II, 
of the Last Century. " 
3L Works, II, 
4 -L Work s, II, 
5L Works, II, 
142. 
143; "On the Artificial Comedy 
142. 
163; "Stage Illusion". 
163-4. 
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In 1954 Sylvan Barnet wrote a long and 
very suggestive article entitled "Charles Lamb's 
Contribution to the Theory of Dramatic Illusion"1 
in which he admitted that Lamb was not usually 
thought of in relation to dramatic illusion, 
partially because of his ideas of non-actability. 
He went on to develop the possible implications 
of some of Lamb's thought into a theory of 
dramatic illusion based on his view that Lamb 
saw the appeal of comedy as intellectual and 
the appeal of tragedy as emotional. From what 
has been discussed already, it should be 
suggested that if Lamb made the kind of distinction 
that Barnet is arguing, he made it possibly in 
the reverse order. Tragedy appealed to the 
imagination, and while closely involved with 
the emotional, it was meditative and abstracting 
and placed heavy emphasis on the intellectual. 
Apart from this, there remains a need to 
point out that Barnet's article makes extentions 
of Lamb's thought which Lamb himself did not 
make. Lamb did not make the kind of con- 
tribution to the theory of dramatic illusion 
that Hunt made, for instance. Lamb's dis- 
cussions of stage illusion are limited, almost 
exclusively, to consideration of comedy. He had 
said, in effect, that Shakespeare's tragedies 
created no illusion but that of real life. That 
illusion he found both painful and, in a sense, 
unavoidable in the theatre of his age. Shake- 
speare's tragedies on stage were a lost cause 
and Lamb spent little time suggesting to tragic 
actors how they might improve their dramatic 
imitation. Elsewhere he gives only a hint that 
1 PMLA, 69 (1954), 1150-59. 
t 
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"scenical illusion" is present in tragedy. He 
says that "we are told" that the nearest approach 
to scenical illusion is in tragedy "when the 
actor appears wholly unconscious of the presence 
of spectators"1 and Lamb comments that "Macbeth 
must see the dagger, and no ear but his own be 
told of it". 
2 
Lamb does not use his theory of `imagination' 
to account for illusion as Hunt did with regard 
to tragic illusion. Lamb is consistent in keep- 
ing his thematic use of imagination in criticism 
confined to the idea that'imagination'is meditat- 
ive and abstracting. He is consistent in main- 
taining that `imagination' cannot be found in the 
theatre. He is consistent, also, in suggesting 
that the only place to experience the sublime 
elevation of tragic imagery is at home by the 
fireside, reading. As Lamb wrote in a letter to 
Coleridge in 1803: 
When shall we two smoke again? Last 
night I had been in a sad quandary 
of spirits, in what they'call the 
evening; but a pipe and some generous 
Port, and King Lear (being alone), 
had its effects as a remon trance. 
I went to bed pot-valiant. 
It was when Lamb was at home reading that he was 
able to focus totally on the 'internal workings 
of the mind' in Shakespeare's characters. At the 
1L Works, II, 163, (1825). 
2L Works, II, 165. See also II9 140. About 
1827, Lamb gave a note to a quotation from Robert 
Yarrington: "The whole theory of the reason of our 
delight in Tragic Representations, which has cost 
so many elaborate chapters of Criticism, is con- 
densed in these four last lines: Aristotle 
quintessentialised". The lines read: 
But though this sight bring surfeit to the eye, 
Delight your ears with pleasing harmony, 
That ears may countercheck your eyes, and say, 
'Why shed you tears? this deed is but a Flay. ' 
(L Works, IV, 439) 
3L Works, VI, 269. 
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theatre he felt the real world impinging on the 
stage, and with the real world, the need to see 
actions in the light of morality. D. J. Mulcahy 
made the point, in. a different context, that 
morality for Lamb related to the real world, not 
to sentiment or imagination. 
' His point might 
have been taken one step further: morality and 
the real world - which Lamb found so frequently 
in the theatre - were inextricably linked. Lamb 
had the greatest enjoyment at the theatre when 
morality was avoided, as was the case (he felt) 
with the Restoration plays. 
There is some truth in suggesting that with 
Lamb, the stage was either too close to reality, 
as in the case of tragedy, or not sufficiently far 
away frora * it, as in the case of comedy. Lamb 
seemed to find that the stage was too effective 
a medium: it had too great a power over the senses. 
While his reaction may appear extreme, it may possib- 
ly be understood in the context of the feelings 
expressed in the previous century (and by Hunt as 
well) that Gloucester should be sent off-stage 
while he is blinded. Or perhaps Lamb can be 
understood in the context of Wordsworth's com- 
plaint against the "degrading thirst after out- 
rageous stimulation" to which he felt "the liter- 
ature and theatrical exhibitions of the country 
have conformed themselves. 112 
When Johnson had spoken of the purpose of 
dramatic representation, he had said simply that 
the spectators "come to hear a certain number of 
lines recited with just gesture and elegant 
modulation. "3 Lamb may have lacked Johnson's 
1 D. J. Mulcahy, "The 
the Two Planes, " Studies in 
1500-1900, III, 1963p 517-5- 
2 Literary, Criticism 
21; (1800 "Preface"). 
3 Johnson on Shakes 
Antithetical Manner and 
English Literature 
2; esp. 535- 
of William Wordsworth, 
are, VII, 77. 
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sympathy with the aim of the theatre, in spite of 
his large amount of experience with the theatre. 
However, Lamb did not lack sympathy with Shakespeare. 
Lamb understood imagination to be a meditative 
faculty which perceived unity in a work of art. It was 
Lamb's understanding of Shakespeare in particular, 
which led him initially to suspect that Shakespeare's 
tragedies were unsuited for the stage. It is Lamb's 
understanding of imagination - overlooked by critics 
in the past - which underlies his comments on 
Shakespeare and drama. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE THEME OF IMAGINATION IN 
WILLIAM HAZLITT 
Hunt and Lamb both defined imagination in 
the course of their criticisms, and they had both felt 
the need to define what they meant by the concept very 
early in their critical careers.. With Hazlitt the 
situation was much different. His theory of imagination 
was the focus of his system of metaphysics, developed 
in his 1805. Essay on the Principles of Human Action and 
revised in 1807, and it remained in favour with him 
until his death. It was not until 1813, when he began 
to write newspaper criticisms that he began to adapt 
his theory to aesthetic purposes. The influences of his 
early theory may be found in his theatrical criticisms in 
The Morni Chronicle, The Champion, The Examiner, and 
The Times; in his 1817 Characters of Shakespear's Plays; 
in his 1818 Lectures on the English Poets; and in his 
extensive criticisms dealing with matters less explicitly 
connected with Shakespeare and drama. 
Hazlitt was almost thirty-five when he began his 
career as a theatre critic with The Morning Chronicle 
and The Champion. Hunt, six years his junior, had 
already been writing regular reviews for eight years and 
was currently serving the first year of his two-year 
prison sentence for libel against the Prince Regent. 
Hunt's time in-prison was ultimately of assistance to 
Hazlitt. In the spring of 1814 they began working on 
"The Round Table", each writing separate essays and Hunt 
working from his prison room. When Hunt needed someone 
to cover Edmund Kean on the London stage for the Examiner 
in July, 1814, he asked Hazlitt. By the time Hunt was 
released in February, 1815, his own interests had returned 
to writing poetry and he asked Hazlitt to-take over as 
the theatre-critic for the Examiner. Between March, 
1815 and June, 1817, Hazlitt wrote almost one hundred 
and fifty separate reviews as well. as some theatrical 
"Round Table" issues for The Examiner. This period 
represents the most active period of Hazlitt's career 
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as a critic. In 1817 he wrote'a few reviews for 
The Times, and in 1828, just prior to his death, he 
made several contributions again to The Examiner. In 
all, just over forty of Hazlitt's reviews were specifically 
devoted to Shakespearean plays, and many others contained 
Shakespearean references. 
In addition to the reviews, Hazlitt also wrote 
his well known Characters ofLShakespear's Plays in the 
time of his greatest critical activity. The work was 
published in 1817, followed, the next year, by his 
Lectures on the English Poets. The Shakespearean 
material in both of these works is slightly different 
from the reviews. In these volumes Hazlitt is for the 
most part a reader; his concentration is as much on the 
details of the play, the images, striking passages, and 
suggestions of a theoretical nature concerning the art 
of Shakespeare, as it is on character, plot and structure. 
In the reviews, the emphasis on the latter is present 
without the same stress on the former, and in addition 
there is, of course, the material relevant to the theatre- 
information about the particular production details, 
the sets and actors, the audience reactions, play 
alterations and so on. In these reviews Hazlitt is 
very much a spectator, which makes the stage more 
immediate to his readers. Both its successes . and its 
failures are laid bare. 
In Characters of Shakespear's Plays there is 
. -perhaps a greater sense of Hazlitt's own involvement 
with the Shakespearean work he is discussing than is 
found generally in his reviews. Herschel Baker describes 
Hazlitt's style in the work as follows: 
Probing motives, testing the force of 
circumstance on character, quoting end- 
lessly, and exclaiming with delight at 
the wonders thus revealed, he shows in 
his responses an extraordinary ardor. 
... Hazlitt [in contrast to Johnson], 
presents himself as advocate and herald 
of Shakespeare]. He proclaims his author's 
power, and tells us to submit. The results 
are not uniformly good, for one tires of 
exclamation points and rapture; but when he 
is able to convey his-own exhilaration he 
writes with stunning force. 
1 Baker, William Hazlitt, 305. 
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One might wish to take exception to Baker's claim 
elsewhere that "Hazlitt's attitude toward Shakespeare 
is essentially emotional, and his emotion is the gauge 
by which he tests the plays", 
1 but-it is true that in 
Characters Hazlitt's own enthusiasm'is often a major 
force behind his comments. When Hazlitt is sitting in 
the theatre this enthusiasm is generally toned down 
because of the shortcomings of the particular production, 
and the reviews overall are less positive. To a certain 
extent these two sides of Hazlitt, Hazlitt as spectator 
and Hazlitt as reader, remain separate in his comments 
on Shakespeare, providing both a subtle contrast of 
perspective and an added dimension of interest. 
As was shown in an earlier chapter of this 
thesis, various critics have commented on Hazlitt's 
1805 Essay and have understood him to be talking about 
the eighteenth century notions of the sympathetic 
imagination. Several critics occasionally have inter- 
preted Hazlitt's literary criticism in terms of the 
sympathetic imagination. However, Joseph W. Donohue, 
in his study on Romantic Character, is the only critic 
to have discussed Hazlitt's Shakespeare criticism 
specifically in relation to Hazlitt's early thought. 
Hazlitt's understanding of'imagination'was closely 
related to the sympathetic imagination, as it is commonly 
understood. Donohue's study of Hazlitt has drawn attention 
to the importance Hazlitt gave to sympathy, for instance 
with regard to an actor and his character or the audience 
and events on stage. 
2 
Hazlitt's theory of imagination was much broader 
in implication than traditional accounts of sympathy 
and was more in line with what was called earlier the 
'democratic imagination'. Auch of the critical signi- 
ficance of Hazlitt's early exploration into metaphysics 
is that it provided him with a basic model of human 
psychology. That model, and the heavy emphasis it 
1 Baker, William Hazlitt, 307, 
2 See Dramatic Character in the Romantic Age, 
323-344. 
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placed on imagination, was easily adapted to criticism. 
It is the intention in this chapter to draw more precise 
links between Hazlitt's early theory Of imagination and 
his criticism than has been done in the past. 
i 
1 
Hazlitt is not clear about which plays are his 
favourites. As You Like It, he says, is Shakespeare's 
most ideal production: 
It is the most ideal of any of this author's 
plays. It is a pastoral drama, in which 
the interest arises more out of the 
sentiments and characters than out of 
the actions or situations. It is not what 
is done, but wýat is said, that claims 
our attention. 
Antony-and Cleopatra he considers, 
the finest of his historical plays, 
that is, of those in which he made 
poetry the organ of history, and 
assumed a certain tone of character 
and sentiment, in conformity to known 
facts, instead of trusting to his 
observations of general nature or to 
the unlimited indulgence of his own 
fancy. What he has added to the actual 
story, is upon a par with it. (IV, 228) 
Concerning the tragedies he has this to say: 
Macbe and ea, , 
thello and Hi me, are 
usually reckoned Shakespear's four principal 
tragedies. ear stands first for the 
profound intensity` of the passion; Magbeth 
for the wildness of the imagination and the 
rapidity of the action; QthDjl. o for the 
progressive interest and powerful alternations 
of feeling; Hamlet for the refined develop- 
ement of thought and sentiment. If the force 
of genius shewn in each of these works is 
astonishing, their variety is not less so. 
They are like different creations of the 
same mind, not one of which has the slight- 
est reference to the rest. (IV, 186) 
A different perspective is taken elsewhere: 
It [Othello] excites our sympathy in an 
extraordinary degree. The moral it conveys 
has a closer application to the concerns of 
human life than that of almost any other of 
1H Works, IV, 338. All future references 
in this chapter will be to H Works unless otherwise 
indicated and will be given internally where possible. 
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Shakespear's plays. 'It comes directly home 
to the bosoms and business of men'. The 
pathos in Lear is indeed more dreadful and 
overpowering: but it is less natural, and 
less of every day's occurrence. We:. have 
not the same degree of sympathy with the 
passions described in. acbet . The interest 
in Hamlet is more remote and reflex. That 
of Qhheljo is at once equally profound and 
affecting. (IV, 200) 
Hazlitt has a genuine admiration for Shakespeare's 
plays, and it is clear that he likes each one for 
different reasons. 
The position Hazlitt took with regard to 
Shakespeare on the stage was much like that of Hunt. 
He protested radical alteration of Shakespeare's plays 
for the stage; he encouraged the revival of Shakespeare's 
original plays and he approved of minor alterations 
for theatrical effect. A review of Kean in Richard III 
at Drury Lane in October of 1817 records Hazlitt's 
displeasure with. the Cibber version which was presented 
and he endorses a proposal he has heard rumoured to 
restore the original. (XVIII, 255ff) Many of his 
remarks in this review are anticipated by his comments 
on Libber's Richard III in Characters. His main 
complaint in his own words, is that: 
Some of the most important and striking 
passages in the principal character have 
been omitted, to make room for idle and 
misplaced-extracts from other plays; the 
only intention of which seems to have been 
to make the character of Richard as odious 
and disgusting as possible. (IV, 300) 
It is interesting that Hazlitt is attributing the 
alteration of Richard's character primarily to Libber's 
version of the play, whereas in 1802 Lamb had blamed 
C. F. Cooke's acting for making Richard into a monster. 
l 
The Antony and Cleopatra which appeared on the 
stage of Covent Garden, 15 November, 1813 was the version 
altered by Kemble. 
2 Hazlitt was not pleased with the 
"several claptraps in the speeches, which admit of an 
obvious allusion to passing characters and events, and 
" .1 See n. 2 on page 213 of this thesis. 
" 2, See J. Genest VIII, 419. 
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which were eagerly seized by the audience". (V, 190) 
Enobarbus's speech describing Cleopatra's appearance 
when Antony first saw. her ("The barge she sat in, like 
a burnish'd throne ... " II1 ii, 191ff. ) was moved to 
after the catastrophe; Hazlitt felt the original position 
had prepared the way for and almost justified Antony's 
subsequent infatuation, but where the speech was now 
placed it served no end. (V, 191)1 Hazlitt further 
complained that the effect of the play had been injured 
by the omission of Enobarbus's repentance: "The 
repentance of Enobarbus after his treachery to his 
master, the most beautiful and affecting part of the 
play, is here, for some reason, entirely omitted. " (V, 191)2 
Hazlitt was in agreement with Hunt on what kind 
of alterations of Shakespeare were justified for stage 
production. As Hazlitt said concerning Richard III: 
The original play is however too long for 
representation, and there are some few scenes 
which might be better spared than preserved, 
and by omitting which it would remain a complete 
whole. The only rule, indeed, for altering 
Shakespear is to retrench certain passages 
which may be considered either as superfluous 
or obsolete, but not to add or transpose anX 3thing. (IV, 300) 
The only exception Hazlitt seems to have made to 
this general principle was with regard to As You Like It 
as performed at Covent Garden on October 2,1816. 
Hazlitt apparently approved of the interpolation of the 
"Cuckoo song" from the end of Love's Labour Lost into 
Act IV, i, of the former play, and called Miss Boyle's 
singing of it (in the role of Rosalind) "quite delight- 
ful". (V, 337) 
An alteration which Hazlitt did approve, for 
the most part, was Garrick's Romeo and Juliet. Hazlitt 
wrote about it in his note for the Oxberry's Drama 
series of 1$1$:, 
1 See also IV, 229 
2 See also IV, 232 
3 See also an earlier comment on Antony and 
Cleopatra, V, 191. 
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Garrick has altered 'Romeo and Juliet, ' not 
spoiled it; which indeed it would hardly 
seem in the power of man to do, if we had 
not known what has been so ingeniously 
effected in other instances of Shakespear's 
plays. He has done chiefly what a judicious 
manager was perhaps bound to do - omitted 
some parts and shortened others. (IX, 81) 
Hazlitt goes on immediately to say the same thing in 
other words, with images from nature being used to 
provide a poetic illustration of his, point. It might 
be noted that this is characteristic of Hazlitt's 
critical method: he is concerned that his reader share 
in his feelings. 
The play of 'Romeo and Juliet' may be compared 
for the sweetness and colours of poetry, to 
a spreading rose-tree: Garrick has pruned 
and trimmed it, has curtailed it of some of 
its arching branches, and lopped off some of 
its fairest flowers, but the crimson dyes 
still sparkle on its bosom, and its fragrance 
scents the air. (IX, $i) 
Hazlitt's approval of the Garrick Romeo and 
Juliet was not unqualified - like the other Romantic 
critics he had serious reservations about the ending 
Garrick had given it. He expresses the same kind of 
reservations about the Tate ending of Lear. However, 
Hazlitt seems more tolerant of both of these for stage 
production than either Hunt or Lamb. He says in one 
place that the last scene of the Garrick play, though 
not from Shakespeare, "tells admirably on the stage". 
(V, 200) In another place his reaction seems a mixture 
of approval and disapproval: 
The concluding scene of all (or the double 
revival of hope-when the lovers meet at the 
tomb and the double agony of despair that follows) is of Garrick's adding, and he may 
be justified on the score of theatrical 
effect; but the distress of mind produced by 
it would accord better with the productions 
of the modern German school than with the 
genius of 'the gentle Shakespear'. (IX, 82) 
On the subject of Lear in Characters, Hazlitt quotes 
Lamb at some length and thus apparently gives his own 
condemnation of the happy ending. (IV, 270-1) . 
However, 
his closing comments in a review of a Lear production a 
few years-later indicate that his condemnation-was not 
as. -, whole-hearted , 
as Lamb's: 
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... The rest of the play was very respectably 
got up, and all we could object to was the 
interspersion of the love-scenes by Tate. The 
happy ending, and the triumph and dotage of the 
poor old king in repeating again and again, 
'Cordelia's Queen, Cordelia's Queen, ' were 
perhaps allowable concessions to the feelings 
of the audience. (XVIII, 329) 
Hazlitt was generally in favour of Shakespeare on 
the stage but at times his frustration with the poor 
productions he saw is evident in his writing. He 
compared seeing As You Like It acted for the first time, 
"after knowing it almost by heart, merely from reading 
it", with "waking from a golden dream; and like Caliban, 
disturbed from the imagination of sweet sounds, 'we 
cry to dream again'. " (IX, 91) Hazlitt speaks, in 
July 1815, of returning from a bad production of the 
Tempest two weeks earlier and resolving never again to 
see a Shakespearean play acted, at least by choice. 
(v, 234). 
The most extensive influence of Lamb's theories 
about the non-actability of Shakespeare's plays is found 
in Characters of Shakespear's Plays, a book dedicated to 
Lamb and in which Lamb is frequently cited. In this book 
much stronger positions are recorded than those above. 
He concludes the section on Hamlet by saying: 
We do not like to see our author's plays 
acted, and least of all, Hamlet. There 
is no play that suffers so-Emu-c. 7 in being 
transferred to the stage. Hamlet himself 
seems hardly capable of being acted. (IV, 237) 
He comments that Richard III is properly a stage play 
(IV, 298) but that Macbeth is less so because of the 
difficulty of the acting. (IV, 194) He can think of no 
one who could play Macbeth properly and remembered no S 
actor who looked as though he believed that he had seen 
the witches. He agreed with Lamb and Hunt concerning the 
ridiculous appearance of the Witches on the modern stage. 
(IV, 194) Similarly, he felt that the fantastic spirit 
of the Midsummer Night's Dream was lost on stage; the 
play, when acted, "is converted from a delightful fiction 
into a dull pantomime. " (IV, 247) 
.. Hazlitt 
does not consistently maintain these 
positions about the impossibility of acting Shakespeare 
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outside of Characters of Shakespear's Plays. For 
example, in November of the same year in which that book 
was published, Hazlitt reviewed for The Times a production 
of Much Ado About Nothing. The production was not 
completely successful, but'Hazlitt had'this to say about 
it: 
With all the faults which attend the getting 
up of this play we must not forget that it is 
Shakespeare's and that an evening passed in 
hearing one of his plays, especially when 
given, as at present, nearly in its genuine 
state, must yield a considerable' degree of 
pleasure. (XVIII, 265) 
It would seem unfair to judge Hazlitt for his apparent 
inconsistency regarding his view of Shakespeare and the 
stage. Hazlitt was deeply in love with the theatre but 
like many theatre critics, he could be deeply annoyed 
with it as well. If he saw a good production of 
Shakespeare, or even one which was at least tolerable, 
he met it with an enthusiasm and a sense of gratification 
which was sufficient to carry him through several 
productions which were disappointing. It is this kind 
of fluctuation in mood which comes out in some of his 
writings. 
Hazlitt does not comment a great deal in his writ- 
ings about the specific features of the theatre of his 
time. J1ýccasional comments he does make however, provide 
a useful insight into the theatre as he experienced it. 
For instance, he speaks of the new decorations he found 
at Covent Garden when it reopened with a production of 
Hamlet in the fall of 1817. Large mirrors had been put at 
each end of the first row of boxes, which Hazlitt said 
reflected the company "in a brilliant perspective, and 
have a very magical effect". (XVIII, 243) A great 
chandelier had been added which he felt both too bright 
to look at and too bright for the house. But from the 
theatrical point of view, Hazlitt noted that it had the 
advantage of reducing distortion of facial expressions: 
... 
[it throws] the light upon the countenances 
of the actors-from above, instead of from below 
--(which last method inverts the, natural shadows 
of the face, and distorts the. expression) [but it] 
is defeated by the gas lights which are still 
retained between the stage and the orchestra. (XVIII, 243) 
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Hazlitt commented that the lower gas lamps could not 
be removed as they were needed. for lightening or 
darkening the stage through being raised or lowered. 
Perhaps it was the brightness of the new chandelier 
which contriLb ed to Hazlitt's complaint that 
Mrs Egerton's Ghost in the production was "the most 
substantial we ever saw". (XVIII, 244) 
In an 1817 article entitled "Whether Actors 
Ought-, to Sit in the Boxes, " Hazlitt argues that the habit 
of some actors appearing in the boxes of the first 
circle to watch the performance, either in or out of 
costume, is injurious to stage illusion. Actors unmabk- 
ing before the public, after playing a part in disguise, 
Hazlitt says, disturbs the "borrowed impression" 
(VIII, 272). This is more true for tragedy than comedy, 
he points out: a tragic actor should "'steal most 
guilty-like away "'# (VIII, 274) On the other hand 
Mr. Matthews was excused by Hazlitt when, in At Home, 
Matthews was seen "to slip out quick as lightning, and 
appear in the side-box shaking hands with our old 
friend Jack '-Bannister" - the comic actor, Hazlitt said, 
could always get another face. (VIII, 273). 
In the same article Hazlitt argued that the only 
place to sit in the theatre to get a proper view of the 
performance was in the pit. He recounts that he sat 
in a box-seat of Covent Garden to see Mr. Macready and 
Elizabeth Brunton in their first appearance in Romeo and 
Juliet in 1817; although he was told by a good critic 
afterwards that the production was very good, his seat 
was so far from the stage, he himself could not tell. 
(VIII, 277) To understand the acting of an actor like 
Kean, Hazlitt said, it was imperative to sit in the pit: 
His face is the running commentary 
on his acting, which reconciles the audience 
to it. Without that index to his mind, you 
are not prepared for the vehemence and 
suddenness of his gestures; his pauses are 
long, abrupt, and unaccountable, if not 
filled up by the expression; it is in the 
working of his face that you see the writhing 
and coiling up of the passions before they 
make their serpent spring; the-lightning of 
his eyes precedes the hoarse burst of thunder 
from his voice. (VIII, 277) 
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If one sat i/ a stage-box instead of the pit, one's 
attention would'be drawn off by a number of things; 
and if one sat in'the second or third tier of boxes, or 
at any distance from the stage, one could neither hear 
nor see well. (VIII, 274) 
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It will be remembered that Hazlitt's under- 
standing of the mental faculties was related to the 
radical division he made when he claimed that past and 
present were completely cut off from the future. In 
1805 the faculties which were related to the past and 
present were memory, which was a kind of storehouse for 
images, and consciousness, which was akin to sensory 
impression. In 1807, the faculty of understanding was 
added to this scheme. 
The radical temporal division Hazlitt made 
helped to emphasise that imagination was the supreme 
faculty in his view. Without imagination man was 
habitually selfish; he was occupied with satisfying his 
own'sensual wants in the present with no concern for the 
future. With imagination, and only by imaginvtion, man 
could hope to overcome his total focus on himself and the 
senses. Imagination gave man an interest in the future, 
even though his direct interest would be'only in the 
past and present. Imagination broadened the horizon of 
man's vision, made ideas about the future vivid, and 
thus allowed the mind to perceive and naturally move 
towards that which was good. Imagination allowed the 
future to strike man, Hazlitt said, as "an imaginary 
idea, or an idea of truth". (I, 48) 
The ease with which Hazlitt made the transition 
from metaphysics to aesthetics becomes apparent when 
it is recognised that the division Hazlitt made between 
present and future is essentially a division between 
that which is sense-orientated and that which is 
231 
imagination-orientated. This division in Hazlitt's 
metaphysical thought is the same kind of division as 
was used effectively by both Hunt and Lamb in their 
critical thought. Concerning Hazlitt it is important 
to recognise that this division occurs first in his 
philosophy and that it is associated with the distinction 
he makes in the Essay between 'real' or 'direct' 
interest in the present and imagined or ideal interest 
in the future. When the identical notions appear 
repeatedly in Hazlitt's criticism, several years later 
(although without the label 'real' to describe that 
which is primarily sensory), their true source is in 
the Essay. 
It has been usual for critics to consider Hazlitt's 
notion of the ideal in art in isolation, without adequately 
stressing its dialectical opposition to the sensory in 
art. The opposition is important for understanding what 
Hazlitt meant by the ideal and in explaining or accounting 
for Hazlitt's connection of the ideal with his own ideas 
of imagination - something which does not seem to have 
tee- 
-done before. ' 
The relation between sensory and ideal in art 
is parallel to their relation in Hazlitt's metaphysics. 
In the metaphysics, it is the past and present which are 
primarily sense-orientated. Just as man relates to the 
past and present with the faculties of memory, conscious- 
ness and understanding, so too man relates to the 
sensory in art with those faculties. The faculties of 
memory, consciousness and understanding are employed in 
creating sense-orientated art, and in perceiving it as 
well. 
Similarly, in the metaphysics it is the future 
which is seen as ideal. Just as man relates to the 
future with the imagination, so too it is the imagination 
which creates the ideal in art and which allows it to be 
perceived as ideal. 
_1 See for instance, Elizabeth 
Schneider, The 
Aesthetics of William Hazlitt, 50 ff. A more recent 
study is that of Leonar N. Trawick, "III, "Hazlitt, 
Reynolds and the Ideal, " Studies in Romanticism, IV 
(1965)9.240-247., 
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The opposition between sensory and ideal may be 
found operating in numerous places throughout Hazlitt's 
criticism, in addition to the one above concerning 
comedy and tragedy. It is in the criticism that it 
becomes clear what Hazlitt sees as the precise differ- 
ences between sense-orientated art and art of the 
imagination. For instance, it is the opposition of 
sensory and ideal which is the theme of Hazlitt's essay, 
"On the Picturesque and Ideal". He connects the 
picturesque with the senses and the understanding. He 
connects picturesque with the particular or individual 
in nature, the factual truth which concentrates on forms 
and shows discrimination and contrast. He says the 
picturesque is "merely a sharper and bolder impression 
of reality. " (VIII, 320) In contrast, the ideal is 
connected with the imagination: "The ideal is that 
which answers to the preconceived imagihation. and appetite 
in the mind for love and beauty. " (VIII, 317) The ideal 
in art is not dependent on discrimination and contrast, 
but on harmony and continuity, and is dependent on feel- 
ing rather than form. The ideal is suggested to be the 
universal and is connected explicitly with the soul. 
(VIII, 317-321) 
What Hazlitt says about painting in the first 
of his 1818 Lectures on the English Poets is very much 
. like his 
description of the picturesque. He contrasts 
the art of painting with the art of poetry. He says that 
painting is concerned with the object itself, poetry 
with what the object implies; painting with the actual 
event, poetry with the progress of the event; and paint- 
ing with the emotional fact, poetry with the progress of 
emotions. (V, 10) A similar distinction had been made 
at the end of his remarks on Lear in Characters of Shakespear's 
Plays' when he listed four things that had struck him in 
the readings of the play. His second point read: 
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That the language of poetry is superior 
to the language of painting ; because the 
strongest, of our recollections relate to 
feelings, not to faces. (IV, 271) 
In his third point he connected feelings, particularly 
the strongest of passions, to the greatest genius and 
"the power of the imagination". (IV, 271) 
The distinction between sense-orientated and 
ideal in Hazlitt's early theory had encouraged Hazlitt, 
in 1816, to incorporate Schlegel's distinctions between 
classical and romantic into his own thought. Though the 
terms were Schlegel's, Hazlitt had already provided the 
theoretical basis in his theory of imagination for 
accepting them: 
The great difference, then, which we find 
between the classical and the romantic style, 
between ancient and modern poetry, is, that 
the one [i. e. classical] more frequently 
describes things as they are interestingly 
in themselves, - the other for the sake of 
associations of ideas connected with them; 
that the one dwells more on the immediate 
impressions of objects on the senses - the 
other on the ideas which they suggest to the 
imagination. The one is the poetry of form, 
the other of effect. The one gives only 
what is necessarily implied in the subject; 
the otýer all that can possibly arise out 
of it. 
It is worth noting, in passing, that the passage contains 
an indication of why Hazlitt was so opposed to Coleridge's 
claim that imagination was not associative. If the 
imagination was not associative (as Hazlitt had suggested 
it was in his discussion of the 'reasoning' action of 
imagination in the Essay), then all art, in his way of 
thinking, would be like classical art - simply interest- 
ing in itself rather than "for the sake of associations 
of ideas connected with [it]. " 
1H Works, XVI, 63. Compare this passage with 
one from Characters of Shakespear's Plays: "Chaucer 
attended chiefly to the real and natura ... 
Shakespear exhibited also the possible and the fantastical, 
not only what things are in themselves, but whatever they 
might seem to be, their different reflections, their 
endless combinations .... Every thing 
in Chaucer has 
a downright reality. A simile or a sentiment is as if 
it-were given in upon evidence. In Shakespear the common- 
est matter-of-fact has a romantic grace about it; or seems 
to float with the breath of imagination in a freer 
element. " H Works, IV, 226. 
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The distinction Hazlitt made in his Essay between 
the sense-orientated and the ideal had considerable 
significance when applied to aesthetics. Hazlitt 
established, far clearer than either Hunt or Lamb had 
done, that the difference between art of the senses and 
art of the imagination, as he saw it, was that the latter 
was primarily referential. Art of the senses represented 
things as they appeared most readily to the senses, 
placing heavy emphasis on shapes and external appearances. 
It was an art which was more or less self-contained. Art 
of the imagination, on the other hand, of necessity 
referred beyonh itself. The imagination went beyond the 
world of the senses, beyond the shapes and forms of the 
individual subject to address the soul of man. 
Hazlitt's belief in the referential quality 
of the art of imagination is widely reflected in his 
dramatic criticisms. He criticises modern opera and 
modern poetry (in this case, the poetry of T. Moore) 
for focusing on the senses and ignoring the imagination: 
... modern poetry in its retrograde 
progress comes at last to be constructed 
on the principles of the modern OPERA, 
where an attempt is made to gratify 
every sense at every instant .... it 
seduces the taste and enervates the 
imagination. It creates a false standard of 
reference, and inverts or decompounds 
the natural order of association, in which 
objects strike the thoughts and feelings. (XI, 170) 
In another essay Hazlitt again raises the subject of the 
opera and suggests that although the music may overpower 
us, it does not raise us to the ideal but rather returns 
us to nature. (XII, 336) Both opera and ballet, he says, 
do not "'come home to the bosoms and businesses of men' in 
the same manner that a Tragedy or Comedy does. "' 
Hazlitt complained that the "exclusive and new 
species of the drama" in the form of the pantomime at 
the London theatres also fell far short of the ideal. 
He said that it was "more wonderful than satisfactory" 
1H Works, XII, 337. Hazlitt is quoting from 
Bacon. 
235 
and had "stifling sensation about it"; he said that it was 
"like tragedy obtruncated and thrown on the ground, 
gasping for utterance and struggling for breath. " (XII, 337) 
Hazlitt suggested that much of the reason opera, ballet 
and pantomime failed in the ideal was that only poetry 
and words could hope to convey the highest objects of 
the human mind. Hazlitt criticised the domestic tragedy 
of his time because it, too, lacked sufficient poetry: 
" "The domestic or prose tragedy which is thought to be 
the most natural, is ... the least so, because it 
appeals almost exclusively to one of these faculties, 
our sensibility. " '(V, 6) 
Two questions arise concerning Hazlitt's 
understanding of the faculty of imagination: firstly, 
how did he understand its-function specifically in the 
context of art? Secondly, how may the referential 
quality he saw in imagination in art be understood? 
The first question is addressed in his discussion of 
dramatic mimesis at the beginning of his remarks on 
Othello in Characters of Shakespear's Plays. There, 
imagination is discussed in relation to sympathy and 
in contrast to understanding. Tragedy arouses our 
sympathy; "... it substitutes imaginary sympathy for 
mere selfishness. It gives us a high and permanent 
interest, beyond ourselves, in humanity as such. " (IV, 200) 
Tragedy heightens our awareness: 
It excites our sensibility by exhibiting the 
passions wound up to the utmost pitch by the 
power of imagination or the temptation of 
circumstances; and corrects their'fatal 
excesses in ourselves by pointing to the 
greater extent of sufferings and of crimes 
to which they have led others. (IV, 200) 
"The habitual study of poetry and works, of imagination, " 
says Hazlitt, is in contrast to the study of science and 
the faculty of understanding: 
Science alone is hard and mechanical. It 
exercises the understanding upon things out 
of ourselves, while it leaves the affections 
unemployed, or engrossed with our own 
immediate, narrow interests. (IV, 200) 
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The contrasts between imagination and understand- 
ing are further developed in Hazlitt's discussion of 
Coriolanus in the same volume.. His description of 
imagination here seems to echo Lamb's thought about 
imagination drawing "all things to one" and making all 
things "take one colour, and serve to one effect. " 
Imagination is said by Hazlitt to make an immediate impress- 
ion on the mind by building up and uniting impressions: 
The imagination is an exaggerating and exclusive_ 
faculty: it takes from one thing to add to 
another: it accumulates circumstances together 
to give the greatest possible effect to a 
favourite object. The understanding is a 
dividing and measuring faculty: it judges of 
things not according to their immediate 
impression on the mind, but according to 
their relations to one another. (IV, 214) 
Hazlitt further develops the idea of imagination as an 
exaggerating faculty, one which works with extremes in 
order to heighten contrasts and effect: 
The one [i. e. imagination] is a monopolising 
faculty, which seeks the greatest quantity 
of present excitement by inequality and dis- 
proportion: the other [understanding] is a 
distributive faculty, which seeks the greatest 
quantity of ultimate good, by justice and pro- 
portion. The one is an aristocratical, the 
other a republican faculty. The principle of 
poetry is an anti-levelling principle. It aims 
at effect, exists by contrast. It admits of no 
medium. It is every thing by excess. (IV, 214) 
Hazlitt takes these ideas and applies them directly 
in his interpretation of Coriolanus. He sees Coriolanus 
as a character who appeals to the imagination and he sees 
the Roman crowd as appealing to the understanding. Our 
interest in Coriolanus and our sympathy for his feelings 
conquer our concern for the plight of the Roman citizens. 
Our thoughts concerning the citizens are democratic and 
republican, but as they are the product of the understanding, 
they are no match for the imaginative excitement provided by 
Coriolanus. (See: IV, 214-217) The contradiction between 
imagination here and the "democratic imagination" of 
Hazlitt is more apparent than real. Hazlitt always main- 
tained that the immediate act:. on of imagination was to 
magnify bad as well as good, but the overall result was 
"democratic". This result is illustrated in the moral 
Hazlitt finds in the whole play, that "those whc have little 
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shall have less, and that those who have much shall 
take all that the others have left; " a moral which 
he says depicts both the history and the tragedy of 
mankind. (IV, 216) 
Hazlitt's ideas find further application in 
Macbeth, a play in which imagination creates extremes 
which are not normally found in daily, life. It creates 
a world characterised not only by the strange and 
unusual, but also by the range of its extremes and the 
tensions which exist in its midst. Hazlitt talks 
about this imaginative world as it is found in the play, 
which he says shows more systematic contrast than any 
other Shakespearean play; it "moves on the verge of an 
abyss, and is a constant struggle between life and 
death: " (IV, 191) 
The action is desperate and the reaction 
is dreadful. It is a huddling together 
of fierce extremes, a war of opposite 
natures which of them shall destroy the 
other [sic]. There is nothing but what 
has a violent end or violent beginnings. 
The lights and shades are laid on with a 
determined hand; the transitions from 
triumph to despair, from the height of 
terror to the repose of death, are sudden 
and startling; every passion brings in its 
fellow-contrary, and the thoughts pitch 
and jostle against each other as in the 
dark. The whole play is an unruly chaos 
of strange and forbidden things, where the 
ground rocks under our feet. Shakespear's 
genius here took its full swing, and trod 
upon the farthest bounds of nature and 
passion. (IV, 191) 
Hazlitt gives a series of examples of the extremes found 
in the world of Macbeth, including Lady Macbeth's speech 
"'Had he not resembled my father as he slept, I had 
done't "' as an illustration of "murder and filial piety 
together". (IV, 191) The description of the glitches 
is also "full of the same contradictory principle ... 
they are neither of the earth nor the air, but both". 
(IV, 191). 
A feature of the imagination, as Hazlitt sees 
it, is. that its images are not tied, tok losely to the ° 
things they represent. As in Coleridge s understanding 
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about the language of transcendental philosopherp, 
Hazlitt makes a distinction between symbol and thought. 
He suggests that in Shakespeare factual reality is not 
stressed, and this is in contrast to what is found in 
Chaucer: 
Every thing in Chaucer has a downright reality. 
A similie or a sentiment is as if it were 
given upon evidence. In Shakespear the 
commonest matter-of-fact has a romantic 
grace about it; or seems to float with the 
breath of imagination in a freer element. (IV, 226) 
One practical illustration of this remark may 
be found in Hazlitt's comment on Antony's speech, 
"Sometime we see a cloud that's dragonish, /A vapour 
sometime, like a bear, or lion ... " at the beginning 
of Act IV, xvi of Antony and Cleopatra: 
This is, without doubt, one of the finest 
pieces of poetry in Shakespear. This 
splendour of the imagery, the semblance 
" of reality, the lofty range of picturesque 
objects hanging over the world, their 
evanescent nature, the total uncertainty 
of what is left behind, are just like the 
mouldering schemes of human greatness. It 
is finer than Cleopatra's passionate 
lamentation over his fallen grandeur, because 
it is more dim, unstable, unsubstantial. (IV, 231) 
The "dim, unstable, and unsubstantial" images of 
imagination which resemble reality and yet point beyond 
themselves were a characteristic of modern rather than 
ancient times, Hazlitt thought. In an article on 
Schlegel he argued that both history and religion had 
enlarged "the bounds of imagination" by encouraging 
contemplation on objects in the distant past and future 
and making the mind accustomed to taking an "interest in 
the obscure and shadowy". (XVI, 66) In Heathen 
mythology, he said, the emphasis was always on form; 
whereas in Christian mythology, with the mystery surround- 
ing the doctrines, "the Infinite is everywhere before 
us, whether we turn to reflect on what is revealed to us 
of the-Divine nature or our own. " (XVI, 66) In Christian 
mythology, Hazlitt says, going on to misquote Milton's 
Paradise Lost, "The imagination alone'broods over the 
immense abyss, and makes it pregnant'. " Briefly then, for 
239 
Hazlitt the imagination functions in relation to art 
by arousing sympathy, by uniting images and exaggerating 
effect, and by employing images symbolically. 
The second of the two questions posed above 
concerns the 'reference' of imagination in Hazlitt's 
understanding. To what does imagination refer if it is 
not immediately concerned with factual truth and if the 
meaning of its images always lies beyond the images 
themselves? One might even ask whether imagination does 
in fact concern itself with reality. It is this question 
which Hazlitt seems indirectly to be toying with in the 
following comment: 
Hamlet is a name; his speeches and sayings but 
the idle coinage of the poet's brain. What 
then, are they not real? They are as real 
as our own thoughts. Their reality is in 
the reader's mind. It is we who are Hamlet. 
` (IV, 232) 
The reality of Hamlet, Hazlitt believed, was to be 
found in the. minds of the readers of the play. The truth 
of-Shakespeare's characters was to be recognised when 
the reader (or viewer) became personally involved in 
the play. 
A similar comment is made concerning Macbeth. 
The violent and dreadful contrast of extremes which 
Hazlitt noted in the play did not reduce the realism 
of the play, he believed. Its reality again existed 
in the mind of the viewer: 
The castle of Macbeth ... has a real 
subsistence in the mind; the Weird Sisters 
meet us in person on 'the blasted heath'; 
the 'air-drawn dagger' moves slowly before 
our eyes; the 'gracious Duncan', the 
'blood-boultered Banquo' stand before us; 
all that passed through the mind of Macbeth 
passes, without the loss of a tittle, 
through ours. All ... are brought before 
us with the same absolute truth and vivid- 
ness. (IV, 186-187) 
Hazlitt wrote in 1821 that both the witches of Macbeth 
and Milton's Satan were artificial in one sense only. 
From a poetic point of view they were highly natural. 
As long as man supposes these creatures to exist, and 
attributes to them unknown powers, they are "more able 
to startle and confound his imagination" than either 
natural or artificial objects. (XIX, 82) The lack of 
fac. tual or objective reality in the workings of imagin- 
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ation clearly does not imply an absence of reality for 
Hazlitt. The reference of imagination is to an internal, 
subjective or emotional reality, and its truth must be 
recognised by each person meditating on his or her own 
response. 
The relative truth of imagination. was again the 
subject of Hazlitt's remarks in the course of his 
review of Schlegel in 1816. He maintained that if the 
"language of imagination" was false "in point of fact", 
it was actually more true to nature since it "conveys 
the impression which the object under the influence of 
passion makes on the mind. " (XVI, 63) In the "Preface" 
to Characters of Shakespear's Plays the superior truth 
of imagination is again stressed in discussing 
Perdita's lines: 
------ 'Daffodils 
That come before the swallow dares, and take 
The winds of March. with beauty; violets dim, 
But sweeter than the lids of Juno's eyes, 
Or Cytherea's breath. '---- 
(The Winter's Tale, IV, 
iv, 118-12 
Hazlitt quips that "the ordinary routine of [Johnson's] 
imagination" (IV, 176) would never have appreciated 
these lines. In what he goes on to say, one is 
reminded of Hazlitt's own appreciation of "dim, 
unstable, and unsubstantial" images: 
To a mere literal and formal apprehension, 
the inimitably characteristic epithet, 
'violets dim, ' must seem to imply a defect, 
rather than a beauty; and to any one, not 
feeling the full force of that epithet, 
" which suggests an image like 'the sleepy 
eye of love', the allusion to 'the lids of 
Juno's eyes' must appear extravagant and 
unmeaning. Shakespear's fancy lent words 
and images to the most refined sensibility 
to nature, struggling for expression: his 
descriptions are identical with the things 
themselves, seen through the fine medium 
of passion: strip them of that connection, 
and try them by ordinary conception: and 
ordinary rules, and they are as grotesque 
and barbarous as you please! (IV, 177) 
Hazlitt's identification of Shakespeare's descriptions 
with reality when viewed through the "fine medium of 
passion" is-significant. Hazlitt protests that 
-'- Shakespeare cannot be tried by "ordinary conceptions and 
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ordinary rules", (IV, 177) as he felt Dr Johnson tried 
to do in arguing that Shakespeare's faults were as great 
as his beauties. Such an approach would determine that 
Shakespeare was excellent only when his art conformed to 
the rules and Shakespeare's art would be at fault when 
the rules were violated, Hazlitt said. Instead, Hazlitt 
argued, Shakespeare must be approached with a'proper 
understanding of the powers of imagination. Shakespeare's 
imagination violated the laws of physical nature, but 
only in order to conform more closely to the way in 
which physical nature is perceived by the individual, 
particularly as that individual is affected by moods 
and feelings with regard to the objects he is viewing. 
It is this idea which is suggested elsewhere when Hazlitt. 
calls Shakespeare "a half-worker with nature". (XII, 343) 
There are many instances in which Hazlitt praises 
Shakespeare's imagination: for depicting nature more 
accurately than would be achieved by the representation 
of strict facts. One instance is his praise for the 
settings of both As You Like It (the forest of Arden) 
and Cymbeline (the mountain scenes). In both he main- 
tains that Shakespeare has mirrored the minds of his 
characters by his descriptions of the settings in 
which they are found: 
... how different the contemplative quiet 
of the one [Arden] from the enterprising 
boldness and precarious mode of subsistence 
in the other! Shakespear not only lets us 
into the minds of his characters, but gives 
a tone and colour to the scenes he describes 
from the feelings of their supposed 
inhabitants. He at the same time preserves 
the utmost propriety of action and passion, 
and gives all their local accompaniments. 
If he was equal to the greatest things, he 
was not above an attention to the smallest. 
Thus the gallant sportsmen in CYMBELINE have 
to encounter the abrupt declivities of hill 
and valley: Touchstone and Audrey jog along 
a level path. The deer in CYMBELINE are only 
regarded as objects of prey, 'The game's 
a-foot, ' etc. - with Jacques they are fine 
objects to moralise upon at leisure, 'under 
the shade of melancholy boughs. ' (IV, 185) 
a 
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The inverse may also be true when imagination is acting: 
the setting may shape the characters. The wild, earthy 
setting in which Caliban grew is reflected in his character: 
Shakespear has described the brutal mind of 
Caliban in contact with the pure and original 
forms of nature; the character grows out of 
the soil where it is rooted, uncontrouled, 
uncouth and wild, uncramped by any of the 
meannesses of custom. It is 'of the earth, 
earthy. ' It seems almost to have been dug 
out of the ground, with a soul, instinctively 
superadded to it answering to its wants and 
origin. (IV, 239) 
Earlier Hazlitt had claimed that Caliban was "one of the 
wildest and most abstracted of all Shakespear's 
characters" and that he displayed great "truth of the 
imagination". (IV, 239) 
Related comments are made about the minds of 
other Shakespearean characters. The power and splendour 
in Shakespeare's characters, Hazlitt says, is: 
.. 0 that of genius darting out its forked flame on whatever comes in its way, and 
kindling and melting it in the furnace of 
affection, whether it be flax or iron. The 
colouring, the form, the motion, the 
combination of objects depend on the pre- 
disposition of the mind, moulding nature to 
its own purposes; in Sir Walter [Scott] the 
mind [of the character] is as wax to 
circumstances, and owns no other impress. (XII, 313) 
The minds of Shakespeare's characters are molded by. the 
circumstances of the characters and the passions that 
they feel. 
Hazlitt uses the descriptions that they give of 
their own situations or their interpretations of events 
around them as useful tools with which to understand 
their psychological makeup. For example, liazlitt 
discusses Act III, iv, of King Lear, where Lear refuses 
to believe that Poor Tom has no\ daughters ("Death, 
traitor! Nothing could have subdu'd nature/ To such 
a lowness but his unkind daughters. " III, iv, 69-70). 
Lear's comment is absurd, says Hazlitt, but yet it 
has truth: 
It is the mere natural ebullition of 
passion, urged nearly to madness, and 
that will admit no other cause of dire., 
misfortune but its own, which swallows. 
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up all other griefs. The force of 
despair hurries the imagination over the 
boundary of fact and common sense, and 
renders the transition sublime; but there 
is no precedent or authority for it, 
except in the general nature of the human 
mind. (XII, 343) 
There is truth also in both Lear (II, iv, 189-192) and 
Othello (III, iii, 460) when they call to the heavens. 
Hazlitt uses Lear and Othello to illustrate his idea that 
imagination seizes symbols in nature which give an 
adequate reflection of the inner reality of the mind. 
... Lear calls on the Heavens to take 
his 
part, for 'they are old like him. ' Here 
there is nothing to prop up the image but' 
the strength. of passion .... This finding 
out a parallel between the most unlike 
objects, is because the individual would 
wish to find one to support the sense of 
his own misery and helplessness .... 
(XII, 342) 
Concerning Othello Hazlitt says: 
So when Othello swears 'By yon 
marble heaven, ' the epithet is 
suggested by the hardness of his heart 
from the sense of injury: the texture of 
the outward object is borrowed from that 
of the thoughts: and that noble simile, 
'Like the Propontic, ' &c. seems only an 
echo of the sounding tide of passion, 
and to roll from the same source, the 
heart. (XII, 344) 
For Hazlitt, the images of imagination are not directly 
tied to what they represent. It is this insight which 
leads him to look for a correspondence between the 
words of a character and that character's psychological 
state. 
Hazlitt sees no problem in mixing what he calls 
"the world of reality" and "the world of imagination", 
which has its own kind of truth. This might take place 
in every Shakespearean play, but The Tempest is an obvious 
choice to consider: 
[Shakespear's] ideal beings are as true and 
natural as his real characters; that is, as 
consistent with themselves, or if we suppose 
such beings to exist at all, they could not 
act, or feel otherwise than as he makes them. 
... The human and imaginary characters, the dramatic and the grotesque, are blended 
together with the greatest art, and without 
any appearance of it.... As the preter- 
natural part [of The Sem e t] has the air 
of. reality, and almost haunts the imagination 
with a sense of truth, the real characters 
and events partake of the wildness of a dream. . 
(IV, 238) 
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Hazlitt praises the local scenery of Prospero's island 
for having "the effect of the landscape background of 
some fine picture. " (IV, 239) Yet even in the 
transition from the outside world to the dream-like 
quality of the island, there is a certain consistency. 
For instance, the drunken sailors who were "at the mercy 
of the winds and waves" at sea, seem on shore "as much 
at the mercy of chance as they were before". (IV, 239),: 
Hazlitt suggests in an article from the "Round 
Table" in August, 1815, that the bringing together of 
two different worlds in the same work of art is itself 
a feature of imagination. He defends Milton for mixing 
Christian 'truths and heathen mythology in the same 
passage by saying that, "To the understanding, the belief 
of the one is incompatible with that of the other; but 
in the imagination, they not. only may, but do constantly 
co-exist. " (IV, 34) Moreover, Hazlitt maintains that 
, even orthodox 
Christians have a belief in the "personages 
of the Heathen mythology" insofar as they "convey a 
positive identity beyond the mere name .... It is only 
by an effort of abstraction that we divest ourselves of 
the idea of their reality; all our involuntary prejudices 
are on their side .... They impose on the imagination 
by all the attractions of beauty and grandeur. " (IV, 34) 
Hazlitt's comments above concerning imagination 
and reality in art dealt primarily with art as it is 
written or read, not as it is seen on the stage. Concern- 
ing stage art, Hazlitt's ideas were quite different. 
The reality of the stage house had no business intruding 
upon a play. The imaginative world of the play could be 
damaged by presentation on stage. As Hazlitt said 
concerning Midsummer Night's Dream, "Poetry and 
the stage do not agree well together". (IV, 247) The 
stage, he says, tends to make everything exist in the 
foreground, and leaves no room for the ideal. Hazlitt 
is talking in particular about the problems of represent- 
ing supernatural events on stage; he speaks of "an airy 
shape, a dream, a passing thought, " immediately becoming 
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on stage "an unmanageable reality". (IV, 247) The 
problem, he points out, is that the imagination cannot 
over-ride the senses; "Any offence given to the eye is 
not to be got rid of by explanation". (IV, 248) 
Hazlitt had described this kind of problem earlier in 
Characters of Shakespear's Plays and elsewhere as well. 
He had said of Caliban that "It is not indeed pleasant 
to-see this character on the stage any more than it is 
to see the god Pan personated there. " (IV, 239) He , 
spoke of Macbeth's witches being "nearly exploded on the 
stage. Their broomsticks are left; their metaphysics 
are gone .... " 
(XII, 343) He was bothered by the 
visible entry of the ghosts through the trap-doors in 
Richard III. (V, 184) Concerning: Midsummer Night's 
Dream, Hazlitt, expressed his disappointment that the 
"fantastic illusion" of Bottom's head in the play had 
sunk to "an ass's head, and nothing more" on stage; that 
an attempt had been made "to personate Wall or Moonshine"; 
that fairies in reading the play are not incredible but 
that "fairies six feet high are so"; and that what are 
meant to be shocking monsters are not so at the theatre. 
(IV, 248) 
iii 
Hazlitt has often been criticised in the 
past for the subjective nature of his criticism; 
Herschel Baker claimed that "Hazlitt's attitude toward 
Shakespeare is essentially emotion, and his emotion is 
the gauge by which he tests the plays. "' The remark 
is not unjustified, for in Hazlitt's writing there is 
a good deal that is claimed for Shakespeare that is 
not, always carefully documented or supported by 
argument. His own enthusiasm is often apparent. Hazlitt's 
1 William Hazlitt, 307. 
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approach places a strong emphasis on intuition. As 
Hazlitt says of the imagination: "The imagination is 
an associating principle; and has an instinctive 
perception when a thing belongs to a system, or is only 
an exception to it. " (XII, 51) However, the fact that 
there is this instinctive factor need not necessarily be 
seen as negative. Rarely is Hazlitt's response to 
Shakespeare simply instinctive or intuitional. His 
emotional responses are seldom without the kind of 
rational justification which comes from a theory of 
imagination that recognises a certain 'logic' in the 
operation of man's passions. Often, when: Hazlitt may 
seem to be rhapsodic in his praise of Shakespeare, there 
are underlying threads in his thought which lead back 
to his general understanding about the principles of 
imagination. In a moment we shall look to some specific 
comments for support of this view. 
An additional dimension of the problem may have 
been either overlooked or underestimated in the past. 
Much of Hazlitt's reason for expressing his own emotion 
in his writing is out of' his concern for his reader. 
Hazlitt wants the points he makes not only to be under- 
stood and digested, but he also wants to share with his 
reader something of his own feeling for what he is 
discussing. Just as the truth of a Shakespearean play is 
recognised only in individual reflection and meditation 
on one's own emotional reactions, in Hazlitt's thought, 
the truth of critical comments may similarly depend in part 
on the emotional reaction of the reader to the critic. 
This is an area of Hazlitt study which will require more 
research in the future, but it seems appropriate here to 
mention some examples which suggest that Hazlitt's concern 
in his writing was to appeal to the imagination of his 
S readerf and thus to convince them that imagination was 
the only faculty which could judge not only the value of 
the work, but the value of the critic's comments on that 
work as well. 
Some examples have'already been given of the 
images, Hazlitt chose to illustrate imagination and to 
convey-his own emotional reactions. The focus here is 
primarily on images Hazlitt himself. used, -rather than 
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images from Shakespeare which Hazlitt discusses. 
Consider the image he chose to convey his feelings 
concerning Garrick's alteration of Romeo and Juliet for 
the stage: he compared the play to a spreading rose tree 
which had been trimmed by a gardener and lost some of 
its finest flowers, but "the crimson dyes still sparkle 
on its bosom, and its fragrance scents the air". (IX, 
81) 
Hazlitt could have omitted the image from his discussion 
. for the fact of 
his appreciation of the altered version 
had been conveyed already. He seemed to want to provide 
however, a more poetic statement, not unlike what he had 
said about the "commonest matter-of-fact" in Shakespeare 
having about it a "romantic grace" and a. lightness as if 
floating "on the breath of imagination". 
Hazlitt's favourite, images for discussing 
imagination seem to be images of water. He contrasts 
Shakespeare's genius with that of Sir Walter Scott: 
"[Shakespear's] genius is like the Nile overflowing and 
enriching its banks; that of Sir Walter is like a mountain- 
stream rendered interesting by the picturesqueness of the 
surrounding scenery. " (XII, 344) In a discussion of the 
difference between the language of poetry and prose while 
reviewing Biographia Literaria, Hazlitt uses images of 
the sea and of flight to describe imagination. Poetry 
was invented, he says, to correct the lack of "natural 
harmony in the ordinary combinations of significant 
sounds" (XVI,. 136); poetry is intended, 
... to supply this inherent defect 
in the 
mechanism of language - to make the sound 
an echo to the sense, when the sense becomes 
a sort of echo to itself - to mingle the 
tide of verse, 'the golden cadences of 
poesy, ' with the tide of feeling, flowing, 
and murmuring as it flows - or to take the 
imagination off its feet, and spread its 
wings where it may indulge its own impulses, 
without being stopped or perplexed by the 
ordinary abruptnesses, or discordant flats 
and sharps of prose .... 
(XVI, 136) 
The image of the sea is again used to describe what 
Hazlitt calls the most passionate scenes in Romeo and 
Juliet. He means the scenes in which Romeo, the Nurse 
and Juliet each hear of Romeo's banishment, the scene 
in which Juliet hears of Tybali's death, and the last 
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tomb scene: 
In all of these it is not merely the force 
of any one passion that is given, but the 
slightest and most unlooked-for transitions 
from one to another, the mingling currents 
of every different feeling rising up and 
prevailing in turn, swayed by the master- 
mind of the poet, as the waves undulate 
beneath the gliding storm. (IV, 255) 
Hazlitt used the image of water to discuss the 
minds of each of what he considered were Shakespeare's 
four major tragic figures. In one place Hazlitt 
considers Othello in terms of a river; "The passion 
in Othello pours along, so to speak, like a river, 
torments itself in restless eddies, or is hurled from 
its dizzy height, like a sounding cataract. " (XVIII, 332) 
The river image is employed again in Characters of 
Sha. kespear's Plays. Hazlitt mentions Othello's passion 
moving up "through rapid but gradual transitions" to the 
extremes of rage and despair and of these emotions at 
last blending "in that noble tide of deep and sustained 
passion, impetuous but majestic, that 'flows on to the 
Propontic, and knows no ebb"'. (IV, 201-202) Hazlitt 
might prefer the river image because of the gradual 
movement and development it suggests, but'in one place, 
when reviewing Macready's Othello for The Examiner in 1816, 
the sea image is used for Othello: 
The movements of passion in Othello (and 
the motions of the body show answer to 
those of the mind) resemble the heaving of 
the sea in a storm; there are no sharp, 
slight, ' angular transitions, or if there 
are any, they are subject to this general 
swell and commotion. " (V, 339) 
Even here, however, the gradual movement is stressed. 
Hazlitt contrasted the river image he used for 
Othello with the sea image he felt appropriate for Lear. 
The passion in Lear, he said, "is more like a sea, 
swelling, chafing, raging, without bound. " (XVIII, 332) 
Hazlitt continues on immediately and mixes his metaphors 
for now Lear is like a ship on the sea: "... without 
hope, without beacon, or anchor. Torn from the hold of 
his affections and-fixed purposes, he floats a mighty 
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wreck in the wide world of sorrows. ', (XVIII, 332) 
In Characters of Shakespear's Plays the "rapid, irregular 
starts of imagination" in Lear are again compared to a 
ship, and also to a rock and a promontory: 
The mind of Lear, staggering between the 
weight of attachment and the hurried move- 
ments of passion, is like a tall ship 
driven about by the winds, buffetted by 
the furious waves, but that still rides 
above the storm, having its anchor fixed 
in the bottom of the sea; or it is like 
the sharp rock circled by the eddying 
whirlpool that foams and beats against it, 
or like the solid promontory pushed from 
its basis by the force of an earthquake. 
(Iv, 258) 
Hazlitt had said that the chief interest in 
Othello was not from "the doubtful conflict between contrary 
passions" which, he said, "continues only for a short 
time. " (IV, 201) In Macbeth, contrastingly, "there is 
a violent struggle between opposite feelings, between 
ambition and the stings of conscience, almost from: first 
to last". (IV, 201) Macbeth is seen by Hazlitt to be 
like a drifting ship: "Macbeth himself appears driven 
along by the violence of his fate like a vessel drifting 
before a storm". (IV, 187) The minds of both Macbeth 
and Hamlet suggest the sea to Hazlitt, thought he sees 
Macbeth's as the more violent of the two. The "agitation 
of [Macbeth's] mind", he says, "resembles the rolling of 
the sea in a storm; or he is like a lion in the toils; 
fierce, impetuous, and ungovernable. " (V, 206-7) 
Hazlitt criticised Kemble's acting of Hamlet and says 
that he: 
unavoidably failed from a want of flexibility, 
of that quick sensibility which yields to 
every motive, and is borne away with every 
breath of fancy; which is distracted in the 
multiplicity of its reflections, and lost in 
the uncertainty of its resolutions. There is 
a perpetual undulation of feeling in the 
character of Hamlet; but in Mr Kemble's act- 
ing, 'there was neither variableness nor 
shadow of turning'. (V, 377) 
Elsewhere Hazlitt comments that "The character of Hamlet 
is made up of undulating lines; it has the yielding 
flexibility of 'a wave o' th' sea"'., (IV, 237) 
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Hazlitt used the sea image in his evaluation of 
actors, as he did concerning Kemble above. He criticised 
Dowton's performance of Shylock at Drury Lane, 5 October, 
1815. He said that Dowton gave only the "prosaic" side 
of the character and lacked the "poetical" which "is 
the essence of tragic acting. " (V, 250) Dowton's 
Shylock failed in part from "the want of that movement 
and tide of passion, which overcomes every external 
disadvantage, and bears down every thing in its course. " 
(V, 250) Kean was deficient in his performance of 
Macbeth on November 5,1815, and had not captured the 
motions of the shifting sea in Macbeth's mind. The 
fifth act in particular was faulty: the text had been 
given inaccurately, the pauses were too long, there was 
little continuity, and all of the turbulence was lost - 
there was not "that giddy whirl of the imagination". 
(V, 207) Kean's movements were "too agile and mercur- 
ial". (V, 207) One year later, curiously, in November 
of 1815, Hazlitt used Kean as a model of tragic acting: 
[The] truth of nature and passion in Mr Kean's 
acting carries every thing before it. He was 
the only person on the stage who seemed alive 
.... Nothing can withstand the real tide of 
passion once let loose; and yet it is pretend- 
ed [by some actors], that the great art of the 
tragic actor is in damming it up, or cutting 
out smooth canals and. circular bastQns for it t, 
to flow into, so that it may do no harm in 
its course. It is the giving way to natural 
and strong impulses of the imagination that 
floats Mr. Kean down the stream of public 
favour.... (XVIII, 205) 
There are three water images in-this passage: 
Kean as an in-rushing tide, other actors as mechanical 
diverters of the natural flow of water, and the more 
mundane image of the "stream of-public favour". (Iiazlitt 
might have wanted any image he. gave to the public to be 
mundane, considering his generally low opinion of theatre- 
goers. ) The second of these images was particularly 1 
appropriate in a country which, in the previous fifty years 
1 i. e. from the time of the building of the highly 
profitable canal linking Manchester and the Mersey River 
in the early 1760's by the Duke of Bridgewater. See R. K. 
Webb, The History of Modern England, London 1969,101-102. 
251 
had seen its transportation system revolutionized 
by the building of canal systems. The channelling 
image was a favourite of Hazlitt's and he frequently 
used it, with some variation, to illustrate the opposite 
of imagination. The most common had to do with plumbing 
and cisterns. Rene Wellek has cited several instances 
in which the image is used, thus it is not necessary to 
*$o into great detail here. 
' But one instance of its 
use which he did not cite and which is fairly represent-.. 
ative of the examples he gives is Hazlitt's description 
of Kemble in King John. Kemble had the correct shape and 
form, Hazlitt said, but he lacked the emotions to carry 
the part beyond the surface actions of the play: 
The varying tide of passion did not 
appear to burst from the source of 
nature in his breast, but to be drawn 
from a theatrical leaden cistern, and 
then directed through certain conduilt 
pipes and artificial channels, to fill 
the audience with well regulated and 
harmless sympathy. (V, 346). 
Hazlitt remembered Kemble's acting in terms much 
closer to the referential and the ideal after Kemble's 
death, for in 1825 he spoke of Kemble's "manly sense 
and plaintive tones, that were an echo to deep-fraught 
sense. " (XII, 301) 
One might ask why Hazlitt was as fond as he was 
of water images? The first reason we might give is 
psychological. There are a number of different images 
which can be found in the movements of water to suggest 
various moods and feelings; images of eddies, whirlpools, 
streams, meandering rivers, torrential rivers, waterfalls, 
gently rolling seas, crashing seas in a storm, the ebbing 
and waning of tides, and the rush of tidal waters are all 
found in Hazlitt's critical descriptions, usually in 
reference to the activities of imagination. The sea, or 
water in general, is also the source of many metaphors 
in his language, particularly with regard to general 
psychology, (i. e. phrases like we use: 'surface of thought' 
1 See: A History of Modern Criticism: The. 
Romantic, Age, 196- . 
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or 'depth of the emotions'). Note Hazlitt's vocabulary 
in the following comment on Othello: 
Not only is the tumult of passion in 
Othello's mind heaved up from the very 
bottom of the soul, but every [sic j 
the s fightest undulation of feeling is 
seen on the surface, as it arises from 
the impulses-of imagination or the 
malicious suggestions of Iago. (Underlining m5 
own. IV, 202 
Secondly, water images, particularly those 
associated with the sea, suggest unlimited power and 
strength. They suggest mystery, for while the surface 
may be known, all that remains beneath the surface is 
unseen and hidden; this is highly, appropriate for 
Hazlitt since imagination in his view never points simply 
to the obvious appearance of things. It is never content 
simply with form but always refers to something beyond 
form. 
Lastly, water images would have been a natural 
choice for Hazlitt because water is associated with 
fertility and creativity (like the image of the Nile 
applied to Shakespeare), and rivers and seas suggest 
an ability both to assist'life and to destroy it. The 
mixture of opposites, especially of life and death, 
are what Hazlitt relished in the powers of imagination. 
Water as a fluid mass is suggestive of the 
imagination for Hazlitt. Imagination moves and is 
unstable, yet it has unity in its movement. There is a 
freedom of movement in Hazlitt's understanding of 
imagination, which is one reason why the image of canals 
or conduits and pipes, which Hazlitt uses in connection 
with some actors and writers, is most appropriate to 
suggest the opposite of imagination. The opposite is 
controlled, artificial, mechanical and forced. 
All of Hazlitt's water images are used to a 
certain degree for poetic effect. Often they are used 
to provide a visual illustration of something Hazlitt has 
already said in more matter-of-fact language. But they 
usually have a power of their own, and it should not be 
overlooked that Hazlitt is.. probably using these images 
above and beyond their illustrative value as a 'kind of 
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emotional appeal to his reader. It is a way for 
Hazlitt both to suggest his own emotions concerning 
what he is writing, and to appeal to the same emotions 
in his readers. 
Hazlitt uses other images in his writing as well. 
For instance he uses an image of the cords of the heart 
or mind, as Hunt had done when he said that the cords 
of Ophelia's mind "are tangled not snapped". Hazlitt 
speaks at one point of "The fine network of the mind 
itself, the cords that bind and hold our scattered 
perceptions together, and form the means of communication 
between them ... " 
(II, 1.56) In discussing Lear, Coleridge 
speaks of the image of the abyss over which imagination 
peers, which was encountered earlier in this chapter: 
[The character of Lear is] sustained, 
reared to a majestic height out of the 
yawning abyss, by the force of the 
affections, the imagination, and the 
cords of the human heart - it stands a 
proud monument, in the gap of nature, 
over barbarous cruelty and filial 
ingratitude. (XVIII, 332) 
Hazlitt uses the image of cords in connection with Hamlet 
as well: "Hamlet is not a person whose nativity is cast, 
or whose death is foretold by portents: he weaves the 
web of his destiny out of his own thoughts ... " 
(XII, 344) 
One of the most beautiful images Hazlitt uses 
in his writing is in connection with the character of 
Viola in Twelfth Night. First he discusses the interests 
which the other characters in the play arouse, interests 
like friendship, patronage, understanding, kindness and 
sympathy. But with Viola, he says, "there is something 
that excites in us a stronger feeling tha\ all this", 'fv 
and he seems to be implying imagination. 
(IV, 315) 
He points to her speech, "She lot concealment, like a 
worm i' the bud, /Feed on her damask cheek". (ActIII, 
iv, 110ff). The poetic effect he praises arises from 
Viola's words functioning on two levels by referring 
beyond themselves and giving echo to the depth of her 
concealed feeling of love for the duke. To describe the 
effect of. Shakespeare's' ima gination in these lines,, 
.. 
Hazl. itt-uses, an image Coleridge had used in '. 'The Eolian' 
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Harp" to describe imagination - the image of a harp 
being played by the wind: 
How long ago it is since we first learnt 
to repeat them [Viola's words]; and still, 
still they vibrate on the heart, like the 
sounds which the passing wind draws from 
the trembling strings of a harp left on 
some desert shore! (IV, 315) 
Hazlitt's comment on Viola has further interest 
because he recognises that the referential quality of 
Viola's words which interested him, was not what other 
critics before him had often praised about the speech: 
Hazlitt made it clear that he was not speaking about 
"the image of Patience on a monument, which has been 
generally quoted, but [about] the lines before and 
after it. " (IV, 315) Indeed, the image of Patience 
seems much more in line with eighteenth-century critical 
tastes and what Hazlitt would have called the picturesque 
or the classical, 'than with what Hazlitt saw as imagination. 
iv 
Hazlitt did not make as clear a division between 
comedy and tragedy on the basis of imagination as did 
both Hunt and Lamb. For instance, in Characters of 
Shakespear's Plays he praises the comedies and tragedies 
alike, without encountering the problems concerning 
comedy which Hunt met because of the rigidity of his 
approach to'conception'and 'imagination. 1 Hazlitt sees 
'imagination operating in the comedies, at least in so 
far as the comedies suggest universal aspects of experience, 
and are not concerned just with the individual. 
Nonetheless, Hazlitt expressed an obvious bias 
toward the tragedies, and this was related to his ideas 
on imagination. As Hazlitt said, "Much as we'like 
Shakespear's comedies, we cannot agree with Dr. Johnson 
that they are better than his tragedies; nor-do we like 
them half so well. " (IV, 3114. ) Elsewhere, Hazlitt had 
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said more boldly that Shakespeare "had an equal genius 
for comedy and tragedy; and his tragedies are better than 
his comedies, because tragedy is better than comedy. " 
(V, 56) W. P. Albrecht has explained Hazlitt's preference 
by saying that for Hazlitt comedy was less sympathetic, 
less orientated toward the identity of others, and there- 
fore was less moral. 
' Albrecht's point seems well-taken. 
The real distinction between comedy and tragedy in Hazlitt's 
thought is that comedy displays less imagination than 
tragedy. It has more appeal to the senses and hak less g 
appeal to the ideal. 
When Hazlitt evaluates actors, particularly 
tragic actors, it is their ability to use imagination 
which he is judging. Again Hazlitt is applying the 
distinction he first developed between sensory and ideal 
in 1805-07. As his description of the best actors 
indicates, he is looking for acting which goes beyond 
the mere sense of the words and captures the referential 
or ideal quality aimed at by the poet: 
... a great histrionic genius is one that 
approximates the effects of words, or of 
supposed situations on the mind, most 
nearly to the deep and vivid effect of 
real and inevitable ones. Joy produces 
tears: the violence of passion turns to 
childish weakness; but this could not be 
foreseen by study, nor taught by rules, 
nor mimicked by observation. Natural 
acting is therefore fine, because it 
implies and calls forth the most varied 
and strongest feelings that the supposed 
characters and circumstances can possibly 
give birth to: it reaches the height of 
the subject. (XII, 335) 
More specifically, however, Hazlitt connected the 
ideal in tragedy not just with the full potential of 
a character and the "height of the subject"; he connected 
the ideal with passions and their effect on the mind. 
In 1811 Hazlitt used Lamb's 1812 phrase to account 
for the difference between the acting of Mrs. Siddons and 
1 "Hazlitt's Preference for Tracedy", 104$. 
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Miss O'Neill. The difference, he said, was "in the 
expression of the internal workings of the mind. "' 
Miss O'Neill was great for characters of "pure natural 
interest" but it was the "lofty imagination" and command- 
ing intellect and passion of Mrs. SiddonZ which allowed 
her to express the inner mind and capture the ideal. 
Mrs, Siddons showed "that terrible reaction of mental 
power on the scene, which forms the perfection of 
tragedy. " Further suggestions of what Hazlitt saw 
as the ideal in acting or writing were given in the 
same review: 
It was those reaches of the soul, in 
which it looks down on its sufferings, 
in which it rises superior to nature and 
fortune, and gathers strength and grandeur 
from its despair, that gave such majesty 
and power to Mrs. Siddons' acting., ZXVIII, 196) 
In 1820 Hazlitt also criticized Miss O'Neill and 
Macready concerning the ideal in different reviews, and 
again, in pointing out their failures, Hazlitt indicates 
what he is looking for in acting. Of Miss O'Neill he 
says: 
There was nothing in her acting of a 
preternatural or ideal cast - that 
could lift the mind aabove morality .... 
(XVIII, 2$1f) 
and of Macready in Macbeth he says: 
Sensibility, not imagination, is his 
forte .... the ideal and preternatural 
ec on him only at a distance and 
mock his embraces.... He is more like 
a man debating the reality, or 
questioning the power of the grotesque 
and unimaginable forms that hover 
around him, than one hurried away by 
his credulous hopes, or shrinking 
from intolerable fear. (XVIII, 340 & 341) 
Hazlitt's approach to the ideal in the theatre 
is perhaps more precise than has been indicated generally. 
J. W. Donohue has suggested that for Lamb, Coleridge and 
Hazlitt, the ideal in the theatre was the "ideal 
production" in their minds, to which they continually 
1H Works-, XVIII, 196.. Lamb's phre was, 
... 
"the interna wor ings and movements of a great mind. " 
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compared the actual production on stage' There may 
be some truth in this general analysis, and perhaps 
Hunt could have been included as well, considering his 
comment about the need for the picture presented to the 
eye to correspond to the picture presented to the mind. 
But as has been emphasised, Lamb did not think in terms 
of an ideal production, and thought very little in 
terms of production at all. Even for Hazlitt (and also 
for Hunt), the ideal in the theatre was not a complete 
mental visualisation of the perfect performance, to which 
no actor could compare favourably. Hazlitt's ideal in a7v 
actor was found when the. acting captured not only the 
literal sense of the poet's words, but also gave an 
adequate suggestion of the emotion behind the words. 
This far more reasonable demand on the actor and his 
imagination perhaps may indicate the degree to which 
Hazlitt was sympathetic to the purposes of the theatre. 
Hazlitt's early Essay provided the theoretical 
groundwork for the important distinction in his 
criticism between sense-orientated art and ideal art. 
Morality, for Hazlitt, became an issue when one did not 
actively cultivate imagination, for without imagination, 
the natural tendency of the mind to move towards the good 
could not be set in motion, carrying an individual out 
of himself into the self of others. Hazlitt reacted 
against artists and art which addressed the senses and 
not the imagination. Art which appealed primarily to the 
senses could cultivate nothing but selfish interests. 
Art of this kind - and Hazlitt tended to see Wordsworth 
and Coleridge in this light - went against all of 
Hazlitt's notions of the democratic ideal, the same ideal 
as he had seen in the French Revolution and then later in 
the campaigns of Napoleon. 
2 
1 This theme is operating in numerous places 
in Donohue's book, but 280-7 and 337 may be consulted 
in particular. 
2 John Kinnard's review of Baker's William 
... Hazl-itt contains a.. very interesting,, if somewhat 
. 
'-s zrp-pointed, assessment of Hazlitt's dedication to 
this idea. "The Forgotten Self", Partisan Review, 
... XXX. (1963), 3 03'-3 06. 
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For the audience sitting in a theatre, the 
difference between watching sensory art and art of the 
imagination was essent Lly the difference between being 
self-complacent and being moved beyond oneself towards 
benevolent action. Imagination is the force for Hazlitt 
which makes good possible by stimulating and vivifying 
thoughts and feelings about future (or fictional) events. 
Hazlitt makes a point in The Round Table concern--: 
ing the audience and dramatic imitation, which he believed 
needed to be stressed. His point relates to this idea 
of imagination stimulating new thoughts about the 
potential of things: 
One chief reason ... why imitation pleases, is, because, by exciting curiosity, and 
inviting a comparison between the object 
and the representation, it opens a new 
field of inquiry, and leads the attention 
to a variety of details and distinctions 
not perceived before. The latter source 
of the pleasure derived from imitation 
has never been properly insisted on. (IV, 73) 
This pleasure, as Hazlitt indicates in numerous 
places on the subject of tragedy, is not simply the 
result of imagination being drawn towards that which is 
morally good, but that which is not, as well: 
We are as prone to make a torment of our 
fears, as to luxuriate in our hopes of 
good .... Objects of terror and pity 
exercise the same despotic control over 
[the mind] as those of love or beauty .... Not that we like what we loathe; but we 
like to indulge our hatred and scorn of 
it; to dwell upon it, to exasperate our 
idea of it .... (V, 7) 
Hazlitt seems to elaborate this position elsewhere, 
indicating that it is the natural action of imagination 
to magnify impressions made upon the mind by the emotions. 
Let an object be presented to the senses 
in a state of agitation and fear - and 
the imagination will magnify the object, 
and convert it into whatever is most 
proper to encourage the fear. (YVI, 63) 
There are suggestions in Hazlitt's criticism 
that the imagination is more excited by evil forces 
than good, and the reason is that forces which are. 
loathed provide the greater stimulant. * Hazlitt's account 
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of Coriolanus gives an example of the imagination and 
admiration being excited by that which might be considered 
morally wrong. Feelings of the justice of the complaint 
of the Roman public are quickly turned to contempt for 
the crowd, Hazlitt says, when Coriolanus enters "to make 
them submit to the last indignities, from mere pride and 
self-will". Coriolanus is favoured, Hazlitt continues, 
because: 
The insolence of power is stronger than 
the plea of necessity. The tame submission 
to usurped authority or even the natural 
resistance to it has nothing to excite 
or flatter the imagination: it is the 
assumption of a right to insult or oppress 
others that carries an imposing air of 
superiority with it. We had rather be the 
oppressor than the oppressed. (IV, 215) 
For Hazlitt, the ultimate effect of imagination 
in tragedy is not simply the production of sympathy 
for the sufferings of the character on stage. Rather, 
the effect is a heightened awareness of both good and 
evil and a heightened consciousness of the common condition 
of all men. It'creates in man "strong cravings after 
ideal good, [and] dread of unimaginable evils. " (XIX, 74) 
Hazlitt's language at times directly echoes the language 
. 
of his early philosophy: 
Tragic poetr ... strives to carry on 
the feeling 
Lof 
pain or pleasure] to 
the utmost point of sublimity or pathos, 
by all the force of comparison or con- 
trast; loses the sense of present suffer- 
ing in the imaginary exaggeration of it; 
exhausts the terror or pity by an 
unlimited indulgence of it; grapples 
with impossibilities in its desperate 
impatience of restraint; throws us 
back upon the past, forward into the 
future; brings every moment of our 
being or object of nature in startling 
review before us; and in-the rapid 
whirl of events, lifts us from the 
depths of woe to the highest con- 
templations on human life. (V, 5) 
Hazlitt seems to be suggesting that the effect of 
tragedy is to awaken all of man's faculties - those of 
the past, present and future: by awakening the faculties, 
. manM_is 
freed from-the tyranny of his own senses and 
habitual selfishness, and is able to move towards the 
'. ideal of benevolence. At the end of a play, for instance 
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at the end of Lear, one's self-interests are the least 
of one's concerns: 
The concluding scenes are sad, painfully 
sad; but their pathos is extreme. The 
oppression of the feelings is relieved 
by the very interest we take in the mis. 
fortunes of others, and by the reflections 
to which they give birth. (IV, 270) 
Hazlitt gives a slightly different slant to the Aristotelian 
interpretation of the pleasure of tragedy. The pleasure_ 
for Hazlitt does not arise simply from the purgation of 
the emotions of terror and pity. Hazlitt's idea is that 
it is the feelings of benevolence which ultimately 
arise from tragedy which provide the pleasure of tragedy. 
It may be, as some critics have suggested, that 
there is a contradiction in Hazlitt's approach to 
tragedy .1 If Hazlitt is interested in selflessness, 
why is he interested in the self-centeredness of 
Shakespeare's tragic heroes? In partial answer to this, 
it might be emphasised that in Hazlitt's 1805 theory 
it was through self-interest that one became aware of the 
needs and interests of others. The benevolent or demo- 
cratic ideal could be achieved only through recognising 
the extent of one's selfish interests. 
Also, it was necessary in Hazlitt's theory that 
the imagination magnify both good and bad, both selfih 
interests and unselfish, in order to highlight the 
consequences of actions. It was in this manner that the 
mind determined what was good. Hazlitt's interest in the 
self-centeredness of the tragic hero is, to a certain 
extent, in how'imagination'worked in the character. 
Hazlitt spoke of Shakespeare's imagination going out of 
himself and into the characters he drew; (V, 191) he 
spoke of the need for actors to throw their minds out of 
themselves; (V,, 184) and he spoke of the audience in a 
similar manner. But with Shakespeare's tragic characters 
he speaks of the failure to escape from self-interest.. 
In other words, it is the failure of'imagination'in the 
tragic heroes, a failure which prevents benevolence, which 
"fascinates Hazlitt. 
1. See Albrecht, "Hazlitt's Preference for 
Tragedy", 104;; and Donohue, 326. 
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Hazlitt explains the plight of Shakespeare's 
tragic heroes in terms of imagination gone wrong. With 
Romeo and Hamlet, the'imagination'had lifted them, to an 
extent, 'out of the real world and left them both self- 
occupied: 
Romeo is Hamlet in love. There is the 
same rich exuberance of passion and 
sentiment in the one, that there is of 
thought and sentiment in the other. 
Both are absent and self-involved, both 
live out of themselves in a world of 
imagination. Hamlet is abstracted from 
every thing, Romeo is abstracted from 
every thing but his love, and lost in 
it. (IV) 254) 
Hazlitt sees in Lear a mind which similarly is abstracted 
from the apparent reality of this world, but through 
causes totally beyond his control. Lear is seen to be 
totally bewildered and overwhelmed by injuries which 
are "without provocation, and admit of no alleviation 
or atonement". (XVIII, 332) The question of benevolence 
or self-love becomes irrelevant for Lear, whose mind 
says Hazlitt, is left, 
impotent of resources, cut off, proscribed, 
anathematised from the common hope of 
good to itself or ill to others - amazed 
at its own situation, but unable to avert 
it, scarce daring to look at, or to weep 
over it. (: VIII, 332) 
In this situation, Hazlitt suggests, Lear's'imagination' 
works without any of the restraints provided by the 
other faculties. His'imagination'seizes on the idea 
of his misfortune and magnifies the idea into the 
dominant element of his thought: 
[Lear's passion] will admit no other 
cause of dire misfortune but its own, 
which swallows up all other griefs. 
The force of despair hurries the 
imagination over the boundary of fact 
and common sense, and renders the 
transition sublime .... (XII, 342) 
With Romeo, Hamlet, and Lear it is the strength of 
'imagination' and passion, not a lack of moral principles, 
which renders the mind self-focusing. 
Hazlitt'b description of the effect on him of 
Iago. -directly mirrors his description of Iago's mind. 
This-is one of those instances Hazlitt speaks of,. in 
which a viewer's mind in a sense becomes one with the 
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character he is watching. Hazlitt said that the reason 
he went to see the character of Iago on stage was because 
of "the interest it excites, the sharper edge it sets 
on [the] curiosity and imagination. " (V, 213) Iago 
similarly is a man whose 'imagination' is on edge; Hazlitt 
describes him as a man whose "whole plot is to keep his 
facuitLes stretched on the rack, in a state of watch and_ 
ward, in a state of breathless suspense, without a 
moment's interval of repose. " (V, 214) Both the viewer 
and Iago, Hazlitt says, have a.. natural desire for. 
mental stimulation and excitement of the kind offered 
by imagination. 
The problem with Iago, in Hazlitt's estimation, 
was not that he was self-centered but rather that he 
was obsessed with the mental excitement offered by 
imagination`. His mind was "not under the restraint of 
humanity or the sense of moral obligation. " (V, 2]. 3) 
Hazlitt sees in Iago an active 'imagination!, not unlike 
that of a playwright, to which Iago is compared: 
He is an amateur of tragedy in real life; 
and instead of exercising his ingenuity 
on imaginary characters, or forgotten 
incidents, he takes the bolder and more 
desperate course of getting up his plot 
at home, casts the principal parts among 
his nearest friends and connections, and 
rehearses it is downright earnest, with 
steady nerves and unabated resolution. (V, 215) 
Iago as a playwright, Hazlitt says in another 
review, "plots the ruin of his friends as an exercise 
for his understanding, and stabs men in the dark to 
prevent ennui. " (V, 214) Elsewhere Iago is interpreted 
as directing the drama which is going on mainly in the 
theatre of Othello's mind: 
Iago ... shews to Othello that he has 'a monster in his thought'; and it is 
his object to make him believe this by 
dumb show, by the knitting of his brows, 
by stops and starts, &c. before hO is 
willing to commit himself by words. (XVIII, 203) 
if Iago had lacked imagination, he would have been 
merely selfish. - But the interest in Iago, in relation to 
Hazlitt's theöry'*of imagination, is that lago has a 
.. -highly active imagination yet. abuses'its powers, and the 
effect is the same as (or worse than) self-love. - Hazlitt 
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sees Iago as a member of a class of Shakespearean 
characters who demonstrateSthe same kind of abuse of 
imagination. Characters of this class - like Richard III, 
Lady Macbeth and Falstaff, in Hazlitt's thought, demon- 
strate "great intellectual activity, accompanied with 
a total want of moral principle" and employ'imagination' 
to their own ends. (V, 213) 
Hazlitt objected to the usual presentation of 
Richard III as an odious and disgusting king. The ground- 
work of Richard's character, as with Iago, is "that 
mixture of intellectual vigour with moral depravity, 
in which Shakespear delighted to. shew his strength - 
[and which] gave full scope as well as temptation to the 
exercise of his imagination. " (IV, 300) Hazlitt views 
Richard as a man who is already great by virtue of his 
intellect: 
The restless and sanguinary Richard is not 
a man striving to be great, but to be great- 
er than he is; conscious of his strength of 
will, his powers of intellect, his daring 
courage, his elevated station .... 
(V, 181) 
It is Richard's consciousness of his own powers which 
make him dangerous, Hazlitt suggests, for Richard, like 
Iago, is able to stand back from his actions and control 
the scenes. He consciously adopts roles: 
Richard should woo not as a lover, but as 
an actor - to show his mental superiority, 
and power to make others playthings of 
his will. (V, 182) 
In another review Hazlitt summarises the nature of the 
moral depravity he finds in Richard: 
[Richard] looked out and laughed from the 
watchtower of his confidence and his 
expectations, on the desolation and misery 
he had caused around him. He held on his 
way, unquestioned, 'hedged in with the 
divinity of kings', amenable to no tribunal, 
and abusing his power in contempt of man- 
kind. (V, 212) 
In Characters of Shakespear's Plays Hazlitt makes the 
comment concerning King John that few characters on 
stage were more contemptible: "He has no intellectual 
grandeur or strength of character to shield him from 
the. indignation which his immediate conduct provokes .... " 
(IV, 306-7) Presumably, Hazlitt felt that it was the 
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grandeur of Richard's intellect which retained the 
audience's respect. 
Similarly, Lady Macbeth is saved from the scorn 
of the audience. Her character clearly is flawed by 
her failure to cultivate imagination: "Her fault seems 
to have been an excess of that strong principle of 
self-interest and family aggrandisement, not amenable 
to the common feelings of compassion and justice, which 
is so marked a feature in barbarous nations and times. " 
(IV, 189) Nonetheless, she has an "obdurate strength 
of will and masculine firmness" which make her great: 
"She is a great bad woman, whom we hate, but whom we 
fear more than we hate. She does not excite out loath- 
ing and abhorrence like Regan and Goneril. " (IV, 188) 
It is this strength of character which also renders 
her sublime in Hazlitt's understanding. He compares 
her to the witches "who become sublime from their 
exemption from all human sympathies and contempt for 
all human affairs, as Lady Macbeth does by the force of 
passion. " (IV, 189) Hazlitt sees her looking into the 
future and being unflinching in her struggle to attain 
the imagined greatness which awaits her and Macbeth. He 
even suggests that she may be wicked-only by accident of 
circumstance: 
She is only wicked to gain a great end; 
and is perhaps more distinguished by her 
commanding presence of mind and inexorable 
self-will ... than by the hardness of her heart or want of natural affections .... Nor do the pains she is at to 'screw his 
courage to the sticking-place, ' ... show 
anything but her greater consistency in 
depravity. Her strong-nerved ambition 
furnishes ribs of steel to 'the sides of 
his intent'; and she is herself wound up 
to the execution of her baneful project 
with the same unshrinking fortitude in 
crime, that in other circumstances she 
would probably have shown patience in 
suffering. (IV, 188) 
Falstaff takes enjoyment from the mental excite- 
ment offered by the 'imagination', and he, too, lacks 
moral principle. Hazlitt sees in him a total indifference 
to truth and 'a ""boundless luxury of .... imagination" . 
His. -self-indulgence of physical appetites is deceptive:, 
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He keeps up perpetual holiday and open house, 
and we live with him in a round of invitations 
to a rump and dozen. - Yet we are not to 
suppose that he was a mere sensualist. All 
this is as much in imagination as in reality. 
His sensuality does not engross and stupify 
his other faculties .... His imagination keeps up the ball after his senses have done 
with it. He seems to have even a greater 
enjoyment of the freedom from restraint, 
of good cheer, of his ease, of his vanity, 
in the ideal exaggerated description which 
he gives them, than in fact. (IV, 278) 
Hazlitt sees method in Falstaff's manner. He 
sees Falstaff instinctively evade "every thing that 
threatens to interrupt the career of his triumphant 
jollity and self-complacency". (IV, 279) Hazlitt 
explains Falstaff's "pulling out the bottle in the 
field of battle" as "a joke to shew his contempt for 
glory accompanied with danger, his systematic adherence 
to his Epicurean philosophy in the most trying circum- 
stances. " (IV, 278) Haziitt sees him, like Iago and 
Richard, as an actor, but he is without the malicious- 
ness of the others: 
He is represented as a liar, a braggart, a 
coward, a glutton, etc. and yet we are not 
offended but delighted with him; for he is 
all these as much to amuse others as to 
gratify himself .... In a word, he is an 
actor in himself almost as much as upon the 
stage .... (IV, 279) 
Although Hazlitt does not classify Hamlet as one 
of the class of Shakespearean characters who combine 
great intellectual activity with moral depravity, he 
does find in Harslet a similar kind of fascination with 
the workings of his own 'imagination', and he suggests 
that this is the main reason for Hamlet's lack of action. 
Part of Hazlitt's analysis is worth quoting at length: 
He is the prince-of philosophical speculators; 
and because he cannot have his revenge perfect, 
according to the most refined idea his wish 
can form, he declines it altogether. So he 
scruples to trust the suggestions of the ghost, 
contrives the scene of the play to have surer 
proof of his uncle's guilt., and then rests 
satisfied with this confirmation of his 
suspicions, and the success of his experiment, 
instead of acting upon it. Yet he is sensible 
266 
of his own weaknesses, taxes himself with 
it, and tries to reason himself out of it 
.... Still he does nothing; and this very 
speculation on his own infirmity only 
affords him another occasion for indulging 
it. It is not from any want of attachment 
to his father or of abhorrence of his murder 
that Hamlet is thus dilatory, but it is 
more to his taste to indulge his imagination 
in reflecting upon the enormity of the 
crime and refining on his schemes of vengeance, 
than to put them into immediate practice. 
His ruling passion is to think, not to act: 
and any vague pretext that flatters this 
propensity instantly diverts him from his 
previous purposes. (IV, 234-235) 
The passage may seem to suggest that Hamlet has consider- 
able control over his own situation, that he could act 
if he did not prefer to indulge hislimagination! - but 
this is. not the impression that Hazlitt wishes to give. 
Later in the same article he clarifies that he sees 
Hamlet's behavior as necessary: "His habitual principles 
of action are unhinged and out of joint with the 
time. " (IV, 236) Concerning the behavior towards 
Ophelia, he adds, "In the harassed state of his mind, 
he could not have done much otherwise than he did. " (IV9 236) 
Some of Hazlitt's most interesting observations 
on the workings of the mind occur outside of his 
Shakespearean criticism but are informative of the 
general understanding of'imagination'that he developed 
there. In particular there are his comments on sleep- 
walking, found primarily in his essay "On Dreams", first 
published in March,. 1$23. He confesses that, "I myself 
am (or used some time ago to be) a sleep-walker; and 
know how the thing is". (XII, 19) He proceeds to attack 
The Physiognomical. System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim (1315) 
for being rooted in modern philosophy and maintaining 
that we acquire all our ideas of external objects through 
the senses. Many of our ideas, he says, are gained as 
they are when sleepwalking with one's eyes open: "The 
external impression is made before, much in the same 
manner as it is after we are awake; but it does not lead 
to. the. usual. train of associations connected with that 
impression. " (vII, 19) 
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Hazlitt continues his analysis: 
The conscious or connecting link between 
our ideas, which forms them into separate 
groups or compares different parts and 
views of a subject together, seems to be 
that which is principally wanting in sleep 
so that any idea which presents itself in 
this anarchy of the mind is lord of the 
ascendant for the moment, and is driven out 
by the next straggling notion that comes 
across it. The bundles of thought are, as 
it were, untied, loosened from a common 
centre, and drift along the stream of 
fancy as it happens. Hence the confusion 
(not the concentration of the faculties) 
that continually takes place in this state 
of half perception. The mind takes in but 
one thing at a time, but one part of a 
subject, and therefore cannot correct its 
sudden and heterogeneous transitions from 
one momentary impression to another by a 
larger grasp of understanding. (XII, 20) 
For Hazlitt the determining factor seems to be the 
degree to which reason is being employed and, consequently, 
the degree to which ' imagination' is ruling the mind. 
Hazlitt goes on to link the "anarchy of the mind" in 
sleepwalking or dreaming with madness as he understands it: 
The difference, so far then, between sleeping 
and waking seems to be that in the latter 
we have a greater range of conscious recollect- 
ions, a larger discourse of reason, and 
associate ideas in longer trains and more as 
they are connected one with another in the 
order of nature, whereas in the former any 
two impressions, that meet or are alike, join 
company and then are parted again, without 
notice, like the froth from the wave. So 
in madness, there is, I should apprehend, the 
same tyranny of the imagination over the 
judgement; that is, the mind has slipped its 
cable, and single images meet, and jostle, and 
unite suddenly together without any power to 
arrange or compare them with others, with 
which they are connected in the world of 
reality. There is a continual phantasmagoria; 
whatever shapes and colours come together 
are by the heat and violence of the brain 
referred to external nature, without regard 
to the order of time, place, or circumstance. (XII, 21) 
he reference to shapes and colours brought together by 
heat and violence seems to echo his words about the 
flame of Shakespeare's genius kindling and melting what- 
ever comes in its way and determining the colour, form, 
motion, and combination of objects. Also the process of 
the mind referring the products of its actions in madness 
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to external nature is the same process that has been 
pointed out in Hazlitt's comments on Lear and Othello 
and their use of the heaven image. ' 
In concluding this chapter it might be interest- 
ing to note that Hazlitt felt that English literature 
in his own time was in a period of decline. Imagination, 
as he understood it, had been exchanged for an excess 
of emotion that had no deep roots in the personalities 
of the characters or the situations in which they found 
themselves. Lord Byron's tragedies were among those 
he criticised: 
Modern tragedy, in particular, is no longer 
like a vessel making the 'voyage of life, and 
tossed about by the winds and waves of 
passion, but is converted into a handsomely- 
constructed steam-boat, that is moved by the 
sole expansive power of words. Lord Byron 
has launched several of these ventures 
lately (if ventures they may be called) and 
may continue in the same strain as long as 
he pleases. We have not now a number of 
dramatis personae affected by particular 
incidents and speaking according to their 
feelings, or as the occasion suggests, but 
each mounting the rostrum, and delivering 
his opinion on fate, fortune, and the entire 
consummation of things. (XII, 53) 
Elsewhere Godwin's tragedies come under attack for the 
same reason. Notice that Hazlitt again uses the image 
of steam power to refer to mechanical'imarrination? 
... the passions are not excited, qualified, 
or irritated by circumstances, but moulded 
by the will of the writer, like clay in the 
hands of the potter. Mr Godwin's imagin- 
ation works like the power of steam, with 
inconceivable and incessant expansive force; 
but it is all in one direction, mechanical 
and uniform. (? VIII, 307) 
In different articles Hazlitt Mentions various 
causes responsible for the decline of literature in his 
own time. The first consists in what Hazlitt saw as the 
abstract and speculative truths which removed poets from 
their own feelings. It is this abstraction which he saw 
1 With t. hi rýý. rltc>>..! ýýi r"ýl r' i ht, Hz z1 tt ý"rý, `+ý 
perhaps, ahead of his time, Later in the nineteenth 
century Ludwig Feuerbach, in his Essence of Christianit_ 
(a work which was translated into ng isi by George B iot) 
was to argue that man's whole notion of God is the result 
of projecting and objectifking the self. However, Hazlitt's 
7 
idea here might have been influenced by Coleridge. See: 
CSC, I, 212-213. 
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in Byron, Godwin, Coleridge and Wordsworth, and it is 
this abstraction which he identified as "the reigning 
spirit of the age! '. (XVIII, 305)1 He felt it was 
irreconcilable with dramatic poetry, which he identified 
as "the closest imitation of nature". (XVIII, 305) It 
is Coleridge's abstraction which Hazlitt is speaking 
about when he remarks, "His metaphysics have been a 
dead weight on the wings of his imagination - while his 
imagination has run away with his reason and common 
sense. " (XVI, 137) 
' Another reason Hazlitt gave for the'decline of 
both comedy and tragedy was the stage itself. In an 
essay entitled "On Modern Comed})'in "The Round Table", 
Hazlitt argues that stage productions have succeeded in 
substituting "artificial and intellectual interest for 
real passion" and that the interests of spectators are 
now "ideal, remote, sentimental and abstracted. " (IV, 13)2 
He goes on to say that even Shakespeare would not have 
been able to write in the current times: "Nature would 
not have presented itself to him in the same freshness 
and vigour; he must have seen it through all the 
refractions of successive dullness, and his powers 
would have languished in the dense atmosphere of logic 
and criticism. " (IV9 13-14) 
A final reason for the decline was the general 
progress of civilization. As Hazlitt said, "the progress 
of knowledge and refinement has a tendency to circum- 
scribe the limits of the imagination and to clip the 
wings of poetry. " (V, 9) In his own age, he felt, 
people looked with less awe and more indifference upon 
the "preternatural world. " Further, he comments with 
some humour, 
At present we are less exposed to the 
vicissitudes of good or evil, to the 
incursions of wild'beasts or 'bandits 
fierce', or to the unmitigated fury of 
the elements .... But the police spoils 
1 For an in depth analysis of' abýtraetiun 
see Roy Park, The Spirit of the A0, esp. Chapter 9. 
2 Hazlitt is not using the word ideal here 
in the same sense as it was discussed earlier. 
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all; and we now hardly so much as dream 
of a midnight murder. Macbeth is only 
tolerated in this country for the sake of 
the music; and in the United States of 
America, where the philosophical principles 
of government are carried still farther in 
theory and practice, we find that the 
Beggar's Opera is hooted from the stage. 
Society by degrees, is constructed into a 
machine that carries us safely and insipidly 
from one end of life to another, in a very 
comfortable prose style. (V, 10) 
Hazlitt was not alone in suggesting a link between 
imagination and an age of superstition - Wordsworth had 
done something similar in his Note to "The Thorn" in 
x. $00.1 Nor was he alone in mourning the decline of 
public taste - virtually all of the main Romantic 
critics did this. But Hazlitt does seem to be alone 
in suggesting that the advance of civilization in his 
own time was leading towards the death of imagination. 
It is a curious cry to hear coming from an acre when 
literary history recognises (certainly in the field of 
poetry, although not drama) to be one of the most fertile. 
Rather than dismissing Hazlitt's evaluation, it is 
important to see it in the context of his ideas of 
imagination. An age of superstition and insecurity for 
Hazlitt would imply a time in which the mind was being 
stimulated by hopes of good and fears of evil. The 
imagination would be highly active, magnifying whatever 
impressions came its way, whether they were good or bad. 
In this process of magnification and heightened awareness, 
Hazlitt believed, as we have already seen, that the mind 
would naturally move towards that which was good. 
Hazlitt did not find this imaginative process happening 
in his own time in England (although he did frequently 
find it in the democratic ideals in France until the 
defeat of Napoleon). Neither did he find a fertile 
working of the imagination where we would expect him to 
find it, in the poetry of at least Wordsworth and 
Coleridge. He did however, find it in Shakespeare. 
Allowing for the personal conflict which might have prc- 
1 See: Literary Criticism of William 
Wordsworth, p. 12 
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vented Hazlitt at times from giving credit to Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, there was a real difference which he 
found between their art and that of Shakespeare. In 
Shakespeare he saw good and bad presented before the 
audience. The imagination, excited by both good and bad, 
inspired the audience towards benevolent action. In 
Coleridge and Wordsworth he saw less concern with human 
behavior in terms of morality (or what Hazlitt would see 
as social concern), and more emphasis on the relation 
between one's own feelings and ideas (or what Hazlitt 
would see as'selfishness). Coleridge's early 'supernatural' 
poetry he found abstracted from reality, and Wordsworth's 
interest in the essential passions of simple life he 
found egotistical. 
Hazlitt and Coleridge had a number of points 
in common. The theories of imagination of both men led 
them to explore the psychological make-up of Shakespearean 
characters and both investigated the symbolic or 
referential function of language. But throughout 
Hazlitt's criticism there runs the idea that imagination 
is linked with morality - as is implied by the idea of 
"democratic imagination" - which Hazlitt never abandons. 




THE THEME OF IMAGINATION IN COLERIDGE 
On the surface, Coleridge's Shakespearean and 
dramatic criticism has less in common with the work 
of his contemporaries than was the case with Hunt, Lamb 
or Hazlitt. The differences in Coleridge's approach 
appear in relation to the theatre, the form of his 
criticism, and the philosophical slant of his criticism - 
differences which help to emphasise both his wide- 
ranging intellect and the relative independence of his 
critical thought, as well as the different circumstances 
of his personal life. Coleridge's theory. of imagination 
is responsible for the most significant of these differ- 
ences from the-other critics: the emphasis on abstract 
philosophical concepts. His ideas on imagination have a 
pervasive influence on his thought. However, it may 
be seen that much of what Coleridge talks about in 
abstract symbolic terms is at least analogous to many 
of the issues that the other critics were led to consider 
from the vantage points of their own ideas of imagination. 
Coleridge's theory of imagination, in spite of its 
abstract metaphysical emphasis, is applied thematically 
in his criticism along many of the lines already discuss- 
ed with the other critics. 
Coleridge did not write regular theatre reviews 
and his critic ms do not contain frequent references S 
either to the productions at Drury Lane and Covent Garden 
or the individual performances of actors. J. R. de J. 
Jackson has shown that the theatre did have a formative 
and lasting influence on Coleridge's thought, and that 
he should not be considered as a closet critic. 
' None- 
theless, it is clear from the body of Coleridge's 
criticism that the theatre had considerably less influence 
on his thought than on the other critics. The critical 
application of his theory of imagination for the most 
part was not modified by response to the particular needs 
1 Jackson, The Influence of the Theatre on 
Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism. npu is ed Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Princeton, 1961, 
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of the theatre. 
Coleridge's Shakespearean criticism, if not 
unknown in his lifetime, was at least largely unrecognised. 
Hazlitt quoted Schlegel's criticism of Shakeopear in the 
"Preface" to his Characters of Shakespear's Plays and 
said that, 
Certainly no writer among ourselves has 
shown either the same enthusiastic 
admiration of his genius, or the same 
philosophical acuteness in pointing out 
his characteristic excellences. 
Hunt made a similar claim when he reviewed Hazlitt's 
work, only he added praise for both Lamb and Hazlitt. 
[Schlegel, ] with the exception of a few 
scattered criticisms from Mr. Lamb, had 
hitherto been the only writer who seemed 
truly to understand as well as feel him 
[Shakespeare] . 
Although neither Hunt nor Hazlitt was sympathetic 
to Coleridge, it was the fragmentary form of Coleridge's 
criticism more than personal animosity, which accounts 
for the silence concerning his work. Coleridge's 
various lectures on Shakespeare from 1808 to 1819 were 
generally well-attended and reports of them were carried 
in several newspapers. But the text of his lectures 
remained unpublished as did his extensive marginalia and 
other notes on the plays. Although contemporary critics 
(with the exception of Hunt) would have heard Coleridge 
in conversation on the subject of Shakespeare, they would 
have discovered only passing comment on Shakespeare in 
most of Coleridge's published works. 
Most of Coleridge's Shakespearean and dramatic 
criticism was written before Biographia Literaria and 
the works on Method. Nonetheless, Coleridge's use of 
the concept of imagination in his criticism may be seen 
to relate closely to many of the ideas in his later 
philosophy. 
It is important to recognise what was new in 
Coleridge's thought in Biographia and the works to 1819, 
and what was not new. Concerning the primary and second- 
1H Works, IV, 172. 
2 Examiner, 20 July, 1817; (DC, 291). 
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ary imagination, McFarland has this to say: 
... the secondary imagination, although 
named as such only in Chapter Thirteen, 
seems really to be the imagination Cole- 
ridge customarily talks about elsewhere, 
and to be called secondary only because 
of the primary imagination. The latter 
IS , the true newcomer. 
It may be pointed out, however, that even if the 
definitions of primary and secondary imagination in 
Biographia are taken at their most basic and literal 
level, they essentially distinguish between God and man. 
It is the primary which is God-orientated: "a repet- 
ition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I AM. " It is the secondary which is 
man-orientated, highlighting, as Coleridge's Chapter 
XIV emphasises, the creative act of the poet. Both 
of these aspects of Coleridge's thought on imagination 
had been present throughout Coleridge's writing to 1$15. 
The 1795 lectures discuss imagination specifically in the 
context of theology and philosophy, and might be seen 
to anticipate directly the later-primary imagination. 
More commonly, though, there is a lack of distinction 
between the divine and human aspects of imagination, 
while at the same time both divine and human are implied. 
What seems to be new in Biographia is not the recognition 
of the God-orientated imagination which Coleridge calls 
primary, but is rather the clear separation of primary 
from secondary, accompanied by the clear definition of 
their natures. 
Concerning Coleridge's discussions on Method 
in the works from 1816-1819, there were, again, some 
new elements and some old. Much of the significance of 
the works lies in further developing the suggestion in 
Biographia that all knowledge relates back to the ultimate 
source of knowledge which is God, or the I AM of the 
primary imagination. One of the principles of conscious- 
ness in man, which derived from the consciousness of God, 
was Method - 'a principle of unity with progression'. 
1 McFarland, "The Origin and Significance of 
Coleridge's Theory of Secondary Imagination", 213. 
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As was seen earlier when Coleridge's hierarchy of the 
faculties was discussed (Sense, Fancy, Understanding - 
Understanding, Imagination, Reason), the understanding 
sought a principle of unity by working in the material 
world, and using Theory to formulate laws of physical 
nature. The understanding also sought progression by 
recognising the need for an antecedent principle behind 
the laws of physical nat"; ire. So too, the secondary 
imagination (called Imagination in the hierarchy) sought 
unity. It combined the Theory supplied by the under- 
standing with its own natural inclination to the Method 
of Law, 
1 the discovery of absolute principles beyond 
which man's knowledge could not take him. With symbols 
the secondary imagination pointed to Reason, or what 
was suggested to be the mind of God, Law, Idea and the 
primary imagination. God may be seen in Coleridge's 
scheme as the absolute 'principle of unity with pro- 
gression'. 
It has been common to assume that Coleridge's 
ideas on Method, like his concept of primary imagination, 
represent new departures in his thought. For the most 
part, the ideas on Method are a new departure, for 
instance with regard to the hierarchical arrangement of 
the faculties and the integration of the faculties with 
his notions of Law and Theory. But the manner in which 
the imagination is said to function in Coleridge's earlier 
writing is close to Coleridge's ideas on Method, Idea and 
Law. This closeness can be seen in the 1795 lectures, 
when imagination was said to seek the originating Cause, 
much in the manner of the secondary imagination seeking 
absolute principles which can have no antecedent: 
1 Coleridge's description of the Method of Fine 
Art (i. e. the Method of secondary imagination), as it is 
found in the Friend reads: 
"Between these two [i. e. Law and Theory] lies the Method 
in the FINE ARTS, which belong indeed to this second or 
external relation [of Theory], because the effect and 
position of the parts is always more or less influenced 
by the knowledge and.. experience of their previous 
qualities; but which nevertheless constitute a link 
connecting the second form of relation with the first. " 
Friend, I, 464. See also: Treatise on Method, 62. 
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The noblest gift of Imagination is the 
power of discerning the Cause in the 
Effect [, ] a power which when employed 
on the works of the Creator elevates 
and by the variety of its pleasures almost 
monopolizes the Soul-1 
Imagination was also said to urge "us up the ascent of 
Being", 2 and man's happiness was connected with the 
"Progressiveness" of his nature; 
3 both ideas suggest the 
'principle of unity with progression' behind Method, in 
Coleridge's later thought. 
Coleridge's Shakespearean and dramatic criticism 
is largely fragmentary. It is given a certain degree 
of unity, however, by the fact that throughout the 
concept of imagination is used in a manner similar to 
that mentioned above regarding 1795 and the ideas on 
Method. Coleridge uses the concept of imagination in 
his criticism as he did in his philosophy; as a means 
of suggesting ultimate principles, which would at once 
say something about the nature of art, the -natureof man 
and the similarities of those natures to God. 
Jackson's discussion of Method in Coleridge's 
criticism has made important strides in indicating the 
connections which exist between Coleridge's criticism 
and philosophy. He has stressed Coleridge's desire for 
principles in art and has aligned these with Coleridge's 
in Method and methodical thinking .4 Jackson did not 
stress, however, the connection between the progressive 
seeking of unity which is part of man's nature (and is 
also Method, deriving from God) and the discovery of that 
unity of God through imagination in art. In other words, 
there remains a need to develop the link between art and 
metaphysics in Coleridge's criticism. 
Rene Wellek found one comment in Coleridge's 
criticism which he felt suggested that art played a 
"metaphysical role which makes it the center of philo- 
sophy"; but in Welleik's opinion this was "merely a 
1 Lects (1795), 338-339. 
2 ibid., 235 & 23&. 
3 ibid., 109. 
4 Method and Imagination in Coleridge's Criticism. 
esp. 21-74. 
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reproduction from Schelling and remain[ed] isolated 
in Coleridge's writing. "' With the understanding of 
Coleridge's metaphysics that has been presented in this 
paper, it might be suggested that Wellek's initial or 
momentary suspicion was correct. Coleridge was far too 
systematic a thinker and far too occupied with art to 
exclude the role of art from his metaphysics. He looked 
for basic principles and abstract laws in poetry as well 
as in philosophy. His understanding of the poetic process 
occupies the central position in his philosophy, for it 
was through symbolic language and art, not through science 
and logic, that'one attained ultimate knowledge of the 
universal. 
One of the earliest indications of Coleridge's 
thinking along these lines can be found in "Religious 
Musings". There bards and philosophers are linked and 
represent the forces of Imagination which will save 
civilization from self-destruction. In 1802 Coleridge 
wrote to William Sotheby: 
Metaphisics [sic] is a word, that you, 
my dear Sir! are no$great friend to / 
but yet you will agree, that a great Poet 
must be implicit6 if no explicit6, a 
profound metaphysician. 
In 1$01+, in a claim which was to be echoed in Biographia, 
Coleridge suggested Wordworth as "the first & greatest 
philosophical poet". 
3 And in a note on Macbeth for the 
second lecture of 1813 at Bristol, Coleridge spoke of 
Shakespeare "standing[ing] the test of philosophic 
examination"4 and of Shakespeare's images demonstrating 
"correctness in the only philosophical sense. "5 
In connecting poets and philosophers, Coleridge 
seems to be doing more than making a general comparison. 
He seems to be indicating that poets have a means of 
uncovering absolute truths about the source of man's 
1 Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism, II, 159. 
2 CL, II, To William Sotheby, 13 July, 1802. 
3 CL, II, To Richard Sharp, 15 January, 1804. 
4 CSC, I, 78. 
5 CSC, I, 79. 
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knowledge. Wordsworth is the "greatest philosophical 
Poet", Coleridge says, largely because he uses "Imag- 
ination or the modifying Power ... in that sense in 
which it is a dim Analogue of Creation, not all that 
we can believe but all that we can conceive of creation. "' 
The imagination which Wordsworth demonstrates is symbolic 
of or analogous to the ultimate creative process of God. 
For Coleridge, imagination in art tells us 
about a realm of reality which cannot be directly per- 
ceived. In his metaphysical discussion imagination 
enabled man to discover the principles of absolute know- 
ledge which resided in God, and imagination in poetry 
serves the same end. For Coleridge poetry is the means 
whereby the innate spirit of man discovers the source of 
its being in God. Consider what Coleridge describes as 
one of the effects of imagination while discussing 
"Venus and Adonis": 
... [the effect of] combining many cir- 
cumstances into one moment of thought to 
produce that ultimate end of human thought 
and human feeling, unity, and thereby the 
reduction of the spirit to its principle 
and fountain, who alone is truly One. 
A similar reference to God is made in Coleridge's 
discussion of Richard II; this time the reference is to 
a higher Will: 
In the epic a pre-announced fate gradually 
adjusts and employs the will and the 
incidents as its instruments .... while the drama places fate and will in opposition [and is] then most perfect when the victory 
of fate is obtained in consequence of im- 
perfections in the opposing will, so as to 
leave the final impression that the fate 
itsel is but a higher and more intelligent 
Will. 
5 
Part of the excellence of Greek tragedy, Coleridge felt, 
was that it conveyed to the viewer an awareness both that 
there is a true source (or "final cause") of humanity and 
that that source lies beyond mortal life: 
1 CSC, I, 79. 
2 CSC, 1, 216. 
3 CSC, I, 142. 
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[Greek tragedy] carried the thoughts into 
the mythologic world in order to raise the 
emotions, fears, and hopes which convince 
the inmost heart that their final cause is 
not to be discovered in the limits of mere 
mortal life [and] force us into a present- 
iment, however dim, of a state in which 
those struggles of inward free will with 
outward necessity, which form the true 
subject of the tragedian .... 
1 
Coleridge goes on to cor. =ent in the same place that the 
ground of all tragedy is the moral law, either as it is 
obeyed or violated, and his understanding of moral law, 
here as in other places, is that it is our morality 
which distinguishes us as humans. Coleridge's comment 
on Caliban is informative: 
Caliban, on the other hand, is all earth, 
all condensed and gross in feelings and 
images; he has the dawning of understanding 
without reason or the moral sense, and in him, as in some brute animals, this advance 
to the intellectual faculties, without the 
moral sense, is marked by the appearance of 
vice. For it is in the primacy of the moral 
being only that man is truly human; in his 
intellectual powers he is certainly approached 
by the brutes, and, man's whole system duly 
considered, these powers cannot be considered 
other that means to an end, that is, to 
morality. 
Coleridge believed that even as we are basically moral 
creatures, as shown to us by our feelings when aroused by 
imagination, so too God is a moral God and it is from 
him that we derive our moral ideas. Because they are 
rooted in him they are absolute and have no logical 
e- antlcedents. Coleridge saw modern art, as opposßd to 
ancient, as being concerned with what he called the 
infinite. His description, heavily influenced by Schlegel, 
gives a further useful indication of his ideal in art: 
Whatever has its root in human nature, 
is excellent, and to the source we must 
go, therefore. 3 
[Modern art is concerned with] the infinite 
and [the] indefinite as the vehicle of the 
infinite; hence more [devoted] to the passions, 
the obscure hopes and fears - the wandering 
1 CSC, I, i72. 
2 CSC, It 134. 
3 CSC, I, 221. 
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thro' [the] infinite, grander moral 
feelings, more august conceptions of 
man as man, the future1rather than the 
present, -- sublimity. 
The reason Coleridge describes the moral feelings 
arising out of poetry as infinite is that he connects 
them with God. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
in the eighth of his 1811-1812 lectures on Shakespeare, 
recorded by J. P. Collier, he tries to compliment poetry 
by identifying it with religion. Poetry and Religion, 
he said, had three objectives in common; the first was 
"To generalize our notions"2 by taking us beyond our 
individual selves into an awareness of mankind as a whole. 
The second, was to take us beyond the world of the senses 
and into the imagination in a way that "subserves the 
interest of our virtues". 
3 The third, was to call us to 
perfection: 
It bids us, while we are sitting in the 
dark round our little fire, still look 
at the mountain tops struggling with the 
darkness, and which announces that light 
which shall be common to us all, and in 
which all individual interests shall 
dissolve into one common interest, and 
every man find in another more than a 
brother. 4 
The transcript continues: 
Such being the case, we need not wonder 
that it has pleased Providence that the 
divinest truths of religion should be 
revealed to us in the form of Poetry, and 
that at all times the Poets ... should have joined to support all those delicate 
sentiments of the heart ... which might be called the feeding streams of Religion. 
5 
Coleridge allocates to poetry a central place in 
his metaphysical system, but one of the questions which 
this raises is why he should connect what he calls above 
"those delicate sentiments of the heart" or in other 
places "moral feelings" specifically with God and the 
Primary Imagination. Up to this point in the current 
study his metaphysical system has been abstract and 
1 CSC, I, 222. 
2 C. 
__ 
on S, 88. 
3 C on S, $$. 
4 C on S, $$-89. 
5 Con S, 89. 
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difficult. Is he here, as he describes the approach 
to ultimate truth, simply abandoning rational argument 
and casting the proof of his thesis on subjective 
criteria - obscure hopes, fears and moral feelings? The 
answer must be a qualified no. In spite of appearances, 
Coleridge is being consistent with some of the basic 
tenets of his theory and he had already prepared for 
objections to this apparent subjectivity. In his des- 
cription of the 'philosophic consciousness' of trans- 
cendental philosophers Coleridge was describing the 
consciousness which is aroused by poetry. He says that 
"philosophic consciousness', "lies beneath or (as it 
were) behind the spontaneous consciousness natural to 
all reflecting beings. "1 He says it is this which 
"render[s] the mind intuitive of the spiritual in man 
(i. e. of that which:. lies on the other side of our natural 
consciousnes4. "2 That which is spiritual and related 
to the Primary Imagination of God can be known only with 
the aid of intuition and can be conveyed only through 
symbols. - "words which are but the shadows of notions; 
even as the notional understanding itself is but the 
shadowy abstraction of living and actual truth. "3 
, What Coleridge says about the transcendental 
symbol further emphasises the impossibility of escaping. 
from this'apparently subjective dimension. Transcendental 
symbols, unlike mathematical symbols, participated only 
inadequately in the reality for which they stood. In 
Statesman's Manual Coleridge had said that the symbols 
of secondary imagination, though "consubstantial with 
the truths", were primarily "the conductors" of those 
truths. In the same work he argued that the absolute 
IDEAS of God (the products of the method of Law which can 
have no antecedents and represent the essence of the 
things to which they relate) correspond to neither our 
sensations or perceptions, neither our intuitions nor 
1 BL, I, 164; (Everyman, 136-7). 
2 BL, I, 168; (Everyman, 139). 
3 BL, I, 168; (Everyman, 140). 
4 The State 's Manual, 29. 
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conceptions, and cannot find "an adequate correspondent 
in the world of the senses". 
1 
In Coleridge's apparent appeal to the emotions and 
the thoughts which arise out of them, two things may be 
discerned. One is that he is trying to incorporate man's 
emotional responses into his system. He is not looking 
for an escape from the difficulties of an objective argu- 
ment by appealing. to that which is subjective. Any truly 
metaphysical system for Coleridge would have to explore 
"the laws of the WHOLE considered as ONE". 
2 
and this 
would include not only the whole universe considered in 
its finite and infinite aspects, but also the whole man 
(intellect plus emotions) and, when considering art in 
terms of metaphysics, the whole created work (the 
relation of part to whole in the poem). The second point 
is that for Coleridge there was no alternative to 
incorporating emotions in his plan: the only way to leap 
the gap between symbol and meaning is by thoughts and 
emotions. The truths which lie in the Primary Imagination 
of God and which reside in the individual consciousness 
(or primary imagination of man) are living truths, just 
as imagination is a "living power", 
3 
and cannot be 
immediately or directly translated into words. 
Coleridge's ideas on Beauty in art seem related 
to his notions of absolute Laws residing in the Primary 
Imagination of God, and again the emphasis is placed on 
intuition: 
The Beautiful arises from the perceived 
harmony of an object, whether sight or 
sound, with the inborn and constitutive 
rules of the judgement and imagination: 
and it is always intuitive. 
He connects the Beautiful with "calling on the soul which 
receives instantly, and welcomes it as something con- 
natural. "5 In numerous places elsewhere in his criticism 
1 See: The Statesman's Manual, 113-114. 
2 The Statesman's Manual, 69. 
3 The Statesman's Manual, 69. 
4 "On the Principles of Genial Criticism", 
BL, II1 243. 
5 . loc. cit. 
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Coleridge connects Beauty with the pleasure in art which 
arises from reconciliation of opposites or the principle 
of "MultUity in Unity. "1 When Coleridge points to the 
universality and unity of Shakespeare's art he seems to 
be suggesting the manner in which 'one graceful and 
intelligent whole' intuitively awakens the mind to its 
spiritual source. 
Poetry, through the function of the secondary 
imagination and resultant emotions, serves Coleridge's 
ultimate goal of discovering the IDEAS or absolute laws 
which are the source of our being. This seems to have 
been what Coleridge had in mind in Biographia when he 
outlined what he saw as the challenge for natural 
philosophy: 
The highest perfection of natural philosophy 
would consist in the perfect spiritualization 
of all the laws of nature into laws of 
intuition and intellect. The phaenomena 
(the material) must wholly disappear, aný 
the laws alone (the formal) must remain. 
The course Coleridge is proposing is the one we have 
already traced in his hierarchy of the faculties. We 
have seen the movement from the material world and the 
Method of Theory to the spiritual world and the Method 
of Law. In light of Coleridge's comment above it might 
be said that poetry does not only supply the emotional 
complement to his metaphysical system, but assists in the 
spiritualization of an intellectual process which began 
with our initial sensory impressions and moved upwards 
through the mind's use of the Methods of Theory and Law. 
Coleridge goes on to point out the ultimate goal of 
natural philosophy: 
The theory of natural philosophy would then 
be completed, when all nature was demon- 
strated to be identical in essence with 
that, which in its highest known power 
exists in man as intelligence and self- 
consciousness; when the heavens and the earth 
shall declare not only the power of their 
1 See for instance, "On Poesy or Art", ßL, II9 
262; and "On the Principles of Genial Crifiicisra", L, 
II, 230 & 232. 
2 BL, It 175; (Everyman, 146). 
2E4 
maker, but the glory and the presence 
of their God, even as he appeared to 
the great prophet during the vision of l 
the mount in the skirts of his divinity. 
In the poetic realm the same process of spirit- 
ualizing the intellectual process is discussed concern- 
ing the goal of tragedy: 
The ideal of earnest poetry consists in 
the union and harmonious melting down, 
the fusion of the sensual into the 
spiritual, of the man as an animal into 
man as a- power of reason and self-govern- 
ment, which we have represented to us 
most clearly in the plastic art, or 
statuary, where the perfection of form 
is an outward symbol of inward perfection 
and the most elevated ideas, where the 
body is wholly penetrated by the soul, and 
spiritualized even to a state of glory. 
Like a perfectly transparent body, the 
matter, in. its own nature darkness, becomes 
[altogether a] vehicle and fixture of light, 
a means of developing [its] beauties [? ] 
and unfolding its unity into all its ... [? 
] 
wealth of various colors without disturb[ance ?] 
... [? 
] or division of parts. 2 
The same spiritualizing process-is discussed in Biographia 
concerning Shakespeare: 
What then shall we say? even this; that 
Shakespeare, no mere child of nature; no 
automaton of genius; no passive vehicle 
of inspiration possessed by the spirit, 
not possessing it; first studied patiently, 
meditated deeply, understood minutely, till 
knowledge, become habitual and intuitive, 
wedded itself to his habitual feelings, and 
at length gave birth to that stupendous 
power by which he stands alone, with no 
equal or second in his own class; to that 
power which seated him on one of the two 
glory-smitten summits of the poetic mount- 
ain, with Milton as his compeer, not rival. 
While the former darts himself forth, and 
passes into all the forms of human character 
and passion, the one Proteus of the fire and 
the flood; the other attracts all forms and 
things to himself, into the unity of his own 
IDEAL. All things and modes of action shape 
themselves anew in the being of MILTON; while 
SHAKESPEARE becomes all things, yet for ever 
remaining himself. 
1 BL, I, 176; (Everyman, 146). 
2 . CSC, 
It 170-1. 
3 BL, II1 19-20; (Everyman, 180). 
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It has often been a stumbling block for critics 
that Coleridge proposed pleasure as the distinguishing 
feature of poetry: "A poem is that species of composition, 
which is opposed to works of science, by proposing for 
its immediate object pleasure, not truth .... "ý' 
M. M. Badawi, for instance, suggests that there is a 
contradiction between the pleasure principle of poetry 
and Coleridge's idea that the poetic imagination is 
concerned with providing a mode of apprehending reality. 
Badawi sees the contradiction as evidence of the inadequacy 
of the pleasure theory, and maintains that it was an 
inadequacy of which Coleridge himself was aware. 
2 
Perhaps Coleridge's pleasure principle has been a stumbling 
block because pleasure, as Coleridge means it, has not 
been understood as a means of apprehending reality in 
itself. For Coleridge, pleasure is another way of talk- 
ing about those thoughts and feelings which arise out of 
the emotional excitement offered by the secondary 
imagination and which end "in the perfect spiritualization 
of all the laws of nature". It is through pleasure that 
the spiritualization takes place. Pleasure is the 
immediate end of poetry because it is only through 
experiencing that pleasure that absolute truth, or know- 
ledge of Law, could ever be discovered. 
What does Coleridge say about the pleasure of 
poetry? He describes it as "that pleasurable emotion, 
that peculiar state and degree of excitement, which arises 
in the poet himself in the act of composition". 
3 In this 
state, he goes on to say, there "is produced a more vivid 
reflection of the truths of nature and of the human heart, 
united with a constant activity modifying and correcting 
these truths by that sort of pleasurable emotion, which 
the exertion of all our faculties gives in a certain 
degree. "4 Further, this is the state "which permits the 
production of a highly pleasurable whole, of which each 
part shall also communicate for itself a distinct and 
1 BL, II, 10; (Everyman, 172). 
2 Badawi, 41-42. 
3 CSc, It 163-4. 
4 CSC, I, 164. 
286 
conscious pleasure ". 
l Coleridge clarifies that it is 
an "intellectual pleasure" about which he speaks. He 
takes up the topic of pleasure again in Biographia 
where he makes many of the same points. In addition 
he points out that the reader is carried to the same 
heights as the poet and by the same means: 
The reader should be carried forward, not 
merely or chiefly by the mechanical 
impulse of curiosity, or by a restless 
desire to arrive at the final solution; 
but by the pleasurable activity of mind 
excited by the attractions of the journey 
itself. 2 
In the same place Coleridge elaborates on the effect of 
pleasure in the reader, and it is akin to the pleasure 
of self-harmony: 
The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, 
with the subordination of its faculties to 
each other, accordng to their relative 
worth and dignity. 
Coleridge had claimed that the self-consciousness 
of the transcendental philosopher "is not a kind of 
being, but a kind of knowing, and that too the highest 
and farthest that exists for us"". 
4 Coleridge includes 
the best poets, and presumably their readers, under the 
category of transcendental philosophers and he regards 
poetry as the medium of that highest kind of knowledge. 
Coleridge was not concerned that his system demanded 
something which might be regarded as subjective affirm- 
ation on the part of his students. After all, did not 
nature demand the same? Was not God in nature only 
affirmed or denied by individual experience? For Coleridge 
the absolute kind of knowledge could only be attained 
through a willingness to trust the logical progression 
of ideas to their source. How, it might be asked, was he 
sure when he had arrived at the source? The answer is 
indicated in an after-dinner conversation recorded by 
J. P. Collier on 21 October, 1E11". Coleridge was speaking 
on the subject of God: 
1 CSC, I, 16i.. - 
2 BL, II1 11; (Everyman, 173). 
3 BL, II1 12; (Everyman, 173-4). 
4 BL, It 187; (Everyman, 155). 
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... if any person asked him why he believed in the existence of a God, his answer was 
because he ought: but he would not attempt 
to prove the existence of God, as many did 
from his works: no: if he acknowledged a 
Creator, every feeling of his heart, every 
being in his works, were in harmony and 
vibrated with the notion: if he did not 
acknowledge a God, all was confusion and 
disorder. He therefore believed'in God 
because he ought, and could give ný other 
reason; nor would he seek for any. 
The unity and order of the creation aroused in Coleridge 
a deep intellectual pleasure. The experience stood as 
a revelation for him of God's ordering presence. 
Coleridge could find evidence of this presence, this 
absolute truth, in poetry as well as nature, and he 
expected others could as well. 
Poetry occupied a central position in Coleridge's 
metaphysics, and his metaphysics had a profound influence 
on his reading of poetry. Wordsworth and Shakespeare 
were Coleridge's examples of philosophical poets. Part 
of what he meant was that he found in their works an 
understanding (and use) of imagination similar to his own. 
A clearer indication of his meaning is hinted at in the 
phrase cited earlier, that Shakespeare "followed rules and 
principles that merit and stand the test of philosophic 
examination". 
2 The "rules and principles" that Coleridge 
singles out in Shakespeare's writing are in most cases 
identical with those which form the basis of his trans- 
cendental philosophy. These rules and principles include 
a concern for universal truths and first causes, the 
relation of cause and effect, unity, progression, the 
relation of part to whole, the relation of the material 
world to the spiritual world, the Methods of Theory and 
Law, the symbolic nature of imaginative language, and, 
perhaps most pervasive of all in influence, the reconcil- 
iation of opposites. 
1C on S, 39. 
2 CSC9 I, 78. 
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Coleridge's praise for Shakespeare is at times 
unbounded and he confesses, for instance concerning the 
quarrel of Brutus and Cassius in Julius Caesar (IV, iii), 
that he finds something of the superhuman or divine in 
Shakespeare: 
I* know no part of Shakespeare that more 
impresses on me the belief of his genius 
being superhuman than this scene. In 
the Gnostic heresy it might have been 
credited with less absurdity than most 
of their dogmas, that the Supreme had 
employed him to create previously to 
his function'of representing. l 
In another place Coleridge said that the poet produces 
"a more vivid reflection of the truths of nature and 
of the human heart"2 presumably than nature itself, and 
this certainly applied to Shakespeare in his opinion: 
"[Shakespeare is] a geniune Proteus; we see all things 
in him, as images in a calm lake, most distinct, most 
accurate, - only more splendid, more glorified. "3 In 
Shakespeare Coleridge finds the ability to go beyond the 
individual to the universal, beyond the particular truths 
of and object, character, or emotion, to truths which are 
universally applicable or of universal interest.. In one 
of the 1808 lectures,, Coleridge speaks of the manner in 
which Shakespeare "elevates and instructs" (a phrase 
which, incidentally, Hunt had used when speaking of 
imagination in Critical Essays, which had just been pub- 
lished). As Coleridge said, "Instead of referring to our 
ordinary, situations and common feelings, he [Shakespeare] 
emancipates us from them and, when most remote from 
ordinary life, is most interesting. "4 Coleridge praises 
the care Shakespeare took in developing and contrasting 
his characters of Troilus and Cressida: 
... Shakespeare calls forth nothing from the mausoleum of history or the catacombs 
of tradition without. giving or eliciting 
some permanent and general interest, 
brings, forward no subject which e does 
not moralize or intellectualize. 
1 CSC, I, 18. 
2 CSC, I, 161. 
3 C sc, It 79. 
4 CSC, II, 18. 
5 CSC, it 109. 
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Coleridge praises the universality, yet he praises the 
particularity which accompanies it, as his comment on 
Hamlet's "To be, or not to be" soliloquy indicates: 
Of such universal interest, and yet to 
which of all Shakes eare's characters 
could it have [been] appropriately given 
but to Hamlet? For Jaques it would have 
been too deep; for Iago, too habitual a 
communion with the heart, that belongs 
or ought to belong, to all mankind. 1 
Elsewhere Coleridge again stressed the universal aspect 
of Shakespeare when he said that Shakespeare cannot be 
said "to have written for any stage but that of the 
universal mind. 112 
It is the consistent appropriateness of 
Shakespeare's art in producing and appealing to universal 
interests and truths which is of particular interest to 
Coleridge. Everything is done for a reason; nothing is 
-left to chance. Everything speaks to a broader concern 
beyond the immediate one. Coleridge scoffs at Dr. 
Johnson's suggestions on how to make Othello a regular 
tragedy and holds up Shakespeare as one who works with 
"the rules dictated by universal reason or the true 
common sense of mankind". 
3 Shakespeare rightly discarded 
the unities of time and place in favour of common sense, 
and as to the unity of action, Coleridge says, it would 
have been more "appropriately, as well as more intell- 
. igibly, entitled the unity of interest". 
4 Even this, he 
maintains, which cannot be considered a rule, was constant- 
ly observed by Shakespeare: 
It is not properly a rule, but in itself 
the great end, not on1yof the drama, but 
of the epic, lyric, even to the candle- 
flame cone of an epigram - not only of 
poetry, but of poesy in general, as the 
proper generic term inclusýve of all the 
fine arts, as its species. 
Rules, Coleridge points out, must always be remembered as 
the "means to ends" and instructs that "the end must be 
determined and understood before it can be known what the 
rules are or ought to be". 
6 
It is a comment similar to 
i CSC, 1, 29. 
2 CSC, I, 4. 
3 CSC, I. 4+9-50. 
4 CSC, I, 50. 
5 csc, I, 50. 
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his maxim in Biographia concerning philosophical works: 
"Until you understand a writer's ignorance, presume 
yourself ignorant of his understanding 
Coleridge always sought Shakespeare's understand- 
ing of his own works before he passed judgement, and he 
expected that the ends of works would be different. To 
compare any works on the basis of absolute rules instead 
of principles arising from within the work he suggested 
was like trying to compare the swan and the dove which 
are both "transcendently beautiful": 
As absurd as it would be to institute a 
comparison between their separate claims 
to beauty from an abstract rule common 
to both, without reference to the life 
" and being of the animals themselves ... 
not less absurd is it to pass judgement 
on-the works of a poet on ... any ground indeed save that of their inappropriate- 
ness to their own end and being, their 
want of significance, as symbol and 
physiognomy. 
Coleridge is advocating an organic approach to poetry that 
treats each work as having a life of its own and operat- 
ing by its own rules. In his own criticism he applied 
this attitude not only to the, genres of comedy, tragedy 
and what he called modern comedy, which obviously would 
have different ends with each "founded on principles of 
its own"3, but also to individual works, or characters 
or lines within those works. 
Throughout Coleridge's criticism there are 
recurring indications of his looking for the particular 
way in which a play, a character, or lines operate by 
their own principles - it is too basic to his approach 
to be otherwise. A few immediate examples might serve 
to clarify how this principle of the organic nature of 
art manifests itself in his criticism. For instance, he 
notes the absence of any punning in Macbeth and finds the 
reason. for it in the play at large: "Entire absence of 
comedy, nay, even of irony and philosophic contemplation 
in Macbeth - because wholly tragic. ,4 He says this with 
1 BL, I, 160; (Everyman, 134). 
2 CSC, S, 196. 
3 CSC, It 172. 
4 CSCt 
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the exception of the Porter scene which he believes to be an 
interpolation. 
1 Concerning Lear Coleridge notes that 
it is "the only serious performance of Shakespeare the 
interest and situations of which are derived from the 
assumption of a gross improbability", 
2 
namely, the 
conduct of Lear. In a serious play like Lear 
improbability could damage the work's unity, but Coleridge 
found that in this case, and in a similar one in Merchant 
of Venice with the "pound of flesh", Shakespeare had 
avoided damaging the life of the play. He gave two reasons: 
firstly, the-stories were popular - they were "without 
any of the effects of improbability". Secondly, the 
scenes provided simply a canvas or an occasion for the 
action - "The accidental is nowhere the groundwork of 
the passions". 
3 
Coleridge normally rebelled against any 
accident in the plot of a play, but when he found one in 
Hamlet - Hamlet's capture by pirates - he found that 
Shakespeare was justified and the reason lay in Hamlet's 
e- pkrsonality: 
Almost the only play of Shakespeare, in 
which mere accidents, independent of all 
will, form an essential part of the plot; 
but here how judiciously in keeping with 
the character of the over-meditative 
Hamlet, ever at last determined by accident 
or by a fit of passion. 4 . 
Coleridge looks for the reason that Ophelia is re-intro- 
duced at the end of IV, v, and-discovers it is Laertes: 
"Shakespeare evidently wishes as mach as possible to 
spare the character of Laertes, tö break the extreme 
turpitude of his consent to become an agent and accomplice 
of the king's treacheries". 
5 Because of the repetition 
of the word'mermaid' in the lines from Julius Caesar: 
So many mermaids, tended her i' the eyes, 
And made their bends adornin s; at the helm 
A seeming mermaid steers 
(II, 
ii, 211-213) 
Coleridge finds the lines impaired. He has so much faith 
in the appropriateness of Shakespeare's usual choice of 
1 CSC, It 77. 
2 CSC, It 59. 
3 csc, It 59. 
4 CSC, It 35. 
5 CSC, It 35. 
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phrase that he suggests an error is present in the 
text: 
I* strongly suspect that Shakespeare wrote 
either "sea-queens, " or rather "sea brides" 
[instead of "so many mermaids"]. He never, 
I think, would have so weakened by useless 
anticipation the fine image following -- 
.... at the 'helm A seeming mermaid -- 1 
Elsewhere, when Coleridge half-heartadly suggests an 
alteration to one of Shakespeare's lines which would 
improve its meter, he reminds himself: 
... Shakespeare never avails himself of 
the supposed licence of transposition 
merely for the metre. There is always 
some logic eitýer of thought or passion 
to justify it. 
" That each work had its own 'life' and operated 
by its own principles of course implied that each work 
was a unity. The unity Coleridge found in Shakespeare's 
works was the same unity he found in nature. As he says, 
in his first lecture at Bristol in 1813, 
[Shakespeare] is not to be tried by 
ancient and classic rules, but by the 
standard of his age. That law of unity 
which has its foundation, not in facti- 
tious necessity of custom, but in nature 
herself, is instinctively observed by 
Shakespeare. 
In Coleridge's early poetry, for instance in 
"Religious Musings" and "The.. Eolian Harp" - written when 
Coleridge was closest to pantheism - the unity in poetry 
and nature was seen directly as the unity of God. Again, 
in Coleridge's first distinction of imagination and fancy 
in 1802, the imagination of the Hebrew poets was soon 
giving each thing a life of its own, yet each demonstrated 
what Coleridge called the "one Life". In the parallels 
Coleridge draws between the unity in nature and the unity 
in Shakespeare's art, the same kind of connection to the 
"one Life" is suggested. 
Coleridge draws explicit parallels between the 
unity in nature and the unity in Shakespeare's art. In 
a discussion of Romeo and Juliet, Coleridge comments: 
l CSC, I, $8. 
2 CSC, 2,16. 
3 CSC, II, 265. 
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... the harmon[ies] that strike us in the wilde, -t landscapes ... are 
effected by a single energy, modified 
ab intra in each component part. Now 
astet its is the particular excellence 
of the Shakespearean dramas generally, 
so is it especially characteristic of 
the Romeo and Juliet. 1 
Elsewhere Coleridge suggests a parallel between the 
unity displayed in the characterisation of Hamlet. The 
parts of the cathedral, he says, 
... are in themselves very sharply distinct 
and separate, and this distinction and 
separation of the parts is counter- 
balanced only by the multitude and 
variety of those parts, by which the 
attention is bewildered; - whilst the 
whole, or that there is a whole produced, 
is altogether a feeling in which the 
several thousand distinct impressions 
lose themselves as in a universal 
solvent. 2 
Coleridge goes on to suggest that the unity in a Gothic 
cathedral, as in Hamlet, is like that found in nature, 
"in a prospect from a mountain's top": "[T]horn is, 
indeed, a unity, an awful oneness; - but it is [a unity], 
because all distinction evades the eyes. "3 
In the first Bristol lecture of 1813 Coleridge 
spoke specifically of two unities he found in Shakespeare. 
He spoke, of a "unity of feeling" which pervades all of 
Shakespeare's plays and gives the example of Romeo and 
Juliet: 
In Romeo and Juliet all is youth and 
spring - it is youth with its follies, 
its virtues, its precipitancies; it is 
spring with its odours, flowers, and 
transiency: - the same feeling commences, 
goes through, and ends the play. 4 
Coleridge also speaks of a "unity of character which 
pervades the whole of his dramas", and points to the 
consistent eagerness and hastiness of the Capulets and 
Montagues, though they are old; he points to Romeo with 
his "precipitate change of passion, his hasty marriage, 
1 CSC9 , I, 5" 
2 CYIC, 149. 
3 CM C, 149-150. 
4 CSC9 II, 265. 
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and his rash death, [which] are all the effects of 
youth", and he points to the "tender and melancholy" 
loveof Juliet which is consistent to the and where 
"it ends with a. long deep sigh, like the breeze of 
the evening". 
" 
The unity to which Coleridge most frequently 
returns in his criticism is the unity of nature found in 
Shakespeare. No writer equalled Shakespeare, Coleridge 
claimed, in use of what he called "the language of 
nature": 
2 
So correct was it that we could see 
ourselves in all he wrote; his style 
and manner had also that felicity, that 
not a sentence could be read without 
its being discovered if it were 
Shakespearean. In observations of 
living character ... [and] in drawing from his own heart .... Shakespeare 
excelled .... [consider] the great 
characters of. Othello, Iago, Hamlet, 
and Richard III.; as he never could 
have witnessed anything similar, he 
appears invariably to have asked him- 
self, How should I ct or speak in 
such circumstances? 
The question that Coleridge imagined Shakespeare to ask 
was the same question that Coleridge asked himself when 
he was reading or viewing a play. The basic criteria 
of the 'language of nature' was how natural does the 
language appear to me; the fact that Shakespeare succeeded 
in this for so many people was further proof, not only 
of the unity of his work with nature but also of the 
universality of his work. Coleridge further discusses 
the language of nature in his notes on the first act of 
Hamlet, particularly concerning the minute sounds that 
drew the attention of Francisco while he stood on watch. 
Coleridge found a psychological truth, or what he called 
"philosophic pertinency", 
4 in Shakespeare's detail: 
The attention to minute sounds, - naturally 
associated with the recollection of minute 
objects, and the more familiar and trifling, 
I CSC, II, 265. 
2 CSC, II, 267. 
3 CSC, II, 267. 
4 CSC, It 42. 
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the more impressive from the unusual- 
ness of their producing any impression 
at all .... 
1 
Beyond that, Coleridge finds another purpose in the 
conversation: 
... commonness in ordinary conversation tends to produce the sense of reality, 
and at once hides the poet and yet 
approximates the reader or spectator 
to that state in which the highest poetry 
will appear [i. e. imagination,, and in 
its component parts, tho' not in whole 
composition, really is the language of 
nature. If I should not speak it, I 
feel that I should be thinking it; the 
voice only is the poet's, the words are 
my own. 
Coleridge's meaning here seems to be that the natural- 
ness of the language helps to move him into the realm 
of the imagination. The characters' words express 
thoughts that he himself might have had were he placed 
in their situations, and this heightens the imaginative 
power of-the work. 
Another aspect of natural unity in Shakespeare's 
work which Coleridge points to is the way in which 
descriptions unfold to the eye as they would were one 
actually present in the scene. The comment comes in the 
course of discussing imagination in Shakespeare: 
In its tranquil and purely pleasurable 
operation, it acts chiefly by producing 
out of many things, as they would have 
appeared in the description of an ordinary 
mind, described slowly and in unimpassioned 
succession, a oneness, even as nature, the 
greatest of poets, acts upon us when we 
open our eyes upon an extended prospect. 
3 
The example he chooses to illustrate this remark are 
the lines from Venus and Adonis describing Adonis's 
flight from the enamoured goddess: "Look! how a 
bright star shooteth from the sky, / So glides he in 
the night from Venus' eye". (11.815-6) Here he marvels 
at the "many images and feelings" which are "brought 
together without effort and without discord. "4 Another 
1 CSC, I, 42. 
2 CSC, I, 42-43. 
3 CSC, I, 213. 
4 CSC, I, 213. 
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example of Shakespeare's natural unfolding of his topic 
Coleridge finds in a brief conversation between Brabantio 
and Othello where the latter is warned to beware of 
Desdemona (I, iii, 292-4). Events seem to be fore- 
shadowed, even as they sometimesappear to be in real life: 
In real life how do we look back to 
little speeches, either as presentimental 
[of], or most contrasted with, an affect- 
ing event. Shakespeare, as secure of 
being read over and over, of becoming a 
family friend, how he provides this for 
his readers, and leaves it to them. 1 
A. firther example is the natural movement of Lear which 
Coleridge compares with "the hurricane and the whirl- 
pool, absorbing while it [i. e. the play] advances. It 
begins as a stormy day in summer, with brightness; but 
that brightness is lurid, and anticipates the tempest". 2 
When Coleridge speaks of the reality of nature 
which permeates Shakespeare's art, he is not referring 
to a strict, factual reality, but rather to nature 
modified by emotion. To try for a strict factual reality, 
he says at one point, 
[is] never attainable, and, if attainable, 
would disappoint the very pur oses and 
ends of the drama, demonstrat[ing] not 
good sense, but an utter want of all 
imagination, a deadness to that necessary 
pleasure, -the being innocently - shall I 
say, deluded? -- no: but drawn away from 
ourselves into the music of nob3est 
thoughts in' harmonizing sounds. 
Coleridge's belief that imagination provides a "more 
vivid reflection of the truths of nature and of the 
human heart"4 is re-stated in Diographia. He points to 
the "union of deep feeling with profound thought; the 
fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative 
faculty. in modifying the objects observed"5 and praises 
particularly those instances in which imagination lifts 
to the ideal world those "forms, incidents, and situations, 
of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all. 
the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew-drops". 
6 
1 CSC, It 49. 
2 CSC, It 54. 
3 -C_, It 79. 
4 csC, I, i6i.. 
5 BL, It 59; (Everyman, 48). 
6 BL, It 59; (Everyman. 48-9). 
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It was exactly that which Coleridge had praised in the 
lines at the beginning of Hamlet: "I have heard, /The 
cock, that is the trumpet to the morn, /Doth with his 
lofty and shrill-sounding throat/Awake the god of day. " 
(I, i, 149-52). Coleridge's brief comment was this: 
"how to elevate a thing almost mean by its familiarity, 
young poets may learn in the cock-crow. "1 
I 
Unity is the ultimateai of Coleridge Is, meta- 
physical system. He aims at an, awareness of the Oneness 
or Wholeness of Creation and a recognition of the creative 
benevolent intelligence of God behind all creation. In- 
sofar as poetry serves the same purpose, in fact provides 
part of the means of attainment of that end, the unity 
of Creation is also its concern. On another level, 
however, the unity of the poem, in Coleridge's system, 
should be seen as analogous to the unity of God's creation, 
even as the imagination of man is analogous to God's 
creative power. It is to be expected that what Coleridge 
applies to Creation in his sytem he will also apply, in 
some manner, to poetry in his criticism. 
In Coleridge's hierarchical arrangement of the 
faculties there was a line drawn half-way. This line, it 
was argued earlier, separated not only Sense, Fancy, and 
Understanding from Understanding Imagination and Reason, 
but also the material world from the primarily spiritual 
and the Method of Theory from the Method of Law. One of 
the features common to both Theory and Law, and which 
served as a basis for Coleridge's understanding of Method, 
was that the mind had a natural inclination to look for 
a cause for every effect and a natural inclination to find 
unity. The difference between Theory and Law was essentially 
1 CSC, I, 21. 
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. 
that Theory looked for natural laws to explain phenomena 
but did not look beyond those, as did the Method of Law, 
for an antecedent principle. But Coleridge recognised 
that in order for the mind to move from Theory to Law, 
a principle of progression was required. Thus he defined 
Method as. 'a principle of unity with progression'. This 
idea of progression, (actually formulated first very 
early in Coleridge's career) when taken in conjunction 
with the idea of unity formed an important part of his 
approach to Shakespeare. 
Coleridge's idea of progression as applied to 
poetry is perhaps best suggested in the seventh of his 
lectures of 1811-1812, immediately following a short 
discussion of reconciliation of opposites: 
These were the grandest effects, where the 
imagination was called forth, not to pro- 
duce a distinct form, but a strong working 
of the mind still producing what it still 
repels, and again calling forth what it 
again negatives, and the result is what 
the Poet wishes to impress, to substitute 
a grand feeling of the unimaginable for a 
mere image. 1 
The/imagination "still producing what it still repels" 
presents a picture of unceasing progression on the part 
of the poet toward the unity which is his goal in a work, 
while the same progressing movement would be experienced 
by the reader. The progression Coleridge talks about in 
his criticism is not just the progression of story or 
plot, although that has much to do with his meaning. 
Rather it is a movement towards the ideal, the progression 
from the material or sensual world (where Theory operates) 
to the imaginative realm (where Law functions). Coupled 
with this it is a progression which does not permit undue 
dwelling on each component part of the whole work: instead 
each part assists in moving the reader -forward with 
anticipation while providing interest in its own right 
the kind of attraction-repulsion paradox Coleridge was 
hinting at above. 
Indications of Coleridge's belief in unity with 
progression in his criticism often appear concerning 
specific lines of images. It is this principle which 
guides Coleridge in determining which lines belong to 
Shakespeare: 
i c. on s_ 82. 
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To distinguish what is legitimate in 
Shakespeare from what does not belong to 
him, we must observe his varied images 
symbolical of moral truth, thrusting by 
and seeming to trip up each other, from 
an impetuosity of thought, producing a 
metre which is always flowing from one 
verse into the other, and seldom closing, 
with the tenth syllable of the line .... 
He maintained that this cascading movement of thought 
from line to line was characteristic of Shakespeare's 
early and later works, and was so clearly to be seen that 
in Pericles, ' "written a century before, but [altered by 
Shakespeare] .... his alteration may 
be recognised even 
to half a line. "2 Coleridge questions the authenticity 
of two lines in Antony's speech to the body of Caesar: 
"0 world, thou wast the forest to this hart.; /And this, 
indeed, 0 world, the heart of thee" (III11,208-9). 
He doubts the authenticity because of the rhythm and 
because there is not the same kind of progression he usually 
finds in Shakespeare's associative thought: 
I* doubt these lines: not because they 
are vile; but first, on account of the 
very rhythm, which is not Shakespearian 
but just the very tune of some old play, 
from which the actor might have interpolated 
them; and secondly, because they interrupt 
not only the sense and connection, but like- 
wise the flow both of the passion and (what 
is with me still more decisive) the Shakespearean 
link of association .... we have only to 
read the passage without it to see that it 
never was in it. 
3 
Coleridge goes on to point out why the particular conceit 
of the hart Antony uses - and which he had first used 
three lines earlier in line 205 - is so unlike Shakespeare: 
Conceits he has, but they not [only] rise 
out of some word in the lines before, but 
they lead to te thought in the lines 
follow ni g. Here it is a mere alien; 
Antony forgets an image, when he is even 
touching it; and recollects it when the 
thought last in h4s mind must have led 
him away from it. 
1 CSC, II, 267-8. 
2 CCSCC, TT 268. 
3 CSC, It 17. 
4 CSCr I, 17. 
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There are numerous instances in which Coleridge 
points to the principle of unity with progression 
operating beyond the scope of individual lines. It is 
found in the progression to the ideal in the various 
parts of Shakespeare's world. In Othello, Shakespeare 
defends the first act at Venice because it assists in 
this process: 
Confirmation of my reason: in how many 
ways is not Othello made, -first, our 
acquaintance - then friend - then object 
of anxiety - before the deep interest is 
to be approached. So the storm, etc. 1 
Coleridge finds a similar kind of progression in Hamlet 
where he finds the "gradual ascent from the simplest 
forms of conversation to the language of impassioned 
intellect". 2 Coleridge charts this rise from what he 
suggests is the senses toward the ideal in another place 
in his criticism of Hamlet: 
[The opening language] is the language 
of sensation among men .... the armour, the dead si ence, the watchfulness that first interrupts it, the welcome relief 
of guard, the cold, the broken expressions 
as of a man's compelled attention to bodily 
feelings allowed no man, - all excellently 
accord with and prepare for the after 
gradual rise into tragedy - but above all into a tragedy the interest of rhich is 
eminently ad et apud intra .... 
Coleridge sees the Sergeant's speech in the second act 
of Macbeth assisting the progression of the play to the 
tragic level by substituting (as he notes was done with 
the play in Hamlet) the epic for the tragic, "in order to 
make the latter be felt as the real-life diction". 
4 
Edgars madness in Lear assists the progression into Lear's 
madness, Coleridge suggests: "Edgar's false madness taking 
off part of the shock from the true, as well as displaying 
the profound difference. "5 The principle of Method was 
an indication to Coleridge of rational thought and the 
right use of reason. So too, the absence of the principle 
1 CSC, It 51. 
2 CSC, I, 6^,. 
3 CSC, I, 20. 
4 CSC, I, 67. 
5 Csc, I, 65. 
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of unity with progression indicated irrational thought, 
as witnessed in the contrast between Edgar and Lear: 
In Edgar's ravings Shakespeare all the 
while lets you see a fixed purpose, a 
practical end in view; - in Lears, there 
is only the brooding of one anguish, an 
eddy without progression. 1 
An integral part of Coleridge's thinking on the 
subject of unity with progression in poetry is his 
understanding of the relation of part to whole in a com- 
position. As he said in numerous places when defining 
poetry: "external nature and human thoughts and affections" 
must work "to the production of as great 'i., ediate pleasure 
in each part as is compatible with the largest possible 
sum of pleasure on the whole". 
2 Man's ability to sub- 
ordinate one part to another or to the whole, he suggests 
at one point, is what "constitutes our pafection". 
3 
Excessive pleasure in any part of a composition would 
draw away from the whole and the progression of the work 
would be interrupted. Instead, each part must be in 
harmony with the whole, and the distinction he makes is 
between the mechanical talent and the imaginative genius: 
The distinction, or rather the essential 
difference, betwixt the shaping skill of 
mechanical talent, and the creative, 
productive life-power of inspired genius: 
in the former each part is separately con- 
ceived and then by a succeeding act put 
together - not as watches are made for 
wholesale - for here each part supposes a 
preconception of the whole in some mind .... but as the pictures on a motley screen. 
The imaginative genius like Shakespeare produced a 
harmony like that found in nature, "effected by a single 
energy, modified ab intra in each component part. "5 The 
effect of this harmony in a work was to fuse the various 
parts or feelings into one whole. Coleridge had described 
the poet in Biographia as one who ! 'diffuses a tone and 
spirit of unity that blends and (as it were) fuß, each 
into each". 
6 That action is further described by Coleridge 
l_ csc, I, 65. 
2 CSC, It 254. 
C on s, 54-537- 
3 C on S, 84. 
4 CsC, It 4-5. 
5 csc, It 5. 
6 -BL, II, 12; 
See also CSC, I, 16tß and 
(Everyman, 17I). 
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when discussing Shakespeare's imagination and Kind; Lear: 
... imagination ... the power 
by which 
one image or feeling is made to modify 
many others and by a sort of fusion to 
force many into one - that whi'ch after 
s ewe itself in such might and energy 
in Lear, where the deep anguish of a 
father spreads the feeling of ingratitude 
and cruelty over the very elements of heaven. 
The same anguish served to bring Lear entirely into the 
sympathy of the audience, with dislike of him for his 
faults being fused into the greater feeling of pity: 
All Lear's faults increase our pity. 
We refuse to know them otherwise than 
as means and aggravations of his suffer- 
ings and his daughters' ingratitude. 
In the character of Richard II Coleridge also finds 
elements which fuse the play together, for Richard's 
development in the course of the play runs parallel to 
that of others, most notably York's: 
This species [found in York] of accidental 
and adventitious weakness is brought into 
parallel with Richard's continually increas- 
ing energy of thought, and as constantly 
diminishing power of acting; - and thus it 
is Richard that breathes a harmony and a 
relation into all the characters of the play. 
3 
In another criticism of Richard II, Coleridge similarly 
notes that Shakespeare "presents the germ of all the after 
events, in Richard's insincerity, partiality, arbitrari- 
ness, favoritism, and in the proud, tempestuous temperament 
of his barons. "4 
The manner in which the imagination, as Coleridge 
saw it, acts to fuse disparate elements in poetry is best 
understood within the context of reconciliation of opposites. 
It was argued when discussing reconciliation of opposites 
in the first section of this thesis that the phrase was 
often misunderstood, and care should be taken that those 
same misunderstandings should not be brought to his 
criticism. Reconciliation of opposites does not produce 
something static. Coleridge emphasised that imagination 
was essentially vital and the product of its action in 
1CC, I, 212-213. 
2 CSC, is 65. 
3 CSC, It 150- 
4 CSC I, 153. 
3 03 
reconciliation of opposites is likewise vital. Two 
things, or thoughts, or feelings of opposite nature 
are brought together each with their own distinct 
identities. They try to repel one another, but are un- 
able. Instead, there is some interpenetration of the two. 
As long as they are held together by the powers of imag- 
ination, they are engaged in this dynamic relationship. 
The product of this relationship is a new identity com- 
posed of the intermingling of the two opposites, while 
their separate identities are not entirely lost to sight. 
Thus reconciliation of opposites is best understood as an 
Sit 
action of the imagination which brings oppoie. es together 
and holds them in tension, forming a new dynamic identity. 
Coleridge's understanding of-poetic reconciliation of 
opposites is quite clear in this passage which discusses 
the reconciliation of Shakespeare's creative and intellectual 
powers: 
In Shakespeare's, Poems, the creative power and the intellectual energy wrestle as in 
a war embrace. Each in its excess of strength 
seems to threaten the extinction of the other. At length'in the DRAMA they were reconciled, 
and fought each with its shield before the 
breast of the other. Or like two rapid 
streams, that, at their first meeting within 
narrow and rocky banks mutually strive to 
repel each other and intermix reluctantly and 
in tumult; but soon finding a wider channel 
and more yielding shores blend, and dilate, 
and flow on in one current and with one voice. 
Coleridge's interest in reconciliation of opposites 
in Shakespeare is fully evident in his criticism. He notes 
that the suppression of Hamlet's feelings at I, ii, 74. 
prepares for their later overflow. 
2 He praises Shakespeare's 
repeated entrance of the ghost in Hamlet for reconciling 
or fusing the objective and the subjective: 
... the apparition itself has by its frequent 
previous appearances [prior to I, iv] been 
brought nearer to a thing of this world. 
This accrescence of objectivity in a ghost 
that yet retains all its ghostly attributes 
and fearful subjectivity, is truly wonderful. 
3 
1 BL, II, 1ý (Everyman, 1S0). 
2 CSC, It 23. 
3 -CSC, I, 25. 
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Coleridge chastises Theobald for trying to remove the 
contradiction in the III, i, 79-80: "The undiscover'd 
country from whose bourn/No traveller returns". For 
Coleridge the logical opposition provides room for 
imagination: the "apparent contradiction" he suggests 
need not be removed as it is "a great beauty"? 
Coleridge finds one contradiction in Hamlet which is not 
reconciled and which he regards as a weakness. The contra- 
diction occurs when the messenger announces to the kind the 
revolt of Laertes: 
Fearful* and self-suspicious as I always 
feel when I seem to see an error of judgement 
in Shakespeare, yet I cannot reconcile the 
cool, 'rational and consequential' reflection 
in these three lines (IV, v, 101-3) with the2 
anonymousness ox' the alarm of the messenger. 
Examples of reconciliations of opposites are 
found in Coleridge's criticism of other plays as well. 
In the friendship of Roderigo and Iago at the opening of 
Othello Coleridge finds a kind of reconciliation of 
opposites: 
The very three first lines happily state 
the nature and foundation of the friendship - 
the purse - as well [as] the contrast of' 
Roderigo's intemperance of mind with Iago's 
coolness, the coolness of a preconceiving 
experimenter. 3 
Opposed to Iago's strength of character is Roderigo: 
"the want of character and the power of the passions, - 
like the wind loudest in empty houses, form his character". 
4 
A similar bringing together of opposite characters at the 
beginning of Act I, vi of Macbeth contributes to the 
poetic effect: 
The lyrical movement with which this scene 
opens, and the free and unengaged mind of 
Banquo, loving nature, and rewarded in the 
love itself, form a highly dramatic contrast 
with the laboured rhythm and hypocritical 
over-much of Lady Macbeth's welcome, in which 
you cannot detect a ray of personal feeling, 
but all is th5own upon the 'dignities, ' the 
general duty. 
1 CSC, It 103. 
2 CSC, I, 34. 
3 CSC, I, 45. 
4 CSC 9 It 44-45. 
5 CSC, It 73. 
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Coleridge praises Richard II for the opposites 
brought together in the character of Richard - 
The consequent alternation of unmanly 
despair and of ungrounded hope; and through- 
out the rapid trinsition from one feeling 
to its opposite. 
and in the character of Bolingbroke, as seen in his 
speech at III, iii, 31-61, where he kisses Richard's hand - 
The fine struggle of haughty sense of 
power and ambition with the necessity 2 
of dissimulation in Bolingbroke's speech. 
Yet in spite of the beauties in the play, Coleridge 
felt it unsuited for the stage. The reason, apart 
from the length and number of long speeches which he 
mentions, might have been that the play presented events 
in their 'reconciled' state, instead of allowing the 
tensions to be worked out in front of the audience: 
... 
(with one exception) the events are 
all historical, presented in their results, 
not produced By acts seen, or hat take 
place before the audience .... 
The function of reconciliation of opposites was 
not limited to tragedy in Coleridge's view, but was a 
property of any work which strived for the ideal. There 
were large differences between comedy and tragedy in 
both Greek and Shakespearean art, he maintained, "But 
as immediate struggle of contraries supposes an arena 
common to both [genres], so both were alike ideal ... "4 
An example of reconciliation of opposites in Shakespeare's 
comedies is found at the beginning of The Tempest, where 
the two roles of Prospero - Prospero the 'magician' and 
Prospero the 'father' - are brought together and the 
audience's possible dislike of one is reconciled with its 
liking of the other: 
Observe ... the perfect probability of the 
moment chosen by Prospero (the very Shakes- 
peare himself, as it were, of the tempest) 
to open out the truth to his daughter, his 
own romantic bearing, and how completely 
any thing that might have been disagreeable 
CSC, It 156. 
2 CSC, it 156. 
3 CSC, I, 142. 
4 CSC, I, ' 169. 
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to us in-the magician, is reconciled 
and shaded in the humanity and natural 
feelings of the father. 
Coleridge examines the speech of Biron at the end 
of Act IV of Love's Labor's Lost, as an example of elevated 
intellectual activity in the play and he points to two 
kinds of reconciliations of opposites which may be found: 
... sometimes you see this youthful god 
of poetry connecting disparate thoughts 
purely by means of resemblances in the 
words expressing them, -a thing in character in lighter comedy, especially of that kind 
in which Shakespeare delights, namely, the 
purposed display of wit, though sometimes, 
too, disfiguring his graver scenes; - but 
more often you may see him doubling the 
natural connection of order of logical 
consequence in the thoughts by the intro- 
duction of an artificial and flought for 
resemblance in the words .... 
The two kinds of union of disparate thought that Coleridge 
is talking about seem to be two kinds of punning. The 
first is based on the resemblance of sound between two 
words with different meanings. Presumably here the 
resemblance would be a natural one, for instance as is 
found between the words 'told' and 'tolled'. The second 
kind of play on words brings together two words which may 
be similar, but which are logically opposed, hence there 
is the doubling of meaning of which Coleridge speaks. 
The example of the latter which he gives, is the line, 
"And then grace us in the disgrace of death". He explains 
that this figure has "force and propriety, as justified 
by the law of passion" and that it excites the mind in 
"unusual activity" which seeks a release or an escape, 
or what Coleridge calls a "means to waste its superfluity". 
3 
Coleridge goes on to explain that there are two kinds of 
release possible: 
... in the. highest degree - in lyric 
repetitions and sublime tautology - (at 
her feet he bowed, he fell, he la 4-down; 
at her feet he bowed, he fell; where he 
Bowe there he fell down dead), - an , in lower degrees, in making the words 
themselves the subjects and materials of 
1 CSC, Is 133. 
2C SC, I, 95-96. 
3 CsC, I, 96. 
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that surplus action, and for the same 
cause that agitates our limbs, and 
forces our very gestures into a tempest 
in states of high excitement. - 
Reconciliation of opposites, apart from its 
centrality in helping to understand how the effects of 
imagination are poetically produced, is of central 
importance in understanding Coleridge's theory of drama- 
tic mimesis. 
Coleridge's discussion of dramatic mimesis is 
related directly to his understanding of secondary 
imagination leading man to an intuitive awareness of the 
primary imagination-of God. His theory of dramatic 
mimesis is essentially this: if drama is purely artificial, 
it will have little correspondence to reality, and will 
lack interest; and similarly, if it is a mere "copy" of 
nature, the interest will be minimal. The imagination is 
aroused when there is a difference between the represent- 
ation of the object and the object itself, a difference 
which at once suggests both identity and contrariety. 
2 
Coleridge talks about that difference in this passage: 
... drama is an imitation of reality, not 
a copy - and that imitation is contra- 
distinguished from copy by this: that a 
certain quantum of difference is essential 
to the former, and an indispensa. ble condition 
and cause of the pleasure we derive from it; 
while in a copy it is3a defect, contravening 
its name and purpose. 
The difference between that which represents and that 
which is represented is like the difference between symbol 
and thought in Coleridge's transcendental philosophy. The 
imagination spans the gap between the two and dim overs the 
nature of the thought behind the symbol. With drama, the 
opposites which need reconciliation are the play as fiction 
on the stage and the play as a representation of truth and 
reality. To accept the presentation as total truth or 
total falsehood would be wrong. A balance must be maintained: 
1 CsC, I, 96. 
2A useful discussion of "copy" versus 
"imitation" in Coleridge's thought may be found in 
J. R. de J. Jacksons' "Coleridge on Dramatic Illusion and 
Spectacle in the Performance of Shakespeare's {plays", 
NP, LXII (1964), 13-21. 
3 CSC, I, 127-8. 
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The mind of the spectator, or the reader .... is not to be deceived into any idea of 
reality, as the French critics absurdly 
suppose; neither, on the other hand, is 
it to retain a perfect consciousness of the 
falsehood of the presentation. There is a 
state of mind between the two, which may 
be properly called illusion .... 
Coleridge had touched on a similar point in one of his 
1811-1812 lectures, identifying the middle state as the 
proper, one for imagination: 
... there is an effort in the mind, when it would describe what it cannot satisfy 
itself with the description of, to re- 
concile opposites, and to leave a middle 
state of mind more strictly appropriate 
to the imagination than any other when 
it is hovering between two images: as 
soon as it is fixed on one it becomes 
understanding, and when it is wavering 
between them, attaching itself to neither, 
it is imagination. Such was the fine 
description of Death in Milton, 'Of 
Shadow like, but called Substance', etc. 
2 
Just as there is an appeal to the imagination in the 
difference between symbol and thought, so, too, there is 
that appeal in the difference between fiction and truth 
in drama. As soon as the imagination fastens on one or 
the other it becomes static and turns back into under- 
standing. This is perhaps the clearest picture of the 
imagination being called forth "not to produce a distinct 
form, but a strong working of the mind still producing 
what it still repels, and again calling forth what it 
again negatives. "3 
There are two re ons that Coleridge gives to S 
account for the mind's acceptance of the apparent reality 
of stage illusion. The first is Coleridge's well-known 
idea of the "willing suspension of disbelief". The second 
is the idea developed earlier in this chapter which has 
not been dealt with by others, that a reconciliation of 
opposites which produces illusion in art leads one to an 
awareness of the eternal consciousness of God. 
With regard to the first, Coleridge suggested 
that the apparent reality of stage illusion might be 
1 CSC, II, 321-2. 
2C on s, 82. 
3C on S, 82. 
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compared with the apparent reality of a dream: 
... as in a dream, the judgement is neither beguiled, nor conscious of the fraud, but 
remains passive. Whatever disturbs this 
repose of the judgement by its harshness, 
abruptness, and improbability, offends 
against dramatic propriety. 
It might be noted that in at least two places in 
Shakespeare Coleridge finds this repose of the judgement 
abruptly disturbed: the blinding of Gloucester, 2 
and the comic and tragic parts in Measure for Measure 
which he finds "disgusting" and "horrible", respectively. 
3 
There are three differences between the mind in 
the state of dreaming and the mind when it is involved 
in stage illusion. Coleridge says the first is that our 
dream images are more vivid because they are separate 
from all outward impressions. Next, sensations and the 
resultant emotions produce the images in dreams but with 
stage illusion (and the wakeful state in general), the 
inverse is true: the images presented to us give rise to 
our emotions. Lastly, with stage illusion the will comes 
into play in order to dismiss the act of judgement, and 
this is not necessary in dreams: 
... in sleep we pass at once by a sudden 
collapse into this suspension of will and 
the comparative power: whereas in an 
interesting play, read or represented, we 
are brought up to this point, as far as it 
is requisite or desirable, gradually, by. 
the art of the poet and the actors; and 
with the consent and positive aidance of 
our own will. We choose to be deceived. 
It was this which Coleridge was talking about in 
Biographic when he used the phrase "that willing sus- 
pension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes 
poetic faith". 
5 He cautions that all aspects of a play 
must work, by increasing the viewer's inward excitement, 
toward the "chief end, that of producing and supporting 
this willing illusion". 
6 Nonetheless, this does not mean 
1 CSC, 11, 322. 
2 CSC, I, 66. 
3 CSC, I, 113. 
4 CSC, I, 129. 
5 -BL, II, 6; (Everyr, ýan, 169). 
6 CSC, I, 130. 
310 
that the excellencies of the drama "therefore cease 
to be themselves ends, and as such carry their own 
justification with them as long as they do not contravene 
or interrupt the illusion. "' 
The second reason for the mind accepting the 
apparent reality of stage illusion is the metaphysical 
one. It is most clearly stated in a fragment which 
T. M. Raysor finds evidence of belonging to Coleridge's 
lectures of 1808.2 Coleridge is talking about the delight 
we feel when we find something in nature which looks 
artificial, or when something artificial (like a play) 
appears natural. The pleasure of the illusion created 
by reconciliation of opposites in both instances leads 
us to a feeling of the presence of the divine: 
Suffice it. that one great principle is 
common to all art, a principle which 
probably is the condition of all conscious- 
ness, without which we should feel and 
imagine only by discontinuous moments, and 
be plants or animals instead of men. I 
mean that ever-varying balance, or balancing, 
of images, notions, or feelings (for I avoid 
the vague word, idea) conceived as in 
opposition to each other; in short, the 
perception of identity and contrariety, 
the least degree of which constitutes 
likeness, the greatest[, ] absolute diff- 
erence but the infinite gradations between 
these two form all the play and all the 
interest of our intellectual and moral being, 
till it lead us to a feeling and an object 
more awful than it seems to me compatible 
with even the present subject to utter 
aloud, tho' most desirous to suggest it. 
3 
The thought at the beginning about reconciliation of 
opposites as 'the condition of all consciousness' is 
very close to Coleridge's formulation of primary imagination 
in Biographia. After the above passage Coleridge continues 
on immediately to suggest that'the "feeling and an object 
more awful" to which he is led by imagination in dramatic 
illusion is the principle of the eternal I AM: 
I CSC9 It 130. 
2 CSC, It 199. 
3 CSC, I, 204-5. In this quotation, and in 
the one which follows, I have left out T. M. Raysor's 
interpolations. 
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For there alone [i. e. in the feeling and 
object] are all things at once different 
and the same; there alone, as the principle 
of all things, does distinction exist 
unaided by division - will and reason, 
succession of time and unmoving eternity, 
infinite change and ineffable rest. 
Coleridge's ideas here again show a firm link between 
art and metaphysics: through dramatic art man becomes 
aware of the foundations of knowledge. 
Coleridge's philosophy had a pervasive influence 
on his criticism and is one of the factors contributing 
to the difference between Coleridge's criticism and 
that of his contemporaries. The influence of his philo- 
sophy and his particular ideas on imagination extend into 
subjects which the other critics approached with their 
own theories. When Coleridge discusses subjects like 
tragedy, tragic effect and characterisation in Shakespeare, 
critical application of his theory of imagination is 
more in line with that of his contemporaries. 
Like Hazlitt, Coleridge does not make a strict 
division between tragedy and comedy on the basis of 
imagination - at least in regard to Shakespearean drama. 
Coleridge does, however, make this distinction when he 
discusses Greek drama. In lecture notes from 1812 which 
T. M. Raysor indicates are heavily influenced by Schlegel, 
Coleridge uses his own language for imagination to define 
the ideal of tragedy. He says that "tragedy is poetry 
in its deepest earnest"2 and continues: "The ideal of 
earnest poetry consists in the union and harmonious melt- 
ing down, the fusion of the sensual into the spiritual. "3 
Greek comedy, in contrast, is "poetry in unlimited jest"4 
and its ideal is found "by making the animal the govern- 
1 CSC, I, 205. 
2 CSC, I, 169. 
3 CSC, It 170. 
4 CSC, I, 169. 
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ing power and the intellectual the mere instrument. "' 
The division Coleridge is making between poetry of 
imagination and poetry of the senses, is basically the 
same division Hunt and Lamb used to apply to Shakespearean 
tragedy and comedy respectively. Coleridge does not 
apply this distinction to Shakespeare. It should be 
noted, however, that while he extends imagination to 
comedy he does not directly connect imagination with wit 
and humour. Wit and humour in Coleridge's thought appeal 
to the faculties of sense, fancy, and understanding, 
2 
- 
those faculties orientated towards the material world 
in Coleridge's hierarchy of the faculties. 
Coleridge uses his ideas of imagination to support 
various divisions in his critical thought. For instance, 
he develops Schlegel's distinctions between classical and 
romantic into distinctions between art of an "elevated 
understanding" (perhaps the higher understanding in 
Coleridge's hierarchy) and art of imagination. Classical 
drama, he said, 
addressed eminently to the outward senses; 
and tho' both fable, language, and 
characters appealed to the reason rather 
than the mere understanding, inasmuch as 
they supposed-an ideal state rather than 
referred to an existing reality, yet it 
was a reason which must strictly accommodate 
itself to the senses, and so far become a 
sort of more elevated understanding. - 
The art of imagination which Coleridge goes on to describe, 
is almost identical to the formulations of the other 
Romantic critics, with the exception that Coleridge is 
not just talking about tragedy: 
... the romantic poetry, the Shakespearean drama, appealed to the imagination, rather 
than to the senses, and toýthe reason as 
contemplating our inward nature, the work- 
ings of the passions in their inmost 
retired recesses. 4 
The phrase "the workings of the passions in their inmost 
retired recesses" may have prompted Lambs similar comment 
1 CSC, I, 170. 
2 CIVIC, 112 & 117. 
3 CSC, I, 198. 
4 CSC, I, 198. See also C on S for further 
comparison of Shakespeare and the c assical drama. 
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about the inner workings of the mind, but it is impossible 
to tell 
1whether 
this passage was written before or after 
Lamb's. 
Coleridge makes other distinctions on the basis 
of imagination. He favoured the stage of Shakespeare's 
time as opposed to the ancient because the former forced 
author and actor "to appeal to the imagination, and not 
to the sense3". 
2 He suggested that he favoured the 
dramatic over the epic on the same kind of distinction. 
3 
Elsewhere he seemed to be talking about plays in which the 
ideal was dominant as opposed to the real. ' It might be 
noted that wherever the distinction between imagination- 
orientated art and sense-orientated art is operating, it 
is also possible to see the other metaphysical (and 
critical) distinction operating: the distinction between 
the spiritually-orientated Method of Law and the materially- 
orientated Method of Theory. 
Coleridge sees imagination characterising works 
which are not tragedies. The difference between imag- 
ination in tragedy for Coleridge and imagination else- 
where seems to be the point of one of his notebook entries 
in 1808. He talks about imagination "in its tranquil & 
purely pleasurable operation" and contrasts that with 
imagination when it is "passionate". In the former case, 
imagination acts, 
chiefly by producing with out of many 
things, as it would have appeared in the 
description of an ordinary mind, described 
slowly & in suee unimpassioned succession, 
a oneness/ even as Nature, the greatest of 
Poets, acts upon us when we op3n our eyes 
upon an extended prospect .... 
The example Coleridge gives of this is the lines from 
Venus and Adonis ("Look! how a bright star shooteth from 
the sky, / So glides he in the night from Venus' Eye -. " 
815-816) in which "many images & feelings are ... brought 
.1 Raysor merely suggests that it is written 
after 1810. 
2C on S, 100. Again there is the possibility 
of Larib - Co eyri e contact. 
3 CSC, It 13$. 
4 Con S, 106. 
5 CN, 3290 f 14-f 15v. Also in CSC, I, 213, 
already cite3-. 
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together without effort & without discord"' "Passionate" 
imagination, on the other hand is that found in the mind 
of King Lear: 
... one image or feeling is made to modify 
many others, & by a sort of fusion to 
force many into one - that which a ter 
shewed itself in such might & energy in 
Lear, where the deep anguish of a Father 
spreads the feeling of Ingratitude &2 
Cruelty over the very Elements of Heaven -. 
The difference between the two examples may be read as 
the difference between employing imagination to create 
a unity and showing imagination working in the mind of 
a character to the same end. 
Part of the difference between "passionate" and 
"tranquil" imagination also lies in the fact that "passion- 
ate" imagination arouses more sympathy in the audience. 
Coleridge is not commonly associated with the sympathetic 
imagination of the eighteenth century, as Hazlitt has been, 
but sympathy is something which Coleridge links with 
imagination in various places. He speaks of Shakespeare 
"project[ing] his mind out of his own particular being, 
& [feeling and making] others feel, on subjects no way 
connected with himself. In one of his 1811 lectures 
he spoke of the need to learn "the first great truth, 
that to conquer ourselves is the only true knowledge. "4 
In a note for his 1813 lectures Coleridge speaks of 
being "drawn away from ourselves into the music of noblest 
thoughts in harmonizing sounds. ""5 In speaking on the 
subject of educating children in 1E1E, Coleridge commented: 
"For this object [of exhibiting moral being] thus much is 
effected by works of imagination; - that they carry the 
mind out of self, and show the possible of the good and 
the great in the human character. "6 Elsewhere Coleridge 
had linked the origin of tragedy with the fact that "Men 
1 CN, 3290 f 15V. 
2 CN33290 f 11.. 
3 CN, 3290. See also CSC, II, 12. 
4C on s, 57. 
5 CSC, I, 79. 
6 CMC, 194.. 
315 
like to imagine themselves to be the characters they 
treat of". 
' Coleridge is partly interested in the 
degree to which "passionate" imagination excites the 
spectators through sympathy, although Coleridge does 
make clear that it is the universality of tragedy, not 
sympathy, which provides the greatest appeal. 
2 
One of the Shakespearean plays which was character- 
ized by imagination but which was not a tragedy was The 
Tempest. Coleridge wrote that its interests "arise from 
their fitness to that faculty of our nature, the imagin- 
ation I mean, which owes no allegiance to time and 
place. "3 Shakespeare's history plays are also seen in 
the context of imagination, particularly, Coleridge says, 
when "unity of a higher order" than succession operates, 
connecting events with people and motives and presenting 
men "in their causative character". 
4 But if Coleridge's 
criticism makes no explicit statement of preference for 
Shakespeare's tragedy on the basis of imagination, Coleridge's 
treatment of Shakespearean character makes at least an 
implicit statement to that effect. 
Coleridge's interest in "the workings of the 
passions in their inmost retired recesses", his interest 
in men "in their causative character", and. his infest in 
a "higher order of unity" than succession (i. e. than the 
association of thoughts and feelings by fancy and under- 
standing? ) are related. They each demand the workings of 
the imagination, or rather, the Method of Law, which 
seeks ultimate cause through effect. The Method of Law 
is spiritually orientated and when applied to character 
analysis, seeks the deepest spiritual, or in this instance 
what may be understood as psychological, causes. The 
workings of passions and their causes are displayed most 
clearly in tragedy where the tumult of circumstances throws 
the mind into highest relief. 
Coleridge felt that in his own age Shakespearean 
tragedy was often read or viewed as being merely symbolic 
1 CSC, II1 8. 
2 CSC, II, '9. 
3 CSC, I, '131. See also C on S, 106. 
4 CSC, 1,139. 
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of passion and the real workings of the passions often 
missed. His reason was the same Hunt and Hazlitt had 
given: "Men are now so seldom thrown into wild circum- 
stances and violences of excitement that the language 
of such states ... 
[is] judged by authority, not by 
actual experience"' - the authority here being related 
presumably to the tone of the speech and the positive 
manner in which it is uttered. Coleridge argued that the 
language of tragedy should not be read as symbolic of 
emotional excitement but should be seen as "the self 
manifestation" of excitement - as "natural symbols"2 
partaking of the reality they represent. The passions in 
a character should be related to a deeper psychological 
or causative reality, as Coleridge himself tried to do. 
Coleridge connects "wild circumstances and 
violences of excitement"3 with the height of poetic talent. 
He connects "the language of such states" with certain 
movements of the mind involving both fancy and imagination, 
or as he puts it, with 
the laws of association of feeling with 
thought, the starts and strange far-flights 
of the assimilative power on the slightest 
and least obvious likenesses presented by 
thoughts, words, and objects, and even, by 
this very power, the after as strange but 
always certain return to the dominant idea 
In In character analysis, Coleridge examines language of 
excitement and tried to discover the dominant idea to 
which the character returns. He is interested in the 
exterior or outward aspects of the character's behaviour 
and language - the images, thought patterns, changes of 
focus and the like - and in how those relate to the deeper 
or more inward aspects of the character's psychological 
make-up. In other words, Coleridge tries to see each 
character as a whole and considers the emotional dimension 
of characters to be as important as their actions. 
Coleridge's phrase concerning the "starts and 
strange far flights of the assimilative power" might well 
have been inspired by the first act of Hamlet. Coleridge 
1 CSC, I, 209. 
2 CSC, I, 209. 
3 CsC, Is 209. 
4 CSC, I, 209. 
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notes the "broken expressions" of the guard which suggest 
to him "a man's compelled attention to bodily feelings 
allowed to no man". 
' The guard's inward terror manifests 
itself in his shift of attention to an outward object and 
in the change in the style of his speech: 
The effort of the narrator to master his 
own imaginative terrors; the consequent 
elevation of the style, itself a continu- 
ation of this effort; the turning off to 
an outward object, 'yon same star. ' 0 heaven! 
words are wasted to those that feel and to 
those who do noý feel the exquisite judgement 
of Shakespeare. 
In a lecture of 1$18, five years later than the above 
passage, Coleridge expanded on the comment: 
... the exquisite proof of the narrator's deep feeling of what he is himself about 
to relate, Lis shown]by his turning off 
from it, as from a something that is 
forcing him too deep into himself, to the 
outward objects, the realites of nature 
that had accompanied it . 00i 
Coleridge also spoke in more detail of another aspect 
of the relation between the inward and the outward in 
the scene: "the ghost-seers were in a state of cold or 
chilling damp from without, and of anxiety from within". 
4 
In the highly agitated states of their minds they were 
being assaulted from within by their thoughts and assaulted 
from outside by the elements; in this condition they were 
particularly vulnerable to the visions that they saw. 
The visions which appear to both Hamlet and 
Macbeth may be seen to a certain extent with the same 
kind of understanding. The reason the ghosts appear at 
the particular moments that they do, lies at least partly 
within the characters themselves. Their conversations, 
immediately prior to the visions, concern indifferent 
matters. Coleridge goes beyond the outward appearances 
and suggests that the indifference is in fact the result 
of the greatness of their concern; because of the weight 
on their minds they have had to shift their attention 
away from themselves and in doing so they became open to 
the ghosts: 
1 CSC9 I, 20. 
2 CSC, I, 20-1. 
3 CCSC, It 43-44. 
4 CSC, It 42. 
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The moment before the Ghost enters, Hamlet 
speaks of other matters in order to relieve 
the weight on his mind; he speaks of the 
coldness of the night, and observes that 
he has not heard the clock strike, adding, 
in reference to the custom of drinking, 
that it is 'More honour'd in the breach, 
than the observance'. From the tranquil 
state of his mind he indulges in moral 
reflections .... The same thing occurs in Macbeth: in the dagger scene, the moment 
before he sees it, he hýs his mind drawn 
to indifferent matters. 
Each of the above examples of Coleridge's insight concern- 
ing the relation of the outward reality to the inward 
has terror or fear as the dominant, returning idea. 
There are numerous other places in Coleridge's 
criticism where his interest in the psychological motives 
of characters leads him to discuss the discrepancy between 
inward and outward reality. In his notes on Richard II 
he speaks of Richard's "wordy courage that betrays the 
inward impotence". 2 He speaks of the discrepancy between 
the world that Hamlet is in, and the world within Hamlet, 
3 
a subject we will return to shortly. He finds the same 
thing in Lady Macbeth: 
One* who had habitually familiarized her 
imagination to dreadful conceptions and 
was trying to do it still more. All the 
false efforts of a mind accustomed only 
to the shadows of the imagination, vivid 
enough to throw the every-day realities 
into shadows, but not yet compared with their 
own correspondent realities. 4 
Macbeth is also living in a kind of private world within 
himself: 
Jho* by guilt tears himself life-asunder 
from nature is himself in a preternatural 
state; no wonder, therefore, if [he is] 
inclined to all superstition and faith in 
the preternatural. 
Coleridge believed that there were two levels of 
action in a play: a surface level and a deeper level. 
Failure to go beyond the surface action had resulted in 
1 C on S, 125. 
2 CSC, It 155. 
3 See: CSC, I, 37-8. 
4 CSC, I, 72. 
5 CSC, It 76. 
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the formulation of the dramatic unities and had led to 
seeing passionate speeches as being merely symbolic of 
emotional excitement. It would be on the surface level 
of the play that the Method of Theory would be involved. 
Theory would be concerned with the more material aspects 
of the poem: rhym*, , thym, decorum, images, character 
contrasts, wit, humour, fancy, and sequence of events. 
Theory would also suggest. the need to look for deeper 
principles. 
The other level of action in a play Coleridge 
saw as psychological. On this level the Method of Law 
would be operating to discover the true psychological 
reasons for behavior. Coleridge suggests that it is on 
this level of the play that the most meaningful action 
takes place. As he says, even in a history play, 
The events themselves are immaterial, 
otherwise than as the clothing and mani- 
festation of the spirit that is working 
within. In this mode, the unity resulting 
from succession [i. e. Theory] is destroyed, 
but is supplied by a unity of a higher 
order, [i. e. Law] which connects the 
events by reference to the workers, gives 
a reason for them in their motives, and 
presents men in their causative character. 
l 
An illustration of this thought may be found in Coleridge's 
comment on Lear. He praises the speed with which the 
details of Lear's foolish trick and the differences between 
Albany and Cornwall are dealt with. By dealing with them 
quickly, the real subject of the play may be turned to: 
... the premises and data, as it were, 
[are] 
thus afforded for our after-insight into 
the mind and mood of the person whose 
character, passions and sufferings are 
the main subject-matter of the play .... 
2 
Similarly it was the psychological action which was the 
main action of The Tempest, and Coleridge cautioned the 
theatres: 
It addresses itself entirely to the 
imaginative faculty; and although the 
illusion may be assisted by the effect 
on the senses of the complicated scenery 
1 CSC, It 139. 
2 CSC, It 56. 
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and decorations of modern times yet 
this sort of assistance is dangerous. 
For the principal and only genuine 
excitement ought to come from within, - from the moved and sympathetic imagination; 
whereas, where so much is addressed to the 
mere external senses of seeing and hearing, 
the spiritual vision is apt to languish, 
and the attraction from without will with- 
draw the mind from the proper and only 
legitimate interest which is intended to 
spring from within. 1 
If we turn now to examine more closely some of 
Coleridge's character analyses, we will gain a better 
idea of the psychological action he found in Shakespeare 
and in addition we will see some of the specific results 
of"causative character. " He wondered why Macbeth was so 
open to the prophecies of the witches at the beginning of 
the play. In his analysis he discovers two causes. The 
first was in the nature of Macbeth's profession, intellect, 
and imagination. Macbeth as a general must often feel, 
Coleridge says, "how great a share chance had in his 
successes"2 and hence at the beginning we see him with 
"the superstition natural to victorious generals". 
3 
His main focus of attention becomes the hope presented 
to him by the witches. He is not concerned about their 
reality, but instead about the challenge which is 
presented: 
Hope [is] the master element of a commanding 
genius, meeting with an active and combining 
intellect, and an imagination of just that 
degree of vividness which disquiets and 
impels the soul. to try to realize its 
images. Greatly increase this creative 
power, and the images become a satisfying 
world of themselves .... 
Macbeth, like Hamlet and others, was to fall victim to 
the satisfaction or excitement of these images within. 
The second cause of Macbeth's openness is his ambition. 
Coleridge maintains that when Macbeth enters, inflated 
with his victory, he has already been "rendered temptable 
by previous dalliance of the fancy with ambitious thoughts. "5 
1 CSC, I, 130-131. 
2 CSC, I, 81. 
3 csc, I, 81. 
4 csc, I, 81. 
5 CSC, 1, 68. 
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while some critics who look at surface action only might 
find the origin of Macbeth's feelings of guilt in the 
temptation, Coleridge finds their source and cause in the 
earlier ambition: "So truly is the guilt in its germ 
anterior to the supposed cause and immediate temptation. "' 
When Macbeth yields to the temptation and 
sacrifices his moral will, he becomes a victim of both 
himself and fate, Coleridge suggests: "the link of cause 
and effect more physico" commences. 
2 With his consent to 
a plan of action, so too, Coleridge discovers, his coward- 
ice first appears: 
This, however, [in Act I, iv] seems 
the first distinct notion as to the 
Plan-- of realizing his wishes; and here, 
t refore, with great propriety, 1,11acbeth's 
cowardice of his own conscience, discloses 
itself. 
In Coleridge's metaphysical thought a plan, such as he 
speaks of here, would imply methodical thinking, and 
since the idea is 'a means to a physical end' - the act 
of murder - the Method would be Theory. How appropriate 
then that at the same time as Macbeth begins thinking about 
the future in terms of cause and effect his mind, almost 
against its wishes, finds itself drawn past material 
considerations of Theory and into the horrors of spirit- 
ual matters produced by imagination and resulting in 
cowardice. 
Coleridge compares the difference in Macbeth's 
mental activity before and after the crime as a means of 
explaining his decline. Before the crime Macbeth tries 
to fool himself about his conscience: he "mistranslates 
the recoilings and ominous whispers of conscience into 
prudential and selfish reasonings. "4 Coleridge believed 
that correct moral understanding was intuitive and that 
any departure from it had to be wilful. He sees Macbeth 
wilfully going against what he knows he should do. Macbeth's 
feelings of remorse, rising from within, are mistranslated 
into fear of dangers from without. 
5 On a similar point, 
1 CSC, I, 69. 
2 C C, it 68. 
3 CSC, I, 71. 
4 CSC, I, 80. 
5 CSC. I. $0. 
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once Macbeth has attained the object of his hope, his 
imagination converts the remaining passion into fear 
and makes him irresolute. 
l With the dislocation of his 
ability to correctly connect cause and effect, he becomes 
like delirious men that run away from 
the phantoms of their own brain, or, 
raised by terror to rage, stab the real 2 
object that is within their own reach .... 
Coleridge used'imagination' to account for the 
actions of both Macbeth and Lady Macbeth in the murder 
scene, and he saw a direct comparison, though on a lower 
key, with Antonio and Sebastian in their attempted 
assassination of Alonzo and Gonzalo in The Tempest. 
In both plays there was the same kind of mental activity: 
... the same ... manner of familiarizing 
a mind, not immediately recipient, to 
the suggestion of guilt, by associating 
the proposed crime with something ludicrous 
or out of place, - something not habitually 
matter of reverence. By this kind of 
sophistry the imagination and fancy are 
first bribed to contemplate the suggested 
act, and at length to become acquainted 
with it. ' 
Elsewhere Coleridge had commented that behind the actions 
of Lady Macbeth there was "a superhuman audacity of fancy 
which she cannot support" and an imagination "vivid enough 
to throw every-day realities into shadows". 
4 
In J. P. Collier's diary entry for October 13, 
1811, there is the following record of Coleridge's 
conversation: 
It was in characters of complete moral 
depravity, but of first-rate wit and 
talents, that Shakespeare delighted; 
and Coleridge instanced Richard the Third, 
Falstaff, and Iago. 
Apparently in the eleventh of his lectures of 1811-12 
Coleridge dealt with the matter again, but Collier makes 
no report of that lecture and all that we find is at the 
beginning of the twelfth lecture: 
x CSC, I, 81. 
2 CSC, I, E0. 
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In the last lecture he endeavoured, he 
said, to point out those characters where 
the pride of intellect, without moral 
feeling, is supposed to be the ruling 
impulse, as }n Iago, Richard 3rd, and even 
in Falstaff. 
It was in the sixth of the 1813-14 lectures at 
Bristol that Coleridge again picked up on the topic. The 
newspaper report included the following: 
The characters of Richard III., Iago, and 
Falstaff, were the characters of men who 
reverse the order of things, who place 
intellect at the head, whereas it ought to 
follow like geometry, to prove and to 
confirm .... Richard, laughing at conscience, 
and sneering at religion, felt a confidence 
in his intellect .... Iago, on the same 
principle, conscious of superior intellect, 
gave scope to his envy, and hesitated not 
to ruin a gallant, open, and generous friend 
.... Falstaff ... a man of degraded genius, 
with the same consciousness of superiority 
to his companions, fastened himself on 
young prince, to prove how muchlis influence 
on an heir2apparent could exceed that of 
statesmen. 
It will be remembered that Hazlitt had selected 
these three characters as examples of self-centeredness. 
Although his own reason for fascination with the characters 
was to be found in the context of his ideas on imagination, 
Hazlitt's selection, as well as some of his ideas, can be 
assumed to have been influenced by Coleridge's conversations 
or lectures. 
Coleridge's interest in these three characters may 
be understood in the context of his metaphysical thought. 
He feels that each of the characters is intellectually 
superior, that each is conscious of that superiority, and 
that each has allowed intellect to over-rule conscience. 
Coleridge speaks of them as men "who reverse the order 
of things, who place intellect at the head whereas it 
ought to follow like geometry, to prove and to confirm". 
Coleridge is suggesting that they are examples of Method 
being perverted. Method places moral sense or moral truth 
in the highest position since primary imagination and Law 
are at the highest point in Coleridge's hierarchy. All 
1C on S, 116. 
2 CSC, II, 286-7. 
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of man's other faculties are to serve the highest. What 
a the Shakespearean characters had done was to cut 
off the mind's natural inclination to moral feeling and 
thus make their faculties serve their own ends. Coleridge 
connects this perversion of Method with the demonic in 
his discussion of the "motiveless malignity" of Iago (as 
seen in Iago's soliloquy at the end of I, iii): 
The last speech, the motive-hunting of 
motiveless malignity - how awful! In itself fiendish; while yet he was allowed 
to bear the divine image, too fiendish for 
his own steady view. A being nelxt to 
devil, only not quite devil .... 
In this respect, Richard, Iago and Falstaff are 
like Edmund in King Lear in Coleridge's eyes: all are 
impressive in their power. Shakespeare knew "that courage, 
intellect, and strength of character were the most impress- 
ive forms of power ... without reference to any moral end". 
2 
Coleridge felt there was a danger for the poet in developing 
any of these characters: 
But in the display of such a character it 
[is] of the highest importance to prevent 
the guilt from passing into utter monstrosity - 
which again depends on the presence or absence 
of causes and temptations sufficient to 
account for the wickedness, without the 
necessity of recurring to a thorough fjend- 
ishness of nature for its origination. 
Coleridge is saying that a perversion of Method in the 
minds of characters can be prevented from becoming I 
mor)trous by depicting the motives of characters. Coleridge 
goes on to say that Iago is the one character that "approach- 
ed to this" fiendishness, and sees it as evidence of 
Shakespeare's genius that he was able to carry it off 
without accounting for the wickedness .4 Edmund's wickedness 
Coleridge feels might have been caused in part by the fact 
of his "absence from home and a foreign education from 
boyhood to the present time" and his father's clear 
favouritism of Edgar. 5 A further cause was the notoriety 
1 CSC, It 49. 
2 CSC, I, 58. 
3 CSC, It 58. 
4 CSC, It 58. 
5 CSC, I, 59. 
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of his birth, the effect of which Coleridge traces 
brilliantly: 
... the consciousness of its notoriety - the gnawing conviction that every show of 
respect is an effort of courtesy which recalls 
while it represses a contrary feeling - this 
is the ever-trickling flow of wormwood and 
gall into the wounds of pride, the corrosive 
virus which inoculates pride with a venom 
not its own, with envy, hatred, a lust of that 
power which in its blaze of radiance would 
hide the dark spots on his disk, [with] pangs 
of shame personally undeserved and therefore 
felt as wrongs, and a blind ferment of vin- 
dictive workings towards the occasions and 
causes,, especially towards a brother whose 
stainless birth and lawful honors were the 
constant remembrancers of his debasement, 
and were ever in the way to prevent all 
chance of its ýeing unknown or overlooked 
and forgotten. 
Similarly, the cause of Richard's wickedness 
Coleridge finds in his deformity: "The inferiority of 
his person made him seek consolation in the superiority 
of his mind; he had endeavoured to counterbalance his 
deficiency". 2 Falstaff, whom Coleridge recognised as 
contrasting Richard though still showing "the subordination 
of the moral to the intellectual being", 
3 
was also given 
motives by Shakespeare. He did not love evil for evil's 
sake but delighted in the pleasure of competition with 
his friends: 
... Falstaff was no Coward but pretended to be one merely for the sake of trying 
experiments on mankind!! That he was a liar 
only with the same object and not because 
he loved falsehood for itself! That he was 
a man of such pre-eminent abilities that he 
had a profound contempt for all those around 
him, and was determined to make them, not- 
withstanding their fancied superiority, his 
absolute tools. He knew that however low 
he degraded himself his own talents could 
extricate him from every difficulty. 
A further instance of Coleridge finding he could 
accept a character if he could understand something about 
the motives behind the actions related to Cleopatra. She 
1 CSC, It 57. 
2C on S, 116. 
3c sc, 1, 234. 
4 Conn s, 30. 
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seemed to be wholly occupied with "the love of passion 
and appetite", 
1 
yet, "the sense of criminality in her 
passion is lessened by our insight into its depth and 
energy ... that it is supported and reinforced by voluntary 
stimulus and sought for associations, instead of blossom- 
ing out of spontaneous emotions., 
2 Coleridge was puzzled 
by the character of Brutus, particularly Shakespeare's 
denying to him any personal motive in the speech, "It 
must be by his death: and, for my part, / I know no 
personal cause to spurn at him, but for the general" (II, 
i, 10 ff): 
This is singular - at least I do not at 
present see into Shakespeare's motive, the 
rationale - or in what point he meant 
Brutus's character to appear. For surely ... 
nothing can seem more discordance with our 
historical preconceptions of Brutus, or 
more lowering to the intellect of this 
Stoico-Platonic tyrannicide, than the tenets 
here attributed to him, to him, the stern 
Roman republican; viz. that he would have 
no objection to a kipg or to Caesar, a 
monarch in Rome .... 
Coleridge thinks Shakespeare should be faulted on this 
point for not having "brought these things forward", 
4 
although he concedes that his own understanding may yet 
. be lacking. 
Coleridge's most extensive character analysis 
deals with Hamlet, and here he is again struggling to find 
the psychological causes of surface actions. He notes 
"the impassioned continuity" of Hamlet's speech prior to 
and during the appearance of the Ghost in I, iv. There 
is no break when the Ghost appears, and Coleridge's under- 
standing of this is as follows: 
[In Hamlet's earlier speech the] momentum 
had been given to his mental activity, the 
full current of the thoughts and words had 
set in, and the very forgetfulness, in the 
fervor of his argumentation, of the purpose 
for which he was there, aided in preventing 
the appearance from benumbing the mind. 
1 CSC, I, $6. 
z CsC, I; 86. 
3 CSC, I, 16. 
4 CSC, it 16. 
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Consequently, it acted as a new impulse, 
a sudden stroke which increased the velocity 
of the body already inImotion, while it 
altered the direction. 
Coleridge goes further and traces the unexpressed thoughts 
and feelings of Hamlet while he is viewing the Ghost. 
Coleridge suggests that already there is the beginning 
of a split in Hamlet. On the one hand he is aware of 
reality and sensations around him; on the other hand 
his mind is totally preoccupied with its own meditations: 
The knowledge, the unthought of conscious- 
ness, the sensation, of human auditors, 
of flesh and ooa sympathists, acts as 
a support, a stimulation a ter o, while 
the front of the mind, the ti conscious- 
ness of the speakeý, is filled by the 
solemn apparition. 
In Act III, i, where Ophelia is acting as a decoy, 
Coleridge finds in Ophelia's "strange. and forced manner" 
proof that she "was not acting a part of her own". 
3 
Coleridge reads Hamlet's "Ha, ha! are you honest? " (1.103) 
as Hamlet's perception of the trick and maintains that 
the speech which follows is not directed to Ophelia but 
to the spies .4 The most obvious feature in Hamlet's 
speech for Coleridge is his "sporting with opposites" 
which Coleridge implies Hamlet does both wilfully and in 
spite of himself: 
[That Hamlet discovers he is watched] in a 
mood so anxious and irritable accounts for 
a certain harshness in him; and yet a wild 
upworking of love, sporting with opposites 
with a wilful self-tormenting irony, is 
perceptible throughout: ex. gr. "I did love 
you" and [his reference tte faults of 
the sex [of Ophelia] .... 
ý 
This 'porting with opposites" is not simply an 
aspect of Hamlet's behaviour in that particular instance - 
it points to the heart of his problem. Coleridge saw 
Hamlet as being unable to reconcile the opposites in his 
life, whether these opposites were particular (his love 
vQns"-S for Ophelia ter- his 'hatred' for women) or general (the 
I CSC, I, 25. 
2 Cam, It 25. 
3 CSC, I, 29. 
4 CSC, I, 29. 
5 CSC, It 30. 
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Ve"S'" 
world within himself viza% the outer world): 
In Hamlet I conceive [Shakespeare] to have 
wished to exemplify the moral necessity 
of a due balance between our attention to 
outward objects and our meditation on in- 
ward thoughts -a due balance between the 
real and the imaginary world. In Hamlet 
this balance does not exist - his thoughts, images, and fancy [being] far more vivid 
than his perceptions, and his very per- 
ceptions instantly passing thro' the medium 
of his contemplations, and acquiring as 
they pass a form and colour not naturally 
their own. Hence great, enormous, intellectual 
activity, and a consequent prloportionate 
aversion to real action .... 
Coleridge's remark about the form and colour of Hamlet's 
perceptions becoming altered in meditation is similar 
to Coleridge's praise of imagination; that imagination's 
best effects are not in producing "distinct forms", but 
in "producing what it still repels" and substituting 
"a grand feeling of the unimaginable for a mere image". 
2 
This would seem to be a fairly accurate description of 
Hamlet's mental activity and Coleridge suggests that Hamlet 
suffers from an excessive activity of imagination. But 
Hamlet at times also approaches Coleridge's description 
of insanity in Biographia: "The sanity of the mind is 
between superstition with fanaticism on the one hand, and 
enthusiasm with indifference and a diseased slowness to 
action on the other. "3 
In the last of his 1811-12 lectures Coleridge 
said that the external world interested Hamlet only as 
it was reflected "in the mirror of his mind"; 
4 he had a 
"vivid imagination" but was like a man "who shuts his 
eyes, [and] sees what has previously made an impression 
upon his organs. "5 Coleridge is almost suggesting that 
Hamlet is a man in a state of dream, and his comment on 
dreams and imagination may be of relevance. Coleridge had 
said that in a waking state, the mind looks for the cause 
of an external impression and the imagination supplies 
1 CSC, It 37. " 
2C on . 
S, 82. 
3 BLEI, 20; (Everyman, 17)- 
4C on S, 124. 
5C on S, 124. 
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one, which may have no correspondence to the reality. 
' 
In a sense, this seems to be what is happening with 
Hamlet in Coleridge's opinion, but there is a difference. 
Hamlet's mind has found the cause of its anxiety and it 
lies in the act he must do; as Coleridge says, "There was 
no indecision about Hamlet; he knew well what he ought to 
do, and over and over again he made up his mind to do it". 
2 
But instead of accepting this cause, his imagination tried 
to find an escape by "retiring from all reality, which is 
the result of having what we express by the term 'a world 
within himself' . , '3 
For Coleridge the tragedy of Hamlet lay not 
only in the split between internal and external but also 
in*Hamlet's knowledge of it: "Hamlet [had] the perfect 
knowledge of his own character, which with all strength 
of motive was so weak as to be unable to carry into effect 
his most obvious duty. "4 Hamlet is like Claudius, whom 
Coleridge notes is unable to reconcile the difference 
between willing and wishing in his, "My words fly up, 
my thoughts remain below". 
5 Hamlet is unable to reconcile 
the particular with the general, and instead runs "away 
from the particular in[to] the general"; 
6 
he displays an 
"aversion to personal, individual concerns, and escape[s] 
to generalizations and general reasonings". 
7 His jesting 
when overtaken by his companions (I, v, 112 ff. ) is 
explained by a similar kind of lack of middle ground, -only 
in this case the reason is more common: 
The familiarity, comparative at least, of 
a brooding mind with shadows is something. 
Still more the necessary alternation when 
one muscle long strained is relaxed; the 
antagonist comes into action of itself. 
Terror [is] closely connected with the 
1 CSC, It 202. 
2 CSC, It 125. 
3 C on S, 126. 
4 Con S, 126. 
5 CSC, It 33. 
6 CSC, It 39. 
7 csc, It 39. 
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ludicrous; the latter [is] the common 
mode by which the mind tries to emancipate 
itself from terror. 
Coleridge comments on Hamlet's eulogy on Horatio "as 
one whose blood and judgement were happily commingled"2 - 
it is interesting that Hamlet praises Horatio for having 
what he himself lacks. Coleridge argues that the play 
ends with Hamlet never reconciling the opposites in his 
life. Instead, he turns himself over to fate: 
... after still resolving, and still 
refusing, still determining to execute, 
and still postponing the execution, he ... finally [gave] himself up to his destiny, 
and, in the infirmity of his nature, at 
last hopelessly place[d] himself in the 
power and at the mercy of his enemies. 3 
Coleridge's use of the concept of reconciliation 
of opposites in character analysis is not limited to 
Hamlet. Many of Shakespeare's other characters were also 
seen by Coleridge to lack an ability to find a balance 
between extremes. An isolated instance is in Romeo's 
initial love for Rosalind, where he fails to reconcile his 
passion for the ideal love with the practical reality. 
4 
In a more general approach, Shakespeare's characters may 
be divided roughly into two groups according to the sub- 
ject of reconciliation of-opposites. There are those who 
are unable to reconcile their feelings with action. Aside 
from Hamlet there is Richard II whose "Constant overflow 
of feelings [and] incapacity of controlling them [produce 
a] waste of that energy which should be reserved for action". 
5 
Lear might also be included for his "brooding of the one 
anguish, an eddy without progression"6 takes him within 
himself to madness. The problem with each of these men 
might also be in terms of Coleridge's analyses, an inability 
to reconcile the strength of their moral beliefs with their 
intellectual and physical capacities to alter their 
situations. 
1 CSC, I, 39-40. 
2 CSC, It 43. 
3 C on S, 128. 
4 C on S, 86. 
5 CSC, it 155. 
6 csc, I, 65. 
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The inverse is true for the other possible 
grouping of characters. These characters are unable 
to reconcile the strength of their intellectual powers 
with moral feeling, and they over-ride their consciences 
with their intellect. This group includes Richard III, 
Iago and Falstaff, discussed earlier; as well as Lady 
Macbeth, who fails to reconcile "the courage of fantasy" 
with "bearing the consequences of the realities o: ' guilt. "1 
Macbeth similarly does not reconcile his conscience and 
his reasoning. 
2 Edmund and Shylock might also be included 
for the one appeals to nature to avoid his own moral 
responsibility and the other tries to avoid the moral 
issue by concentrating solely on the physical act: 
In this speech of Edmund [Lear, I, ii, 
9-14] you see, as soon as a man cannot 
reconcile himself to reason, how his 
conscience flies off by way of appeal 
to nature, who is sure upon such occasions 
never to find fault .... [T]he oppressed 
will be vindictive, like Shylock, and in 
the anguish of undeserved ignominy the 
delusion secretly springs up, of getting 
over the moral quality of an action by 
fixing the mind on the mere physical act 
alone. 3 
Coleridge found it useful in his character analysis 
to discuss psychological motivation by identifying opposing 
forces within the character. What those forces were and 
the manner in which characters failed to reconcile them 
could be many and various. One thing clearly emerges from 
Coleridge's ideas on "causative character": the failure 
to achieve a balance or reconciliation of opposites interrupts 
the basic principle of Method which is "unity with pro- 
gression". A character who fails to find a natural balance 
between moral principles and intellect will find no peace, 
no harmony, no unity within himself. Further, there will 
be no growth, no progression to an awareness of the harmony 
which underlies all creation in the benevolent intellect 
of the Primary Imagination of God. Coleridge believed 
I CSC, It 72. 
2 CSC, I, 80. 
3 CsC, I, 62. 
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that viewers of these characters in the theatre would 
perhaps in their own imaginations reconcile the opposites 
they saw within the characters, and be le/d by the whole 
experience of the play to that same awareness of God. In 
any case, Coleridge wished all of his readers to recognise 
the necessity of employing the principles of Method not 
just in the theatre, or in studying his own metaphysical 




In 1949, Rene Wellek took up the challenge 
offered by A. O. Lovejoy, twenty-five years earlier, 
when he had attacked the use of the word 'romantic' 
on the basis that it was used to apply to many things 
which in fact lacked a common denominator.. Part of 
Wellek's argument, which is still important, relates 
to the subject of 'imagination': 
Turning to England, we can see a complete 
agreement with the French and the Germans 
on all essential points. The great poets 
of the English Romantic movement constitute 
a fairly coherent group, with the same 
view of poetry and the same conception of 
imagination, the same view of nature and 
mind. They also share a poetic style, a 
use of imagery, symbolism, and myth, which 
is quite distinct from anything that had 
been practised by the eighteenth century, 
and which was felt by their contemporaries 
to be obscure and almost unintelligible. 
Wellek's paper was successful injits attempt to prove 
that there were sufficient unified strands in the 
evolution of European culture to justify continued 
use of the term 'romantic'. Later, Wellek answered 
another critic that he had not proved that the 
writers had used the terms 'imagination', 'nature', 
and 'symbol' with the same literal sense: "I do not 
see how anybody can prove a literal identity exclusive 
of all individuality. "3 
Wellek's point was justified, at least with 
regard to Romantic poetry. The relationship between 
imagination theory and poetic practice is often ambiguous 
in order to talk about 'imagination' operating in 
Romantic poetry, that is, in order to use the concept of 
imagination as a tool in approaching the Romantic movement, 
1 "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms, " 
PP4LA (1924), 229-253; reprinted in Essays in the History 
ofrdeas (Baltimore, 1948), 22$-253. 
2 "The Concept of Romanticism in Literary 
History, " Concepts of Criticism (New Haven, 1963), 178. 
3 "Romanticism Reconsidered, " Concepts of 
Criticism, 199. 
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it may be necessary to use the concept in a general 
manner. The concept has been used very profitably, for 
example in Sir Maurice Bowra's The Romantic Ima ination, 
which develops elements common to a wide range of poets, 
from Blake to Christina Rossetti. 
However, there is also a considerable danger 
involved in using a modern, generalized understanding of 
'imagination' in relation to the Romantics. This is 
especially true concerning Romantic criticism, although 
it applies to the poetry as well. Romantic criticism, in 
contrast to Romantic poetry, frequently uses the term 
'imagination' and is often quite precise about the 
characteristic functions of'imagination'. In addition, the 
criticisms of each particular author show a fairly consistent 
understanding of 'imagination'. This understanding is on 
many points in disagreement with the understandings held 
by the contemporaries of each. A modern understanding of 
'imagination' applied to the Romantics overlooks important 
differences in their thought. Too readily in the past 
has it been assumed that Lamb, Hazlitt or Hunt must have 
meant the same thing by 'imagination' as Coleridge, or 
Wordsworth, or some earlier writer. Within Romantic 
studies, and also within the history of literary criticism 
as a whole, it is fallacious to assume that a word which 
is used critically by several people at the same period 
in time is used with the same understanding. 
The present study has traced the historical 
development of ideas of 'imagination' in relation to 
Coleridge, Leigh Hunt, Hazlitt and Lamb, the four main 
Romantic critics of Shakespeare and drama. It has tried 
to develop precisely what each critic saw as 'imagination'. 
With each the Shakespearean and dramatic criticisms have 
been examined for the manner in which 'imagination' has 
been used as a critical tool. Every attempt has been made 
to interpret the criticisms in a manner which seems 
authorized by and consistent with the particular ideas of 
'imagination' of each critic, in order to avoid distortion. 
This thesis presents a more balanced historical 
perspective on the evolving Romantic ideas of imagination 
than there has been in the past. Not only has the thought 
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of each of the critics been traced from his earliest 
writings, but also the definite and possible influences 
of his contemporaries have been explored. It would seem 
appropriate here, in this concluding chapter, to review 
briefly some of the conclusions reached in the first 
part of the thesis. 
One fact which was discovered was that Hazlitt, 
Hunt and Lamb each had their own specific theories of 
'imagination' which were neither mere copies of ideas 
expressed in the eighteenth century, nor mere paraphrases 
of Coleridge and Wordsworth. In fact, both Hazlitt and 
Hunt had published their theories of 'imagination' almost 
a decade before Coleridge and Wordsworth published their 
most important remarks. Also, it was found that the ideas 
of Hazlitt and Hunt were largely unrecognised by their 
contemporaries. It has been recognised by critics that 
Coleridge had an interest in 'imagination' before he met 
Wordsworth in the fall of 1795; but it has not been noticed 
previously that in the early part of 1795, Coleridge under- 
went a considerable, change of attitude towards 'imagination'. 
Whereas fancy had at first been the superior faculty, 
'imagination' took its place as the faculty of poetic 
creation and also became the faculty of religious per- 
ception. These changes indicated a radical change in 
Coleridge's attitude to poetry and anticipated the flower- 
ing of his poetic talents in 1797, when there was intimate 
contact with Wordsworth and considerable mutual influence. 
Further, it was seen that when Coleridge rejected Hartley's 
theory of association of ideas in 1$03, he substituted for 
it a theory of aggregation, which maintained that ideas 
are called to mind by aggregation or conjunction of 
feelings. In 1812, and again in 1816, both the Hartley 
idea and Coleridge's new theory were brought together 
to describe the function'of fancy, as Coleridge then 
understood it. 
The study given here to Biographia Literaria has 
found that the work has greater integrity than has been 
generally believed. There remains work to be done else- 
where on the subject of its integrity, but the conclusion 
reached here is that Chapter XII is not a simple borrowing 
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of another author's thought inserted into Coleridge's 
argument. Instead, it is fundamental to Coleridge's 
own argument and one of the most important chapters in 
the work. His definitions of Primary and Secondary 
Imagination in Chapter XIII, seen in the light of 
Chapter XII, take on a new meaning and some of what have 
been formerly thought to be contradictions or ambiguities 
in'his thought are resolved. It has further been seen 
that his definitions are closely related to his later 
works on Method and the ideas of Law and Theory, and 
are not inconsistent with some of his earliest thoughts. 
William Hazlitt had close contact with both 
Coleridge and Wordsworth, particularly around the turn 
of the century when the friendship was new and Hazlitt's 
ideas on imagination were in a formative stage. Coleridge 
was instrumental in encouraging Hazlitt to develop and 
publish his ideas. It is surprising therefore, that when 
Hazlitt did publish in l$05, his ideas were not of an 
identical cast. It has been seen that his Essay on the 
Principles of Human Action demonstrated originality of 
thought and less influence of the eighteenth century 
than it has been the custom to assume. His idea of what here 
has been called the "democratic imagination" is in essence 
that if imagination is cultivated in individuals. and 
society at large, mankind will naturally move towards the 
good of all. Various powers of imagination that modern 
studies have found mentioned only in Hazlitt's later work have 
been shown to be present already in 1$05. 
Hazlitt and Coleridge developed their ideas of 
imagination to serve their own particular needs and 
interests: Coleridge was concerned with both poetic 
creation and metaphysics; Hazlitt only with metaphysics. 
Leigh Hunt's needs and interests concerned the theatre, 
and he developed his theories to assist in his critical 
reviews. It was seen that although Hunt was working in 
isolation from the other critics, his imagination - 
conception distinction was remarkably similar to the 
imagination - fancy distinctions of Coleridge and 
Wordsworth. 
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No critic had greater opportunity to be 
exposed to the ideas of all other critics on the subject 
of imagination than Charles Lamb. lie had been a close 
friend of both Coleridge and Wordsworth since the 1790's, 
would have come in contact with Hunt's Critical Essays, 
and entertained Hazlitt regularly at his home. In spite 
of this contact, Lamb's ideas of imagination presented 
the most striking contrast with the other theories. 
This was because his concept was tied to the meditative 
action of the mind. 
The most general conclusion of the first part 
of the thesis was that none of the Romantic critics 
thought Of'imagination'in the same way as the rest. 
When the critical application of the particular theories 
was considered in the second part of the thesis, those 
differences were again clearly evident. It was seen that 
Hunt applied his distinction between imagination and 
conception in a fairly rigid manner to reinforce the 
classical separation of tragedy and comedy. The 
relative inflexibility of his overall approach at times 
lessened the critical value of his comments, particularly 
concerning his view of comedy as an imitation of real life. 
His approval tended to be greater towards those comedies 
which do "imitate life" - especially Much Ado About 
Nothing, Henry IV Part One, The Merry Wives. 'of Windsor, 
and the low comics in Twelfth Nirht. 
l Similarly his 
insistence that tragedy has nothing to do with imitation 
of real life led to his dislike of some Shakespearean 
tragedy, most notably, Coriolanus. The main contributions 
of Hunt's criticisms (many of which have not previously 
received critical attention), apart from the information 
they provide about the early nineteenth century theatre, 
were found to lie in the area of imagination and tragedy. 
He understood tragedy to be "an imitation of life in 
passion" and his theory of imagination led him to an interest 
in "the workings of great minds in awful situations". 
2 
1 See p. 160 ff. of this thesis. 
2 Examiner, 29 March, 1812; (DC, 66). 
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When Lamb's Shakespearean and dramatic criticism 
was considered it was discovered that it was his idea 
of imagination as meditative rather. than spontaneous 
which led him to be against Shakespeare in the theatre. 
He believed that meditation and abstraction were the 
actions of'imagination'and were necessary both to discern 
and appreclate'imagination'in art. His understanding led 
him to be entirely unsympathetic to the aim of the theatre: 
in his opinion Shakespeare's characters appealed almost 
exclusively to the 'imagination' and the theatre appealed 
almost exclusively to the senses. 
Hazlitt's early theory of 'imagination' was 
metaphysical, not aesthetic. However, it has'been seen 
that it was easily adapted for aesthetic purposes when 
Hazlitt began critical writing. His early theory had 
been based on a division between sensory (i. e. past and 
present) and ideal (future). He used this distinction 
in his critical writings to make divisions between the 
picturesque and the ideal, between classical and the 
romantic or modern, between, form and feeling, and between 
painting. and poetry. Related to this, it was seen that 
he was interested in the referential quality of the words 
of the characters: 'imagination' for him refe ed to an 
internal, emotional reality and this was its proper 
focus. It was seen that his own choice of images in his 
critical remarks was meant to appeal to the 'imagination' 
of his readers. Further, it was observed that the moral 
purpose of 'imagination', which had been his focus in 
1805, continued to be his concern throughout his criticism. 
He rejected art which addressed the senses and he rejected 
the art of Coleridge and Wordsworth for failure to present 
their readers with relevant moral alternatives. His 
interest in the self-centeredness of Shakespeare's tragic 
characters was again concerned with morality: he was 
interested in how the 'imagination' of each of the 
characters had been abused to work for selfish action 
rather than the good of all. 
In the previous chapter we took the insights into 
Coleridge's metaphysical system that were gained in the 




Scholars and critics have generally believed that 
Coleridge's art and criticism remained isolated from 
his metaphysical thought. However, we have seen not 
only that metaphysics plays a major role in his criticism 
but also that poetry serves the end of his metaphysical 
system. The understanding of Method, Theory, Law, 
progression, cause and effect, and reconciliation of 
opposites(among other ideas)was extended to his criticism, 
where each concept was shown to be of importance. Pleasure 
and the "willing suspension of disbelief" were shown to 
assist the spiritualization of knowledge which Coleridge 
sought as the end product of the progression from 'Theory 
to Law. Coleridge's critical interest in men in their 
"causative character" was explored and it was found that 
he and Hazlitt were interested in the same characters and 
for the same reason: to explore their moral depravity. 
For Coleridge it was a study in the abuse of Method. 
This thesis has shown not only that there are 
clear differences in how each Romantic critic thought of 
'imagination' but also in the manner in which those 
theories were applied. Clearly there have been many 
similarities, as well, in the critical application of the 
theories. These include many specific points of similarity, 
which have been mentioned along the way, and many general 
ones as well. For example, it was seen that each critic 
used his theory of 'imagination' to define tragedy, to 
account for a preference for it, and to discuss dramatic 
mimesis. Each critic used his theory as a critical tool 
in dealing with poet, actor, audience, and character. 
Our task in concluding should be to try to draw 
the four approaches closer together than has been possible 
up to this point. Are there further similarities in the 
critical use of 'imagination' which can assist us in 
seeing what is common among the approaches? Part of the 
challenge is to suggest guidelines for modern use of the 
word 'imagination' in relation to the Romantics. These 
guidelines are needed both to prevent generalizations 
concerning Romantic 'imagination' which ignore/ the real 
differences in Romantic thought, and to facilitate use of 
the term in contexts which correspond with the essential 
Romantic concerns. 
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In the space we have here perhaps only a beginning 
can be made. It might be helpful to concentrate more on 
what the Romantics suggested were goals of their critical 
use of 'imagination' than on their specific achievements. 
With this in mind it is possible to see that the Romantic 
critics stood on common ground in thinking of 'imagination' 
as a tool for describing transcendent reality, or what we 
may call metaphoric experience. In some respects the 
Romantic ideas of 'imagination' are less close to modern 
understanding of that term than they are to modern under- 
standing of the term 'metaphor'. 
' 
The term metaphoric experience is coined to 
accommodate the Romantic experience of encountering two 
levels of action in a work of imagination, be it the 
written work or the theatrical production. These two 
levels are recognised by the contemporary understanding 
of the concept of metaphor, for instance in I. A. Richard's 
terms 'vehicle' and 'tenor'. The levels have recently 
been given significant attention by Paul Ricoeur in his 
essay entitled, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of 
Hermeneutics". 2 As mentioned at the beginning of this 
thesis, Ricoeur's argument provides useful tools for draw- 
ing out the similarities in approach and will be given 
attention here. 
1 On a cautionary note it should be remembered 
that the Romantics themselves did not necessarily regard 
metaphor as we do toda . Cyrus Hamlin has argued that "metaphor was defined 
Lby 
the literary tradition of the 
Romantics] exclusively as a kind of verbal ornament" and 
was rejected along with the entire tradition of rhetorical 
theory. ("The Temporality of Selfhood, " in New Literary 
Histor , 
(Autumn, 1974) Vol. VI, No. 1, p. 17 While 
Hamlin is probably correct in general terms, he might be 
questioned concerning Coleridge and Wordsworth. In these 
two quotations from Coleridge, metaphors are not necessarily 
to be seen as negative, and in the first meta hors are 
connected with Imagination. Part of CN 2723 
(l$05) 
reads: 
"A man's Imagination fitfully awaking & sleeping = the odd 
metaphors and no metaphors of-modern poetry/Language in 
its first state without the inventive passion; " and from 
CN 2724: "Metaphors mistaken` or Reality one of the Springs 
öf the many-headed Nile of Credulity .... " In Wordsworth's 1815 Preface, metaphor is used in a positive sense and is 
connected with imagination: "... but, by tha intervention 
of the metaphor broods, the affections are called in by the 
imagination to assist in marking the manner in which the Bird 
reiterates and prolongs her soft note .... " Literary 
Criticisms of Wordsworth, 14.7. 
2 In New Literary History, (Autumn, 1974) 
Vol. VI, No. 1,9T-7710. 
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He argues that metaphor may be understood in 
contexts larger than the specific word-groupings or parts 
of a sentence to which the definition of metaphor usually 
refers. He sees the principle of metaphor operating in 
whole works, or what he calls discourses, and he outlines 
the opposing levels that are there: 
I enumerate the basic polarities of discourse 
in the following condensed way: event and 
meaning, singular identification and general 
predication, propositional act and illocution- 
ary acts, sense and referenrle, reference to 
reality and self-reference. 
For Ricoeur these polarities äre basically different 
descriptions of the main polarity which exists in metaphor. 
He points out that the fundamental issue in any of these 
is the shift from a literal meaning to the new meaning 
given by the metaphor. The basic differentiation in any 
metaphor exists between the literal meaning or the 
"sense" and that to which it refers or the "reference". 
He explains these terms further: "I oppose reference to 
any sense by identifying 'sense' with 'what' and 'reference' 
with 'about what' in discourse. "2 He relater, the context- 
ual "sense" of metaphor to fable or plot in a discourse 
(Aristotle's mythos); it is the literal connection between 
the discourse structure and the metaphor. 
3 - He suggests 
that the "reference" is related to "the intentionality of 
the work as a whole, that is, in its intention to represent 
human actions as higher than they actually are: and this 
is mimesis. "4" 
Ricoeur's work facilitates using the concept of 
metaphor in relation to the Romantic 'imagination' and 
his analysis of the levels, particularly of "sense" and 
"reference", in a work are useful to us here. 
The Romantic critics recognised at least two 
different kinds of art: sense-orientated art and 
imagination-orientated art. For Hunt sense-orientated 
art was characterized by conception and involved comedy, 
real life, manners, and common feelings. For Lamb it was 
1 Ricoeur, 98. 
2 Ricoeur, 105. See also, 96" 
3 Ricoeur, 109. 
4 Ricoeur, 109. 
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art which did not permit the meditative and abstracting 
action of imagination: comedy, as well as the art of acting 
in general, imposed too great a sense of reality on 
the viewer. For Hazlitt it was a variety of things: it 
was the picturesque and the classical. It was concerned, 
as he felt painting was, with the object itself, with 
factual truth, with form and outward shapes, or as he 
said concerning modern opera, with satisfying our sensory 
appetites. For Coleridge, sense-orientated art was art 
which functioned by the Method of Theory. It was art 
concerned with the Material world and was related to the 
faculties of Sense, Fancy and Understanding. 
The Romantic critics are in basic agreement as 
to what constitutes sense-orientated art. They agree 
that it is the lower kind of art, and with their emphasis 
on its relation to the real or material world they agree 
that its representation is of a literal sort. It represents 
things as they most readily appear to the senses. It is 
mainly concerned with shapes and external appearances. 
Its intention and meaning are readily apparent and lie 
within the work_pe r se, not beyond it. It is a self- 
contained art which has no external referent. 
If we consider this kind of art in relation to 
Ricoeur's discussion, we can see a correspondence between 
it and what Ricoeur calls "sense". We have already seen 
that he connected "sense" with "what", or the factual 
reality of a work. Ricoeur's "sense" is also related to 
its correspondent parties in the other polarities mentioned, 
hence its affiliation is primarily with event or action, 
with specific structure, with the individual as opposed 
to the general, with "content" as opposed to "force" or 
power, with the "act of saying" as opposed to what "I 
do in saying", with the problems of "explanation" as 
opposed to "interpretation", and with reference to reality. 
1 
Ricoeur, like the Romantics, is thinking of this dimension 
of art as being the most literal, and the most external. 
It is immediate and accessible. 
For Ricoeur, "sense" related more to the fable 
or plot structure of a work as a whole than to the 
interpretation of that work. Obviously, Ricoeur was not 
intending "sense" to be understood as one of two kinds of 
1 See: Ricoeur, 97-98. 
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art; "sense" was one of two poles in the metaphoric 
structure of any work or discourse. It is also clear 
that the Romantics were thinking of sense-orientated 
art as being a kind of art in itself: it was not one of 
two poles which served as a vehicle for communicating the 
other. ' Sense-orientated art for them was one-dimensional. 
To try to relate Ricoeur's ideas too closely to Romantic 
ideas of sense-orientated art would be a mistake. 
However, we are on much more solid ground with 
Romantic notions*. of imagination-orientated art. This 
kind of art is two-dimensional for them. It has two 
levels: one level is implied in their comments and relates 
to their understanding of literalness of the sense- 
orientated art and to the "what" of Ricoeur's "sense". 
The other is explicitly discussed and relates to Ricoeur's 
"reference". It is in connection with imagination- 
orientated art that contemporary understanding of metaphor 
is of most significance. 
Our purpose is to emphasise what each critic 
saw as the purpose of imaginative art, in other words, 
to review what they themselves thought was the 'reference' 
of imagination. Ricoeur saw "reference" of metaphor as 
being related variously to "about what", to meaning, to 
general truths, to the "force" of the work, to the intent 
or achievement behind "the act of saying", to interpretation, 
and to the self of the speaker as opposed to the reality 
of the world around him. 
2 The Romantics, with their ideas 
of the 'reference' of imagination were in remarkable 
agreement, not only among themselves, but also with 
Ricoeur's thoughts on the "reference" of metaphor. To 
develop and illustrate this point let us return briefly 
to the words of the critics themselves. Many of the 
quotations we have already seen and discussed in the con- 
text of each man's particular thought, but they are 
repeated here to draw out the similarities among the critics. 
I Coleridge is a possible exception to this 
for clearly he did feel that the purpose of the material 
dimension was not static but was expressed in the pro- 
gression from Theory to Law. 
2 See: Ricoeur, 97-98. 
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Leigh Hunt was fairly clear as to what the 
'reference' of imagination was for him: it was the realm 
of emotions. He saw imagination reaching behind normal 
experience to another dimension of reality removed from 
senses and the "sense" of the play. In his view 
imagination transcends ordinary human encounter: 
Imagination then is the great test of 
genius; that which is done by imagination 
is more difficult than that which is per- 
formed by discernment or experience. It 
is for this reason, that the actor is to 
be estimated, like the painter and the 
poet, not for his representation of the 
common occurrences of the world, not 
for his discernment of the familiarities 
of life, but for his ideas of images 
never sybmitted to the observation of the 
senses. 
The purpose of the words of the play, the plot, and the 
stage art itself was presumably to serve this dimension 
of reality of which Hunt speaks. The standard for 
evaluating imagination-orientated art was the degree to 
which it corresponded to inner psychological reality. 
Imagination, he felt, was "an imitation of life in 
passions" - it was not concerned with factual reality 
but with emotional. There is a hint that Hunt felt that 
the 'reference' of imagination was the emotional response 
of the character and the viewer. He defended the lines 
from Gray which Wordsworth had quoted in his Preface 
(1800-1802) and marked as unworthy poetry. Hunt felt that 
Wordsworth had been using the word poetry in too restricted 
a sense. The lines were specimens of "the secondary 
species of poetry, " demonstrating "fancy" not "feeling", 
but were still poetry because, if they did not create 
emotions, they at least spoke of them. 
2 Imagination and 
poetry of feeling went beyond the mere explanation of 
emotion to the creation and interpretation of emotion. 
Lamb's point is similar. He suggests the plot 
or "sense" of the play is of secondary importance to the 
"reference", or, "the inner structure and workings of the 
mind in a character": 
1 CE, 51. 
2 Feast of the Poets, (1$14), 102-3. 
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But in all the best dramas, and in Shakespeare 
above all, how obvious it is, that the form 
of speaking, whether it be in soliloquy or 
dialogue, is only a medium, and often a highly 
artificial one, for putting the reader or 
spectator into possession of that knowledge 
of the inner structure and workings of mind 
in a character, -which he could otherwise 
never have arrived at in that form of com- 
position by any gift short o intuition. 
What Lamb is saying is that one must use the immediate 
sense of a character's words as a vehicle -a vehicle for 
conveying psychological truths beneath the surface action 
of the play. 'Imagination' refers the reader away from 
the obvious actions in the play: 
... 
[with] characters in Shakespeare so 
little do the actions comparatively affect 
us, that while the impulses, the inner 
mind in all its perverted greatness, solely 
seems real and is exclusively attended to, 
the crime is comparatively nothing. 
The actual actions and external appearances should 
assist the 'reference' of 'imagination' and not distract 
from it. As readers we should have 
presentEed] to the fancy just so much 
of external appearances as to make us 
feel that we are among flesh and blood, 
while the better part of our imagination 
is employed upon the though s and internal 
machinery of the character. 
Lamb believed that art which functioned totally on the 
level of the senses and "sense" allowed no participation 
for the reader or viewer: 'imagination, ' required meditation 
and abstraction. In the same manner an author's true 
intent could not "be made comprehensible without some 
pain and perplexity of. mind"; 
4 
one had to go beyond the 
literal sense of the words. 
In Chapter VIII! ' of this thesis we already studied 
what Hazlitt believed was the 'reference' of imagination. 
5 
We saw that for him imagination referred to an inner, 
subjective, emotional reality as opposed to an objective, 
factual reality. The passage in which Hazlitt contrasts 
1 L Works, I, 99. 
2 L Works,, 1, 106. 
3 L Works, S, 111. 
4 L Works, I, 98. 
5 See pp, 238-240 -of this thesis. 
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classical and romantic art (i. e. Shakespearean art, 
not Wordsworthian or Coleridgean for Hazlitt) may be 
taken as fairly representative of his comments: 
The great difference, then, which we 
find between the classical and the 
romantic style, between ancient and 
modern poetry, is, that the one [i. e. 
classical] more frequently describes 
things as they are interestingly in 
'themselves, - the other for the sake 
of associations of ideas connected with 
them; that the one dwells more on the 
immediate impressions of objects on the 
senses - the other on the ideas which 
they suggest to the imagination. The 
one is the poetry of form, the other of 
effect. The one gives only what is 
necessarily implied in the subject; the 
othir all that can possibly arise out of 
it. 
What Hazlitt is doing in this passage is establishing that 
classical poetry, in effect, is poetry of "sense", while 
romantic poetry has two levels, "sense" and "reference". 
Romantic poetry has descriptions of things, but the 
descriptions go beyond the things themselves. It makes 
impressions on the senses but calls on the'imagination'as 
well. It has form, but its emphasis is on emotional 
power or effect. Recognition of the two levels in 
imagination-orientated art was present in Hazlitt's 
praise of the "dim, unstable, and unsubstantial" images 
in Antony and Cleopatra which resembled reality yet 
pointed beyond themselves. 
2 Similarly the levels are 
implied when Hazlitt speaks of "the instinct of imagination" 
as being the "intuitive perception of the hidden analogies 
of things": 
3 beyond the "things" themselves are deeper 
meanings. As an interesting note, Hazlitt believed that 
meter contributed toj'two-dimensional' quality of imag- 
inative art. Perhaps in answer to Wordsworth and Coleridge 
on the subject, Hazlitt maintained that meter functioned: 
to supply the inherent defect of harmony in 
the customary mechanism of language, to 
make the sound an echo to the sense, when 
the sense becomes a sort of echo to itself 
... to take the language of the imagination 
1H Works, XVI, 63. 
2H Works, IV, 231. 
3H Works, XVI, 8-9. 
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from off the ground and enable it 
to spread its wings where i, may indulge its own impulses. Y 
Meter helps to remove language from a more literal 
level to a level of 'imagination', where he says the sense 
. 
begins to echo itself. 
Coleridge was fully aware of the possibility of 
words functioning on two levels. He felt that readers 
of transcendental philosophy perhaps were not, and in 
his address to its potential critics he was concerned 
to point out the 'referential'. dimension: 
Critics, who are most ready to bring this 
charge of pedantry and unintelligibility, 
are the most apt to overlook the import- 
ant fact, that, besides the language öf 
words, there is a language of spirits (sermo interior) and that the former is 
'ý1ý only '( vehicle of the latter. 2 
In Chapters V and VII of this thesis we saw that Hunt 
and Hazlitt, in at least one place, clearly connected 
the'imagination'with the soul3 and Coleridge is doing 
something similar here in suggesting that the 'reference' 
of'imagination'is spiritual. To be aware of the two 
dimensions of language one had to be aware of a dimension 
of experience beyond the senses which for Coleridge was 
the exclusive domain of transcendental philosophy: "There 
is a philosophic (and inasmuch as it is actualized by 
an effort of freedom [i. e. an act of will], an artificial) 
consciousness, which lies beneath or (as it were) behind 
the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting 
beings. "4 It is this which "render[s] the mind intuitive 
of the spiritual in man (i. e. of that which lies on the 
other side of our natural consciousness). " It is only 
communicable, "through words which are but the shadows 
of notions; even as the notional understanding itself is 
but the shadowy abstraction of living and actual truth. "5 
1 H Works, V, 12. 
2 BL, I, 190-1; (Everyman, 158). 
3-- See pp. 153 and 232 above. 
4 BL, I, 161; (Everyman, 136-7). 
5 BL, I, 168; (Everyman, 139). 
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Without going deeply into Coleridge's criticism 
again, we may say that his idea of Method as "unity with 
progression" preserved recognition of the two levels of 
which we have been speaking, throughout his critical 
approach. The mind was to employ the principles of Method 
whether contemplating a specific image or an entire play; 
one was to move from the material level of Theory (i. e. 
from "sense") to the Spiritual level of Law (i. e. to 
"reference"). In Coleridge's idea of "causative character" 
there was the same attempt to go beyond appearances and 
discern higher truths which in this case concerned 
psychological motivation. 
The purpose of reviewing these various ideas of 
the critics, in relation to Ricoeur's terms, has been to 
try to clarify the similarities among the critics. In 
spite of the clear differences in the specific theories 
of imagination, the similarities should by now be quite 
apparent. Each critic identified. imagination-orientated 
art with an art of two levels, quite similar to the 
"sense" and "reference" Ricoeur uses to identify his 
understanding of metaphor. The "reference" of imagination 
for the Romantics, although variously connected with the 
emotions or the spirit, may be exemplified by their common 
descriptions of their interest in Shakespeare. Coleridge 
spoke of his interest in "the workings of the passions in 
their inmost retired recesses"; ' Lamb sought "possession 
of that knowledge of the inner structure and workings of 
mind in a character"2 and spoke of the need of actors of 
Shakespearean tragedy "To know the internal workings and 
movements of a great mind ... "; 
3 Hunt praised the emotional 
involvement that was created "in witnessing the workings 
of great minds in awful situations"; 
4 
and Hazlitt praised 
actors for "the expression of the internal workings of 
the mind". 
5 
The Romantic critics were not without their 
excesses. In relation to our immediate topic, it might 
be questioned whether Hunt was right in expecting the kind 
1 CSC, I, 198. 
2L Works,, I, 99" 
3L Works, I, 989 
4 Examiner, 29 March, 1812; (DC, 66). 
5H Works, XV II I, 196. A 
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of tragic decorum in Shakespeare as is implied in his 
phrase "great minds in awful situations" or whether Lamb 
was right is describing Othello, for instance, as a 
"great mind". Also, it might be questioned whether the 
Romantics did not tend generally to overvalue the 
"reference" as opposed to the "sense"; their idca]. isation 
of Shakespearean tragedy and the imbalance of their 
criticism, weighted in favour of character, perhaps 
contributed to later problems of criticism. 
On the positive side, it may be that one of the 
defining elements of the Romantic movement is the increased 
historical reliance on linguistic "reference" to carry 
the poet's meaning and increased appreciation of that 
reliance on the part of the critic. 
The Romantic movement has long been plagued with 
labels of excessive subjectivity, and as long as Romantic 
"reference" has been considered in purely subjective 
terms, it has been difficult to develop a meaningful 
vocabulary with which to discuss the distinctive features 
of Romantic perception. Ricoeur may be of further assist- 
ance to us here for the problem of subjectivity in 
Romantic imagination is similar to the problem of subject- 
ivity he found in hermeneutics. He felt that the inter- 
pretation of a work (i. e. the "reference") in relation to 
the cultural setting of its reader, might be reacted 
against as implying a subjectivist approach. A correct 
reading of the process, he said, would displace it "from 
a subjectivist to an ontological level": 
1 
Far from saying that a subject already 
masters his own way of being in the world 
and projects it as the a priori of his 
reading ... I say that interpretation is 
the process by which the disclosure of 
new modes o. f bein - or, if you prefer Wittgenstein to }Teidegger, of new forms 
of life gives to the subject a new capacity 
of knowing himself. 2 ' 
The Romantics were interpreting in their criticism and 
were discovering "new modes of being" and "new modes of 
life". Certainly they regarded their work more in an 
ontological sense than a subjectivist one and might haare 
I Ricoeur, 107. 
2 Ricoeur, 107. 
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had trouble identifying with our modern view of them as 
excessively subjective. The "reference" of imagination 
for them was a dimension of existence that was 'more real', 
more true, than everyday material reality. Hunt, as we 
have just seen, praises the tragic actor for his 
"discernment of ... images never submitted to the observ- 
ation of the senses". The actor's discernment could be 
tested against the viewer's own. In other words actor 
and viewer recognised a common reality above the world 
of the senses. Lamb had said that in Shakespeare 
"speaking" was "a medium, and often a highly artificial 
one" for conveying psychological truth: he was suggesting 
that if anything was artificial it was the "sense", not 
the "reference", for the latter spoke to the meaning 
of being. Coleridge, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
incorporated the emotions into his metaphysical system; 
for him this was to serve the purpose of discovering 
ultimate truth concerning existence. For Hazlitt, 
imagination opened up new dimensions of experience which 
are removed from the senses but are just as real, in fact 
more so, because they demonstrate truths on a deep 
psychological level: 
Let an object be presented to the senses 
in a state of agitation and fear - and the 
imagination will magnify the object, and 
convert it into whatever is most proper 
to encourage the fear. It is the same in 
all other cases in which poetry speaks the 
language of the imagination. This language 
is not the less true to nature because it 
is false in point of fact; but so much the 
more true and natural, if it conveys the 
impression which the object uider the influence 
of passion makes on the mind. 
The Romantics were not concerned with frivolous emotion 
but with acquiring a greater knowledge of a dimension of 
life that was difficult to understand. 
Ricoeur's discussion of 'sense' and 'reference' 
enhances contemporary ability to use the concept of 
metaphor more vigorously in criticism. He felt himself 
to be pointing to new possibilities in criticism and he 
ended his paper, rather significantly for the purposes of 




the present enterprise, by discussing imagination: 
Our conclusion should ... "open up" some 
new vistas. On what? Maybe on the old 
problem of imagination, which I cautiously 
put aside. We are prepared to inquire 
into the power of imagination, no longer 
as the faculty of deriving "images" from 
sensory experiences, but as the capacity 
to let new worlds build our self-under-- 
standing. This power would not be conveyed 
by emerging images but by emerging meanings 
in our language. Imagination, then, should 
be treated as a dimension of language. In 
that way, a new link woulq appear between 
imagination and metaphor. 
Perhaps Ricoeur was unaware that beyond the possibility 
of his thoughts having application to the subject of 
imagination, the Romantic ideas of imagination in fact 
could be seen to have anticipated many of his remarks 
on metaphor. . 
The Romantic critics did not have a homogeneous 
understanding of 'imagination'. Nor did they believe 
themselves to be engaged in a systematic debate on 
'imagination'. Nor did they critically apply their ideas 
of 'imagination' in an identical fashion. Nonetheless, 
as we have seen, there were important similarities in 
their ideas. These similarities became apparent not so 
much when considering their specific theories, but rather 
when considering their theories in relation to their 
Shakespearean and dramatic criticism. The similarities 
are important: they point to the similarity between our 
critical consciousness and their own. 
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